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The thesis will address the question of why Islamic political parties, in the first decade 
of the reform era, suffer internal fragmentation and have failed to develop cohesion, 
while one Islamic party has been able to develop and consolidate. This thesis will 
explore and analyze factors and reasons behind the problem of the cohesion of the 
Islamic political parties by associating it with the existence of party institutionalization. 
For this purpose, this thesis would be a study of comparative institutionalization of 
Islamic political parties, particularly between the National Wakening Party (PKB) and 
the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). PKB is a good exemplar for an Islamic party that 
experienced severely fragmented parties. In fact, this party has became the largest 
among Islamic political parties and including one of the worst fragmentations among 
all new political parties in Indonesia. Meanwhile, PKS has been able to maintain its 
internal discipline and unity, although factionalism and fragmentation have become 
commonplace during the first decade of the Reform Era. This thesis believes that the 
more a party have been institutionalized, which is indicated by the existence of 
procedural leadership in decision-making process, the effectiveness of internal 
conflict resolution mechanism, the continuation of systematic cadrerization and the 
commitment to the shared values, there is a bigger chance of the party to preserve 
its cohesion. On the other hand, the less a party have been institutionalized which is 
indicated by the ineffectiveness of procedural leadership, the failure of internal 
conflict resolution mechanism, the impediment of systematic cadrerization, and the 
failure to provide ideology as the guidance of policy and uniting values, there is more 
possibility for the party to be fragmented. 
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PAN: Partai Amanat Nasional (Party of National Mandate).  
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PKB: Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party). 
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The fall of Soeharto signified a new chapter in Indonesian political history. This new 
era provided substantial political freedom for all Indonesians that had not existed for 
decades. President Soeharto’s administration created a centralised and 
uncompromising government, which, in the end, profoundly restricted the rights of the 
people in the name of political stability, the condition that was believed to be the main 
prerequisite to accelerate national economic development. The 32-year existence of 
the New Order government (1966-1998) was popularly regarded as an era of political 
oppression, at least by the pro-democratic elements in Indonesia and it generated 
many setbacks in political life. 
 
The Reform Era has brought a vast expansion to the freedom of expression. 
In the first years of the Reform Era, Indonesia underwent what O’Donnell and 
Schmitter have called a process of political democratisation1. This was mainly 
indicated by the existence of government policies that loosened political control over 
the people and, on the other hand, gave people the opportunity to regain a role in the 
policy making process. President Bacharuddin J. Habibie appeared to be the key 
figure behind several democratising policies, including the release of many political 
prisoners, the freeing of the press and making possible the establishment of diverse 
political parties. This changed many aspects of political life in the country, supporting 
more broadly the emergence of democratic values in the nation. 
 
It is in these circumstances that the awakening of the political parties became 
a reality in Indonesia. People enthusiastically responded to the government’s policy 
that allowed them to create a party based on their interests. The ensuing euphoria 
was illustrated by the emergence of more than a hundred new parties. During this 
                                                 
1 Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative 
Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p.7-
11. 
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period, 184 political parties emerged of which 141 received legal status. This 
extraordinary phenomenon was commonly considered as a normal condition for a 
country which was undergoing a period of political transition as was the case of 
Indonesia. Of 141 political parties that had legal status, 60 were considered to be 
eligible to obtain verification and after validation by Tim Sebelas2, only 48 parties 
were qualified to participate in the 1999 election3.   
 
In their development the quality of the parties in performing their main duties, 
such as representing the people’s interest in the policy making process and 
managing daily organisational activities, did not automatically follow the presence of 
these parties. The previous government had provided a situation and conditions that 
to some extent impeded the parties from emerging as a solid and professional 
institution. The New Order Government paid little attention to the development of 
political parties and was not really concerned in supporting the people in the 
modernisation of the political parties so that these parties could function properly. On 
the contrary, the regime tended to restrict the evolvement of the parties. This attitude 
showed the political position of the regime in that it did not want to see the existence 
of parties that were able to take on their role as they should have done. Soeharto’s 
exclusive government did not really regard the parties as its partners in governing 
and with the exception of Golongan Karya (The Functional Group/Golkar) as the 
government’s party, treated them simply as insignificant units in the political system. 
As a result, political parties merely played a minor role in the decision-making 
process. Their role was simply to legalise the policies of the government or as “a 
rubber stamp”.  
 
Moreover, in terms of organisational matters, the restricted development had 
also terminated the opportunity for the parties to appropriately develop their internal 
management. The parties relied more on the favour of the government, for instance 
in terms of putting people in certain positions on the parties’ committee boards rather 
than on the aspirations of their own members, who had a better knowledge of the 
                                                 
2 As a response to this situation, the Indonesian government subsequently made several efforts to 
rationalise the number of the parties. This was particularly effected by forming an independent 
committee (that consisted of 11 members and then was called the Tim Sebelas (the Team of Eleven) 
that held a series of verifications to mainly examine and stipulate the eligibility of the parties to join the 
1999 election. This effort was important as not all parties were actually ready to join the election. 
3 Tim Sebelas announced that 48 political parties were eligible to participate in the 1999 election. This 
announcement was declared in the Election Committee Head Quarters on 4th March 1999 and was 
confirmed by the Minister of Interior Decree, Number 31/1999. 
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quality of a number of their people. On the other hand, the government had an 
interest to intervene in the parties to maintain its influence on them. According to 
Sanit this government’s attitude was not only part of the strategy to seek who were 
exactly its enemies and the supporters of the government, but also to make the 
process of controlling the parties easier4. In essence, the parties in the New Order 
Era had not enjoyed their independence and in fact were effectively controlled by the 
government. This situation eventually created internal organisational problems such 
as those of management and cadrerization within the party.             
 
Most people felt that the political parties were not really efficient in conducting 
their functions. Baswedan’s study on the political parties’ behaviour, for instance, 
indicates that most of the major parties were not actually present in the people’s day 
to day life, leaving people to deal with their own problems up to several days before 
the next election5. In general, people also considered that most of the parties were 
being deeply trapped into an elitist power game in struggling for public positions 
without making a significant positive impact for the people.  
 
Another important phenomenon that occurred and became an important fact 
in the first decades of the Reform Era is the phenomenon of fragmentation in the 
political parties. Besides indicating a significant internal problem, at the practical level 
this phenomenon contributed to the decreasing role of the party in society6. This 
phenomenon encompassed almost all the major parties. From the secular camps, for 
instance, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (the Indonesian Democratic Party- 
Struggle/PDIP) that had split into several new parties, Partai Nasional Banteng 
Kemerdekaan (the Freedom Bull National Party/PNBK) and Partai Demokrasi 
Pembaruan (the Renovation Democracy Party/PDP). Some of Golkar’s disappointed 
cadres, mainly after losing in the internal election, established several parties such as 
Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan (the United and Justice Party/PKP) and Partai Hati 
                                                 
4 Arbi Sanit, “Manajemen Politik dalam Negeri”, in “Tiras”, 9th February 1995, in Kamarudin, Partai 
Politik Islam di Pentas Reformasi. Refleksi Pemlu 1999 untuk Pemilu 2004, (Jakarta: Visi Publishing, 
2003), p.37. 
5 Anies Baswedan, “Political Islam in Indonesia: Present and Future Trajectory, Asian Survey, Vol. 44, 
No. 5 (Sep-Oct 2004), p.688. Sukardi Rinakit, “Indonesia”, in Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (ed.), Parties 
and Democracy, The KAS Democracy Report 2007, (Bonn: Bouvier, 2007), p. 151. 
6 Lili Romli, “Potret Buram Partai Politik di Indonesia”, in Mahrus Irsyam dan Lili Romli, eds. 
Menggugat Partai Politik, (Depok: Laboratorium Ilmu Politik FISIP UI, 2003), pp. 142-144. 
Kamarudin, Partai Politik Islam di Pentas Reformasi. Refleksi Pemilu 1999 untuk Pemilu 2004, 
(Jakarta: Visi Publishing, 2003), pp. 170-174. On the discussion on the performance of political parties 
at the local level post New Order see Lili Romli, ed. Potret Partai Politik Pasca Orde Baru (Jakarta: 
Pusat Penelitian Politik LIPI, 2003). 
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Nurani Rakyat (the People’s Consciousness Party/Hanura). In the mean time, some 
unsatisfied cadres of Partai Demokrat (the Democrat Party/PD) left the party and 
established new parties such as Partai Barisan Nasional (the National Front Party/ 
Barnas).      
 
This phenomenon also occurred in the Islamic parties camp. In early July 
2008, for instance, two rival leaders of Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (The National 
Awakening Party/PKB) at the same time presented themselves at the Indonesian 
Election Commission’s (KPU) official ballot to obtain their contestant number for the 
2009 general elections, this being obligatory for each political party wishing to 
participate in the election. The first leader was Abdul Muhaimin Iskandar, the nephew 
of the former President Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) and chairman of the so-called 
‘Ancol’ version of PKB; the second was Zannuba Arifah Wahid (Yenny), the daughter 
of Wahid, who was the general secretary of the ‘Parung’ version of PKB which was 
led by her father. Before a hall full of bemused senior politicians, electoral officials 
and journalists, both Muhaimin and Yenny tried to claim the card announcing PKB’s 
contestant number to participate in the election. After the intervention of KPU 
officials, both eventually agreed to hold the numbered card together. This unseemly 
public incident demonstrated the depth of division within this party. 
 
The emergence of two competing PKB boards, namely Muhaimin’s and Gus 
Dur’s, provided further evidence of the chronic internal fragmentation afflicting most 
Islamic community-based parties during the 10 years of the Reform Era. PKB had 
suffered debilitating splits since 2001 and more recently several of its disaffected 
cadres had formed two other rival parties, namely Partai Kejayaan Demokrasi (the 
Democracy Glorious Party/PKD) and Partai Kebangkitan Nasional Ulama (National 
Awakening of Islamic Scholars Party/PKNU).   
 
In addition to PKB, other Islamic parties, such as Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan (the United Development Party/PPP), and Partai Amanat Nasional 
(the National Mandate Party/PAN) also experienced serious internal divisions leading 
to the creation of new parties or an exodus of members into other parties. In the case 
of PPP, it had two off-shoot parties: Partai Persatuan (the United Party/PP), and 
Partai Bintang Reformasi (the Reform Star Party/PBR). The dissident PAN cadres 
recently formed Partai Matahari Bangsa (the National Sun Party/PMB). The only 
major Islamic community-based party that had not experienced internal 
fragmentation was Partai Keadilan Sejahera (the Prosperous Justice Party/PKS). So 
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far, PKS had been able to manage its internal differences of opinion and aspiration 
and succeeded in consolidating the party.  
 
The fragmentation trend observed in the Indonesian Islamic parties, to some 
extent should illustrate that Islam, as a political ideology, appears to be an important 
value, but at the same time it has not quite reliably worked as a uniting element for 
several of the Islamic parties. For most Indonesian Islamic parties, particularly at the 
beginning of the Reform Era, Islam, as a political foundation of existence, has not 
been really functioning in preventing these parties from being inflicted with 
destructive internal conflicts, where some of them eventually resulted in a party split. 
On the other hand, however, this is not the case for PKS. The PKS case shows how 
Islamic ideology can serve as an adhesive for an Islamic political party. As an Islamic 
party, which clearly cites Islam as being its foundation, so far this party is able to 
demonstrate the role of Islam as a political ideology in maintaining its internal 
harmony and cohesion. Both cases eventually infer that there were other factors that 
played a significant contribution to creating internal fragmentation, which, at the same 
time, could be considered as a positive contribution playing an important part in 
preventing Islamic parties from becoming fragmented.  
 
The fragmentation of political parties, to certain extent, also indicated that the 
transition of democracy not only supported the establishment of political parties, but 
also created extended internal conflicts and disputes. These later sometimes became 
a stepping stone or trigger for the emergence of internal fragmentation. To some 
extent, fragmentation commonly occurred, since democracy basically tolerates the 
people’s free expression and struggle for its opinions and interests. The democratic 
transition, however, should not be considered as a final answer to all political 
phenomena and problems, which emerged after the fall of the old regime including 
the problem of internal fragmentation of the political parties. The existence of the 
democratic transition, which obviously generates many interesting and important 
political cases, ought to be reasonably regarded only as a political background or a 
pre-condition of the political context of certain phenomena. In this regard, one has to 
consider other aspects or relevant variables that provide a direct impact or correlation 
on specific political cases. 
 
2.  Research Question 
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The phenomenon of fragmentation is not something new to the Islamic political 
parties. It occurred, as will be explained in the following chapter, during almost all of 
the Indonesian political-history periods. The Reform Era has witnessed many serious 
fragmentations in the Islamic parties and, on the other hand, the ability of one of the 
largest Islamic parties to maintain its cohesion. My thesis will address the question of 
why Islamic political parties during the first decade of the Reform Era, suffered 
internal fragmentation and had failed to develop cohesion, while one Islamic party 
had been able to develop and consolidate. This thesis, therefore, will explore and 
analyse factors and reasons behind the problem of fragmentation and cohesion of 
the Islamic political parties by associating it with the existence of party 
institutionalisation during the first decade of the Reform Era (1998-2008).  
 
It is, in essence, a study of comparative institutionalisation of Islamic political 
parties particularly between PKB and PKS. In the Reform Era, PKB had become an 
example as one of the severely fragmented parties. In one decade this party 
fragmented three times. In general, PKB’s fragmentation was the severest of the 
Islamic political parties and included one of the most serious fragmentations 
compared to those of the new Indonesian political parties. Meanwhile, PKS had been 
able to maintain its internal discipline and unity. PKS, at least up until today, is the 
only major Islamic party which is able to avoid a spilt, although in its first ten years, 
factionalism and fragmentation had particularly become commonplace in 
contemporary Indonesian politics. Moreover, as party fragmentation phenomenon 
even occurred before the Independence Era, this study will also provide a brief 
explanation on the party’s fragmentation and cohesion before the Reform Era.         
 
3.  Hypothesis 
  
Fragmentation and cohesion are two of the many important phenomena in post-
Soeharto Indonesian Politics. Such phenomena, as will be discussed in the section 
on the theoretical framework, have been scrutinised from many perspectives. This 
thesis argues that the rationale for the emergence of fragmentation and cohesion 
does not consist of one factor. The hypothesis of this thesis is that party unity and 
discipline are closely related to the ability of those parties to institutionalise 
themselves. In this case, the factors contributing to or associated with fragmentation 
or cohesion of the parties are: (1) The procedural leadership model in decision-
making process, in which the party based itself through its constitution or its 
procedure for making policy, which was based on the organisation’s statutes (rules of 
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the game), (2) The existence of internal conflict resolution mechanisms, (3) The 
systematic and well-organized regeneration or training for recruiting new members 
and leaders (cadrerization), and (4) The presence of shared values as an identity 
provider and uniting factor. These are determinant variables influencing the 
fragmentation and cohesion of a party.  
 
Table 1 
Comparison of Party Institutionalisation  
between PKB and PKS  
 
 PKB PKS 
Procedural Leadership in the 





Systematic Cadrerization - + 






     -      :  Does Not Exist 
     +     :  Exists 
 
From the above explanation, the hypothesis of this thesis shall be that the 
more a party has been institutionalised (which is indicated by the existence of 
procedural leadership, the effectiveness of an internal conflict resolution mechanism, 
the systematic continuity in its cadrerization and the commitment towards shared 
values as the guidance of policy and uniting values), there is a larger opportunity for 
the party to preserve its cohesion. On the other hand, the less a party has been 
institutionalised (which is indicated by the ineffectiveness of its procedural leadership, 
the failure of its internal conflict resolution mechanism, the impediment of systematic 
cadrerization and the failure to provide an ideology to guide its policy and unite its 
values), there is a larger possibility that the party will be fragmented.  
 
Pertaining to the objectives above, this thesis explores three important 
events, which occurred in PKB during the first decades of its existence that indicate 
internal fragmentation in this party. Three important main events are the first 
fragmentation in 2001, the second fragmentation in 2005 and the third fragmentation 
in 2008. They will be the main examples and topics of discussion in each chapter, 
where each dimension of party institutionalisation will be discussed. In this thesis, 
four dimensions of party institutionalisation in regard to these three events will be 
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discussed from four different angles. The exploration of these phenomena is 
important since they will prove the clear evidence of the failure of the implementation 
of institutionalisation in this party leading to party fragmentation. 
  
Through the exploration on those different phenomena in PKB and PKS, this 
thesis will also include a discussion on the reasons behind the failure and the 
capability of each party to implement and maintain its institutionalisation. Therefore, 
in general, this thesis will provide an explanation on how and why fragmentation and 
cohesion occurred in a party, while at the same time revealing some factors that are 
driving the lack or the presence of institutionalisation.   
 
4.  Objectives  
 
The phenomenon of fragmentation and cohesion of Islamic parties during the 
Indonesia Reform Era is important to study as it provides not only a measure of 
trends in political Islam but also an understanding of the political conditions in 
contemporary Indonesia and in particular of the development of Islamic political 
parties. Moreover, besides answering specific questions, which have been stated in 
the scope of research section, this thesis is also dedicated to the perspectives 
concerning the correlation between party institutionalisation and the phenomenon of 
fragmentation and cohesion of the party. 
 
5.  Theoretical Framework 
 
The study of political parties has been one of the most important and tempting areas 
in political science. The relevance of this study is related by and large to the position 
of the party as power seeking and preserving machinery, where the power itself is 
one of the main cores of politics. The study of political parties has been developed by 
scholars since the third quarter of the nineteenth century7. During that period, the 
studies of political parties were mainly a response to the rapid development of the 
role of a political party in governmental life8. In the late nineteenth century and the 
                                                 
7 Susan E. Scarrow, “The Nineteenth-Century Origins of Modern Political Parties: The Unwanted 
Emergence of Party-Based Politics”, in Richard S. Katz and William Crotty, Handbook of Party 
Politics, (London: SAGE Publication, 2006), pp. 21-22.  
8 Ibid. These include the books written by Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, (New York: 
George Adelard, 1839). Earl Grey and Henry George, Parliamentary Government Considered with a 
Reference to a Reform of Parliament, (London: Richard Bentley, 1858). Woodrow Wilson, 
Congressional Government A Study in America Politics, (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Co, 1885). 
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beginning of the twentieth century, new developments occurred when the study of 
political parties started to discuss parties as being extra-parliamentary organisations. 
The book of Ostrogorski discussing the modern political party, for instance, is one of 
the works which signify the beginning of this field of study in the modern era9. It is 
followed by influential studies, for example, from Michels who focuses on the 
tendency of oligarchy in political parties10. Coupled with the emergence of new 
approaches in political science, the study on political parties continues with various 
new focuses of study and provides more advanced theories developed by scholars, 
which discuss issues related to the development of political parties including their 
ideology, political culture, political development and democratisation, their relations to 
the political and party systems and institutionalisation.  
  
Scholars have put forward a range of definitions of a ‘political party’. Thus, 
Sartori emphasises the role of the party as a mediator or “channelling organisation” 
between the interest of society and the state11. Such a definition basically regards the 
party as an element of democratic government and tool of society in articulating its 
interest. More comprehensive definitions view a party as an institution comprising 
persons seeking governmental positions based on a particular interest or ideology 
through competition for popular support12. In this definition, a party is related to its 
origin, main duties and the way it conducts its interests, which differ from other 
organisations such as the interest or pressure groups.  
 
On the other hand, other scholars regard a party as a system. Eldersveld 
believes that a party is a “social organism and a miniature political system” at the 
same time. As a political system, a party according to him “has a representative 
process, an electoral system and sub-process for recruiting leaders, defining goals 
and resolving internal system conflict”13. In a relatively similar pattern, Maor, while 
                                                 
9 M. Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Organisation of Political Parties, (London: Macmillan, 1902). 
10 Robert Michels, Political Parties,(London: Jarrold, 1915). 
11 Giovani Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, A Framework for Analysis, Volume 1. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 41. 
12 Roger Soltau, An Introduction to Politics, (London: Longmans, Green & Co, 1961), p. 199. Sigmund 
Neumann, “Toward A comparative Study of Political Parties”, in Harry Eckstein and David E. Apter, 
eds. Comparative Politics: A Reader, (New York: The Free Press, 1963), p.352. R.M Maciver, The 
Modern State, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1926), pp. 396-406. Bernard Hennessy, “On the 
Study of Party Organisation”, in William J. Crotty, ed., Approaches to the study of Party Organisation, 
(Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc, 1968), pp.1-2. Leon D. Epstein, Political parties in Western 
Democracies, (New Brunswick, NI: Transaction Book, 1980), pp. 9-12. 
13 Samuel J. Eldersveld, Political Parties A Behavioral Analyses, (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), p. 1. 
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exploring the scheme of a party definition, suggests that a party is an institution 
which has durable and recurring patterned ways of doing things. He believes that a 
political party is a system which has several unique internal tasks, including 
organising popular support, rewarding activists, modifying electoral strategy, 
producing a cohesive legislative party, ensuring party cohesion, extending electoral 
support and maintaining electoral strength14. Maor’s perspective regards the studies 
on the internal problems of parties as the important way to understand the behaviour 
and goals of a political party.   
 
This thesis will combine all of the above approaches by understanding the 
political parties as groups of people who are tied by a similar belief, interest and 
commitment, who promise to be united and who struggle for their ideals, providing an 
alternative policy for government and for occupying public and political positions in a 
constitutional manner; and as an organisation, which has to manage its internal 
interests as a response to internal and external needs.  
 
The comparative study of political parties encompasses various parts of the 
world and eventually includes developing countries when people began to pay 
attention to politics outside the western world. In the context of the developing 
countries, the discourse on political parties basically mimics several “developed 
countries theories”. However, in its development, the study of political parties in such 
areas provides various important theories.  
 
The studies on modern politics in Latin American and many post-colonial 
countries, for instance, have produced many essential conclusions including those on 
the role of the political party in the democratisation process and organisational 
development of political parties. In general, the political party studies in developing 
countries tend to be closely related to the discussions on specific matters such as 
democratisation, ideology and several new studies on party system and 
institutionalisation15. Pertaining to these, the various studies of Randall and 
Svasand16, Mainwaring and Timothy17, Sachsenroder and Frings18 and Mainwaring19 
                                                 
14 Moshe Maor, Political Parties and Party Systems, Comparative Approaches and The British 
Experience, (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 10-14. 
15 Vicky Randall, Political Parties in the Third World, (London: Sage, 1988). Scott Mainwaring, 
“Politicians, Parties, and Electoral Systems: Brazil in Comparative Perspective”, Comparative Politics, 
Vol. 24, No. 1 (Oct., 1991), pp. 21-43. 
16 Randall and Svansand, “Party Instutitionalization in New Democracies”. 
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to name a few, basically represent new concerns on party studies, particularly in the 
new democratic states, where a political party tends to be regarded as an actor or a 
system whose existence is mainly influenced by the capability to develop and 
institutionalise itself as a proper response or answer to internal progress and external 
expansion.    
 
The study of political parties in contemporary Indonesia has been quite 
influenced by the contemporary development of studies on such topics as those 
above. However, many scholars had actually explored the study on these topics long 
before such current influential studies emerged. The first generation of scholars 
(1960s-1970s), who were concerned with Indonesian political parties, produced 
much influential work, which inspired similar studies up until today. Their studies are 
generally dominated by the topics on the origins of parties and party ideology; and 
related to the existence of one particular party with one or more of four Indonesian 
significant political episodes20. In addition, these studies commonly relate the party to 
the elections and political culture21. In terms of the number of parties, the studies 
range from discussing many different parties22 in a specific time-frame to only 
examining one party in a particular period23. 
 
5.1.  Islamic Parties 
 
                                                                                                                                            
17 Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully, Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin 
America, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995). 
18 Wolfgang Sachsenroder and Ulrike E. Frings, eds., Political Party Systems and Democratic 
Development in East and Southeast Asia: Volume I Southeast Asia, (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing 
Limited, 1998). 
19 Scott Mainwaring, “Political Parties and Democratization in Brazil and the Southern Cone”, 
Comparative Politics, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Oct., 1988), pp. 91-120 
20 Most Indonesian political experts agreed that there are four political episodes in the modern 
Indonesian history, namely (1) Liberal Democracy (1945-1959), (2) Guided Democracy/ Old Order 
(1959-1966), (3) New Order (1966-1998), (4) Reform Era (1998-present). 
21 William Liddle, Ethnicity, Party and National Integration: An Indonesian Case Study, (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1970). Herbert Feith, The Indonesian Election of 1955, (Ithaca: Cornell 
University, 1957). 
22 Daniel S Lev, “Political Parties in Indonesia”, Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol. 8, No. 1, 
(Mar., 1967), pp. 52-67. 
23 Kenneth Ward, The Foundation of the Partai Muslimin Indonesia, (Ithaca: Cornell University, 
1970). Donald Hindley, The Indonesian Communist Party, 1951-1963, (Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1964). Deliar Noer, Masjumi: Its Organisation, Ideology, and Political Role in 
Indonesia, M.A Thesis, (Cornell University, 1960). 
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One of the branches of political party study in Indonesia discusses Islamic political 
parties. Many observers consider the important role of Islamic parties not only in the 
pre-independence era but also in the current situation. The first political party ever to 
emerge in Indonesian history was an Islamic party, called Partai Sarekat Islam 
Indonesia (the Party of Indonesia Islamic Association/PSII). While in India the oldest 
party is a secular party, the Congress Party, in the Indonesian context, the Islamic or 
religious party is the oldest one. In this position and for other reasons that will be 
explained in the next discussion, Islamic political parties therefore become one of the 
salient objects of study in Indonesian politics.    
 
A number of scholars then produced definitions to describe and understand 
the existence of Islamic parties. According to some scholars, Islamic parties in 
Indonesia are divided into several types24. The first is those that clearly state Islam 
as the foundation of their organisation. The second is those who use Islamic symbols 
or symbols that are closely associated or have been identified with Islam, such as the 
Crescent and Star, Ka’bah, or Arabic words, although their foundation is not purely 
based on Islam in which they use, combine or synthesise Islam and other ‘isms’, 
such as nationalism (Pancasila) or socialism as their ideology. The third is the Islamic 
mass based parties, which do not use Islamic symbols, do synthesise Islam and 
other ideologies as their foundation or orientation and yet rely mainly on, or could not 
be separated from the Islamic communities in order to be able to exist in national 
politics, particularly for the elections. The second and third types of Islamic parties 
were sometimes regarded as Islamic parties that put forward more values or 
substance of Islam as their objective, rather than trying to install Islamic Syari’ah into 
the national constitution. This situation actually shows a transformation in the life of 
Islamic parties.  
 
Before 1983, the Indonesian Islamic parties had been identified with the 
parties that used Islam as their foundation. All Islamic parties clearly declared Islam 
as their foundation in their statutes, which is in line with the first type of the above 
categories. However, after 1983, when the New Order dictated the implementation of 
Pancasila as the foundation for all parties, it became common for Islamic parties to 
add or embrace other ‘isms’ as their foundation as well as Islam, on condition that 
                                                 
24 Azyumardi Azra, “Islam Politik pada Masa Pasca-Soeharto”, in A.M Fatwa, Satu Islam Multi Partai: 
Membangun Integritas di tengah Pluralitas, (Bandung: Mizan, 2000), p. 13. Arskal Salim, Partai Islam 
dan Relasi Agama-Negara. (Jakarta: IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah, 1999), p.8. Eep Saefullah Fatah, 
“Format Baru Politik Islan (1). Belajar dari Kekeliruan Politik Lama”, Republika, 2 Januari 1999. 
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those ‘isms’ were still in line with the spirit of Islam. This included the use of 
Pancasila, which was then simply related to the spirit of nationalism, or a mix 
between Islam and Pancasila or, in the case of PBR, a mix between Islam and 
socialism25. This spirit is actually in line with the tendency to understand Islam as a 
more substantial manner in political life in a way that considers the essence of Islam 
in a wider perspective. The Islamic parties believed that the struggle to uphold 
Islamic values, as the focal point for an Islamic party, was not always related to the 
implementation of Islamic symbols together with stating that Islam was the foundation 
of the party. They argued that it is more important to present the essence of Islam to 
the people rather than its symbols. Moreover, this type of Islamic party was often 
open to allow non-Muslims to hold important positions in the party26. With regard to 
this condition, the Islamic parties could also be labelled as the parties that had a 
commitment to spread Islamic values, although these parties do not obviously state 
Islam as their foundation in their statutes.   
   
Furthermore, in his research on Indonesian Islamic parties, Amir provided a 
relatively similar categorisation in analysing the contemporary Indonesian Islamic 
parties. He noted that a party could also be categorised as an Islamic party if it was 
dominated by Islamic figures and had tendencies to struggle for or to defend the 
interests of the Islamic communities27. Hence, he concluded that the Islamic parties 
fell into two camps. The first camp embraced the parties that were concerned with 
the use of Islamic symbols including adhering to Islam as their foundation and mainly 
in the position to support the interests of the Muslims. The second camp embraced 
the parties who did not use Islamic symbols and tended to combine Islamic values 
and other ideologies to create their foundation. They were not purely Islamic but were 
founded and dominated by Islamic figures in terms of party management, as well as 
having a tendency to maintain the interests of the Islamic communities and 
comprised the social bases in the Islamic groups.  
 
This thesis is in line with the main argument of the current categorisation of 
the Islamic parties. The Islamic parties were a cover for those that had been founded 
by the Islamic figures or communities and this in order to struggle mainly for the 
                                                 
25 On PBR see Edison Muchlis, “Upaya Pelembagaan Partai: Kasus Partai Bintang Reformasi”, in Lili 
Romli, Pelembagaan Partai Politik Pasca-Orde Baru: Studi Kasus Partai Golkar, PKB, PBB, PBR 
dan PDS, (Jakarta: Pusat Penelitian Politik Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, 2008). 
26 Arskal Salim G., “Fragmentasi Partai Islam”, Kompas, 26th June 1999. 
27 Zainal Abidin Amir, Peta Islam Politik Pasca Soeharto, (Jakarta: LP3ES 2003), pp. 20-21. 
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interests of the Muslim groups and Islamic values as well as national interests. In 
terms of the foundation of the party, Islam may have been used, or a mix between 
Pancasila and Islam as their foundation or ideology. It should also be noted that for 
some Islamic parties including PKB, even their understanding to embrace Pancasila 
as their foundation is based fundamentally on Islamic perspectives and they still 
regard themselves as Islamic Parties28. Yusuf Muhammad, one of PKB’s important 
figures who initiated the establishment of this party, associated PKB as “a bus that 
would bring people to Mecca”29. In this regard, this thesis shall consider both PKB 
and PKS as Islamic parties.        
 
Scholars have explored the existence of Islamic parties in Indonesia covering 
various topics. In the context of the Reform Era, research on Islamic parties carried 
out by several scholars who were interested in bringing to the fore several 
phenomena such as the aspects of ideology and mission of the new Islamic parties30, 
their political struggle in the Indonesian politics31, constellation and plurality inside 
Islamic parties32, internal conflict33 and party institutionalisation34. In the meantime, 
many specific studies on some of the prominent Islamic parties in the Reform Era 
have also been carried out. For instance, Harahap conducted research on PPP35. 
                                                 
28 Muhaimin Iskandar, “PKB: Politik Rahmatan Lil’Alamin”, in Sahar L Hassan, Kuat Sukardiyono 
and Dadi M.H. Basri, eds. Memilih Partai Islam, Visi, Misi dan Persepsi, (Jakarta, Gema Insani Press, 
1998), p.24.  
29 Muhammad Munib Huda, ed., Mutiara Nahdatul Ulama, (Jakarta: Fatma Press, 1998), p.78. 
30 Al-Chaidar, Pemilu 1999: Pertarungan Ideologis Partai-Partai Islam Versus Partai-Partai Sekuler,  
(Jakarta: Darul Falah, 1998). Hassan, Sukardiyono and Basri, eds. Memilih Partai Islam, Visi, Misi dan 
Persepsi. 
31 Hamid Basyaib and Hamid Abidin, Mengapa Partai Islam Kalah? Perjalanan Politik Islam dari Pra 
Pemilu 1999 sampai Pemilihan Presiden, (Jakarta: Alphabet, 1999). Kamarudin, Partai Politik Islam 
di Pentas Reformasi. Refleksi Pemilu 1999 untuk Pemilu 2004. Lili Romli, Islam Yes, Partai Islam Yes, 
(Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2006). 
32 Fatwa, Satu Islam Multi Partai: Membangun Integritas di tengah Pluralitas. Amir, Peta Islam 
Politik Pasca Soeharto. 
33 Kamarudin, Konflik Internal PKB, (Depok: Akses Publishing, 2008). 
34 Lili Romli, “Model Pelembagaan Partai Politik di Indonesia: Kasus Partai Keadilan Sejahtera”, in 
Edison Muchlis, (ed.). Reformasi Kelembagaan Partai Politik Pasca-Orde Baru di Indonesia, (Jakarta: 
LIPI Press, 2007). Syamsuddin Haris, “Problematik institusionalisasi PPP“, in ibid. Tri Ratnawati, 
“Beberapa Masalah Pelembagaan Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) dan Alternatif Solusi”, in Romli, 
ed., Pelembagaan Partai Politik Pasca Orde Baru Studi Kasus Partai Golkar, PKB, PBB, PBR dan 
PD, (Jakarta: P2P LIPI, 2008). Nyimas Latifah Letty Azis. “Pelembagaan Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB): 
Penerus Misi Masyumi” in ibid. Edison Muchlis, “Upaya Pelembagaan Partai: Kasus Partai Bintang 
Reformasi”, in ibid. 
35 Abdul Asri Harahap, PPP: Sintesa Nasionalisme dan Religiusitas, (Jakarta: Integritas Dinamika 
Press: 2004). 
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PKB analysed by Choirie36 and discussed by several scholars who were all for and 
against37. Choirie also explored the ideology of PKB by comparing it to that of the 
United Malay National Organization (UMNO)38.  
 
With regard to PKS, several scholars researched into its background and its 
relation to the dakwah movement39 and the Hasan Al Banna teachings40. Several 
scholars also provided discussions on PKS’ ideology41. Others developed a 
perspective to relate its presence with the global networking of the Islamic revivalist 
movements42. Moreover, Waluyo explores the political strategy and concept of the 
party in dealing with the national political constellation during the Reform Era43. In 
addition, Hurriyah analysed the aspects behind the concept and the implementation 
of the party’s cadrerization.44 The current studies on PKS also discuss the political 
behaviour and movement of its elites and cadres and how they then influenced its 
internal dynamic45. 
 
                                                 
36 A. Effendy Choirie, PKB Politik Jalan Tengah NU, (Jakarta: Pustaka Ciganjur, 2002). 
37 Muhammad Munib Huda, (ed). Pro Kontra Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, (Jakarta: Fatma Press, 
1998). 
38 A. Effendy Choirie, Islam-Nasionalisme UMNO-PKB Studi Komparasi dan Diplomasi, (Jakarta: 
Pensil-234, 2008). 
39 Ali Said Damanik, Fenomen Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di 
Indonesia, (Bandung: Teraju, 2002). 
40 Aay Muhammad Furkon, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Ideologi dan Praktis Politik Kaum Muda 
Kontemporer, (Bandung: Teraju, 2004). 
41 Nandang Burhanudin. Penegakan Syariah Islam Menurut Partai Keadilan, (Jakarta: Al-Jannah, 
2004). M. Imdadun Rahmat, Ideologi Politik PKS. Dari Masjid Kampus ke Gedung Parlemen, 
(Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2008). 
42 Anthony Bubalo, and Greg Fealy, Joining the Caravan? The Middle East, Islamism and Indonesia, 
(Alexandria: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2005). Yon Machmudi, Partai Keadilan 
Sejahtera, Wajah baru Islam Politik Indonesia, (Bandung: Harakatuna Publishing, 2005). 
43 Sapto Waluyo, Kebangkitan Politik Dakwah. Konsep dan Praktik Politik Partai Keadilan Sejahtera 
di Masa Transisi, (Bandung: Harakatuna Publishing, 2005). 
44 Hurriyah, Sistem Kaderisasi Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (1998-2003), BA Thesis, unpublished, 
(Depok: Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas 
Indonesia, 2004). 
45 Ahmad-Norma Permata, “The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and the Decline of Political Islam in 
the 2009 Election in Indonesia”, in Ahmad-Norma Permata and Najib Kailani, Islam and the 2009 
Indonesian Elections, Political and Cultural Issues. The Case of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), 
(Bangkok: IRASEC, 2010). Arief Munandar, Antara Jemaah dan Partai Politik Dinamika Habitus 
Kader Partai Keadilan Sejahtera dalam Arena Politik Indonesia Pasca Pemilu 2004, Ph. D Thesis, 
unpublished, (Depok: Post Graduate Program of Sociology, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, 
Universitas Indonesia, 2011). 
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The study of the Islamic political parties produced many important works. 
Several of the eminent studies on the Islamic parties have influenced the present 
study. They include, for instance, work on party ideology46, the history of the 
emergence and the struggle of Islamic parties in national politics47 and the relations 
of Islamic political parties with the New Order regime48. However, what remains thin 
on the ground is research that directly discusses the phenomenon of fragmentation 
and cohesion let alone in relation to the political party institutionalisation. 
 
5.2.  Fragmentation and Cohesion 
 
Many scholars have explored the issues of fragmentation and cohesion in a political 
party. There is no single explanation about the background of these issues. The 
following sub-section will discuss the background or factors behind the emergence of 
fragmentation and cohesion respectively. The exploration of these subjects implies 
the relation between the background of fragmentation and cohesion, where the 
factors that strongly encourage the development of cohesion became important 
points to avoid internal conflicts or fragmentation and vice-versa.  
 
5.2.1. Fragmentation 
The issue of fragmentation or cohesion of parties has been evaluated from many 
perspectives. In this thesis, fragmentation is applied to the situation where a party 
was split into several groups or camps, in which each group claims to be the 
authentic one and hence deserves to obtain all the assets and represent the 
aspirations of the previous party. 
 
Certain scholars believe that the phenomenon of fragmentation of the political 
parties is the result of the situation where they failed to respond to the discontent 
among members through dialogue. According to Hirschman, when explaining the 
management of the state and enterprise as an organisation, the decision of a person 
or a group of persons to exit from an organisation is related to the awareness of the 
futility of dialogue. By contrast, the choice to be loyal reflects a belief in the prospect 
                                                 
46 Deliar Noer, “Islam dan Politik: Mayoritas atau Minoritas?”, Prisma, No. 5 tahun 1988. 
47 Umar Radi, Strategi PPP 1973-1982. Suatu Studi tentang Kekuatan Politik Islam di Tingkat 
Nasional, (Jakarta: Integrita Press, 1984). Deliar Noer, Partai Islam di Pentas Politik Nasional: 1945-
1965, (Jakarta: Grafitti Press, 1987). M. Rusli Karim, Perjalanan Partai Politik di Indonesia sebuah 
Potret Pasang Surut, (Jakarta: Rajawali Press, 1993). 
48 Ward, The Foundation of the Partai Muslimin Indonesia. Syamsuddin Haris, PPP dan Politik Orde 
Baru, (Jakarta: Grasindo, 1991). 
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of dialogue as an exercise to express interests and rebuild common understanding 
and commitment49. In other words, in Hirschman’s view the degree of being heard 
and being proportionally accommodated by the party plays an important role in 
maintaining the cohesion of an organisation.   
 
In the political party context, Lewis Fickett’s study on party fragmentation 
indicates that the differences in understanding party ideology and the presence of 
personal conflicts among elites are the main roots of fragmentation. Fickett points out 
that the fragmentation will remain an unsolved problem as long as these basic 
matters are not properly handled by the party50. In general, his study underpins the 
role of cultural and personal variables in the development of internal fragmentation.  
 
In relation to the role of ideology, Daniel Bell and Bernard Shaw state that 
although ideology sometimes conceals personal ambitions as the real problem of 
conflict, the cases of Social Democrat Parties in the Western Countries indicate the 
significant role of ideology behind disruption of party cohesion51. Stephen Padgett in 
his study on the German Social Democratic Party also believes in the role of 
differences in understanding ideology in supporting fragmentation. He emphasises 
that the more a party tends to be an open organisation, the more internal pluralism 
will be more likely to occur which eventually will potentially weaken party unity52.    
 
Martin Bull on the other hand believed that the dispute on party orientation 
and the strategy to reach the goal are the factors that should be taken into account 
when discussing a party split. Moreover, he also concludes that a lack of discipline 
mechanism and the mass-based party’s model for recruitment tended to lessen the 
cadres’ discipline and provide the chance for the emergence of internal conflict53.  
The above studies indicate the relation between the deficiency of ideological unity 
and the lack of organisational discipline and the deficiency of party’s unity. 
                                                 
49 Albert O Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to decline in Firms, Organisations and 
States, (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970). 
50 Lewis P. Fickett, Jr, The Major Socialist Parties of India: A Study in Leftist Fragmentation, Foreign 
and Comparative Studies, (New York: Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs Syracuse 
University, 1976). 
51 David S. Bell and Eric Shaw, (eds), Conflict and Cohesion in Western European Social Democratic 
Parties, (London: Pinter Publisher, 1994), p. 175. 
52 Stephen Padgett, “The German Social Democratic Party: Between Old and New Left”, in ibid, pp. 
10-28. 
53 Martin F. Bull, “Social Democracies’ Newest Recruit?: Conflict and Cohesion in the Italian 
Democratic Party of the Left”, in ibid, pp 31-48. 
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 In the Indonesian context, the discussion on party fragmentation is indirectly 
developed by scholars through the studies of internal conflict and the party 
management. One particular work which describes the phenomenon of fragmentation 
of several Islamic political parties during the Reform Era was written by Soebekti, 
Achmad and Hendrowinoto54 and depicts the phenomenon of fragmentation of 
Indonesian political parties in general, not specifically Islamic parties. This book 
indicates some factors which are related to party fragmentation in the Reform Era, 
namely the failure to create good leadership, the incapability to construct a fair 
internal system and the existence of pragmatic political elites.  
 
Haris in his study on PPP in the New Order Era indicates various factors that 
have created serious problems in this party in handling internal conflicts55. The first 
was the existence of an elitist and exclusive leadership, which did not value 
alternative opinions and differences. This situation created resistance and eventually 
disharmony among the party’s members and cadres. The second was the unfair 
distribution of strategic positions inside the party and the government were not 
proportionally spread. This unbalanced proportion created an uncomfortable 
atmosphere in the majority camp and became a continuous sensitive issue in this 
party.  
 
The third was the irrational organisational structure with some branches 
having the right to make their independent policy, sometimes causing an overlap in 
the policy-making process and disintegration. The fourth factor was government 
intervention. This mainly occurred because of the inability to solve internal disputes 
and the tendency in particular of the minority group to invite the government as a 
political patron. This situation was actually in line with the interest of the New Order 
authoritarian regime to have access to the party in order to be able to control and 
eventually weaken the non-government political parties. The last is the fact that two 
main factions inside the party, that is Parmusi and NU, did not appreciate the 
existence of the party using the same line. The former tended to see PPP in a 
secular perspective and tended to be pragmatic in its political activities. Whereas NU 
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regarded PPP as an Islamic party that had a main obligation to struggle for the 
interest of Islam in a stricter way.  
  
In his study on internal conflict of PKB, Kamarudin reveals the causes behind 
the failure of PKB to avoid internal conflict that led to internal fragmentation56. The 
first factor was the existence of the personalised leadership of Abdurrahman Wahid 
as the chair of Dewan Syura (the Consultative Board); supported by the constitution 
of the party that gives immense power to Dewan Syura, particularly in determining 
the direction of the party and its policy making process. The second factor was the 
unwillingness of each of the clashing groups to compromise their interests. The third 
was the inability to solve internal problems independently. This failure tended to draw 
in the external factors, which in the end tended to worsen rather than improve the 
conflict situation. For instance, the existence of an external factor such as the 
ambiguous judgment of Mahkamah Agung (the Supreme Court/MA) as to which 
group had the right to be in charge of PKB, had not only created the belief of each 
group to have a right to represent PKB, but also to influence the government to 
accommodate the existence of both groups. And finally the fourth, which was the 
failure of a cultural approach to solve internal conflict including islah (attempt to 
gather conflicted group in the Islamic tradition).  
 
Moreover, Kamarudin believes that the case of internal conflict in PKB shows 
the growth of pragmatisme (the Indonesian term for ‘self-seeking behaviour’, quite 
different from the common English usage for ‘pragmatism’) among its members. This 
attitude according to Kamarudin strengthened conflict of interest on one hand and 
weakened the obedience of santri (the follower or the student) towards kyai (as a 
religious patron or scholar) on the other, which in the end dissolved the spirit of 
togetherness57. 
 
The above discussion indicates a number of common factors behind the 
phenomenon of internal fragmentation, namely the differences in understanding party 
ideology, the deficiency of shared values, the presence of personal conflicts among 
elites, the dispute on the party orientation and the strategy to reach the goal, a lack of 
discipline mechanism and the mass-based party model for recruitment, the failure to 
create good leadership, the incapability to construct fair internal system, and the 
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inability to solve the problems independently in a rational way, which invites third 
party intervention.  
 
5.2.2. Cohesion  
The term cohesion in a political academic context has been developed in several 
understandings and frameworks. Some scholars focussed their discussion on party 
cohesion by highlighting the voting behaviour of the party members in the 
parliaments. It talks mainly about how the party attempted to control the voting 
behaviour of its members in the delivery of the party’s voice or interests in the 
legislative body and the reasons behind the presence of a cohesive or un-cohesive 
party related to the members’ attitudes in the parliament58.  
 
This thesis does not follow the same direction as those studies in 
understanding cohesion. Rather, this thesis regards cohesion as the capability to 
preserve existence and unity. The presence of cohesion in the party as a system, 
therefore, will be related to the capacity to unite and maintain all sub-systems inside 
the party, ensuring that all elements are working together to reach the main objective. 
For this reason, the term cohesion will be used in the same manner as with the 
various terms such as unity, solidity, harmony and homogeneity.   
 
Hence, the term cohesion is used to describe the situation where the party 
could maintain its unity and work together to reach its goals. In this regard, the 
problem of maintaining solidarity, party coherence and the reduction of tension 
among the party’s elements are essential. As a system that consists of sub-systems, 
in the context of cohesion establishment, the party will play a role that is described by 
Parson as “integration”, where “the problem of maintaining solidarity in the relations 
between the units, in the interest of effective functioning”59. 
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Some scholars have argued on the background of party cohesion. According 
to Mahendra Singh, in general, there are two factors explaining why the party is 
cohesive, namely the internal factors, which originate from within the party itself and 
the external factors, such as the socio-cultural situation and political system 
surrounding the party. Related to the first aspect60, he believes that the party, which 
is based on ideology and not on pragmatic matters as a binding factor, tends to be 
able to preserve internal cohesion. It means that a totalitarian-ideological party would 
have more chance to be a cohesive party rather than a restricted-pragmatic party. 
Moreover, he also believes that the party that applies a close recruitment policy, with 
limited members, would be more cohesive rather than an open party.  
 
Singh considers that the party that implements a branch party model tends to 
be more conducive to internal cohesion rather than to a caucus party, where the 
power tended to be decentralised. In the light of this situation, the centralised party, 
hence, is more favourable to be a cohesive party rather than a decentralised one. 
Singh also states that the party that clearly articulates its rules of the game, meaning 
to use them as guidance for all party activities, would have a better chance of 
preserving its cohesion compared to the party with a weak articulation that “does not 
lay down precise rules governing the internal structure of its basic elements and units 
and their integration with the party”61.  
 
As for the external aspect, Singh considers the presidential system as the 
element that would potentially weaken party cohesion. He also considers that the 
federal state and use of the district system for election would play a similar role. He 
also believes, however, that such claims really could not be entirely confirmed, since 
in fact the phenomenon of un-cohesion could also be found in the states that used a 
parliamentary system, unitary state and simple majority for the election. It means that 
the political system tended to play as a complementary element in creating cohesion. 
 
However, Singh believes that a fragmented society would potentially bring a 
negative effect to cohesion development, particularly for the parties that try to stand 
out above all groups and represent them in it. Moreover, in the situation where 
intraparty competition is strong, the tendency to have a consciousness to hold unity 
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in order to be able to win the competition sometimes paved the way for the 
emergence of party cohesion. However, using the case of the Congress Party in 
Bihar, Singh also indicates that such a situation actually could also happen in the 
situation where a party faces no serious competitor in its district62. In general, Singh 
confirms the relativity of external aspects as the only and important elements or 
source for party cohesion.    
 
Other studies on political ideology suggest a correlation between ideologies 
and cohesion. Duverger’s study on party, for instance, suggests that left-wing 
ideology has more ability to discipline the party members, thus generating more 
consolidated parties. He believes that hierarchical parties, which are typically more to 
the left and centralised parties, are regarded as having a strong tendency to be a 
solid party. Furthermore, he argues that more extreme the ideology adhered to by the 
party, the more opportunity that party will have to avoid63. In relation to the ideology, 
Kumar’s study on the Indian parties indicates the important role of ideology for party 
cohesion mainly as the uniting factor between factions and the variables that 
strengthen the party’s organisation64.   
 
Other scholars tended to see the role of party recruitment in the building of 
cohesion. In this case, Alan Ware suggests that solidity could more easily be 
maintained if the party is a ‘cadre party’, rather than a “mass-based party”, for the 
fact that a cadre party could guarantee more militancy and solidity among the 
cadres65. On the other hand, Ozbudun reached a different conclusion with Ware, in 
saying that the mass party has some qualifications to be a supportive element to 
party cohesion, since this kind of party could guarantee financial independency and 
reduced patron-client relations in the party, which could endanger the cadres’ loyalty 
to the party66.  
 
Brass believes that the leader is the most important element due to his 
capability in uniting a group, based on his understanding of people’s problems, ability 
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to solve conflict and knowing the art of manipulation, including providing goods to 
maintain the followers’ loyalty67. In line with this argument, according to Prassad, 
ideology plays a secondary role in maintaining cohesion, where the salient problem 
lies actually with the leader68. Such studies confirm the important role of the elite in 
securing the solidity of the party. Myron Weiner also believes in the role of leader in 
cohesion, particularly as the element that maintains a compromise between factional 
disputes, source of prestige to the members and main source of articulation of 
values69. Weiner also sees, however, other factors that play an important role in 
establishing party cohesion. He believes that other factors such as the tolerant 
attitude towards the existence of other factions and the presence of consensus or the 
crosscutting idealism similarity should be also taken into account when discussing 
party cohesion background70.    
 
On the other hand, some scholars put forward the discussion on the party 
structure rather than on the existence of political culture or ideology that surround the 
party, as a variable that should be explored to seek the reason behind cohesion. 
Studies on the Western European social democratic parties indicate several 
situations behind the emergence of party cohesion71. These include the style of party 
organisation or organisational structure (where the centralised and disciplined party 
tends to be more conducive to party cohesion), the ideology (in this case social 
democracy) that united the party cadres and the followers of ideology, charismatic 
figures (particularly for the case of Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party), the presence of 
uniting values and external situations such as political system, national issues, the 
existence of rival parties.  
 
The more specific study discussing the capability of Partai Keadilan (the 
Justice Party), PKS’ antecedent party, to preserve its solidity was conducted by 
Suhban Akbar. To some extent, this study is a closely-related study to the cohesion 
discussion. Akbar concludes that the phenomenon of party solidity is the result of the 
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party’s aptitude to have or to build a kind of uniting ideology with a leadership that put 
forward consultation and good cadrerization72.  
 
The study on the internal activity of PKS, particularly that on Taklim Rutin 
Mingguan (Weekly Routine Training) or halaqah (the meeting or the development 
unit) by Prabowo, indicates the relationship between the presence of the halaqah and 
the capability to find super-ordinate goals or a sort of uniting values for PKS 
members, who eventually supported the party in maintaining its cohesion. In general, 
Prabowo, concludes that the presence of an institutionalised activity like halaqah in 
the party would enable the party to maintain its solidity73. The fact that halaqah is one 
of PKS cadrerization elements actually suggests that the presence of good 
cadrerization is a prerequisite for party cohesion.     
 
The above discussion indicates, therefore, several important factors in the 
development of party cohesion, which, in general, consist of external and internal 
aspects. With regard to the external aspects, they mainly include the social and 
cultural conditions surrounding the parties, its life and the existence of a political 
system. The internal aspects comprise several factors such as organisation style, 
party ideology, the role of the figures or leaders and good cadrerization. 
 
The above exploration points out that fragmentation and cohesion were the 
phenomena that have several rationales behind their presence, which seem 
exclusive. However, the study of these issues essentially infers and indicates that the 
capability to avoid fragmentation by having or operating certain variables or 
dimensions are, to some extent, an entry point into maintaining cohesion. This thesis 
believes that one could use quite the same material factors or parameters to 
measure or discuss the presence or the absence of fragmentation and cohesion. In 
the above discussions, some factors seem to be less compelling however, due to the 
fact that they were not supported by convincing data or a real situation at the 
practical level. Some factors appear to have a contradictory position. The problem of 
organisation style, for instance, tends to be fairly argued against since fragmentation 
could potentially happen in both the “cadre” and “mass” parties. Ozbudun and Ware’s 
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study, which gives a contradictory result from the relation between a cadre party and 
cohesion, represents that situation. Also the position of the leaders is quite 
debatable. To some, it is believed to be a supportive element for cohesion; but for the 
others, this situation has the potential to endanger the cohesion of the party.   
 
On the other hand, it should also be noted that some of the comparative 
research findings reported above seem to be less relevant to this study. Thus, the 
relation between the left-wing ideology and the tendency to be able to maintain party 
cohesion and the correlation between the number of parties and the tendency of 
cohesion would seem to be irrelevant to the Indonesian case. For the former, this is 
because the terminology of the “left” and the “right” itself does not find its relevance in 
contemporary Indonesian politics74, when the people tend to categorise the parties 
based on the degree of secularism or Islamism. And for the latter, the Indonesian 
case seems to contradict those comparative findings. Indonesia continually 
implements a multi-party system, but still faces the fragmentation phenomenon, even 
today in the extensive sense. In this context, the external system, although it cannot 
be entirely neglected, should be regarded as a supporting factor for party 
fragmentation, as the real problem is actually internal to the party. In other words, 
one should regard that in the case of Indonesian current politics as long as the 
parties can properly manage their internal matters, the party would tend to survive 
from fragmentation or a split.  
 
What is quite omitted from these studies, however, is the explanation on the 
role of the absence or the presence of party institutionalisation in generating internal 
party fragmentation and cohesion, particularly in the Indonesian Islamic political 
context.  
 
The existence of undemocratic leadership and the inability to solve internal 
problems independently, for instance, are basically related to the failure of the party 
to maintain the rules of the game and consistently follow their internal constitution. 
Moreover, the existence of the fragmented elite should also be considered as a 
product of the failure of the party to create good communication and trust among 
them. This condition is actually the result rather than the cause of unmanageable 
conflict. On the other hand, the capacity to maintain trust and loyalty should be 
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regarded as part of the success in maintaining cadrerization and enacting fairness 
and rules of the game. The capability to avoid the elites behaving as in the above 
constitution throughout the consistency in implementing and respecting the party’s 
constitution also played a salient role. The existence of a mechanism that could bring 
essential solutions to internal conflict also could not be neglected as an important 
background for creating internal cohesion. To sum up, this thesis will argue that the 
internal party situation leading to fragmentation or cohesion will be determined by the 
party’s capacity to maintain its institutionalisation. 
 
5.3.  Party Institutionalisation 
 
This thesis will use the study of institutionalisation of the contemporary Indonesian 
Islamic parties. This field of study relates to the political study by Duverger75 which, 
according to Sartori, opened a new approach to the study of political parties by 
focusing on the issues of internal organisation and linking to the general area of 
organisation theory76. Huntington was the first to offer a definition and criteria for 
institutionalisation: “the process by which organizations and procedures acquire 
value and stability”77.  
  
Huntington then offers a number of criteria to measure the existence of party 
institutionalisation: the ability of the party to develop adaptability, complexity, 
autonomy and coherence. Adaptability is related to the degree of ability to survive in 
a political scheme. He believes that “the more adaptable an organisation or 
procedure, the more highly institutionalised it is”. This includes the ability to functional 
adaptation in the power relation context. Complexity is associated by the existence of 
several sub-units inside the party. This may also entail a multiplication of 
organisational subunits, hierarchically and functionally. He infers that there is a 
relation between the number of the variety of sub-units and the capability of the party 
to maintain the loyalties of its members. This situation, in the end, will contribute to 
the creation of internal stability within the party.  
 
                                                 
75 Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organisation and Activity in the Modern State, (London: 
Methuen, 1964). 
76 Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, A Framework for Analysis, Volume 1, p. 71. 
77 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Society, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1968), p. 394. 
 35
Autonomy refers to the level of differences and having clear boundaries with 
other groups. It means that the institutionalised party should be able to maintain its 
independence, both organisationally and procedurally, from the influences of other 
social groups, including non-political groups and methods of behaviour or expression 
of interests. Coherence is measured by the existence of an internal consensus 
including the ability to provide conflict resolution. He implies that the capacity to 
create unity, esprit, morale and discipline are crucial in party institutionalisation78.     
 
Other scholars have developed alternative definitions and conditions of 
institutionalisation. Particularly valuable is the contribution of Panebianco, who 
defines institutionalisation as “the way the organisation solidifies”79. This process is 
basically related to the ability of the party to preserve its autonomy vis-à-vis its 
environment and the level of ‘systemness’ or the degree of interdependence among 
its members. Thus, according to Panebianco, an institutionalised party is one that 
can enhance autonomy from the intervention of other groups and maintain 
interdependence among its internal actors and different sectors. He suggested that 
the early stage of a party development period will determine the ability of the party to 
reach the ideal type. In his opinion, a party that was developed through a centralised 
process rather than a diffused one and with limited “external supports” rather than 
depending on the “external legitimation” will most likely find autonomy easily and 
develop a high degree of interdependence among its elements80.    
 
Maor divides the understanding of institutionalisation into two categories81. 
The first category refers to institutionalisation as a process, which include the studies 
from Duverger, Huntington and Panebianco. The focal point of this category is 
related to history and the attempt of a party to advance itself into the best form or into 
being institutionalised. In other words, party institutionalisation is related to the party 
development process. The second category sees institutionalisation as a property or 
state. In this perspective, according to Janda, the institutionalised party is “one that is 
reified in the public mind so that ‘the party’ exists as a social organisation apart from 
its momentary leaders and this organisation demonstrate recurring patterns of 
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behaviour valued by those who identified with it”82. Maor’s categorisation regards 
institutionalisation, rightly, as both an internal process and as an attempt to exist in 
society.  
 
However, though he concludes that there are advantages in both categories 
when dealing with part of the institutionalisation discussion and he also realises that 
there is some regression, which is mainly related to the tendency to 
overgeneralization and neglect several critical aspects. He then suggests discussing 
other matters, such as the structural features of the party (for instance, the number of 
members, number of paid staff); the way the party manages internal and external 
affairs (dealing with matters, for instance, political recruitment and mobilising people) 
and the party’s mode of government (the policy process) to reach a more 
comprehensive conclusion83. 
 
The most recent study on party institutionalisation is that by Randall and 
Svansand. They argue, in line with the above insight, that institutionalisation should 
be understood as “the process by which the party becomes established in terms both 
of their integrated patterns of behaviours and of attitudes, or culture”. They then 
distinguish the aspects of this process into the internal aspect referring to internal 
development; and the external aspect, related to relationship with the society. Based 
on this understanding they suggest four elements or dimensions to measure party 




Dimension of party institutionalisation 
 
 Internal External 
Structural Systemness Decisional autonomy 
Attitudinal Value infusion Reification 
Source: Vicky Randall and Lars Svasand, “Party Instutitionalization in New Democracies”, in 
Party Politics, Vol. 8 January/1/2002, p.13. 
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It is meant here is that systemness is the regularity or routinisation of 
interactions among the members and between the regulation and the member inside 
the party. In this context systemness implies the development of “prevalent 
conventions” which guides the behaviour of the members. This rule, in the end, 
should be the base for any activities in the party. Value infusion is to do with the 
existence of distinct identity that makes the members and supporters acquire 
identification and similar commitment to the party. According to them, this refers to 
the extent to which the members and the supporters of the party identify each other 
and share commitment which is based on a similar belief. They also imply that this 
has to do with the ability to create a distinctive culture or value system, which 
eventually would potentially bring a positive impact to the context of party cohesion. 
Meanwhile, decisional autonomy refers to a certain degree of freedom in the internal 
decision-making process. This situation refers to the high autonomy vis a vis its 
environment. Lastly, reification implies the situation where the existence of the party 
has settled in the public mind. It refers to the condition where the party does not only 
exist in society, but more importantly has a special position in the people’s 
imagination as the result of a close relation between them85. 
 
In relation to the existence of value infusion, MacGuire suggests that value 
infusion has a certain causal primacy for party institutionalisation. MacGuire states 
that “value infusion helps an organization survive long enough to become taken for 
granted and both value infusion and taken-for-grantedness, enhance an 
organisation’s capacity to shape and constrain behaviour over an extended period of 
time”86. The existence of value infusion is basically to do with the development of the 
values of identity or unique culture that identifies and differentiates one particular 
party from the others. It also infers the development of the common values, or 
according to Macguire as the taken-for-grantedness, which determine the conduct of 
the members and to some extent has also something to do with the development of 
the sense of togetherness among the cadres.  
 
In relation to “value infusion”, Levitsky argued that institutionalisation should 
not be seen as merely a matter of consistency in implementing the party procedure. 
The development of the situation where the member values the existence of the party 
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also becomes an important element in institutionalisation. According to Levistky, a 
party that is weak in terms of procedure implementation, but strong in terms of “value 
infusion“ making the continuation of a party’s existence become possible, sometimes 
may occur and could not be judged as un-institutionalised. In this kind of situation, to 
some extent, the party actually became a value by itself, indicating the real 
dimension of party institutionalisation, described by Huntington as “the process by 
which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability”. Levitsky argues 
hence that besides the “technical matters”, one should take into account the ability to 
create the commitment based on “non-technical elements” as part of 
institutionalisation87. In this regard, the problems like values, ideology or shared 
values and others like commitment to those matters, which, as part of “value 
infusion”, has become relevant when discussing party institutionalisation.   
 
In the Indonesian context, several researches have been conducted on party 
institutionalisation. Ufen’s comparative study on party institutionalisation in three 
South-East Asian Countries concludes the advanced position of Indonesian parties 
compared to those in the Philippines and Thailand in terms of party 
institutionalisation88.  Although an uneven situation occurs in which degradation of 
the quality of the party institutionalisation occurs he believes that Indonesian parties 
are better than those in the two other countries.  
 
By using Levitsky’s approach to party institutionalisation that implements two 
dimensions of party institutionalisation, namely value infusion which is related to the 
capability to establish political roots in the civil society and behavioural routinisation, 
Ufen indicates that old parties, such as Golkar, PPP and PDI are the most 
institutionalised parties, particularly Golkar. However he also believes that the new 
parties such as PKB and PKS have also a fairly strong root in society, mainly in the 
rural, traditionalist Muslim domains and in urban areas respectively, indicating the 
presence of party institutionalisation. However, Ufen also recognises that over time, 
this situation became questionable and has been challenged by the current political 
situation of several parties. Several of the contemporary local elections and national 
election, for instance, confirm the weakness of value infusion, including that in PKB. 
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The failure of PKB’s candidate to win the 2008 Governor Election in the East Java 
Province89, as one of the most important or “traditional” political pouches for PKB, 
became the very indication of the absence of value infusion for this party. 
 
The Centre for Political Research, Indonesian Institute of Sciences (P2P LIPI) 
has developed so-called LIPI categories in examining party institutionalisation of 
several prominent political parties in the Indonesian Reform Era. These factors 
include the existence of internal democracy, party identity or value infusion, which is 
strongly related to party ideology, cohesive relationships among members of the 
party, financial autonomy, the systematic cadre development and good relationships 
with the public90.  
 
In terms of party ideology, the P2P LIPI research includes matters such as 
the existence of a political platform, the problem of understanding the political 
attitudes of the party, the commitment to the political aims and the existence of the 
sense of togetherness. Internal democracy has to do with problems such as the 
implementation of the rules of the game, the decentralisation of sources, the 
existence of an effective control and the procedure for leadership selection. Cohesion 
covers internal conflict resolution, consensus institutionalisation and the code of 
conduct. Financial autonomy includes the origin of the financial sources, the 
continuity and the management of the party funds. The systematic cadre 
development infers the existence of systematic recruitment, the membership 
management and the organising of data and information relevant to membership. 
Good relationship with the public is related to the implementation of mechanisms, 
specific and medium timeframe for building relationships. 
 
This study concludes that almost all the important parties in the Indonesia 
experience had trouble with their institutionalisation, particularly in relation to these 
matters mentioned above. This study discuses ten major parties that were in 
existence before the 2009 election, namely PDIP, Golkar, PKB, PPP, PD, PKS, PAN, 
PBB, PBR and PDS. Of the ten parties measured, this study infers that only PKS can 
be categorised as an institutionalised party, while the others can be regarded as 
parties that are half way to be institutionalised and two of them, PDIP and PKB, are 
                                                 
89 The PKB’s candidate Achmady only gained 7% of the total votes. The Election was won by 
Soekarwo who was supported by three main parties namely the PD, PAN and PKS.  
90 Muchlis (ed.), Reformasi Kelembagaan Partai Politik Pasca-Orde Baru di Indonesia, pp. 18-19.  
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regarded as parties that suffer serious problems with institutionalisation91. This 
interesting study has properly indicated issues that are related to the problems of 
party institutionalisation, although they are not quite complete in explaining many of 
the impacts, whether internal or external, of such conditions on the parties. This 
study is also in general not related to the problem of fragmentation tendency.      
 
The discussion above shows that party institutionalisation has many 
interpretations of its definition and categories. In terms of categories, we can divide 
them into three main situations or categories. The first is a high degree of 
‘systemness’, where the coherence between the rules of the game and their 
implementation exists. In this situation, the internal system becomes more prominent 
and influential than the individual or figure. These “internal categories” include the 
degree of systemness, autonomy, consistency in implementing internal regulation, 
coherence, systematic recruitment and cadrerization.  
 
The second is related to “the value infusion”, or the preservation of shared 
values or identity that played a role as a guide or code of conduct and an element 
that supports the continuation of party existence. At the practical level, it is also 
related to the capability to establish adaptability in the new environment and the 
establishment of an effective connection with the social movements or communities 
having similar values. In this thesis, it is mainly related to how the values are 
transformed and developed.  The third is the party’s capability to be consistently 
present in the political system and over time to be reified by the society. These 
“external categories” comprise the existence of decisional autonomy, adaptability and 
the development of established relations with society (reification) and the continuity 
to participate in elections. However, these categories are not directly related to the 
fragmentation and cohesion problems. 
  
5.4.  Party Institutionalisation and Fragmentation or Cohesion: Dimensions 
 
To fill the gap, this thesis operationalise ‘party institutionalisation’ as an independent 
explanatory variable for party cohesion and fragmentation. To do so, this thesis will 
for practical purposes focus on the internal aspects of institutionalisation and value 
infusion; stepping aside from “external factors”, such as reification as defined in 
relation to society and the ability to continually participate in elections: these are, 
                                                 
91 Ibid. 
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arguably, dependent parts of institutionalisation. Moreover, in Indonesia, many 
important parties could continue to participate in the elections, several even gaining a 
considerable number of votes for their well-known existence, without having sufficient 
institutionalisation and even won the election 92.  
 
By contrast, our focus on the internal elements is in line with the approach 
that views a party as “a miniature of political system”, according to Eldersveld, where 
one of its main functions is to maintain its existence through appropriate internal 
management93. Specifically this “internal dimension” is related to three factors, 
namely (1) procedural leadership in the decision-making process, (2) presence of 
conflict resolution mechanism and (3) systematic cadrerization for developing cadres 
and political recruitment. Pertaining to “value infusion”, as one of the dimensions of 
institutionalisation, it was related to the commitment towards shared values. Thus, in 
this thesis there will be four elements of institutionalisation which will be examined in 
relation to the fragmentation and cohesion of political parties. These factors are, 
where they exist, mutually interactive (they feed into each other and are mutually 
supportive), but are collectively independent. 
 
5.4.1. Procedural Leadership in the Decision-Making Process 
The first dimension is what has been called by Randall and Svasand as the degree of 
systemness, or in my perspective is called procedural leadership, particularly in the 
decision-making process. Procedural leadership in the decision-making process 
requires a consistent implementation of policy once a policy is passed by the 
members. According to Levitsky94, in his explanation of the real meaning of 
institutionalisation, it is the process by which rules and procedures become known, 
accepted and obeyed as the main element of the party institutionalisation.  
 
The charismatic figures or leaders can be employed as a uniting symbol 
which, according to Panebianco, could bring a valuable impact to the party in some 
cases95. However they should not be put in a position above the law or the internal 
                                                 
92 Syahrul Hidayat, ed. Kerangka Penguatan Partai Politik di Indonesia, (Depok: Pusat Kajian Politik, 
Departemen Ilmu Politik, Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik, Universitas Indonesia, 2008), pp. 2-3.  
93 Maor, Political Parties and Party Systems, Comparative Approaches and The British Experience, pp. 
11-12. 
94 Steven Levitsky, “Organisation and Labor-Based Party Adaptation: The Transformation of Argentine 
Peronism” in Comparative Perspective, World Politics, Vol. 54, No. 1 (Oct., 2001), pp. 33-34. 
95 Panebianco, Political Parties: Organisation and Power, pp. 65-67. 
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rules of the game. The existence of procedural leadership in the end would preserve 
the sense of togetherness, since it basically ensures the implementation of the rules 
of the game, equality before the party constitution and the involvement in the 
decision-making process. In the case of Indian National Congress Party, “the politics 
of sycophancy” and the tendency to create party personification which undermines 
procedural mechanism, during the first years of Indira Gandhi leadership, appears to 
be the focal point for de-institutionalisation of the party which leads to a party spilt96. 
Though as mentioned by Michels, the tendency of oligarchy is actually a part of party 
life97, one should believe that the implementation of procedural leadership should be 
implemented, since it has a potential impact on avoiding distrust and fragmentation.  
 
5.4.2.  Conflict Resolution Mechanism 
The second is the ability to develop the internal conflict resolution mechanisms 
(CRM). CRM is a mechanism that deals with the conflict terminating attempts and 
management. It is believed that the establishment of this mechanism should help the 
development of a win-win outcome that satisfies each conflicting group, or at least 
some of their needs98. This mechanism to some extent is part of conflict 
management, in which according to Mial, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, relates to 
the attempts in handling conflict99. Bennet implies, moreover, that the success of 
conflict management is a pre-condition for the success of CRM100. In this regard, 
Maoz believed in the overlap between the role played by CRM and conflict 
management101.  
 
                                                 
96 James Warner Bjorkman, “Party, Personality and Dynasty”, in Alan Ware, ed., Political Parties, 
Electoral Change and Structural Response, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), pp. 59-68.  
97 Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern 
Democracy, (New York: The Free Press, 1966), pp. 353-354. 
98 James H. Laue, “The Emergence and Institutionalisation of Third Party Roles in Conflict”, in John 
Burton and Frank Dukes, eds., Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution, (Hampshire: 
Macmillan, 1990), p. 258. 
99 Hugh Mial, Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, Contemporary Conflict Resolution: the 
Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts, (Malden: Blackwell Publisher Inc, 
1999), p. 21. 
100 D. Scott Bennet, “Patterns of Conflict Management and Resolution in Enduring Rivalries”, in Zeev 
Maoz, Alex Mintz, T. Clifton Morgan, Glenn Palmer and Richard J. Stoll, eds., Multiple Paths to 
Knowledge in International Relations. Methodology in the Study of Conflict Management and Conflict 
Resolution, (Oxford: Lexington Books, 2004), pp. 225-229. 
101 Zeev Maoz, “Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution: A Conceptual and Methodological 
Introduction”, in Zeev Maoz, Alex Mintz, T. Clifton Morgan, Glenn Palmer and Richard J. Stoll, eds., 
Multiple Paths to Knowledge in International Relations. Methodology in the Study of Conflict 
Management and Conflict Resolution, (Oxford: Lexington Books, 2004), p. 19. 
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This thesis, hence, accounts for CRM as a mechanism that is related to or 
becomes part of conflict management. There are at least two levels of conflict 
resolution; namely (1) conflict prevention, before the conflict happens and (2) conflict 
termination, after the conflict took place. The institutionalised party is accordingly a 
party that has a capacity to prevent conflict potentials and to find a comprehensive 
solution in terminating the conflict. 
 
The party should have clear rules of law to solve internal conflict and form a 
body (or sub-unit) to handle the problem of internal conflict. The existence of this 
mechanism, or the body that handles this function, is important since the party, as a 
system, has responsibility to ensure the implementation of the party functions, 
including the management of internal cohesion. In order to be able to effectively 
operate the function, such mechanism should have a distinct position, much the 
same as a judicative body in the context of the government system. The capable and 
respected figures should be part of this body and equipped with independent rights to 
stipulate policy and be free of any intervention.  
 
With the potential ability to solve internal problems, the existence of this 
mechanism should also prevent the party from any external intervention; for instance, 
the intervention from the government apparatus that sees the unfinished internal 
conflict as an opportunity to run their agenda inside the party. According to Pirages, 
the third party intervention, particularly from the government, could not find a 
comprehensive solution. In fact, it does not help the party to solve its problems, since 
it tends to reduce preferences that might possibly be taken by the conflicting groups 
in terms of the bargaining position process as part of the conflict resolution method 
before intervention occurs102. This situation tends eventually to prevent a win-win 
solution from being obtained based on the natural interests of each group. 
 
In the Indonesian political cases, such external intervention sometimes occurs 
when one of the conflicting groups intentionally invites an external element to act as 
mediator to solve the conflict103. But this external factor, mainly from the government 
apparatus in the New Order Era, tended to worsen the problem rather than to resolve 
                                                 
102 Dennis C. Pirage, Stabilitas Politik dan Pengelolaan Konflik, (Jakarta: FIS-UI, 1982), pp. 57-58. 
103 Haris, PPP dan Politik Orde Baru. Kamarudin, Partai Politik Islam di Pentas Reformasi. Refleksi 
Pemilu 1999 untuk Pemilu 2004, pp. 18-22. 
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it. The reason was that the New Order government had a hidden agenda to weaken 
the unity of the opposition parties, rather than to solve the real problem104.  
 
In this circumstance, the existence of this mechanism could also become an 
instrument to maintain party autonomy. Furthermore, the existence of the internal 
conflict mechanism solution would possibly foster the sense among the members of 
being fairly treated. This is because it would protect them from any discrimination and 
unilateral action from the elite and other members. In addition, this mechanism could 
also support intraparty dialogue, since it provides a chance to share points of view 
and establish understanding, regarded to be important by Hirschman105. To resume, 
the existence of such a mechanism together with its many positive consequences 
would potentially minimise the disappointment of the party members, including the 
tendency to divide the party.           
 
5.4.3. Systematic Cadrerization. 
This should cover the matters of holding fair recruitment, systematic evaluation of the 
cadres, systematic and gradual training in recruiting new members and elites and 
certainty of their career level. The substance of this activity should encompass a 
certain amount of basic information and orientation, including on (1) the ideology and 
the mission of the party, (2) the role of the cadre both as a member of the party and 
as member of the society, (3) the party’s management and other rules of the game 
and (4) the respective internal values that have to be properly conducted by all 
members. In relation to these functions, this process should be an effective media to 
transmit the fundamental values and attitudes of the party. This activity should be 
clearly written in the statutes of the party or on other official documents and 
conveyed to all of the members of the party, so that it could be collectively learnt. In 
this regard, the cadrerization process should also have clear parameters and be easy 
to comprehend by all the cadres. These transparent rules of the game would not only 
avoid any kind of unilateral and exclusive understanding, but also potentially prevent 
the elites from manipulating this activity for their personal interest. This situation 
could also minimise internal conflict potentials, since it could reduce any tension 
caused by an unfair mechanism and its implementation106.    
 
                                                 
104 Arbi Sanit, “Manajemen Politik dalam Negeri”, in “Tiras”, 9 February 1995, in Kamarudin, Partai 
Politik Islam di Pentas Reformasi. Refleksi Pemlu 1999 untuk Pemilu 2004, p.37. 
105 Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to decline in Firms, Organisations and States. 
106 Hidayat, ed. Kerangka Penguatan Partai Politik di Indonesia, p. 50. 
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Furthermore, systematic cadrerization requires consistency and continuation 
in its implementation. It should not be terminated for any reason. This is a part of 
what many scholars said as a party’s “routinisation”, which is one of the indicators for 
the existence of party institutionalisation. The main reasons for this continuation are 
so that the party could guarantee the successive process and maintain regeneration 
based on the spirit of meritocracy. In other words, the result of the cadrerization 
process should eventually be the basic standard for party recruitment and selection. 
The recruitment includes legislative recruitment and candidate selection, which the 
“political party decides which of the persons is legally eligible to hold an elective 
office”107. In addition, pertaining to some of the functions indicated above, it could be 
said that this process should be part of the attempts to maintain party coherence and 
to develop internal discipline for all members. Thus, the existence of systematic 
cadrerization would generally give a positive impact on party cohesion.                             
 
5.4. 4. The Commitment to the Shared Values or Ideology  
The presence of a shared values commitment is an impact on the existence called by 
Selznick and Levitsky as “value infusion”, where the members are infused by certain 
values. The institutionalised party, therefore, is the party that is capable of developing 
its own and distinct values, which over time enable it to build its roots in the civil 
society domain and with the people who share similar values. On the other hand, as 
applied in this thesis, it also determines relations between the party and its members, 
where the values and the interests holding and maintaining them become the main 
foundation for such relations.   
 
In the internal party context, which is the focus of this thesis, the presence of 
this commitment is indicated by the eagerness to implement the shared values as a 
guide or main consideration in its activities and movements. The presence of such 
commitment will also enhance collective identity and the spirit to preserve the 
continuation of the party. Levitsky said that the continuation of the party becomes 
more important rather than the objectives of the party, including the reasons behind 
the party establishment. In this case, the party tends to be more than merely a tool to 
meet specific aims or other technical matters. Rather, the party and its continuity 
become tools of personal satisfaction for the cadres108. The presence of this 
                                                 
107 Austin Ranney, “Candidate Selection” in David Butler, Howard R. Penniman and Austin Ranney 
(eds), Democracy at the Polls, (Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1981), p. 75. 
108 Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration. A Sociological Interpretation, (New York: Row, 
Peterson and Company, 1957), p. 17. 
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commitment also encourages the cadres to adjust their behaviour according to this 
value; in other words become a code of conduct109. Eventually, the commitment to 
the shared values became “the ’receptacle’ of group idealism”110. 
 
In Randall and Svasand’s perspectives, this situation, where the members of 
the party acquire an identification and commitment, is an important aspect of party 
cohesion111. On the other hand, the lack of having this value will lead to the situation 
where the members could act freely based on their self-interest. This condition would 
potentially trigger negative impacts such as the difficulty to maintain consistent 
attitudes, the spread of self-seeking behaviour and the creation of uncompromised 
disputes among the members.  
 
To have a more influential position in the party organisation, the party should 
preserve its ideology by developing an “apparatus ideology”. Such apparatus 
consists of the people who are committed and have a duty to maintain and develop 
the party ideology112. This apparatus is part of the values infusion process and plays 
a salient role in the cadrerization and the socialisation of the party. 
 
The meaning of shared values used in this thesis is a common belief, derived 
from matters such as platform, ideology, figure, interest, myth or struggle that gathers 
people and provides identity. In this thesis, since both discussed parties are using 
mainly their ideology as a basis for creating common belief and their main tools to 
gather people, ideology became an important shared value in both parties. In relation 
to this, ideology at heart provides a collective identity and binds the people who 
adhere to it113. According to Volkens and Klingman, ideology provides the party not 
only with a core identity but also with a blue print for an alternative solution towards 
social problems and many other matters114. Sani dan Sartori puts all these party 
roles into two domains namely “domain of identification”, when dealing with matters 
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of creating relationships between electors and the party, including the elites, party 
members and voters; and “domain of competition”, in which ideology became the 
guide for the decision-making process and policy preference, which is rewarding 
when competing before all people115. In other words, party ideology has both roles as 
a party vision and a uniting element or identity.  
 
This thesis takes these four elements as the elements of party 
institutionalisation in order to explain the phenomenon of fragmentation and cohesion 
of Islamic political parties in Indonesia during the Reform Era. 
 
6.  Methodology 
 
The samples for this research are taken from two Islamic political parties in 
Indonesia, namely PKB and PKS. The reasons to select these parties are their 
significant role in Indonesian politics, particularly in the early phases of the Reform 
Era. For instance, the first president in the Reform Era, Abdurrahman Wahid, 
popularly known as Gus Dur, was the prominent leader and the founder of PKB. On 
the other hand, the second General Chairperson of Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat 
(the People’s Consultative Assembly/MPR), the highest body in the Indonesian 
political system, in the Reform Era was Dr. Hidayat Nur Wahid, who was also the 
Second President of PKS. In general, contrary to several ephemeral Islamic parties, 
both are likely to continue playing a significant role in the Indonesian political 
constellation in the future. They also represent two versions of the Islamic political 
mainstream in Indonesia. While PKB tended to be supported by and a representative 
of the traditionalist Muslims, who live mainly in the rural areas, PKS found its 
ideology roots in so called Islamic neo-revivalism or “fundamentalism” which was 
mainly supported by the young, urban and educated Muslims.  
 
Moreover, above all both parties are an excellent example of the failure and 
the success of party institutionalisation respectively in Indonesia, particularly in 
relation to the phenomenon of fragmentation and cohesion in Islamic political parties. 
By exploring these parties, this thesis should be properly able to provide correlations 
between dependent variables (the fragmentation or cohesion of political parties) and 
independent variables (party institutionalisation). 
                                                 
115 Giacomo Sani and Giovanni Sartori, “Polarization, Fragmentation, and Competition in Western 
Democracies”, in Hans Daalder and Peter Mair (eds), Western European Party Systems. Continuity and 
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 This research is descriptive-analytical and will employ qualitative methods.  
By implementing this method, the research will give flexibility in finding data and 
information and creating their interpretation based on experience during the research 
in order to be able to, what Denzin said as, “assemble image into montage”116. This 
thesis could also be categorised as explorative in the way that it will try to find original 
information from significant sources related to the problem of political party 
institutionalisation. The focus of the study is to provide an analytical explanation by 
describing and explaining the phenomena of party fragmentation and cohesion and 
examining this in the role played by specific elements of institutionalisation. 
 
Data collecting for this research will be through in-depth interviews and 
documentary data exploration. The field research method is used to provide first-
hand information and data pertaining to the research problems addressed and in 
order to support or falsify my hypothesis.   
 
Interviews will be undertaken with a range of groups within PKB and PKS:  
the parties’ elites, including members of the each party’s managing board, members 
of the legislative body at a national or local level; and also activists, ordinary party 
members, who do not have organisational position in the party and do not have a 
governmental position at any governmental level and committee members of 
affiliated organisations. By researching these groups, I have aimed to analyse in 
detail the characteristic of thinking, motives and the actions of each party and its 
members and leadership. Interviews will also be carried out with some key figures 
who represent the different sides of groups in conflict within these parties in order to 
maintain a balance. In addition, a number of national intellectuals and political 
observers will also be interviewed. 
 
Interviews will employ “open ended questions” and “informal probing 
techniques”117. Through these techniques, the respondents of this research will have 
the opportunity to freely state and convey their beliefs, information and interpretation 
on the particular issues, phenomena or problems. Nevertheless his method should 
provide an opportunity for the researcher to deeply elaborate many of the points 
                                                 
116 Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, Handbook of Qualitative Research: 2nd Edition, (Sage 
Publication, London, 1994), p.4. 
117 Devine Fiona, “Qualitative Methods”, in David Marsh and Gerry Stocker (eds.), Theory and 
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made by the respondents. For these reasons this research will conduct several 
limited discussions and personal interviews with some key figures and relevant 
respondents.  
 
Documentary research – secondary sources apart – will cover all relevant 
references in the research such as books, newspapers, journals, magazines, tabloids 
and all other data related to the research question. This includes in particular party 
official documents, such as Anggaran Dasar and Anggaran Rumah Tangga (the 
statutes and rules of association/AD/ART), official publications and other kinds of 
documentation on party attitudes and views.  
 
The research will be conducted mainly in four areas, namely Jakarta, (DKI 
Jakarta Province), Depok, Bekasi (West Java Province), Tangerang (Banten 
Province), and Rembang (Central Java Province). The reason for choosing Jakarta is 
not only because that is where the central headquarters of both parties are located, 
but also because this area is the place where several prominent figures of each party 
reside. It is also the place where many very prominent PKB figures, including former 
important cadres from many areas in Indonesia, including Surabaya, usually meet 
and discuss the various problems related to their party. Depok, Tangerang, and 
Bekasi were chosen because these are potential areas for PKS, based on the results 
of the 2004 and 2009 elections, and where some potential interviewees including 
several elites cadres and activists of the party stay. Rembang is a replacement for 
Surabaya that initially was the place to conduct research. This replacement was in 
response to the situation where the writer had a chance to conduct interviews with 
almost all important respondents from Surabaya in Jakarta. Hence it was no longer of 
use to go to the Surabaya. The main reasons to choose Rembang are because of its 
historical role in the establishment process of PKB, where some prominent ulama 
met in this city to draft the constitution of the party. Rembang is also important for the 
existence of several prominent figures, including one of two founding fathers of PKB 
who were still alive when this research was conducted, namely A. Mustafa Bisri.  
 
7.  Structure 
 
This thesis consists of thirteen chapters. Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 
II will elaborate the phenomenon and growth of the Islamic-based political parties 
before the Reform Era. This chapter will mainly focus on the reasons behind the 
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phenomena of fragmentation and cohesion experienced by Islamic parties from the 
beginning of the twentieth century until the New Order period, in order to provide an 
illustration on the continuation of such phenomenon in the history of Indonesian 
Islamic political parties. Chapter III will discuss the socio-political background of PKB. 
This chapter will survey PKB’s ideology, organisational structure and activities. This 
will also enable us to present a number of facts relevant to institutionalisation, such 
as the influence of a political culture background, the history of the party, the rules of 
the game and the characteristics of its elite members’ relationships. Chapter IV will 
elaborate PKS through similar subjects of discussion and objectives as for the 
previous chapter.   
 
Chapter V and Chapter VI will explain the existence of procedural leadership 
in both PKB and PKS. These chapters will explore the elements of this style of 
leadership and how does it correlate with party institutionalisation. The main 
discussion in these chapters is on how both PKB and PKS meet this element of 
procedural leadership and how these parties are affected. Chapter VII and Chapter 
VIII will detail the correlation between the existence of CRM as part of 
institutionalisation and the tendency to be a cohesive party. These chapters will 
explore several important issues related to the serious internal conflict, particularly in 
relation to the cases that explain the rights of the members to formally defend 
themselves and be treated fairly and equally and how both PKB and PKS handle 
these problems.  
 
Chapter IX and Chapter X will elaborate the correlation between the existence 
of systematic cadrerization and the party fragmentation or cohesion. In this regard, 
these chapters will explore the real conditions of party cadrerization both in PKB and 
PKS and how it makes and impact on the parties. This comparison between both 
parties will be based on several cases that show the commitment of the party 
members in dealing with the unity of the party, which, in the end, presumably has to 
do with the conditions of party cadrerization. Chapter XI and Chapter XII will discuss 
the existence and the preservation of shared values in both PKB and PKS. The 
discussion will provide an explanation that correlates the problem of fragmentation 
and cohesion with the commitment to the shared values. The discussion also covers 
several topics such as the development of the shared values, how each party 
maintains them and how this commitment on the shared values finally influences 
party fragmentation and cohesion. 
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Chapter XIII will comprehensively compare the existence or non-existence of 
the elements of party institutionalisation in both parties. By comparing these 
elements, it is hoped that the relation between the element of institutionalisation and 
the phenomenon of party fragmentation in PKB or cohesion in the case of PKS, 
would be more clearly understood. The last part of this chapter is a conclusion that 
mainly discusses the relation between variables, namely party institutionalisation and 





The Development of Islamic Political Parties: 
The Experience of Fragmentation and Cohesion 





1.  The Pre-Independent Era  
  
The phenomenon of the Islamic party’ fragmentation is not something new in 
Indonesia’s political history. It first occurred in Sarekat Islam (the Islamic 
Association/SI), originally a trade union called Sarekat Dagang Islam (the Islamic 
Commerce Association/SDI) established in 1905 by Samanhoedi, a Muslim 
entrepreneur, to pursue indigenous entrepreneurs’ interests, an Islamic organisation 
that later became the first political channel for the interest of the people118. Initially, 
for more than a decade, SI, which in 1930 was transformed into PSII, became a 
political medium for indigenous Muslims. It united almost all Islamic organisations – 
including Muhammadiyah, the largest modernist Islamic organisation and NU, the 
famous representation for the traditionalist Muslims – and many important figures 
from different ideological backgrounds119. Indeed this party, under the leadership of 
Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto120, eventually represented the Muslims and the 
entrepreneurial groups, but also aristocrats, peasants, intellectuals, teachers, social 
activists, the poor, the puritans and even the abangan (the nominal Muslim)121.  
 
                                                 
118 On Sarekat Islam see A.P.E Korver, Sarekat Islam Gerakan ratu Adil?, (Jakarta: Grafiti Press, 
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The first internal fragmentation took place when the members of PSII with 
communism orientation, popularly known as SI-Merah (Red-SI), left the party after 
enduring a long severe and unresolved dispute with non-communist members 
popularly known as SI-Putih (White-SI). Most of Red-SI sympathizers were actually 
also member of Indische Social Deemocratische Vereeneging (the Hindia Social 
Democracy Association/ISDV), the first Marxist group in Indonesia, and had actually 
became cadres of Partai Komunis Hindia (the Hindia Communist Party/PKI) since 
1920. The communist faction, led by Semaun, Alimin, Marco Kartodikromo and 
Darsono, the leaders of Semarang Branch SI122, popularly known among the first 
communist figures in Indonesia’s history, wanted SI to implement Marxism-Leninism 
as the foundation of its struggle. This offer triggered a massive rejection from the 
non-communist wing, which regarded such an opinion as offensive to the Islamic 
teachings as the very foundation of the party’s ideology and orientation. These two 
camps, over time, developed different thoughts and strategies on how to respond to 
the political situation at that time, including in dealing with the colonial government’s 
policies, which sometimes created severe disputes among cadres123.  
 
However, a political manoeuvre of the White-SI camp during the 1921 
National Congress terminated this situation. Led by Agus Salim, Abdoel Moeis and 
Soerjopranoto, the non-Communist camp successfully had a clause introduced into 
the constitution of SI regarding the prohibition to hold dual membership, which was 
opposed by the communist orientated cadres124. Consequently, the communist 
cadres in SI had to leave the party125. They subsequently founded Sarekat Rakyat 
(the People Union), which latter on became a backbone for the PKI’ establishment in 
many local areas. 
 
The second fragmentation was related to a unilateral decision to remove 
some figures, including Soekiman and Soerjopranoto, who were regarded as being 
committed to the indirect humiliation of Tjokroaminoto, the highest leader of SI. This 
                                                 
122 On the Semarang Branch Sarekat Islam see Soe Hok Gie, Di Bawah Lentera Merah, Riwayat 
Sarekat Islam Semarang 1917-1920, (Yogyakarta: Yayasan Bentang Budaya, 1999). Dewi Yuliati, 
Semaoen. Pers Bumiputera dan Radikalisasi Sarekat Islam Semarang, (Semarang: Penerbit Bendera, 
2000). 
123 Safrizal Rambe, Sarekat Islam. Pelopor Bangkitnya Nasionalisme Indonesia 1905-1942, (Jakarta: 
Yayasan Kebangkitan Insan Cendikia, 2010), pp. 111-137. 
124 Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942, (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford 
University Press, 1973), pp. 123-125. 
125 Ibid, p. 125. 
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was related to the financial mistreatment, as unveiled by a special team led by 
Soekiman, in one of the important indigenous organisations namely Persatuan 
Pegawai Pegadaian Hindia (the Hindia Pawnshop Employees Union/PPPH), where 
Tjokroaminoto was a member and seemed to be involved. This depiction resulted in 
the dismissal of Martodiredjo, the leader of PPPH. Although PPPH did not dismiss 
Tjokroaminoto, the work of Soekiman’s team very largely disgraced him. He then 
sought to punish them in revenge. For this reason, although this case actually was 
not related directly to SI, he accused the members of the team of violating SI’s 
internal procedure and its organisational ethics.   
 
According to Tjokroaminoto, as member of SI, the central committee aught 
first to be informed and its approval obtained before making any judgements that 
would affect SI126. The PSII central committee approved Tjokroaminoto’s intention 
and consequently dismissed Soekiman after initially giving him a chance to stay if he 
agreed to apologise for his action towards Tjokroaminoto and publish his 
acknowledgment in the newspaper, which was rejected by Soekiman. This policy 
disappointed some of the local branches, mainly those in Java that regarded such a 
policy as unfair and too severe on Soekiman. In response to his dismissal, after 
having been formally dismissed in 1933 in absentia, supported by some branches of 
PSII that disagreed with central committee’s decision to dismiss him, Soekiman 
established a new Islamic party called the Partai Islam Indonesia (the Indonesian 
Islamic Party/Partii) in the same year127.  
 
The split between PSII’s moderate wing and the rest of the party’s members 
led to the next fragmentation. The moderates, led by Agus Salim, the party’s 
prominent leader after the death of Tjokroaminoto, suggested that the party should 
carry out cooperative strategies to implement their interest against the Dutch colonial 
government128. They considered that this choice was still in line with the basic 
teachings of SI and decided that non-cooperative ways would be an ineffective 
strategy129. This offer was rejected by the majority of the members, who were still 
strongly committed to maintaining non-cooperative ways as the very characteristic of 
                                                 
126 Ibid, pp.139-140. 
127 Ibid, p.157. 
128 On the thinking of Salim about cooperative way see Moh Roem, “Pergerakan Kesadaran dalam 
PSII”, in “Pemandangan”, in Suradi, H. Agus Salim Dan Konflik Politik Dalam Sarekat Islam, (Jakarta: 
Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1997), p. 62. 
129 Ibid, pp.62-63. 
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the organisation. It was actually a reflection of personal conflict between Salim, the 
old figure and former leader of this party, who was also the advisor for cooperative 
ways and Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, the new leader of this party, who represented the 
majority’s interest. Once the Central Committee of PSII had formally rejected the 
cooperative proposal, the moderate group then created a faction inside the party. 
This faction, called Barisan Penyadar PSII (The Self-Realisation Front of the PSII) in 
1936130, as a part of the efforts to bring in to being Salim‘s interest and challenge the 
existence of Abikusno’s leadership131, created confusion among the members. As 
this clique became stronger, the Central Committee of PSII responded to this attempt 
by providing a policy that stated such an attempt as illegal and dismissed Salim and 
his followers132. Salim and his followers then established a new party called 
Pergerakan Penyadar (the Self-Realisation Movement) in 1937133.   
 
The next fragmentation occurred when Sekarmadji M. Kartosuwiryo, one of 
the party’s leaders with the support from eight branches of the party in Central Java, 
created Komite Pembela Keberanan PSII (The Defence Committee of Truth for PSII) 
in 1940 as a response to his dismissal. The KPK-PSII consisted of the followers of 
the PSII who regarded him as a victim of an unfair decision made by the party and 
believed in non-cooperative ways to reassure the implementation of the ideals of 
PSII. On the other hand, the central committee of PSII regarded Kartosuwiryo as a 
figure who had a hidden agenda to lead the party in another direction by introducing 
a new interpretation of its ideology, which was mainly related to mystical and militant 
teachings134. In addition, the party concluded that the radical approaches established 
by Kartosuwiryo, including the rejection of PSII’s attempts to join Gabungan Politik 
Indonesia (the Federation of Indonesian Political Parties/GAPI), a moderate political 
alliance seeking to establish the Indonesia parliament and establish the so called “the 
Islamic State”, would potentially endanger the existence of PSII against the colonial 
government135. 
  
                                                 
130 Rambe, Sarekat Islam. Pelopor Bangkitnya Nasionalisme Indonesia 1905-1942, pp. 259-260. 
131 Marwati Djoened Poesponegoro and Nugroho Notosusanto, Sejarah Nasional Indonesia V Zaman 
Kebangkitan Nasional dan Masa Hindia Belanda, (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 2008), p. 347. 
132 Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942, p. 146. 
133 On the process of this party establishment see Suradi, H. Agus Salim Dan Konflik Politik Dalam 
Sarekat Islam, pp. 67-77. 
134 Ibid, pp. 148-149. 
135 Rambe, Sarekat Islam. Pelopor Bangkitnya Nasionalisme Indonesia 1905-1942, p. 271. 
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The case of internal fragmentation of PSII suggests the inability of an 
ideology loosely comprehended by its members in its handling of the variety of 
backgrounds of political affiliation, idealism, and motives of the members. The 
fragmentation of PSII appears to be logical since the ideology, as a uniting value, 
was actually absent. It indicates also the absence of uniting values among the SI 
members, particularly in the first fragmentation case. This situation provided 
opportunities for members to continue embracing other values, becoming loyal to 
other groups and interpreting the PSII’s ideology in an exclusive manner. The 
existence of a communist group, moderate wing and Kartosuwiryo’s followers 
became the example of this case. Moreover, the fact that many members of this 
party held dual membership generated a deterioration of this situation, as the 
ensuing difficulty was to maintain loyalty. The existence of Semaun, Alimin and 
Darsono and their followers, for instance, shows a good example of the possibility of 
a cadre to join the cadrerization held by two different organisations that is in PSII and 
PKH136 at the same time. In this case, value infusion became an important process 
and accordingly was not implemented correctly.  
 
Moreover, the fragmentation was also the impact of different strategies 
among the cadres. Different strategies held by Salim (cooperative leader) and 
Tjokrosujoso (non-cooperative leader), for instance, played a salient part in creating 
a third fragmentation in this party. Rambe mentions that the different strategies in this 
organisation to deal with the colonial government problem, over the time, had 
triggered conflicts among the cadres137. In addition, PSII’s fragmentation also 
reflected the power of charismatic leaders who occasionally could act beyond the 
rules of the game to convince the members to attain their interests, which sometimes 
was made worse by the non-existence of a fair conflict resolution mechanism thus 
generating disappointment and a deterioration of party cohesion. The dismissal of 
Soekiman and his followers that had humiliated Tjokroaminoto, then generated the 
second fragmentation as shown by this case. 
 
2. The Independent Era (1945-1998) 
  
                                                 
136 Before the establishment of PKH most of Red-SI activists were also the members of the Indische 
Sociaal-Democratische Vereeniging (Indies Social Democratic Association or ISDV), a communist 
organisation established by Henk Sneevliet, which then became the backbone of the communist 
movement in Indonesia. 
137 Rambe, Sarekat Islam. Pelopor Bangkitnya Nasionalisme Indonesia 1905-1942, p. 248. 
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In the early years of the independent era (1945-1952), fragmentations reappeared. 
Partai Politik Islam Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (the Islamic Political Party of 
Consultative Assembly of Indonesian Muslim/Masyumi) became the first party to 
experience party fragmentation. In 1945 in Yogyakarta, the prominent Islamic figures 
and important organisations, including Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (the 
Awakening of Islamic Scholars/NU), the two largest Islamic organisations established 
Masyumi. Initially, this party was created to act as the sole Islamic party to represent 
all Indonesian Muslims. This objective was a reflection on the harmonious 
relationship among Islamic communities in the first years of the independent era. 
This situation was motivated by a similar idealism, such as to protect the country 
from foreign occupation and to preserve the interest of the Muslims138. However, this 
ideal situation did not last long.  
 
In 1947, some of the PSII’s ex-leaders left Masyumi and declared its 
independence. This was triggered by the proposal of Amir Sjarifuddin, as the 
formateur (designated-prime-minister) of a new government formed from Partai 
Sosialis Indonesia (Indonesia Socialist Party/PSI), to those figures to join the 
coalition as the representative of the Islamic element in his government. Just before 
this offer was made, Masyumi had formally stated that it would not join Sjarifuddin. 
This was due to the other elements in the coalition, namely PSI, Partai Nasionalis 
Indonesia (Indonesia Nationalist Party/PNI) and Partai Buruh (Labour Party), did not 
accept the concerns of Masyumi to hold several of the strategic, ministerial posts 
and, in particular, those of prime minister and the minister of defence139.  
 
The ex-leaders of the PSII, Arudji Kartawinata and Wondoamiseno, 
considered the proposal as a chance to revitalize PSII and in particular, their position 
in national politics. For this reason, they confirmed the re-establishment of PSII as an 
independent party and joined the coalition140. According to Deliar Noer, this situation 
                                                 
138 Furthermore, the organisational structure of Masyumi also contributed to preserve the harmony 
since it contained almost all the prominent Islamic figures and provided a proper and balanced position 
for them. The important figures from the traditionalist groups, mainly Islamic scholars from the NU 
such as Hasyim Asyhari and Wahab Chasbullah, mostly filled the Majelis Syura, which its main duty 
was to give direction and act as a legislative body for the party. Meanwhile, the politicians, 
professionals and many important figures from the modernist camps led the Dewan Tanfidziah, which 
was an executive body of the party, to implement the policy of the party. 
139 Yusril Ihza Mahendra, Modernisme dan Fundamentalisme dalam Politik Islam, Perbandingan 
Partai Masyumi (Indonesia) dan Partai Jamaat-i-Islami (Pakistan), (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1999), 
p.130. 
140 Deliar Noer, Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional. Kisah dan Perkembangan Politik Indonesia 1945-
1965, (Mizan: Bandung, 2000), p.81. 
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was actually in line with the interests of ex-PSII members to re-establish the party in 
some local areas, which afterwards, in 1943, the Japanese colonial government 
dissolved this party. They believed that the PSII reestablishment would enabled them 
to be more independent in conducting their interests and, most of all, to become one 
of the key political groups in the national political constellation141.   
 
Prior to the 1955 Election, the second fragmentation occurred in Masyumi. It 
took place when NU, as another main pillar of Masyumi and was one of Special 
Members142 of this party that was also the foremost representation of the 
traditionalist group in Indonesia, declared that it had left Masyumi in 1952. The core 
of the problem of this separation was based on at least three factors. The first, 
related to the different points of view vis-à-vis the role of ulama in the party’s 
organisational structure. This eventually became an ideological issue as for NU since 
it related to the position of ulama as being the most important element in its belief143 
and existence144. To NU, ulama should be elevated to the highest position in the 
party both as an advisor and as an executor, similar to what happened in Dewan 
Syuriah (the Board of Assembly) of NU. It would give ulama a holistic role in the 
organisation to guide the party along the best path.  
                                                
 
However, in Masyumi, most of the ulama, particularly with NU background, 
were placed in Majelis Syuro (the Consultative Assembly), an advisory body and 
played merely as advisors for Dewan Pimpinan Pusat (the Central Executive 
Board)145. This position indeed limited their role in daily decision-making process and 
 
141 Ibid, p.82. 
142 Anggota Istimewa (Special Member) was a status given to the organisations, and not to individuals, 
that formally declared its political affiliation to the Masyumi. During the existence of the Masyumi 
there were eight organisations that were given this status namely the NU, Muhammadiyah, Persatuan 
Islam, Persatuan Umat Islam, Al-Irsyad, Jam’iyatul Wasliyah, Al-Ittihadiyah dan Persatuan Ulama 
Seluruh Aceh (PUSA).Mahendra, op.cit, pp. 182-183. 
143 Greg Fealy, Ijtihad Politik Ulama. Sejarah NU 1952-1967, (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2003), pp. 23-24. 
This was also to some extent regarded as an assault on the very foundation of the ideology of the NU 
that actually legitimized the supreme position of the ulama, as a medium of socialization for values and 
Islamic teachings traditionally adhered to by this community from generation to generation. Hence  the 
ulama is regarded as a chain of the propagation of the teaching of Islamic teachings which were taught 
and practiced by the four best friends of the prophet and the next generations of the followers 
afterwards. 
144 Mahrus Irsyam, Ulama dan Partai Politik Upaya Mengatasi Krisis, (Jakarta: Yayasan 
Perkhidmatan, 1984), p.84. 
145 In relation to this, some scholars believe that the organisational structure change, stipulated in 1949 
by the National Congers in Palembang, which transformed the position of the Majelis Syuro from a 
legislative body to be just an advisory body, had triggered disappointment among the NU’s people. See 
for example, Irsyam, Ulama dan Partai Politik Upaya Mengatasi Krisis, p.27. Noer Partai Islam di 
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activities in this party. The daily life of the party, including assessing political 
strategies matters, was determined mostly by the Central Executive Board, 
consisting predominantly the politicians and professional. The limited role of ulama, 
supported by the modernist wing that regards party management as something that 
to be maintained by the professionals regardless their religious background, was 
understood by NU as a clear tendency to underestimate the existence of ulama146.  
 
The second factor was related to the failure of the NU to hold the minister of 
religion’s post in the newly formed cabinet, named the Wilopo Cabinet (1952-1953). 
To NU, its eagerness to pursue such a position was not only related to the matter of 
simply gaining a political position, but also to part of the struggle to obtain fairness in 
the party147. Indeed, in the previous governments, where the Masyumi was the 
leader or a part of the coalition, Muhammadiyah (the modernist Islamic organisation) 
cadres gained more positions compared to NU. For this reason, Wahab Chasbullah, 
the highest leader of NU who was also a member of Majelis Syuro of Masyumi, 
asked the Masyumi’s central committee to accommodate the interest of NU, as the 
largest Islamic organisation and element in Masyumi148. Moreover, after having lost 
his patience, he eventually met Wilopo personally to discuss it without initially having 
a consultation with the party149, regretted by many members of Masyumi150. Masyumi 
eventually answered Chasbullah’s demand by holding an internal election to 
determine who would be the representative of the Masyumi for such a position. The 
result was far from NU’s hopes. Faqih Usman, one of the Muhammadiyah’s 
prominent figures, gained the majority of the votes and won the election151.  
                                                                                                                                            
Pentas Nasional. Kisah dan Perkembangan Politik Indonesia 1945-1965, p. 86. However, according to 
Yusril Ihza Mahendra, the rules of the game on the position of Majelis Syuro in the Masyumi had never 
actually been changed by the party. The Masyumi, according to Mahendra, consistently placed the 
Majelis Syuro as an advisory body and never put this body in a position to undertake legislative duties 
since its establishment. Mahendra, Modernisme dan Fundamentalisme dalam Politik Islam, 
Perbandingan Partai Masyumi (Indonesia) dan Partai Jamaat-i-Islami (Pakistan), p. 125. 
146 Some people even labelled the Masyumi as “the party that disrespected the ulama”, Noer, Partai 
Islam di Pentas Nasional. Kisah dan Perkembangan Politik Indonesia, 1945-1965, p. 86. 
147 The NU regarded that since four of five positions of ministerial posts for the Masyumi in the new 
cabinet had been provided for other elements, it was sufficiently fair if the NU demanded to hold the 
last position in the cabinet.   
148 Fealy, Ijtihad Politik Ulama. Sejarah NU 1952-1967, pp. 109-113.  
149 Ibid, p.114. 
150 Noer, Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional. Kisah dan Perkembangan Politik Indonesia, 1945-1965, p. 
92. 
151 Other candidates are Osman Raliby, Kasman Singodimedjo, Haji Ilyas Ja’cob, Ali Akbar, Zainal 
Abidin Ahmad, Masjkur and Fathurrahman (the last two persons were from the NU). Noer, Partai 
Islam di Pentas Nasional. Kisah dan Perkembangan Politik Indonesia 1945-1965, p.92. Mahendra, 
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 The third factor was the development of the number of politicians in NU. In 
this regard, the existence of a new political medium to exercise their interests 
became important. Accordingly, the segregation from Masyumi was eventually 
regarded as a chance to manage their political organisation independently and 
advance the position of NU in the national political constellation, something that could 
not be attained, if it held the status merely of a “special member” in Masyumi152. 
Furthermore, by gaining independence, they would also be more advanced in 
achieving economic advantages and a better political status153. The existence of a 
charismatic ulama figure, particularly their most prominent leader, Chasbullah, 
became a supporting factor that inspired most of NU’s politicians and members by 
the importance of a new organisation that could serve their interests. 
 
It was the exclusive commitment particularly that related to the exclusive 
preservation of political interest or the protection of leading positions in the 
government, which motivated PSII to leave Masyumi and became one of the main 
reasons behind each of two Masyumi fragmentations. On the other hand, the issues 
on the limited role of ulama, also touching essentially the ideological position of NU 
and contributing to worsen the situation. It was possible for this to happen since the 
value infusion and uniting values were absent. This situation not only led to the 
creation of a different level of understanding and lessened the sense of unity, but 
also eventually encouraged each element inside the party to put forward its interest 
first and overrule the interests of the party.  
 
During this era, also popularly known as the Liberal Democracy Era (1945-
1959), it was not only Masyumi party that experienced fragmentation. In 1956, the 
“new” PSII also experienced fragmentation. This party was divided into two camps, 
namely PSII Abikusno Tjokrosujoso (PSII-Abikusno) and PSII Arudji Kartawinata – 
Anwar Tjokroaminoto (PSII-Arudji/Anwar). This division began in 1953 with the 
suspension of Tjokrosujoso, the leader of the party in 1930s who was also the son of 
Tjokroaminoto. The party suspended him for his decision to take in secret the 
ministry of public services position in Ali Sastroamidjojo’s Government (1953-1955) 
                                                                                                                                            
Modernisme dan Fundamentalisme dalam Politik Islam, Perbandingan Partai Masyumi (Indonesia) 
dan Partai Jamaat-i-Islami (Pakistan), p. 135. 
152 Mahendra, Modernisme dan Fundamentalisme dalam Politik Islam, Perbandingan Partai Masyumi 
(Indonesia) dan Partai Jamaat-i-Islami (Pakistan), pp. 150-151. 
153 Fealy, Ijtihad Politik Ulama. Sejarah NU 1952-1967, pp. 117-118. 
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or without initially reporting to the party. As one of the most senior and highly 
respected members, mainly due to his service to the party, this decision disappointed 
him. In such a situation, Arudji, the initiator of PSII’s reestablishment and Anwar, the 
brother of Tjokroaminoto, then held the leadership of the party.  
 
However, in 1955, due to his indispensable position in the party, the party 
released Tjokrosujoso from his punishment. Tjokrosujoso’s position in the party 
remained strong, even though he was non-active. In fact, many cadres hoped that he 
would be the leader of the party in the next year. He regarded this situation as a 
support for him to build a new committee that would be different from the previous 
one. In the 1956 National Congress, as predicted previously, Tjokrosujoso was 
elected to be the person to be in charge of setting up a new committee for PSII. By 
using this opportunity, he then tried to establish a central committee based on his 
own interests. It meant to reduce the influence of Arudji/Anwar and their followers 
who according to him and his supporters was “a clique of anti-SI” in PSII154.  
 
However, Tjokrosujoso never achieved this objective. Political manoeuvres by 
his opponents, mainly from the previous committee that was worried about the 
internal radical change, made it impossible for him to establish a new committee. 
According to Tjokrosujoso, the opposing group had manipulated and sabotaged the 
process of forming a new committee in order to save their position in the party by 
cancelling the policies that he made155. However, in the opinion of the Arudji-Anwar 
camp, the accused group, which then became a formal opinion of the PSII, 
Tjokrosujoso had tried to abuse the mechanism by regarding himself as the only 
formateur and discharging the role of four others, including Arudji and Anwar156. They 
believed that such efforts were unacceptable and broke the law.  
 
After that, each camp regarded itself as a legitimate group and then created a 
committee. Both committees then held their own activities including conducting 
national conferences and establishing local committees. In 1960, President 
Soekarno, however, under an authoritarian political system, only acknowledged the 
                                                 
154 Institute of History Department of General Affairs PSII, Short History of PSII, (1960), p.32. 
155 Lembaga Sejarah Departemen Urusan Umum LT PSII, “Keringkasan Sejarah (Kronologie) Syariat 
Islam, 10 September 1912-10 September 1960”, (1960), in Noer, Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional. 
Kisah dan Perkembangan Politik Indonesia 1945-1965, p. 84. 
156 “Ikhtisar Kongres-Kongres Syarikat Islam”, (1972), pp.19-20, ibid, p.84 
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existence of PSII-Arudji/Anwar. Consequently, PSII-Abikusno becoming formally 
illegitimate and terminated its activities. 
  
The end of the democracy era, marked by the resolution to re-implement the 
1945 Constitution signed by President Soekarno on July 5 1959, signified the 
termination of the Islamic party’s fragmentation for more than four decades. 
President Soekarno established a new political system called Demokrasi Terpimpin 
(the Guided Democracy), supported by the military group, where it became the 
centre for almost all the political activity in Indonesia157. He limited the role of the 
political parties and disbanded many parties, including two influential parties namely 
Masyumi and PSI158. The three other Islamic parties, namely NU, PSII and 
Persatuan Tarbiyah Indonesia (The Islamic Education Association/Perti), like other 
parties159, that had been kept in existence by Soekarno160, indeed became 
fundamentally powerless and ineffective to voice the interest of the people against 
the new regime. 
the life of national politics as “the non-party system”161. The parties’ interest mainly 
 
In this situation, in essence, the party played no role. Affan Gaffar described 
                                                 
157 Harold Crouch, Militer dan Politik di Indonesia, (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1986). 
158 Both the Masyumi and the PSI were regarded as the main enemy of the new regime, particularly for 
their stubborn rejection of the new model of government. Ahmad Syafii Maarif, Islam dan Politik: 
Teori Belah Bambu, Masa Demokrasi Terpimpin, 1959-1965, (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 1996), p.61 
and 70-75. Mahendra, op.cit, p. 51. They became an architect in the establishment of Liga Demokrasi 
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the Masyumi, the involvement of some prominent figures, such as M. Natsir, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara 
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party in 1960. To some, this movement, even though it involved military action, was close to a show of 
force movement rather than a real rebellious movement. The main objectives of this movement were to 
erase the influence of the communist group in Indonesia and to demand a better balance of power 
between the Java and non-Java representation in the national government, which at that time tended to 
be a “Javanese Government”. See R.Z Leirissa, PRRI Permesta: Startegi Membangun Indonesia tanpa 
Percaturan dalam Konstituante, (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1985), pp. 189-191. 
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159 Except to some extent the PKI, that at that time was getting stronger and was regarded by the 
military as a serious rival. 
160 Namely the Partai Nasionalis Indonesia (Indonesia Nationalist Party/PNI), Partai Komunis 
Indonesia (Indonesia Communist Party/PKI), Partai Katolik (Catholic Party), Partai Kristen Indonesia 
(Indonesia Christian Party/Parkindo), Ikatan Pendukung Ke
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161 Affan Gafar, “Sistem Kepartaian yang Hegemonik dan Terobosan Demokrasi Indonesia”, in Amir 
Effendy Siregar (dkk), “Percikan Pemikiran Fisipol UGM t
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was to preserve and to protect their existence, which was equal to becoming a 
loyalist to Soekarno. Their religious affiliation backgrounds of NU and Perti for the 
traditionalists and of PSII representing the modernists, provided difficulty in 
establishing trust and a strong alliance among themselves. 
 
However, during Soekarno’s Guided Democracy Era (1959-1966), all Islamic 
parties were able to avoid internal fragmentation. The restriction on the number of 
political party policies held by Soekarno were to become essential, since an 
increased awareness grew among the members of the party of the negative effect of 
internal fragmentation, which would potentially endanger their fragile and limited 
existence in national politics. Moreover, there was no guarantee that each conflicting 
group would subsequently be approved by the president for them to continue to exist 
in the political world, similar to what occurred in the case of PSII-Abikusno. In other 
words, the external factor, namely Indonesia’s political system at that time, supported 
the creation of party cohesion. As for NU, the awareness to defend the interest of the 
traditionalist Muslims happened to be another focal point that fairly contributed to 
avoiding the party having an internal fragmentation162.      
 
In the New Order period (1966-1998), party fragmentation in the Islamic camp 
did not occur but internal conflict did. The new political system, established by the 
Soeharto Government only allowed one party to represent the interests of the Islamic 
communities. The new regime believed that political stability was a fundamental 
prerequisite for a rapid economic growth required tight control of any political 
institution163. To the New Order, it meant to allow a little room for the political parties 
to manoeuvre, with the exception of Golkar as the government party that enjoyed 
free and direct access to the people. For this reason, this regime not only imposed 
Pancasila as the sole ideology to be adhered to by any of the organisations in 
Indonesia, but also provided a fusion policy for the political parties in 1973, which 
consequently reduced the number of parties from ten to three164.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
Fisipol UGM, 1990), p. 19, in Kamarudin, Partai Politik Islam di Pentas Reformasi. Refleksi Pemilu 
1999 untuk Pemilu 2004, (Jakarta: Visi Publishing, 2003), p.24. 
162 Fealy, Ijtihad Politik Ulama. Sejarah NU 1952-1967. 
163 Mohtar Mas’oed, Ekonomi dan Struktur Politik Orde Baru 1966-1971, (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1989).  
164 M. Rusli Karim, Perjalanan Partai-Partai Politik: Sebuah Potret Pasang Surut, (Jakarta: Rajawali 
Press, 1993). As for non-Islamic parties, they were merged into a new political party namely Indonesia 
Democratic Party (PDI). PNI, Catholic Party, Parkindo, IPKI, and Murba. 
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All the political parties with an Islamic ideological background, that is NU, 
PSII, Perti and Partai Muslimin Indonesia (the Indonesia Muslim Party/Parmusi), 
were merged into a new party called Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (the United 
Development Party/PPP). Once again, the Islamic party became a trans-ideological 
party, consisting both of modernist and traditionalist Islam wings. With this policy, the 
New O
r time, PPP’s role in national politics tended to be insignificant and 
erely secured this position as a complementary element in the national political 
                                                
rder party’s system model made fragmentation become impossible.  
 
However, PPP, particularly towards the end of the 1970’s and the beginning 
of the 1980’s, experienced a prolonged internal conflict. It was mainly triggered by 
competition among the elements, particularly between NU representing the 
traditionalist group and Parmusi representing predominantly the modernist camp165. 
Generally, both elements wanted to spread their influence inside the party and gain a 
possible maximum many of the political strategic positions in national politics and in 
particular gaining more seats in parliament. Although NU was the largest element in 
PPP, Parmusi, to some extent, was able to lead the party and made such NU’ 
conditions become less influential. After the implementation of several unfair policies 
supported by Parmusi, as will be mentioned in the next chapter, in 1982 NU then 
decided to leave PPP. However, NU still allowed its members as individuals to join 
PPP. In 1985 PPP, based on the new regulation enforced by the New Order, had to 
embrace the Pancasila as its ideological base and replaced the Ka’bah with the Star 
as its symbol. This situation essentially reduced its image as an Islamic party and 
gave Golkar the opportunity to be a serious competitor in attracting many Muslim 
voters166. Ove
m




The development of the Islamic parties discussed above suggests that there were 
several aspects of internal fragmentation. The ideology factor was one of the reasons 
for the fragmentation. This included the dispute between the followers of two different 
ideologies inside a party and the disputes related to the different understanding and 
 
165 Syamsuddin Haris, PPP dan Politik Orde Baru, (Jakarta: Grasindo, 1991). 
166 Golkar’s efforts, for instance. were conducted by continually using regime-friendly ulama in 
approaching the voters and spreading religious jargon and agenda in its political campaigns and 
providing material aids for religious activities and development. On the role of Ulama ini Golkar see 
Heru Cahyono, Peran Ulama dan Golkar, 1971-1980, (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1992). 
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interpretation of one particular ideology. The severe contradiction between “the Red-
SI” and “the White-SI” represents the first situation. The quarrel between the 
moderate wings and the rest of PSII’s members on the party’s strategy is a good 
example of the latter. The case of party fragmentation in the Pre-reform Era indicates 
that the existence of ideology had become an important element, which influenced 
the creation of unity and disunity inside the party. The dispute pertaining to the 
direction that the party should take to respond to the political situation, particularly 
between the moderate or cooperative and the radical or non-cooperative ways, had 
become the rationale behind party fragmentation. It is quite reasonable to conclude 
that since the ideology as had been believed by some scholars, should play a very 
basic role in giving the party direction and become a key element in uniting the 
embers of the party, the absence of a solid ideology that brings unity among the 
membe
n still occurred. In other words, fragmentation 
also happened in the political parties who did not have any problems with their 
interna
                                                
m
rs would potentially deteriorate party’ solidity.  
 
Moreover, party fragmentation in the Pre-reform Era was more likely to 
happen in the situation where a party practised as a “federation body”, consisting 
Islamic groups with different background of political thoughts and interests. It 
happened to PSII (before the Independence Era) and to some extent to Masyumi. 
Generally, fragmentation was mainly related to the difficulty to create uniting values 
among the groups. This situation, according to Feith, infers that stringent 
membership criteria were actually absent during the party’s life167. After some of the 
critical elements had left the party and “purification” took place, the party acted more 
exclusively as the representation of a certain group and solidity tended to occur. This 
indicates that when a party became a medium for one particular political ideology, the 
tendency to be fragmented was less likely to occur and vice versa. During the 
Reform Era, however, the situation was considerably different. Every single Islamic 
party had been dedicated to be the representative of one Islamic political stream and 
at least one main community. However, although they did not have any intention to 
act as a federation body, fragmentatio
l existence of other ideologies.  
 
Furthermore, the dependency on party figures became another reason that 
aught to be taken into account as causing the party fragmentation. The patron-client 
 
167 Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, (Itacha: Cornell University 
Press, 1962), p. 122.  
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relationship still dominantly influenced the political culture, where people tended to 
entirely invest their political interest in the elites that made this happen. The fact that 
personal leadership168 rather than procedural leadership still played a salient role in 
these parties was a major example that showed the absence of party 
institutionalisation. Sometimes their special position could overtake the procedural 
mechanism that created controversy and became the focal point of dispute and 
disappointment. This type of situation also generated conflicts of interests among the 
elites who far too much dominated the life of the party. This occurred due to the 
power of the relations at that time which mainly embraced the elites’ interests. The 
self-withdrawal of PSII from Masyumi in 1947 was related to its elites’ attempts to 
gain a more powerful position in the government. A similar situation in 1952 became 
also one of the main reasons for NU leaving Masyumi, the spilt of PSII in 1956 and 
Soekim
, when party members form the NU left the party and 
                                                
an’s dismissal in 1933. 
 
In addition to the above, the development of Islamic political parties indicates 
that the complexity of Islamic teachings provided the opportunity for a different 
understanding of them when the Muslims used them as the foundation for their 
political activities. The history of political Islam shows a deep and prolonged conflict 
among the Muslims, which occurred due to different understanding in conducting 
Islam as political ideology or as a basis for making a political strategy. The case of 
the Indonesian Islamic parties indicates that they are not an exception to this 
phenomenon. The different opinions on how to establish a political strategy, like in 
the case of the PSII for instance, had triggered fragmentation. In other words, beside 
the failure of upholding party institutionalisation dimensions, the different 
interpretations on Islam and to some extent the Islamic teachings themselves gave 
opportunity for every Muslims to establish their own understanding, which eventually 
played an important role in damaging party unity.  This condition, then, sometimes 
was worsened by the existence of a “communal loyalty” that took time to evaporate 
when a cadre of an Islamic organisation became a party cadre. In such situation, the 
party cadres sometimes tried to defend or put forward the interest of their previous 
organisation, for instance in order to preserve or gain strategic positions inside the 
party. This attitude sometimes became the core problems of disharmonic relations 
between cadres with different Islamic organisations or affiliation backgrounds. The 
case of Masyumi split in 1962
 
168 In which the relatives of the founding fathers clan could play a salient role inside the party. Noer, 
Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional. Kisah dan Perkembangan Politik Indonesia, 1945-1965, p.80. 
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the case of prolonged conflict between NU and Parmusi members inside PPP 
indicate
ntation could happen in the 
uthoritarian Era. For this reason, the role of the political system as an external 
factor t
hich some 
of them relate to the problem of institutionalisation. In the Reform Era, some of these 
reasons re-emerge as the existence of a revitalised, democratic system.  
s the above situation. 
 
In addition, the political system as an external factor determined the existence 
of the political parties and to some extent also played a role in creating the party’s 
fragmentation or cohesion. Indeed, the fragmentation in the Islamic political camps 
was absent in Indonesia during the authoritarian regimes, whereas two democratic 
periods became witnesses for party’ fragmentations. However, a democratic system 
actually did not really serve as a medium for party fragmentation. The fact that Partai 
Keadilan Sejahtera (The Prosperous Justice Party/PKS), in the first decade of the 
Reform Era, was able to maintain its cohesion; this indicates the possibility to avoid 
fragmentation in the era where freedom of action and expression, which at a practical 
level allows everybody to be different and independent, is entirely supported by the 
regime. On the other hand, the case of Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (the Indonesian 
Democratic Party/PDI), a tiny secular party, established by the New Order in 1973, 
was split into two groups in 1996, namely “PDI-Suryadi” and “PDI-Megawati” and on 
the edge of the New Order Era, indicates that fragme
A
o party fragmentation is actually still debatable.  
 
The above explanation also suggests the existence of many factors and not a 
single factor behind the phenomenon of fragmentation and cohesion, in w
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Chapter III 





1.  Background to PKB’s Emergence 
 
The establishment of PKB reflected the strong eagerness of the people of NU to 
have their own political party that could comprehensively strive for their interests. 
PKB was an answer towards the unhappy feeling of NU’s people on their place in 
politics, related to the fact that for decades, none of the existing political parties had 
fairly represented their interests. This included PPP as the party to which the majority 
of NU members channelled their votes and NU became its strongest supporter. The 
statement from Cholil Bisri, one of NU’s prominent figures, represents this feeling: 
 
“Now is the time for NU to break the fast, after more that 32 years 
fasting from the political life which made its existence was torn to 
shreds… if we could associate the condition of the NU to one who 
was left behind and even spat after helping somebody whose car 
had  broken down169 .”         
 
Throughout Indonesia’s modern political history, NU was one of the most 
important parties. It was the largest Islamic party in Indonesia, particularly after the 
dismissal of Masyumi170 in 1960 and until the fusion of Islamic parties in 1973. During 
the political transformation era in the mid of 1960s, prior to the establishment of the 
New Order, NU played significant roles by not only giving a hand to eliminate 
                                                 
169 A. Effendy Choirie, PKB Politik Jalan Tengah NU, (Jakarta: Pustaka Ciganjur, 2002), p. 174. 
170  Masyumi was the largest Islamic political party, until Soekarno dissolved this party in December 
1960. The Masyumi was established in November 1945 in Jogjakarta by prominent Islamic 
organisations namely Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, Sarekat Islam, Persatuan Umat Islam and 
Perikatan Umat Islam. It was projected as the only Islamic party for the Indonesian Muslims, but failed 
after the Sarekat Islam element left this party in 1947 and subsequently the NU in 1952. In the 1955 
Election, the Masyumi attained 52 seats in the Majelis Konstituante (the Peoples’ Assembly) and 
together with the Partai Nasional Indonesia (the Indonesian National Party/PNI) became the largest 
faction in the parliament. In the meantime, the NU obtained 45 seats in the Peoples’ Assembly. On the 
Masyumi see Yusril Ihza Mahendra, Modernisme dan Fundamentalisme dalam Politik Islam, 
Perbandingan Partai Masyumi (Indonesia) dan Partai Jamaat-i-Islami (Pakistan), (Jakarta: 
Paramadina, 1999). 
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communist groups, namely PKI and its affiliated organisations171, but also 
contributing to legitimate and to support the existence of the new regime172. Such 
contribution can be observed from the existence of prominent figures of NU, one of 
them being M. Subchan Z.E as one of the vice chairpersons173, in the meetings of 
Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara (the Provisional People’s Consultative 
Assembly/MPRS) in the late 1960s that provided a legal foundation for the 
establishment of the New Order.  
 
In the early years of the New Order period, NU still could preserve its 
existence as the most important Islamic political party. This can be seen form the 
result of the 1971 Election, in which NU became the runner up and gained almost 
similar percentage of the vote with the 1955 Election (see table 3). Furthermore, 
based on the 1971 Election, NU became the biggest element inside PPP, the only 
Islamic party during the New Order. PPP was established in 1973, following fusi (the 
merging) of all Islamic parties174. 
 
Tabel 3 
The 1971 Election Result 
 
PARTIES VOTES % SEATS 
Golkar 34,348,673 62.82 236 
NU 10,213,650 18.68 58 
Parmusi 2,930,746 5.36 24 
PNI 3,793,266 6.93 20 
PSII 1,308,237 2.39 10 
Parkindo 733,359 1.34 7 
Partai Katolik 603,740 1.10 3 
Perti 381,309 0.69 2 
IPKI 338,403 0.61 0 
Murba 48,126 0.08 0 
Total 54,669,509 100.00 360 
       Source: www.kpu.go.id 
 
                                                 
171 Greg Fealy, Ijtihad Politik Ulama, Sejarah NU 1952-1967, (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2003), pp. 299-340. 
See also Hermawan Sulistyo, Palu Arit di Ladang Tebu, (Jakarta: Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia, 
2006). 
172 Fealy, Ijtihad Politik Ulama, Sejarah NU 1952-1967, pp. 341-259. 
173 The Leadership of the MPRS (1967-1972) consisted of General Abdul Haris Nasution 
(Chairperson), H.M Subchan Z.E (Vice Chairperson), Osa Maliki (Vice Chairperso), M. Siregar (Vice 
Chairperson), Brigadier General Mashudi (Vice Chairperson).  
174 Other Islamic parties that joined the merger were the Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesia 
Muslimin Party/Parmusi) that later on was popularly known as the Muslimin Indonesia (MI), PSII or 
Sarekat Islam (SI), and the Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah (Islamic Education United /Perti). 
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However, at the practical level, the fact that NU was the second biggest party 
in the 1971 Election was not matched by an equal role in the political world. At the 
party level, the role and existence of NU in PPP was continually marginalised by 
other elements in PPP particularly exponents of the Indonesian Muslimin (MI). Even 
though in the early years NU obtained three of four strategic positions in this party, 
namely the president of the party, the chairperson of party advisory assembly and the 
chairperson of legislative assembly, NU actually could not control the real activities of 
the party.  
 
In reality, the role of the general chairperson, another important body held by 
MI element, became the most powerful and determining variable in PPP, which 
sometimes neglected the existence of other bodies and created oligarchy inside the 
party175. The decision-making process mechanism in this party gave opportunity to 
the general chairperson to decide something independently176. The lack of effective 
and decisive figures and the tendency of having disunity177 among NU’s cadres 
became another reason why in reality NU tended to lose and to follow the interest of 
other elements inside PPP. Moreover, the political support from the regime towards 
non-NU elements, which at that time tended to be cooperative to the regime, 
increased confidence among non-NU elements to stipulate internal policies based on 
their exclusive interests.  
 
The implication of this situation was the emergence of many internal policies 
that worsened the position of NU. Worst was the elimination of many prominent 
figures of NU from the list of Member of Parliament candidate prior to the 1982 
Election178. This controversial decision was stipulated by the elites of PPP, 
particularly by Jaelani Naro as the General Chairperson of PPP, from MI element, 
and his inner circle, without initially having intense consultation with others in NU. 
This action was not only to strengthen the position of MI element in the party and 
parliament, but also to reduce conflict between the regime and the party by 
eliminating NU critical figures. The last objectives showed the close relation between 
Naro and the regime, which demonstrate his opportunist tendency. The political 
                                                 
175 Syamsuddin Haris, PPP dan Politik Orde Baru, (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1991), p.76. 
176 Ibid, pp. 73-74. 
177 On the NU internal conflict see, for instance, Mahrus Irsyam, Ulama dan Partai Politik. Upaya 
Mengatasi Krisis, (Jakarta: Yayasan Perkhidmatan, 1984), pp. 83-163. 
178 Haris, PPP dan Politik Orde Baru, pp. 69-72. 
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situation of NU became worse after Naro, the new leader of the party, dissolved all 
those strategic positions obtained by NU before 1984. This weakened the position of 
NU and its figures almost entirely179.  
 
Moreover, the agreement on the proportion of the seats for each element in 
legislative body was continually violated. As the result, NU only gained 45 seats in 
the 1982 Election from 58 seats that were originally promised (see table 4). The 
number of important positions for NU in the legislative body also decreased. MI took 
over the position of the chairperson of the VII Commission, one of the more important 
commissions in the parliament that responsible to the matters of trade, financial and 
the central bank, without having permission from NU as the real owner of that 
position based on the previous internal party agreement. However, with the support 
of government groups, namely Fraksi Karya Pembangunan (the Functional 
Development Faction/FKP) and Fraksi Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (the 
Republic of Indonesia Armed Forces Faction/FABRI), in voting process to determine 
the chairperson for this commission, this expropriation became possible180. At the 
executive branch, the political position of NU also deteriorated. NU was not only 
unable to hold the position of the Ministry of Religion, the position that was 
traditionally held by this organisation since the independence era, but also in general 




The DPR Seats Proportion of  
Each Element in PPP 
 






NU 58 56 45 
MI 24 25 34 
PSII 10 14 11 
Perti 2 4 4 
Total 94 99 94 
                           Source: PPP dan Politik Orde Baru, (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1991), p.143 
 
                                                 
179 NU never had an opportunity to hold the position of general chairperson of PPP, until Hamzah Haz 
elected as the new leader of this party in the beginning of the Reform Era. 
180 Haris, PPP dan Politik Orde Baru, pp. 67-68. 
181 One of important reasons was NU’s lack of qualified human resources to deal with the many 
modern and contemporary technical matters. H. Rozikin Daman, Membidik NU Dilema Percaturan 
Politik NU Pasca Khittah, (Yogyakarta: Gama Media, 2001), p. 148. 
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This state of affairs eventually became the main reason for NU to leave PPP. 
The internal decision on the banner of the Khittah 1926 (return to the spirit of 1926) in 
the 27th Annual Congress of NU in Situbondo confirmed and legitimatised this 
political attitude. The Khittah policy itself encouraged NU to return to their 
fundamental interests, in which social, education and religious development matters 
once again should regain priority182. But by concentrating only on such matters, the 
role of NU as an institution in PPP and generally in national politics effectively came 
to an end. In such circumstance, the bargaining position of the NU in real politics was 
weak. 
 
Against this political background, it can be understood that the establishment 
of PKB related to the attempts to revive the role of the NU in politics. In that sense, 
PKB became a symbol of the awakening of NU in the national political arena, to 
struggle for the interests and political orientations of NU; although it is not the only 
party that represents the existence of NU communities during the first decade of the 
Reform Era183.    
 
The efforts to present PKB in the national politics came not long after the fall 
of Soeharto. NU people across the nation, particularly in Java, sent proposals to 
Pengurus Besar Nahdlatul Ulama (the Central Board of Islamic Scholars 
Awakening/PBNU) to establish a new party184. The prominent figures of NU generally 
responded positively to this aspiration185. In response, PBNU reacted carefully. This 
was because the policy of Khittah 1926, which decrees NU not to directly engage in 
political activities, is still the foundation of the organisation. Abdurrahman Wahid, the 
grandson of the founder of the NU Hasyim Asyari who latter on became the first 
president in the reform era and popularly known as “Gus Dur”, as the General 
                                                 
182 Ibid, pp. 167-176. See also Kacung Marijan, Quo Vadis NU. NU setelah Khittah 1926, (Surabaya: 
Penerbit Erlangga, 1992). 
183 Although the PKB was set up mainly to represent the interests of the NU, as will be explained in the 
next section, at heart its followers realised that the role of the party should not exclusively be dedicated 
to the interests of the NU. In fact, they believed that the function of the PKB will go beyond the 
interests of the NU. This thinking became the reason behind the choice of PKB as the name of the party 
and not other names such as for instance: the Partai Kebangkitan Ulama or the Partai Kebangkitan 
Ummat. 
184 Choirie, PKB Politik Jalan Tengah NU, p. 181-182. See also www.dpp-pkb.or.id 
185 Of the proposals for the party’s establishment, was the draft from the Lajnah Sebelas Rembang, 
headed by M. Cholil Bisri and Pengurus Wilayah Nahdlatul Ulama (PWNU) West Java that were the 
most comprehensive proposals. 
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Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidziyah (the Executive Board) of PBNU initially rejected 
the possibility for PBNU to involve in the establishment of a party.  
 
However, PBNU could no longer avoid the growing aspiration of its followers 
to have their own party that would serve their aspirations. Eventually PBNU agreed to 
facilitate the establishment of a party, without being a party itself. Based on this 
interest, PBNU held a join meeting on 3rd June 1998 that provided a decree to set up 
a committee, namely Tim Lima (the Team of Five) consisting of five people186, to 
handle party establishment aspirations. Subsequently PBNU formed Tim Asistensi 
(the assistance team) consisting of nine people187, whose main function was to assist 
Tim Lima to inventory and to review proposals on the party establishment and to 
support the party establishment. On 26th-28th June 1998, Tim Lima and Tim Asistensi 
held a meeting and provided five basic drafts: (1) the basic thought of NU about 
political reform, (2) Mabda Siyasi (the political principles); (3) the relationships 
between PBNU and political party; (4) AD/ART and (5) the script of declaration. They 
then socialised these drafts to NU communities in some forums.               
 
After Tim Lima and Tim Asistensi accomplished their duty on July 21 1998, 
PBNU decided the D-day of declaration. On July 23 1998, in the residence of Wahid, 
the establishment of PKB was announced. This announcement was declared by five 
senior figures of ulama, namely Munasir Ali, M. Ilyas Ruchiyat, A. Muchith Muzadi, A. 
Mustofa Bisri, and Abdurrahman Wahid. Thousands of NU’s followers and santri (the 
disciples) witnessed this declaration. Some national figures, politicians, and 
intellectuals, who sympathised with the platform of the party, also attended this 
ceremony188.   
 
This shows the important role of NU and its followers in facilitating the 
establishment of PKB. The role of prominent figures of NU, particularly Wahid, was 
significant and comprehensive. Arifin Junaidi says Wahid played immense roles in 
many things, including in determining the name of General Chairperson of Dewan 
                                                 
186 Makruf Amin (Rais Syuriah), M. Dawam Anwar (Katib Aam PBNU), Prof. Dr. Said Agil Siradj, 
MA (Wakil Katib PBNU) , M Rozy Munir (Ketua PBNU), Ahmad Bagja (Sekjen PBNU).  
187 Arifin Junaidi (Wakil Sekjen PBNU), H. Muhyidin Aburusman, HM. Fachri Thaha Ma’ruf, Abdul 
Azis, Andi Muarly Sunrawa, Nashihin Hasan, Lukman Saifuddin, Amin Said Husni dan Abdul 
Muhaimin Iskandar. 
188 Choirie, PKB Politik Jalan Tengah NU, pp. 193-200. 
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Tanfidz189. At the local level, the development and establishment of PKB were also 
facilitated by NU. Hence, close relations between NU and PKB became inevitable. 
The establishment of PKB shows NU as an organisation with profound political 
awareness. Its role in the establishment of PKB suggests that the political instinct of 
NU and its followers was preserved.  
 
In the end, this situation influences not only the organisational structure of the 
PKB, which is very similar to NU190, but also the values, orientation and political 
culture of the party. Many phenomena inside the party can be fairly understood only 
by relating them to the culture of NU. Yet there were also aspects of the new party 
that did not derive from the culture of NU, and in fact in some sense had to overcome 
NU traditions. 
 
2.  NU Tradition and the PKB’s Political Orientation 
 
As an organisation that had been facilitated by PBNU, headed by the prominent 
figures of NU and gains strong support from the people of NU, PKB had a tendency 
to follow the political orientation of NU. The General Chairperson of PBNU Hasyim 
Muzadi states that PKB is “one of NU’s tools of struggle”191. Meanwhile PKB 
acknowledges, through the statutes of the party, that its existence is actually a result 
of a synthesis192 between the traditions of NU and semangat reformasi (the spirit of 
reform).        
 
The existence of NU itself cannot be separated from the existence of ulama 
(Islamic Scholars) and pesantren (Islamic Scholars-led Islamic boarding school). NU 
was established on 31st January 1926 in Surabaya, by prominent and charismatic 
ulama, who were the alumni and the owner of pesantren193. It was basically a 
response to rapid development of Islamic modernism movements in Indonesia, which 
                                                 
189 H.Z Arifin Junaidi, “Belajar dari Sejarah PKB”, in Yenny Zanuba Wahid, A. Effendy Choirie and  
M. Kholid Syeirazi, (eds.), 9 Tahun PKB. Kritik dan Harapan, (Jakarta: Panitia Nasional Harlah ke-9 
PKB, 2007), p. 32. 
190 Choirie, PKB Politik Jalan Tengah NU, p. 221. 
191 Hasyim Muzadi, “Membangun NU Pasca Gus Dur”, (Jakarta: Grasindo, 1999), p. 31 in Kamarudin, 
Konflik Internal PKB, (Jakarta: Akses Publishing, 2008), p.66. 
192 In this document a metaphor is used “as a result of legal marriage”, in Dokumentasi Hasil Muktamar 
II Parai Kebangkitan Bangsa, Semarang 16-19 April 2005, (Jakarta: DPP PKB, without year), p. 17. 
193 Some influential ulama who became the founding fathers of this organisation were Hasyim Azhari, 
A. Wahab Chasbullah, Bisri Saymsuri, R. Asnawi, Ridwan, R. Hambali, Nachrowi, Ndoro Muntaha, 
Nawawi. 
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was led by reformer organisations such as Muhammadiyah (literally, the Follower of 
Muhammad) and Persatuan Islam (the Islamic United/Persis) in the beginning of 20th 
century and to the new politico-religious situation in Hijaz (Saudi Arabia) where 
Wahabism became the main religious stream, adhered to by the new authority (the Al 
Saud)194. Both movements to some extent share similar values, in which purification 
of Islamic teachings is the core of their belief. This belief is opposite to the belief of 
NU that tends to be more moderate towards the existence the norms outside Islam. 
Such developments then were regarded by NU as a serious threat for their teachings 
and in the end their existence.  
 
Scholars classify NU as part of traditionalist Islam movement, with some 
important characteristics, which fundamentally differentiate it with the modernist, 
such as the obligation to adhere deeply to the implementation of the teachings of the 
Islamic scholars, namely the experts of jurisprudence system who lived between 7th 
and 13th century195. They also believe that the gate of ijtihad (interpretation through 
reasoning) had been closed and the duty of the Muslim should just follow the 
teachings provided by the middle ages scholars. In facing the contemporary 
situations, the main task of Muslim is to make adjustment of the teachings of such 
scholars with the context where they live. Furthermore, they also tended to be 
tolerant with the developed and living traditional values adhered by the society 
around.  NU in reality performed some non-Islamic traditions in the society, such as 
kenduren (feast to mark someone’s death) and ziarah kubur (visit to a shrine or 
grave) after Islamising such tradition or at least legitimising it with Islamic 
interpretations196. The ‘modernists’ regard these kinds of practices as bid’ah 
(innovation not guided by Al-Qur’an) 
 
Apart from the definitions labelled to this organisation, NU itself defines their 
Islamic orientation as the followers of ahlussunnah wal jama’ah, the moderate stream 
that follows the teachings of the prophet and his four best friends. NU also believes 
that to hold all or at least one of four mazhabs (schools of Islamic jurisprudential 
thought), namely Syafii, Hanafi, Hambali or Maliki, is necessary, even though in 
                                                 
194 Fealy, Ijtihad Politik Ulama, Sejarah NU 1952-1967, pp. 29-39. Azis Thaba, Islam dan Negara 
dalam Politik Orde Baru, (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 1996), pp. 135-136.  Deliar Noer, Gerakan 
Modern Islam di Indonesia 1900-1942, (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1982), pp. 241-254. 
195 Zamakhsyari Dhofier, Tradisi Pesantren: Studi Tentang Pandangan Hidup Kyai, (Jakarta: LP3ES, 
1982), p. 1. 
196 Daman, Membidik NU Dilema Percaturan Politik NU Pasca Khittah, p. 32. 
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reality they sometimes just follow and honour the interpretation of ulama in 
understanding and conducting something in Islam.197 They put fiqh (the system of 
jurisprudence) as a foundation for social activities198, including in political life by using 
the thinking of Al-Mawardi and Al-Ghazali, which provides NU a tolerance and 
flexible approach199. Based on this approach NU are popularly known as an 
organisation that are tolerant in facing different values and cultures in social realm 
and tend to be flexible in conducting their interest in political domain. The opponents 
of NU sometimes criticises its political flexibility as being commit to opportunism.  
 
As for pesantren200, this institution is an educational institution or boarding 
school in which ulama educate santri. Pesantren is part of the efforts from 
traditionalist ulama and the followers to preserve and to protect the tradition, culture 
and teachings of Islam given by the earliest generations of ulama in Indonesia. There 
was a time when pesantren became a medium of escapism from the western cultural 
penetration conducted by colonial regime and to some extent from the reformer 
thinking and movements hold by the modernist201.  
 
However, today many pesantrens (i.e the Modern Pesantren of Gontor) have 
adopted the method of modern teachings derived from the western academic world. 
Pesantren does not only teach santri about the religious matters, but also teach them 
about problems of social life. This extended material of teaching in the end makes 
the students become also aware of and being in touch with the real problem of the 
people outside pesantren. The social functions of pesantren, eventually, develop into 
a part of the real function of pesantren. In such condition, the close relationship 
between pesantren and its social environment turns into inevitable, in which the 
charisma of ulama sometimes influences the life of the society.  
 
                                                 
197 NU also regards itself as a movement in which the fiqh context follows all or at least one of the 
Mazhabs, particularly taught by Imam Syafii, in the terms of the tauhid follows the teachings of Imam 
Abu Hasan Al-Asyari and Imam Abu Mansur Al-Maturudi; and in the matters of the tassawuf 
implements the teachings of Imam Al-Ghazali and Imam Abu Qosim Al-Jinaid. 
198 Daman, Membidik NU Dilema Percaturan Politik NU Pasca Khittah, pp. 88-92. M. Ali Haidar, 
Nahdlatul Ulama dan Islam di Indonesia. Pendekatan Fikih dalam Politik, (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1998). 
199 A. Effendy Choirie, Islam-Nasionalisme UMNO-PKB Studi Komparasi dan Diplomasi, (Jakarta: 
Pensil-234, 2008), pp. 129-134. 
200 On Pesantren see Dhofier, Tradisi Pesantren: Studi Tentang Pandangan Hidup Kyai. Sukamto, 
Kepemimpinan Kiai dalam Pesantren, (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1999). 
201 Mahrus Irsyam, “Memahami Hakekat Nahdlatul Ulama”, Kompas, 22 November 1999. 
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Moreover, pesantren also creates internal culture, which influences the 
behaviour and the thinking of santri. The most important culture of pesantren is the 
unique and close relationship between ulama and santri, which in modern terms can 
be described as a patron-client relation202. In this dyadic relationship, ulama is the 
patron or the superior who provides protection and wealth for santri. Santri, as a 
return for all the goodness that he or she gets, is a client, who obeys ulama and fully 
supports his existence. The very fundament of this relationship is not merely related 
to the material interests, but in fact is also strengthened by the spiritual matters, in 
which santri feels spiritually enlightened by ulama. In this context, the respect from 
santri towards ulama is a result of combination between the fulfilment of the material 
and spiritual needs. The central role of ulama, which differentiates this organisation 
with other Islamic organisation, particularly with the modernist, is not only because of 
their role in founding this organisation but also because of his traditional authority 
given by the society203. Pesantren, in this situation, according to Dhofier, becomes 
“kerajaan kecil“(a little kingdom), where the ulama is the main source of authority for 
almost every matters204.  
 
This mode of relationship reveals the real position of ulama in NU’s world. 
Ulama conduct a role as a medium of socialisation for values and teachings that are 
traditionally adhered by this community from generation to generation. Ulama is then 
regarded as an important link of a chain of the propagation of the teaching of 
Islam205. In this regard, NU’s people also consider ulama as the testator of the 
prophet and the continuer of the teachings of the prophet. All these kind of tributes 
provide ulama a source of legitimacy and an important position in NU’s 
communities206. 
 
In terms of organisation, based on this acknowledgment, the NU gives ulama 
a very significant and respectable position. The ulama-santri relationship is reflected 
                                                 
202 Maswadi Rauf, Konsensus Politik. Sebuah Penjajagan Teoritis, (Jakarta: Direktorat Tinggi 
Departemen Pendidikan Nasional, 2000), pp. 92-99. 
203 Daman, Membidik NU Dilema Percaturan Politik NU Pasca Khittah, pp. 46-47. 
204 Dhofier, Tradisi Pesantren: Studi Tentang Pandangan Hidup Kyai, p.58. 
205 According to NU, they are the followers of Islamic teachings that were taught and practiced by the 
four best friends of the prophet, tabiin (the second generation of Islam, who lived after Muhammad 
passed away), tabiit (the third generation of Islam who learned from the tabiin), and the next following 
generations. 
206 Fealy, Ijtihad Politik Ulama, Sejarah NU 1952-1967, pp. 23-24. Ibnu Hajar, Kiai di tengah Pusaran 
Politik Antara Petaka dan Kuasa, (Jogjakarta: IRCiSoD, 2009), pp. 54-58. 
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by the existence of Dewan Syuriah (the Consultative Board), consisted of ulama, and 
Dewan Tanfidziyah Board (the Executive Board) consisted of mainly non-ulama, 
professional or politician figures represented santri. In such relationship, ulama in 
Dewan Syuriah played a comprehensive role as a advisor, controller and guider for 
the organisations established by NU. The withdrawal of the NU from Masyumi in 
1952, for instance, reflected this attitude. According to NU, Masyumi had intentionally 
diminished the role of ulama in the organisation, by only giving the ulama position as 
advisor rather than determiner. This unacceptable situation became one of the 
reasons for NU to leave Masyumi207.  
 
However, at the practical level, NU’s attitude to the ulama, in which the 
relationships model of patron-client becomes the main foundation, is not consistently 
conducted. The interest to find certainty in order to secure better political positions 
and to get political advantages becomes the causes behind the deterioration of 
santri’s attitude to ulama, particularly in the political world. In his exploration on the 
involvement of NU in politics, Irsyam concludes that the patron-client relationship will 
be broken down, if it is implemented in the political realm208. This appears to happen 
since in reality both ulama and santri could independently create their own political 
networking with many political actors and groups.  
 
This situation eventually, on the one hand, could provide significant political 
sources for santri, which in the end gave them opportunity to be important and 
independent political actors. On the other hand, this situation could make ulama 
become relatively dependent to santri politically, or at least could not freely dictate 
their political interests to santri. In the NU political and organisational history, this 
situation also sometimes created a serious dispute and even conflict between these 
two bodies. The conflict between the General Chairperson of Dewan Syuriah Ali 
Maksum, which was considered as a representation of “idealist group”, and the 
General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz Dr. Idham Chalid, who was regarded as the 
champion of “realist camps” and pragmatic politicians who had very good relation 
with the Soeharto regime in the 1980s, for instance, reflected this situation. In the 
end, this kind of political situation creates what Irsyam called as “hubungan 
simbiosis” (the symbiosis relationship) as an alternative to the patron-client 
                                                 
207 Thaba, Islam dan Negara dalam Politik Orde Baru, pp. 162-164. Noer, Gerakan Modern Islam di 
Indonesia 1900-1942, 80-82. Fealy, ibid. 98-133. 
208 Irsyam, Ulama dan Partai Politik. Upaya Mengatasi Krisis, pp. 7-8. 
 79
relationship. In this relationship, the close connection between ulama and santri 
could continually be preserved as far as they could provide advantages to each 
other209.  
 
Moreover, another contributory factor in weakening the patron-client 
relationship in NU is the emergence of new ulama figures in NU. These figures, who 
sometimes are regarded to have similar capability and contribution to NU, in reality 
challenge the position of others ulama figures. The new figures establish their new 
patron-client relationships that in the end sometimes decrease the loyalty of santri 
towards the old patron. This situation also becomes the reason for the phenomenon 
of loyalty transformation to the new patron210. In accordance to the fact that the 
number of the first generation of ulama, who are commonly respected by most NU’s 
people and played as an uniting element, significantly decreased, this phenomenon 
appears to happen. This equal condition sometime creates a conflict as a 
consequence. In these circumstances, disloyalty and conflict at the practical level 
become also part of NU’s political tradition. As a political institution that inherits the 
political tradition and culture of NU, such conditions, including the problem of 
disloyalty, will potentially happen to PKB, which in the end influences their thought 
and activities. 
 
In terms of political orientation, PKB believes in the role of Islamic teachings 
in the political realm. Thus, the role of PKB is to be part of the interest of the Muslims 
to protect their existence on the one side and to struggle for the goodness for all as 
the reflection of the spirit of rahmatan lil alamin (the mercy for the universe), on the 
other side. This thinking is actually in accordance to the political orientation of NU. 
During its existence in the national politics for almost four decades, NU regarded 
itself as the tools for Islamic values and laws implementation. Based on this PKB 
does not separate politics and Islam, in fact the elite and the member of this party 
regards PKB as the true Islamic party. Wahid said, “It is not necessary for PKB to 
have Islam as the foundation. The important thing is PKB is indeed Islamic party… 
PKB put forward the essence rather than the label”.211 In line with such opinion, Alwi 
Shihab regards that although some people has doubted it, PKB is a party that was 
                                                 
209 Ibid, p. 166. 
210 Rauf, Konsensus Politik. Sebuah Penjajagan Teoritis, p.109. 
211 Jawa Pos, 29 Mei 1999. 
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set up and erected based on the truth of Islamic teachings.212 According to Muhaimin 
Iskandar PKB as a party set up by ulama is an Islamic party213.  
 
However, PKB also regards that the very importance of their existence is 
actually related to the interests of Indonesian people. Therefore, PKB believes that 
their existence should be apart of the national movement in struggle for the interest 
of all. The fact that the vast proportion of Indonesian people is Muslim becomes a 
rationale for PKB to regard the interest of the Muslim as essentially the interest of the 
nation and vice versa. In this regard, beside the interest to establish the Islamic 
morality in politics, the commitment towards the values of nationalism is highly valued 
and becomes an important element in the political orientation of PKB. One of the 
main objectives of the party reflects the commitment of PKB towards nationalism that 
is to realise the ideals of the independence of the Republic of Indonesia214.  
 
As a reflection of such orientation, PKB believes in the spirit of pluralism, as 
one of the most important characteristics of Indonesia as a nation. Indeed, PKB 
came to stand out as one of those Islamic organisations with a very clear position in 
this regard. For some, PKB, particularly under the leadership of Wahid, became one 
of the real bastions of nationalism and pluralism. According to Iskandar, PKB has a 
commitment to integrate religious values and pluralism, as the core of Indonesian 
nationalism, as a realisation of Islamic teachings as a pity for the entire world215. 
Accordingly, PKB in the statutes of the party declares Pancasila (the five basic 
pillars)216 in the spirit of ahlussunah wal jama’ah217, as the foundational principle of 
the party. As a result, PKB subsequently had a legitimate foundation to become a 
“catch all” party, providing equal opportunity for all Indonesians to join, regardless 
their primordial backgrounds. In real life, PKB has shown no hesitation in building a 
good relationship with the secular nationalist and even Christian parties. Many 
                                                 
212 Republika, 30 Mei 1999. 
213 A. Muhaimin Iskandar, “PKB: Politik Rahmatan lil Alamin“, in Sahar L. Hassan, Kuat Sukardiyono 
and Dadi M.H. Basri, eds, Memilih Partai Islam, Visi, Misi dan Persepsi, (Jakarta, Gema Insani Press, 
1998), p.24. 
214 Zainal Abidin Amir, Peta Islam Politik Pasca Soeharto, (Jakarta: LP3ES 2003), pp.115-116. 
215 Ibid, p.115  
216 The 1998 AD of PKB Article 3; The 2000 AD of PKB Article 3; The 2002 AD of PKB Article 3; The 
2005 AD of PKB Article 3; The 2008 AD of PKB Article 3.  
217 The 1998 AD of PKB Article 4; The 2000 AD of PKB Article 4; The 2002 AD of PKB Article 4; The 
2005 AD of PKB Article 4; The 2008 AD of PKB Article 4. 
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prominent figures of PKB have also close relations to the people form minority 
groups. 
 
PKB has relatively institutionalised its political orientation, by means of putting 
it as part of political ideology of the party. The synthesis between Islam and 
nationalism can be observed in Mabda Siyasi, one of the central official documents of 
PKB. Most members of the party have accepted and implemented this standpoint, 
which also shapes their political behaviour. This attitude, to some extent, 
differentiates PKB from the others Islamic parties, which tend to identify themselves 
in Islamic terms. There is widespread recognition of the commitment of the party to 
the implementation of pluralism as a reflection of the realisation of PKB’s political 
ideology. According to Ratnawati, PKB has successfully made this orientation one of 
its main characteristics218. In other words, PKB has relatively institutionalised one 
important aspect namely the values regarding the relation between religion and 
politics that has guided this party to be an inclusive Islamic party. 
 
However, in terms of the role of ideology in the party, PKB actually does not 
provide the exact values that can be implemented as a foundation for preserving the 
cohesion of the party. Although it has a comprehensive value set which identifies the 
political positions of PKB in real politics, the party does not properly maintain uniting 
values or its ideology for its internal needs. The ideology of the party is merely 
focused on external matters, and cannot be used as a platform to establish the sense 
of togetherness and to reduce factionalism or exclusive political orientations. One 
could not find, for instance, a comprehensive understanding and explanation on this 
value and the way the party conduct it in PKB official documents. This situation, in a 
momentous situation, could move the members to change their stand and loyalty. 
Thus, in general besides having a tendency to conduct conflict and disloyalty, in the 
way proposing self-seeking orientation, as a legacy from NU, the value infusion 
process, in relation to the attempts to strengthen uniting values, became an 
unfinished business for PKB. 
 
3.  Organisational Structure  
 
                                                 
218 Tri Ratnawati, “Beberapa Masalah Pelembagaan Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) dan Alternatif 
Solusi”, Lili Romli, ed., Pelembagaan Partai Politik Pasca Orde Baru Studi Kasus Partai Golkar, 
PKB, PBB, PBR dan PDS, (Jakarta: Pusat Penelitian Politik, Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, 
2008), p. 108. 
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In terms of organisational structure, PKB in many ways duplicates the organisational 
structure of NU. The existence of two important and powerful broads, namely Dewan 
Syura (the Consultative Board) and Dewan Tanfidz (the Executive Board), as are 
implemented by NU, proves this influence219. These boards exist at every level of 
party committee (from the national/state level to the sub-district level). At the national 
level, the join of theses boards is called as Dewan Pengurus Pusat (the Central 
Managing Board/DPP).  
 
Dewan Syura is officially the most powerful body and the holder of the highest 
command in PKB220. It consists of mainly ulama and the experts. According to the 
statutes of PKB, the main functions of Dewan Syura are to preserve the purity of the 
struggle of the party, to provide and to promulgate the general policies of the party, to 
control the implementation of the policies conducted by Dewan Tanfidz and to give 
report to the party highest assembly forum, namely muktamar (conference) at the 
end of its period221. At the practical level, this body can also veto the policies of 
Dewan Tanfidz, if such policies are not in line with the statutes and the spirit of the 
party. The members of the party committees who entitled to vote elect the general 
chairperson of Dewan Syura and the members of this body, which consist of no more 
than 17 people. The existence of this body represents the culture of NU in terms of 
honouring the role and position of ulama. 
 
Dewan Tanfidz is the body that implements the basic policies and programs 
of the party. It has also an obligation to run daily organisation activities. At daily 
activities, this body can provide policies as a respond to the needs of organisational 
matters. The members of Dewan Tanfidz are elected for five years term of 
leadership, and have to give report and responsibility at the same forum222. The 
general chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz is elected by the participants of conference, 
after getting agreement from the new elected general chairperson of Dewan Syura as 
                                                 
219 In each regional and local board there are also two main boards, namely the Dewan Syuriah and the 
Dewan Tanfidziyah. 
220 The 1998 ART of PKB Article 17 (1); The 2000 ART of PKB Article 18 (1); The 2002 ART of PKB 
Article 20 (1); The 2005 ART of PKB Article 20 (1). 
221 The 1998 ART of PKB Article 17 (9.a,), (9.b), (9.c); The 2000 ART of PKB Article 18 (10.a,), (10.b), 
(10.c); The 2002 ART of PKB Article 20 (10.a,), (10.b), (10.c); The 2005 ART of PKB Article 20 (9.a,), 
(9.b), (9.c), (9.d;. The 2008 ART of PKB Article 18 (10.a,), (10.b). 
222 The 2000 ART of PKB Article 19 (2); The 2002 ART of PKB Article 21 (2); The 2005 ART of PKB 
Article 21 (2), 21 (10.d); The 2008 ART of PKB Article 22 (2). 
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one of the candidates prior to the election. The statute of party actually does not 
arrange in detail the mechanism of vote for both Dewan Syura and Dewan Tanfidz.  
  
The organisational structure of PKB reflects the very huge role of DPP, 
particularly Dewan Syura, in determining the direction of the party. The undisputable 
role of Dewan Syura has a potential to create an oligarchy inside the party. In reality, 
as would be discuss latter on the subsequent chapters, Dewan Syura, under the 
leadership of Wahid, sometimes makes some important policies without initially 
having consultation with other elements of the party that should actually be involved. 
According to Notosusanto PKB under Wahid has been a party that experiences a 
personalisation of power, by giving the leader, particularly Wahid, wide and 
complicated authorities, which at practical level cannot be effectively controlled by 
the members of the party223. However, the party’s constitution also indicates the spirit 
of musyawarah (consultation) as one of the main foundation in the decision-making 
process. In such matter, PKB, as would be explained more comprehensively in the 
fifth chapter, hence normatively encouraged collectivism and discouraged 
dictatorship in the party.  
 
On the other hand, as has been mentioned before, the political precedent in 
the NU also gives a room for some elements in party, particularly Dewan Tanfidz, to 
oppose the decision made by Dewan Syura. It appears to happen since in reality 
each body could run their interest separately, in order to find a better political position 
or defend their position and idealism. The case of conflict between Wahid who 
represented the existence of Dewan Syura and Matori Abdul Jalil, Alwi Shihab, 
Saifullah Yusuf and Abdul Muhaimin Iskandar, who structurally represented the 
existence of Dewan Tanfidz signifies this condition. This situation in some cases also 
triggered conflict between those bodies or at least involving persons from those two 
bodies. It shows that PKB was actually suffering lack of sense of togetherness.  
 
In terms of handling internal conflict, PKB, similar to NU224, still face a serious 
problem. In reality, conflict resolution mechanism is not something that seriously 
discussed and developed by the party. PKB does not have a kind of arbitration body 
to resolve proportionally many internal disputes or conflicts. As a result, even the 
                                                 
223 Smita Notosusanto, “Analisa AD/ART Partai Politik”, seminar paper, unpublised, p. 3, 15 in 
http://forum-politisi.org/downloads/Analisa_AD_ART_Parpol_-_Smita.pdf. 
224 Kang Young Soon, “Antara Tradisi dan Konflik: Kepolitikan Nahdlatul Ulama 1984-1999”, 
Dissertation Summary, (Jakarta: Political Science Post Graduate Program, 2002), p. 31.  
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General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz could experience the injustice decision. It 
makes insecurity and uncertainty, particularly during the leadership of Wahid, 
become something common to appear. These feeling in reality are spread out and 
are felt by the members. As mentioned by one of member of the local committees: 
“…there is no safety so far. I mean there is no peace. In political party life, we need 
harmony. In PKB, the members of committee could suddenly be dismissed by the 
party, even though they already do their best. There is a powerful authoritarian hand. 
There is subjective policy”.225 The existence of conflict mainly was approached by 
personal approaches not by the rule, while for the big cases PKB even needed a 
third party to solve it, which did actually not really end the rivalry between conflicting 
groups.   
 
Generally, PKB needed to institutionalise many more aspects within the party. 
The problem that was faced by this party was not only related to how such decision 
was made, but also in terms of how such decision was stipulated. This condition 
eventually became one of main reasons for the emergence of unresolved internal 
conflicts, which eventually were resulted in the party fragmentation. Thus, the 
institutionalisation is necessary particularly in order to be able to reduce violation in 
the decision-making process and eventually to avoid the potential of internal 
fragmentation. 
 
4.  Political Activities  
 
In the first decade of reformasi, PKB appeared to be one of the most important 
parties in Indonesia. The third position reached by this party in the 1999 Elections, 
with 13 millions votes, showed the real power of this party. PKB gained 51 seats in 
parliament that made this party became the fourth biggest group in the legislative 
body. 
 
PKB gained the votes mostly from the Java Island. The main basis of PKB in 
the 1999 Election and the next two elections was pesantren communities in the East 
Java Province and the Central Java Province. Those provinces provided more than 
half of the seats of DPR for PKB (see Table 5). Even though NU also exists and 
relatively grows even not long after its establishment in some provinces such as 
                                                 
225 Ratnawati, “Beberapa Masalah Pelembagaan Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) dan Alternatif 
Solusi”, p. 95. 
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South Sumatra, South Kalimantan, and South Sulawesi, the votes for PKB in these 
regions were not significant. Such phenomenon strengthens the thesis that PKB 
actually grows only in Java226 and indicates that not all NU’s people regard PKB as 
their channel for interests227.     
 
Table 5 
The Top Three Provinces that Provides DPR Seats for PKB  
  




The 2009  
Election 
Provinces 
Seats % Seats % Seats % 
East Java 24 47.1 28 53.8 12 44.4 
Central Java 10 19.6 13 25.0   6 22.2 
West Java   6 11.8   3   5.8   3 11.1 
Others   11* 21.5       8** 15.4       6*** 22.3 
Total 51 100 52 100 27 100 
Source: Zainal Abidin Amir, Peta Islam Politik Pasca Soeharto, (Jakarta: LP3ES 
2003), p. 122. A. Effendy Choirie, Islam-Nasionalisme UMNO-PKB Studi 
Komparasi dan Diplomasi, (Jakarta: Pensil-234, 2008), p.126. 
http://www.kpu.go.id 
Note:  
*:Lampung (2) North Sumatra (1), Riau (1), South Sumatra (1), DKI Jakarta (1), DI 
Yogyakarta (1), Bali (1), East Kalimantan (1), South Kalimantan (1), South Sulawesi 
(1). 
**: Banten (2), Riau (1), Sumatera selatan (1), Lampung (1), DI Yogyakarta (1), 
South Kalimantan (1), Papua (1). 
***: Riau (1), Lampung (1), DI Yogyakarta (1), East Kalimantan (1), Maluku (1), Papua 
(1).  
 
The result of the 1999 Election on the other hand inferred the existence of 
relatively solid supports from NU’s ulama in both East Java Province and Central 
Java Province. Some influential ulama were present at PKB’s campaigns prior to the 
election to convey the programs of the party and asked the audience, which mainly 
are NU’s santri, to support PKB. This situation to some extent also revealed the 
existence and the effectiveness of patron-client relations in the politics of NU. Soon 
describes this phenomenon:  
 
“In the 1999 election, the present of kyai (Muslim cleric) and 
ustadzs (religious teacher) is really significant for the votes of PKB. 
There are approximately 3,917 kyai and 30,983 ulama. They 
influence santri and the people around pesantren to mobilise the 
supporter…including K.H Achmad Zarkasyi, K.H Chotib Umar, K.H 
Muchtith Muzadi, K.H Muhammad Subadar, K.H Hamzah Achmad, 
K.H Idris Marzuki, K.H Abdulah Sahal, K.H Abdullah Faqih, K.H 
                                                 
226 Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, “Akibat Kekuasaan”, in E. Soebekti, Achmad, Nirwan Ki S. Hendrowioto, 
eds, Di Saat Ekonomi Terpuruk Partai Politik Rame-Rame Pecah Kongsi, (Jakarta: Gria Media Prima, 
2002), pp. 190-191. 
227 Amir, Peta Islam Politik Pasca Soeharto, p. 121 
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Masduki Mahfud, K.H Hasyim Muzadi…they (the senior kyai) 
directly come to PKB’s campaign. They are united in giving 
support to PKB by continually coming to the areas to get supports 
from the santri and the people around”228.  
 
In the 1999 Presidential Election, conducted by the DPR, PKB together with 
other Islamic parties, which were united in Poros Tengah (the middle axis)229, win the 
election, and successfully put Wahid as the first president in the reform era. The 
victory of Wahid made him to be the first president from NU, and provided an 
opportunity for NU’s cadres to gain important positions in the government, including 
the ministerial posts230. However, the period of President Wahid government was not 
long. Wahid had to give up his presidency before the time231. The member of 
parliaments, from many parties including from the exponent of the Middle Axis, used 
the cases of budget mismanagement in the Institute for Logistic Supply (the Bulog) 
and the charity of Sultan Brunei misuse, in which Wahid was presumably involved in, 
as entry point to shake the position of Wahid. Even though the legal status of these 
cases were still in the process, almost all of the members of DPR, except PKB 
Faction (FPKB) and the Faction of Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa (Nation Love 
                                                 
228 Kang Young Soon, Antara Tradisi dan Konflik: Kepolitikan Nahdlatul Ulama, Ph.D Thesis, 
(Jakarta: Post Graduate Program, Department of Political Science, University of Indonesia, 2008), pp. 
317-318.  
229 Middle Axis was a political faction in the DPR and composed of the Islamic Parties, including the 
PPP, PAN, PBB and PK. This faction was created in response to the existence of two strong 
presidential candidates, Megawati Soekarno Putri (PDIP) and former President BJ Habibie (Golkar), 
who according to this faction, were not in favour of the Muslim’s interests, since Megawati basically 
represented the secular and pro-Christian groups, while Habibie represented the old regime groups. The 
Middle Axis then produced an alternative option by promoting Wahid as a presidential candidate from 
the Muslim groups.  Kamarudin, Partai Politik Islam di Pentas Reformasi. Refleksi Pemilu 1999 untuk 
Pemilu 2004, (Jakarta: Visi Publishing, 2003), pp.124-125.    
230 Initially, Wahid did not include amongst his priorities the prerogative right of the president in 
determining the composition of his cabinet, since he was not from the largest party in the parliament 
and thus had to share some of the cabinet positions with his coalition members as a political 
concession. Many prominent political figures such as Prof. Dr. M. Amien Rais (the Chairperson of 
PAN), Akbar Tanjung (the Chairperson of Partai Golkar), and Dr. Hamzah Haz (the Chairperson of 
PPP) became key figures behind the formation of the cabinet. However, after some controversial 
cabinet reshuffles, Wahid eventually put his close colleagues in his cabinet. 
231 This situation appeared to happen mainly as an impact of his controversial behaviour and 
statements, made during the time of his presidency. His decision to make some dispensable cabinet 
reshuffles, by dismissing some important figures from the coalition parties, including M. Jusuf Kalla, 
General (ret.) Wiranto, and Haz, were two of them. This decision politically created a serious rift 
between himself and his former supporters in parliament. In the mean time, people in general became 
dissatisfied with the performance of Wahid’s Government that, according to them, was not really 
making a significant acceleration for establishing prosperity for the nation. His controversial 
comments, such as to open diplomatic relations with Israel and to dissolve the policy on the prohibition 
of the teachings of Marxism-Leninism or Communism, deteriorated his relations with many Islamic 
parties, organisations and figures who actually were his main supporters. The idea that the government 
would be better without Wahid subsequently spread among the people and politicians. 
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Democracy Party/PDKB), agreed to propose impeachment for the president, since 
the president failed to provide proper answer for the questions from DPR around 




The 1999 Election Result  
 
NO PARTIES VOTE SEAT 
1 PDIP 35,689,073 153 
2 Golkar 23,741,749 120 
3 PKB 13,336,982 51 
4 PPP 11,329,905 58 
5 PAN 7,528,956 34 
6 PBB 2,049,708 13 
7 PK 1,436,565 7 
8 PKP 1,065,686 4 
9 PNU 679,179 5 
10 PDKB 550,846 5 
11 Other Parties 8,292,463 12 
 TOTAL 105,786,661 462 
Source: www.kpu.go.id 
 
The PKB subsequently decided to suspend FPKB in parliament as a protest 
and to show the disagreement to the decision of MPR towards President Wahid233. 
Consequently, FPKB would not attend Sidang Istimewa Majelis Permusyawaratan 
Rakyat (the Special Meeting of People’s Consultative Assembly/SI MPR) which 
would formally impeach the president. However, the General Chairperson of Dewan 
Tanfidz Jalil individually chose to attend the meeting. Jalil stated that his present was 
in his capacity as one of the chairpersons of the MPR. His attendance was also in 
order to seek alternative ways to save the face of president234. This decision became 
the main reason for PKB to dismiss Jalil from his position as the general chairperson 
of Dewan Tanfidz. The dismissal of Jalil, which was totally rejected by him and his 
supporters, eventually triggered internal conflict and subsequently became one of 
                                                 
232 Wahid then declared the dissolution of the parliament as a response to his impeachment. This 
extraordinary and unimaginable decision weakened his position. Mahkamah Agung (The Supreme 
Court or MA) assessed and stipulated that this decision made by President Wahid was unconstitutional. 
Parliament then voted President Wahid out for his commitment to corruption and the violation of the 
constitution. 
233 After the dismissal of President Wahid, the PKB annulled its decision and returned to the DPR, 
based on the reason to struggle for the interest of the voters. 
234 The Leadership of the MPR 1999-2002 consisted of M. Amien Rais (Chairperson), Ginandjar Karta 
Sasmita (Vice Chairperson), Kwik Kian Gie (Vice Chairperson), Husni Thamrin (Vice Chairperson), 
Matori Abdul Jalil (Vice Chairperson), Jusuf Amir Faisal (Vice Chairperson), Hari Sabarno (Vice 
Chairperson), H.A Nazri Adlani (Vice Chairperson).    
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reasons behind internal fragmentation of this party, creating two offshoot parties 
namely PKB-Matori, which was the Matori version’s PKB that also was popularly 
known as PKB-Batu Tulis235, and PKB-Gus Dur/Alwi, popularly known also as PKB-
Kuningan236.    
 
After the dismissal of Wahid from the position of president and the dismissal 
of Jalil as the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz, PKB suffered prolonged 
internal conflict. The focus of this party had more to do with the efforts to finish the 
internal conflict, in the way mainly to look for the real status of each conflicting group, 
rather than to comprehensively develop party institutionalisation and to maintain a 
close and good relation to the people. In terms of public relation, the PKB relied on 
the charisma and the popularity of Wahid and Ulama to gain support from NU as the 
biggest Islamic community in Indonesia.          
 
The fact that PKB was still able to achieve the third position at the national 
level and the first place in the East Java Province at the local level in the 2004 
Election indicated the continuity of ulama’s support for PKB, particularly in the East 
Java Province. It also inferred that the charisma of Wahid still works for the highest 
proportion of the people of NU. On the other hand, this situation also indicates that 
the figure or personal charisma still plays an important role in NU’s communities, in 
terms of determining political preference. In other words, the people of NU, 
particularly those who votes for PKB, were not really concerned with more some 
rational matters such as the political track record, the implementation of one’s 
political program or agenda, or the level of party institutionalisation, when making 
political decision.  
 
Even though PKB successfully maintained its third position in terms of the 
number of votes, this party lost around 2 millions votes in the 2004 elections. In the 
parliament, PKB got one additional seats, but its position decreased from forth to the 
sixth rank. In this election also, PKB for the first time gained seats in some non-
Muslim areas, including Papua. This was the result from the existence of Wahid, who 
consistently performed his friendly and accommodative attitudes towards minority 
                                                 
235 Batu Tulis was the name of the street in Jakarta where the central committee of the Matori’s version 
PKB took place. 
236 Kuningan was the name of an area in South Jakarta where the central committee of the PKB-Gus 
Dur/Alwi existed.  
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groups, rather than because of the performance of PKB237. In relation to the 
significant improvement of the vote of PKB in Ende, East Nusa of Southeast (NTT) 
Province, Hermawi Taslim a political figure from NTT who also the activist of PKB 
said that “the Gus Dur factor is more influential than the party. People choose PKB 
because of Gus Dur with his commitment towards pluralism and nationalism”238.   
 
In 2004, for the first time, Indonesian political system implements presidential 
election in which the people can directly vote for their preferred candidate. Wahid and 
his close colleagues regarded this new mechanism as a good opportunity to be back 
to power. However, in reality not all NU’s influential ulama supported the candidacy 
of Wahid. According to them group, which opposed the candidacy, beside the 
problem of physical condition239, the best position that Wahid should maintain after 
his dismissal is not to be president but as Guru Bangsa (the teacher of the nation) 
like he used to be240. This position would give him many chances to develop 
intensively the culture of democracy, for the nation. The candidacy of Wahid itself 
eventually failed. The rules of the game, established by Komisi Pemilihan Umum (the 
Election Commission/KPU), obligated a healthy condition as one of the requirements 
to be a candidate of president and vice president, in which Wahid was not able to fill 
it. General Dr. Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono won this first presidential election. 
President Yudhoyono, in order to respect the existence of NU and to gain support 
from NU people as a return, provided two ministerial posts to PKB, namely the 
coordinator ministry for the prosperity of the people held by Alwi Shihab and the 
ministry of the development of abandoned regions held by Syaifullah Yusuf. 
 
In the mean time, PKB did not respond the failure to maintain the number of 
votes and the decline of its position in DPR properly. Not long after the 2004 election, 
which was actually not satisfactory for PKB, the very problematic internal conflict 
trapped this party once again. The trigger of the conflict was the dismissal of Shihab, 
and Yusuf, the general chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz and the general secretary of 
Dewan Tanfidz respectively, from their positions. The formal reason used by PKB to 
dismiss these two leaders was the matters of dual positions held by Shihab and 
Yusuf. According to Wahid, PKB clearly does not allow its member to have important 
                                                 
237 A. Effendy Choirie, “Menjadikan PKB Partai Nasional dan Terbuka”, in Wahid, Choirie and 
Syeirazi, (eds.), 9 Tahun PKB. Kritik dan Harapan, p. 190. 
238 Ibid, p. 87. 
239 H. Fuad Anwar, Melawan Gus Dur, (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Tokoh Bangsa, 2004), pp. 20-24. 
240 Gatra, Edisi 51, Jumat 31 Oktober 2003. 
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position outside the party while holding a structural position in the party. On the other 
hand, beside the reason of dual position was weak, according to the supporter of 
Shihab and Yusuf the way that used by Wahid to dismiss Shihab and Yusuf was 
actually unconstitutional.  
 
The dismissal of Shihab and Yusuf triggered dispute among the member of 
PKB and eventually created internal conflict for the second time, involved the 
supporter of the PKB-Gus Dur/Muhaimin and the PKB-Alwi (which also sometimes 
regards itself as the PKB-Ulama or PKB-Surabaya). Different from the case of Matori 
versus Wahid, this time conflict was involved more elements and big groups inside 
PKB and NU. Some influential ulama, who used to be strong supporter of Wahid in 
the first internal conflict, stated their support for Shihab-Yusuf. These ulama including 
those who were popularly called as ulama khos (very senior Islamic scholars in 
Java). This was the time when the disagreement between Wahid and some 
influential ulama, mainly from the East Java Province, reached the highest peak and 
appeared to be impossible to resolve. This situation also generated conflict between 
PKB-Gus Dur/Muhaimin and DPW PKB of East Java. It was an irony since this DPW 
in reality was the biggest vote getter machinery for PKB. 
 
As happened in the first fragmentation, in the legal context Wahid won the 
second conflict. Wahid then pointed Iskandar as the General Chairperson of Dewan 
Tanfidz of PKB replacing Shihab. The 2005 Muktamar in Semarang confirmed PKB 
under the leadership of Wahid and Iskandar. On the other hand, the supporter of 
PKB-Alwi, backed by ulama khos created a new party namely PKNU, which wished 
to be more Islamic and honoring the very tradition of the NU. Other exponent of PKB-
Alwi’s supporter preferred to join other Islamic parties, such as PPP.  
 
One year prior to the 2009 Election, PKB experienced the third internal 
conflict. This time conflict involved Iskandar and Wahid. The trigger of the conflict 
was the issue of disloyalty of Iskandar towards Wahid, conveyed by Wahid. In a very 
limited forum, Wahid suggested the elite of the party to dismiss Iskandar from his 
position as the general chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz. In that forum, Wahid gave the 
participants choices, which inferred that if they did not agree to dismiss Iskandar, he 
would leave the party. Even though the issue of disloyalty was not yet proven, the 
majority of the participants agreed to dismiss Iskandar from his position. Iskandar 
totally rejected the decision, which according to him was based on the fake fact and 
unconstitutional process. Iskandar and his supporters then held MLB in February 
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2008 in Ancol, Jakarta, to confirm his leadership and to dismiss some figures who 
were identified by his special team as actors behind party disintegration. Wahid and 
his loyalists on the other hand also held MLB in Parung, Bogor, West Java, to 
confirm the new leadership of the party, in which Ali Masykur Musa is the new 
General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz, and to dismiss formally Iskandar from his 
position. This situation resulted in the existence of twin committees, namely PKB-Gus 
Dur, popularly also known as PKB-Parung; and PKB-Muhaimin or the PKB-Ancol.   
 
Different from the two previous cases, this time the PKB-Wahid lost and the 
government only recognised the existence of PKB-Muhaimin. With such recognition, 
PKB-Muhaimin had right to be one of the participants in the 2009 Election. In the 
2009 Election, the votes for PKB sharply decreased from around 13 millions of vote 
in the 1999 Election to around four millions of vote in the 2009 Election. The seats of 
PKB in parliament also considerably decrease from 52 to 27 seats. This condition 
shows significant negative impact of prolong internal fragmentation experienced by 
this party. 
 
5.  Closing Remarks 
 
The explanation above showed that PKB was set up to be a political representative 
of NU’s community. The emergence of reform era provides an opportunity for NU’s 
people to have their own political machinery to struggle for their political agenda and 
interest. During its initial years, PKB seemed to be a promising party that could bring 
better situation for NU’s people. However, over time, PKB could not take role as a 
solid party in running its main idealism. Although it was established by a community 
that believe in tolerance and had its own unique tradition to solve conflict, PKB 
appeared to be party that could not escape from severe-prolonged internal conflict. 
For some, the cases of internal fragmentation experienced by PKB, as a party that 
believes in democracy, showed a paradox. On the one hand, PKB believes in 
democracy and has been popularly regarded as the defender of democracy and 
pluralism. One of the political objectives of this party is to preserve the existence of 
democracy. On the other hand, in internal reality democratic principles were not 
properly conducted PKB. Many factors were actually involved in PKB’s internal 
fragmentation phenomenon. The following chapters will explain the background of 










1.  Background 
 
In the reform era, PKS became one of the important Islamic political parties. An 
Islamic dakwah (propagation) group popularly known as Jamaah Tarbiyah (education 
group) became the backbone of its existence. After more than 20 years of being an 
underground group, the democratization momentum led this movement to enter 
national politics in 1998 by creating a political party. Contrary to some mainstream 
Islamic groups such as Muhammadiyah and NU, which had existed since the 
beginning of 20th century, Jamaah Tarbiyah came into being almost four decades 
after Indonesia independence.       
 
The exact time of the establishment of this group is still uncertain, although 
many scholars believe it to be in the early 1980s241. This was mainly related to the 
arrival of new Islamic scholars from some Middle East countries, namely Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia242, who subsequently became prominent figures behind this group’s 
establishment. Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (the Indonesian Islamic 
Predication Council/DDII),243 one of influential Islamic organizations established by 
M. Natsir, the former leader and central figure of Masyumi, came to play a salient role 
by providing a link for those scholars to the universities.  
 
                                                 
241 Comprehensive studies about the background of emergence of tarbiyah in Damanik’s research for 
example suggests the years circa 1982-1983 as a starting point for the development of this movement. 
Ali Said Damanik, Fenomena Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di 
Indonesia, (Bandung: Teraju, 2002), pp.63-101. Other researches conclude a same direction. See Aay 
Muhammad Furkon, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Ideologi dan Praktis Politik Kaum Muda 
Kontemporer, (Bandung: Teraju, 2004). Imdadun M. Rahmat. Ideologi Politik PKS. Dari Masjid 
Kampus ke Gedung Parlemen. (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2008). Yon Machmudi Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, 
Wajah baru Islam Politik Indonesia, (Bandung: Harakatuna Publishing, 2005). 
242 Namely Islamic University of Madinah Al-Munawarrah, Saudi Arabia; University of Ibnu Saud, 
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; University of Al-Azhar, Egypt.  
243 Anthony Bubalo and Greg Fealy, Joining the Caravan? The Middle East, Islamism and Indonesia, 
(Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2005), pp. 58-59. See also p.124.  
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One of the senior figures of this movement was Abdi Sumaiti (popularly 
known as Abu Ridha). He was a member of the DDII who then gained the opportunity 
to continue his study in Egypt. After returning to Indonesia and soon becoming 
involved in Jamaah Tarbiyah, he became one of the movement’s main ideologues. 
Other key figures are Hilmi Aminuddin, graduated form University of Medina and now 
the chairperson of Majelis Syura (the Consultative Assembly/MS), the most important 
body in PKS, and the late Rahmat Abdullah, one of the founding fathers of PKS, who 
before he died was honoured as a “syaikh at tarbiyah”. Sumaiti, Aminuddin, and 
Abdullah represented the first generation of tarbiyah activists who at the very early 
stage played a central role in the growth of Jamaah Tarbiyah 244.  
 
Although not all of the seniors graduated form the Middle East245, the role of 
the Middle East alumnus, particularly in the development of this movement and latter 
on the party, is influential246. Many of Jamaah Tarbiyah’s prominent figures generally 
developed close relationship with Ikhwan Muslimin (the Islamic Brotherhood) 
networking during their educational period247 or were inspired with its teaching 
through the books written by prominent figures of IM, such as Hasan Al-Banna, Said 
Qutb or Said Hawwa248. This situation eventually influenced and differentiated 
Jamaah Tarbiyah’s characteristics with other mainstream groups, including from DDII 
as their first supporting institution.  
 
Maintaining a new understanding of Islam249, inspired mainly by the 
teachings of Hasan Al-Banna250 and dakwah method of Ikhwan Muslimin as a 
                                                 
244 Muhammad Adlin Sila, “Gerakan Salafi Sebagai Gerakan Islam Politik di Indonesia”, Dialog, 
edition I, 2004, p.41. Furkon, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Ideologi dan Praktis Politik Kaum Muda 
Kontemporer, pp. 131-132. 
245 Rahmat Abdullah for instance was alumni of Perguruan Islam Assyafiiyah (The Islamic Institute of 
Assyafiiyah) Jakarta. Dr. Nurmahamudi Ismail, former the general chairperson of PK graduated from 
University A & M Texas. Tifatul Sembiring, the second president of the party, was an alumnus of 
Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Manajemen Informatika dan Komputer (STI&K) Jakarta. (the Graduate School 
of Computer and Information Management Science), Jakarta. Anis Matta, General Secretary of 
National Managing Board of PKS, graduated from Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab (the 
Islam and Arabic Institute of Science), Jakarta.   
246 Machmudi, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Wajah baru Islam Politik Indonesia, p. 67. 
247 Ibid, p.22-24. 
248 Damanik, Fenomena Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia, pp. 
95-97. 
249 This can be seen, for example, from the statement form Hilmi Aminuddin who stated, “This group is 
not referring to Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama nor to other Islamic groups”. Hilmi Aminuddin, 
Strategi Da’wah Gerakan Islam, (Jakarta: Pustaka Tarbiatuna, 2003), pp.153-154. 
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model251, tarbiyah activists entered dakwah arena in Indonesia mainly by creating 
active and limited cells in the civil society domain, particularly at the universities 
mosques252. In its development, Jamaah Tarbiyah gained positive response and 
attracted many more students. In less then a decade, the presence of this group 
could be felt in almost all main universities in Indonesia, particularly in Java. Jamaah 
Tarbiyah became one of the most successful Islamic groups in secular campuses. 
Slowly but sure, this group also developed in non-campus communities, particularly 
in the urban areas attracting mainly young Muslim who were still in the process to 
find their identity. This acceptance in the end labelled PKS as the young-urban-
intellectual-pious people’s party. In its development, however, PKS also attracted 
Muslims in the rural areas, mainly in Java. 
                                                                                                                                           
 
In addition to these reasons, the existence and growth of Jamaah Tarbiyah in 
universities was actually in accordance to the gradual dakwah doctrine adhered to by 
this movement, which consisting of four phase. The first development focuses on the 
creation of a good individual. The second phase relates to the formation of a 
harmonious family. The third one is the expansion to the civil society to construct a 
better society. The fourth development is the establishment of state or civilisation 




250 Hasan Al-Banna and the Ikhwan Muslimin, known since the 1950s and influenced several Islamic 
groups. One of the Masyumi’s members K.H Bustami Darwis was taught by the Ikhwan Muslimin in 
1930s. Sabili, No.3/IX, 1 Agustus 2001.   
251 Damanik, Fenomena Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia, p. 
98. 
252 University mosques became ideal places, since there were relatively safe places to conduct 
alternative methods of dakwah and new understanding of Islam, in the era when any non-Pancasila 
ideologies propagations were regarded commonly as a threat. The New Order regime, with its Islamic-
phobia tendency, had a strong suspicion of several Islamic groups and sometimes stigmatised them as 
“right extremist”. For this reason, the regime spread its apparatus to monitor targeted Islamic figures 
and groups. This situation at heart restricted dakwah activities in many ways. However, the regime did 
not count university’s mosques as a peril that would potentially endanger its position. The regime 
considered such mosques as merely places for students to worship and to discus unworldly matters. 
Therefore, the university’s mosques were quite sterile from the government’s apparatus control 
networks. Moreover, the tarbiyah group found that some inactive Islamic student activist networking, 
created by previous Islamic student groups, as a potential medium to grow their existence. Jamaah 
Tarbiyah then took over this networking, provided it with new perspectives and in the end incorporated 
it including many Islamic dakwah activists in the movement. This movement mainly focused its 
activities on some prominent public universities, such as in Salman in Institute of Bandung Technology 
(ITB), Arief Rahman Hakim in University of Indonesia (UI), Al-Ghifari in Institute of Bogor 
Agriculture (IPB), and Salahuddin in Gajah Mada University (UGM) and Manarul Ilmi in Institute of 
Sepuluh November Technology (ITS). 
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      Picture 1 
           The Orbit of Dakwah according to PKS 
 
 







                                                     Tanzimi (Individual) 
                                                     Sya’bi (Social)  
                                                     Muasasi (Political Institution) 
         Daulah (State) 
 
Source: Majelis Pertimbangan Pusat Partai Keadilan 
Sejahtera, Memperjuangkan Masyarakat Madan. 
Falsafah Dasar Perjuangan dan Platform Kebijakan 
Pembangunan PK Sejahtera, (Jakarta: MPP PKS, 2008), 
p.51. 
 
This grand design was articulated in specific activities, in which their 
movement in campuses was a part of the creation of a good individual. These 
individuals were expected to have eventually a strong commitment to dakwah and 
become dakwah activists who ready to create an Islamic society. Latter on, in the 
beginning of 1990s, related to the second phase, Jamaah Tarbiyah started to 
establish its existence in society, particularly through the establishment of many 
social, economical, communications and educational institutions253. 
 
In the late of 1990s, this movement considered entering a new phase of 
dakwah development by joining political world as a response to the current 
development in Indonesian politics254. The fall of the Soeharto Regime caused by 
economic and political system decay was regarded by this movement as the end of 
“Mecca period” where dakwah should be conducted silently and replaced by the 
                                                 
253 Some activists, particularly those of the first generation, then founded institutions such as magazines 
(Sabili, Saksi, Ummi and Anida), publishers (Gema Insani Press, Era Intermedia, Robbani Press, Al-
Kautsar, Tarbiyatuna and Asyamil), study groups, (Nurul Fikri and Studi dan Informasi Dunia Islam 
Kontemporer), Islamic foundations for Islamic studies and boarding schools (Yayasan Haramain and 
Al-Hikmah). 
254 The first direct political experience for the tarbiyah movement in the national political arena was in 
1998 through Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union (KAMMI). This organization was set up in the 
last months of the New Order, with main objective was to struggle for the interests of the people, which 
meant to replace Soeharto and bring about reform. Together with other reform elements, KAMMI 
eventually succeeded in bringing down President Soeharto from his power. On KAMMI and its 
activities, see Andi Rahmat and Mukhamad Najib, Gerakan Perlawanan dari Masjid Kampus, (Solo: 
Purimedia, 2001).  
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democracy era that brought a more conducive situation for dakwah. Most tarbiyah 
activist considered this situation as an opportunity to extend their movement, by 
emerging into public and spreading dakwah more openly to all Muslims. 
 
This opinion triggered dispute, since for some activists the time has not yet 
arrived. They believed that the late of 1990s was not a perfect time for the tarbiyah to 
enter the political world. For this reason, they suggested to wait until all the elements 
of tarbiyah were ready to enter the political domain255. Thus, the main issue was 
whether they had to accelerate dakwah development or not. Internal polling to 
observe the enthusiasm of tarbiyah activists to enter a new dakwah phase solved this 
polemic.  The result of the polling showed that the majority of cadres agreed to the 
acceleration and were ready to appear into political sphere through the party 
establishment256. This choice showed the very characteristic of this movement as an 
Islamic group with a strong political consciousness. On the other hand, it also 
illustrated a moderate characteristic reflected by the willingness to join “non-syari’ah-
based political system”, which differentiates it form the “radical” camps, such as 
Hizbut Tahrir of Indonesia (HTI) or Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (the Indonesia 
Mujahidin Assembly/MMI) which tend to refute the existing political system let alone 
entering it257.  
 
Based on this conclusion, tarbiyah movement established a party, named 
Partai Keadilan (the Justice Party/PK), on 9th August 1998. The announcement of the 
                                                 
255 For this group, tarbiyah activists should be consistent with the previous programme, which stated 
that the next level would begin in the year 2010. This group also believed that internally the tarbiyah 
was not ready to struggle at the level of real politics, particularly due to a lack of human resources, 
political networking and financial capacity. This situation inevitably triggered internal arguments. 
Hidayat Nur Wahid, Anis Matta, Ihsan Tanjung were actually part of those who disagreed. On the other 
hand, Rahmat Abdullah was an advisor for the party establishment. Interview with Aus Hidayat Nur, 
the Head of the II Dakwah Region (2002-2005), the Chairperson of BPDO (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 15 
October 2010; with Akmal Burhanuddin, 20 November 2005; interview with Kamarudin, 20 November 
2005. 
256 Of 6,000 questioners distributed by the seniors to the cadres, 5,800 questioners were returned and 
about 68% stated to agree to the party establishment and the rest preferred to establish non-
governmental organization. Damanik, Fenomena Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan 
Tarbiyah di Indonesia, p. 229. 
257 On the HTI see Yahya A.R, Struktur Negara Khilafah: Pemerintahan dan Administrasi, (Jakarta: 
HTI Press, 2006). Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, Manifesto Hizbut Tahrir untuk Indonesia (Jakarta:HTI, 
2009). Syafuan Rozi, “Potret Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia: Pro Kontra Khilafah dan Wacana 
Keindonesiaan”, in Syafuan Rozi (ed.), Nasionalisme, Demokratisasi, dan Sentimen Primordial di 
Indonesia: Problematika Identitas Keagamaan versus Keindonesiaan (Kasus Ormas Pendukung 
Khilafah Islamiyah), (Jakarta: LIPI Press, 2010). On MMI see Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni, eds., 
Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia, (Jakarta: Rajawali Pers, 2004). M. Imdadun Rahmat, Arus Baru 
Islam Radikal: Transmisi Revivalisme Islam Timur Tengah ke Indonesia, (Jakarta: Erlangga, 2005). 
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PK held in Al-Azhar Mosque, Jakarta and witnessed by some 50,000 people; most of 
them were Tarbiyah activists.258 This was a moment when all key figures of this 
movement appeared in a public sphere for the first time. PK was idealised to be a 
dakwah party, using the political arena as a medium for dakwah to give a greater 
Islamic impact on society and the government. Mutammimul Ula, one of the PK’s 
founding fathers, described this eagerness by stating that this party would use the 
parliament as “a podium for preaching”.259 Accordingly, the member of Jamaah 
Tarbiyah considered this party not only as power machinery to hold prestigious 
political positions and to be involved in the policy making process, but also as a tool 
for the moral development through dakwah.  
 
This establishment signified the arrival of a new political stream in Islamic 
political thought, in particular, and in the Indonesian political system. In relation to the 
Islamic world, this also suggests the influence of new political thought from Middle 
East, particularly from Egypt. This situation proved the importance of the Islamic 
groups’ global network, particularly from the Middle East countries, which for 
decades has been a central source for Islamic movement in Indonesia. Yusuf 
Qardhawi, one of the international figures of Jamaah Tarbiyah, commented on the 
implementation of dakwah method of the IM in PK as being an effort of the latter to 
imitate the former, which in the end makes these organisations seem to be like 
twins260. After five years of existence, due to new election regulation that disqualified 
it from joining the next election, in 2003 PK formally declared itself a part of PKS. As 
a new party for tarbiyah activists, PKS, which was declared on 20th April 2003, was 
set up to be the continuation of PK with all vision and objectives261. 
 
2.  The Foundation of Ideology and Political Orientations  
 
The fundamental doctrine of PKS is basically a combination between totalism or 
perfection (syumuliatul Islam) and gradualism or moderatism. In relation to the 
                                                 
258 Republika, 10 August 1998. The thousands participants of this declaration wore mainly white dress 
for man and long white veil for all woman participants and even brought their children, which 
impressed many people at that time.   
259 Sapto Waluyo, Kebangkitan Politik Dakwah. Konsep dan Praktik Politik Partai Keadilan Sejahtera 
di Masa Transisi, (Bandung: Harakatuna Publishing, 2005), p.31. 
260 Yusuf Al-Qardhawi, Umat Islam Menyongsong Abad 21: Sebuah Catatan Akhir Abad, Evaluasi 
Perjalanan Umat Abad ke-20 dan Proyeksi Abad ke-21, (Solo: Era Intermedia, 2001), pp. 92. 
261 “Sejarah PK Sejahtera”, www.pk-sejahtera.org. See also “Partai Keadilan Sejahtera dideklarasikan 
bersama Partai Keadilan”, Kompas, 21 April 2003. 
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doctrine of perfection, this party believes Islam covers all aspect of human life. Islam 
is regarded as “a perfect life system, a comprehensive package-deal which will 
reconstruct the entire aspects of life of the Muslim community wherever they are”.262 
It is stated that. 
  
Islam is a universal system of living that entails all aspects of life. 
Islam is a state and homeland, government and community, moral 
and power, blessing and justice, culture and constitutions, science 
and judiciary, material and natural resources, efforts and 
prosperity, jihad and dakwah, soldiers and thoughts, beliefs and 
acts of devotion. Muslims have an obligation to implement such 
cores of Islamic teachings comprehensively together with their 
universality. Islam is a system of life that covers religion, politics 
state, and society 263. 
 
Accordingly, the syumuliah doctrine regards Islam as the way of life and 
solution for civilisation; as a religion for all humankind, which is relevant to societal 
matters; and as a religion is concerned with profane and sacred matters.264  
Consequently, every Muslim is obliged to the only source of values for their life. Al-
Qur’an and Hadith then regarded both these comprehensive teachings,265 which 
according to Al-Jufri, “not only consists of “peta dunia (the map of the world)”, which 
secures humans from the cunning tricks of worldly life, but also “the map of eternity” 
which saves humans from torture in the hereafter”.266  
 
Hence, PKS does not believe in the secular doctrine that dichotomises state 
or politics and religion. For PKS, the political world is a medium to serve all 
                                                 
262 Syamsul Balda, Abu Ridho and Untung Wahono, Politik Da’wah Partai Keadilan, (Jakarta: DPP 
Keadilan, 2000), p. vii. 
263 Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Keadilan, Jati Diri Partai Keadilan, (Jakarta: Pustaka Tarbiyatuna, 
2002). This point of view reflects the influence of Hasan Al-Banna, who states: “Islam in 
comprehensive meaning covers worship, faith, state, nation, ethics, moral, materials, tolerance, 
assertions, cultures and constitutions. You have believed in the truth of Islam as a religion and state, 
government and society, mushaf (the handwritten notes that constitute the Al-Qur’an) and arms and as 
a witness of God for all nations in the earth”. See this statement in Hasan Al-Banna, Risalah 
Pergerakan Ikhwanul Muslimun, Jilid 2, (Solo: Eramedia, 2001), p. 67. See also similar statement in 
Mahfudz Siddiq, Pemikiran dan Manhaj Politik Ikhwanul Muslimin, (Bekasi: Masdar Ilmu Agency, 
2003), p.12. 
264 Hurriyah, Sistem Kaderisasi Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (1998-2003), BA thesis, (Depok: 
Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Indonesia, 2004), 
p. 110. 
265 Hidayat Nur Wahid, “Menerapkan Syariat Islam dalam Bidang Sosial Budaya dan Pendidikan”, in 
Bukhori Yusuf and Iman Santoso, Penerapan Syariat Islam di Indonesia antara Peluang dan 
Tantangan, (Jakarta: Globalmedia Cipta Publishing and Pusat Konsultasi Syariah, 2004), p. 142. 
266 Salim Segaf Al-Jufri, “Pengantar”, ibid, p.15. 
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humankind as part of the implementation of Islamic teachings267. Muslims actually 
have an obligation to set up a political structure or civilisation based on Islamic 
values to renovate the thinking and personality of Muslims in order to transform 
every aspects of life based on the desires of God.268 In addition, this obligation is 
related to the need for a supporting system that could protect Muslims in conducting 
their duties perfectly. According to Ridha, only through an Islamic system every 
Muslim could properly conduct his deeds based on the God’s will269. Furthermore, 
this establishment would provide opportunity for Muslim to prove Islamic civilisation 
as useful for humankind. The life of the prophet Muhammad during its era in Seventh 
Century was a precedent that demonstrated such situation. The legacy of the life of 
the prophet, namely The Medina State, also proved the perfection of Islam at the 
practical level270 and has become guidance for the next Islamic generations to 
establish a civilisation. To sum up, the creation of an Islamic civilisation as a 
reflection and consequence of Islamic values is one of the ultimate objectives 
believed by PKS.     
 
However, PKS also holds a gradualism perspective. This standpoint 
becomes a foundation for their moderate thought and attitudes, in striving for their 
objectives and commitments. Syirah Nabawiyah (the history of the prophet), which 
indicates the implementation of gradualism in creating a civilisation -- started from his 
family, best friends, to the closet communities, until the Medina State establishment 
– inspires this perspective271. PKS believes that the accomplishment of the prophet 
in erecting an Islamic civilisation was the result of the gradual method that upheld the 
evolutionary attempts from their simplest stage, namely individual to the more 
complex stage that is, the state. This party actually believes that: “every effort that is 
dedicated to separate political achievements from this principle (the gradual 
                                                 
267 Majelis Pertimbangan Pusat Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Memperjuangkan Masyarakat Madan. 
Falsafah Dasar Perjuangan dan Platform Kebijakan Pembangunan PK Sejahtera, (Jakarta: MPP PKS, 
2008), p. 33. 
268 Anis Matta, Menikmati Demokrasi Strategi Dakwah Meraih Kemenangan, (Jakarta: Pustaka Saksi, 
2002), p. 8. 
269 Abu Ridha, Negara dan Cita-Cita Politik, (Bandung: Syaamil Cipta Media, 2004), p.32. 
270 Muslih Abdul Karim, “Penerapan Syariat Islam pada masa Rasulullah SAW”, in Yusuf and Santoso, 
Penerapan Syariat Islam di Indonesia antara Peluang dan Tantangan, pp. 23-36.  
271 Majelis Pertimbangan Pusat Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Memperjuangkan Masyarakat Madan. 
Falsafah Dasar Perjuangan dan Platform Kebijakan Pembangunan PK Sejahtera, p. 51. 
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mechanism) will break down and even could be categorised as a crime against 
humanity and the universe”272.    
 
This bottom up and gradual strategy is implemented through a concept called 
as marhalah (the phase). Marhalah consists of four stages namely mihwar tanzhimi 
(individual stage), mihwar syabyi (society stage), mihwar mu’assasi (entering political 
intitutions stage) and mihwar daulah (state or civilisation stage). The accomplishment 
of one stage becomes a sign to start the next stage. To Matta, in terms of political 
life, this concept is related to the development of a tenacious group, creating 
supportive elements in society, up to creating Islamic groups at the policy making 
level.273 The final objective of this “islamisation” is the establishment of a state or 
civilisation based on the spirit of Islamic law. The creation of the state (khilafah), 
however, does not stop this process. This is because the main function of the state is 
to maintain the devoutness of the entire people. PKS believes that an ideal Islamic 
order should set up a political structure which is not only capable of managing public 
matters properly, but also capable comprehensively of enforcing devotion at the 
individual level.274  
 
The core of dakwah is another reason for conducting a moderate attitude. To 
PKS, a dakwah should be in line with the spirit of the epoch. It means that it has to be 
relevant and in accordance with the need of the people. In relation to this, Aminuddin 
stated that a good dakwah requires an understandable language for the people and 
has to avoid exclusiveness, since flexibility and tolerance are part of its important 
spirit” 275. Hence, the implementation of dakwah cannot be in contradiction to the real 
situation, it should rely on the context and avoid exclusive approaches. This point of 
view legalises the party to develop an adaptable political strategy without necessarily 
sacrificing its idealism. This principle eventually becomes a foundation for PKS to put 
into practice peaceful and constitutional ways and to reject revolutionary and radical 
approaches.  
 
Moreover, PKS implements the doctrine of “tsawabit wa mutghayyirat” as 
another source of moderatism. This doctrine explains two aspects of Islamic 
                                                 
272 “Kebijakan Dasar PK“, in Buku Anggaran Dasar Partai Keadilan, (Depok: Dewan Pimpinan 
Daerah Partai Keadilan Kota Depok), pp. 41-42. 
273 Ridha, Negara dan Cita-Cita Politik, p. 9-11. 
274 Balda, Ridho and Wahono, Politik Da’wah Partai Keadilan, p.19. 
275 Aminuddin, Strategi Da’wah Gerakan Islam, pp. 62. 
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teachings, namely tsawabit (the fundamental aspects) and mutghayyirat (the 
dynamic aspects). Tsawabit relates to the problems that have been clearly stated 
and arranged in Al-Quran and Hadith. Human interpretations are considered as 
irrelevant to this matter. This aspect relates actually to fix laws, which for this reason 
become absolute and eternal. On the other hand, mutghayyirat is related to the 
issues that are not comprehensively explained in Al-Quran and Hadith. This is 
theoretically known as furu’ (the branch matters). In such situation, PKS believes that 
every Muslim is allowed to develop a contextual approach in conducting his religion 
as a response to mutghayyirat matters including political activities. To PKS “there are 
matters in politics that should be adjusted to contemporary time and places in order 
to provide improvement for humankind”.276 Therefore, it is possible for PKS to adopt 
any political point of views as far as they do not contradict with the very foundation of 
Islamic teachings. This point of view provides this party with flexibility to accept 
modern political concepts, including using democracy as a mechanism to reach 
political goals.  
 
The PKS thought model has attracted many attempts to obtain a scholarly 
comprehension. Some scholars regard PKS as a representation of the hard line 
groups and define it as “fundamentalist”277, “islamist”278 or even “radical Islam”, more 
dangerous than the suspected terrorist group jamaah islamiyah279. Other scholars 
concluded that PKS is a part of modernism movement and placed it at the same level 
with some Islamic parties with a modernist tendency, namely PPP and PBB280. 
However, the mixture between a totalism and moderate attitude, which to some is 
understood as a combination between “radical” elements and “peaceful” ways, also 
became a focal point for other observers to understand the ideological background of 
this party. In this regard, some observers came up with other terms such as “a 
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moderate alternative to radical Islamism”281, moderate fundamentalism282 or 
“Islamist-Reformist”283. This situation indicates the complexity of PKS’ political 
ideology. Nevertheless, those criteria generally suggest the “right” or fundamentalist 
tendency of this party in terms of ideology that differentiates PKS to most other 
Indonesian Islamic parties.   
                                                
 
This apart, the above foundations of thought have influenced the political 
orientation and behaviour of PKS ever since. The strong belief in the comprehensive 
role of Islam encourages the cadres to uphold a commitment to the creation of a 
good individual, high-quality society up to an Islamic civilisation. As a result, the 
cadres are driven by the similar devotion and see themselves as a tool of struggle for 
their commitment. For this commitment, also they sometimes call themselves guru 
bagi alam semesta (the teacher for the universe)284 that would bring people to such 
idealism. This commitment unites the cadres and at the same time preserves the 
sense of togetherness among them.  
 
The belief that the perfection of Islam provides another implication, namely 
the notion that Islam is the solution for humanity. PKS believes that since Islam is 
relevant to all dimensions of humankind, it inherently has answers for all problems 
faced by the people285. In the end, this orientation becomes the rationale for the party 
to take part in non-political activities, such as humanitarian and social activities, in 
order to solve the practical problems of the people. At the very practical level, for 
instance, the existence of PKS cadres to help the victims in many disastrous areas is 
just one of them.  
 
Regarding its belief in gradualism, the PKS examines the readiness of society 
for accepting an Islamic structure as this readiness is a major prerequisite before the 
creation of an Islamic state. Thus, as far as the “readiness” is still nonexistence, as 
 
281 Elizabeth Fuller Collins, “Islam is the Solution”, Dakwah and Democracy in Indonesia”, in 
http://www.classics.ohio.edu/faculty/collins/islamsolution.pdf. 
282 Firman Noor, Moderate Islamic Fundamentalism in Indonesia: A Study of Political Thinking and 
Behaviour of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), 1998-2005, MA Thesis, (Canberra: Faculty of Asian 
Studies, ANU, 2006). 
283 Rahmat, Ideologi Politik PKS. Dari Masjid Kampus ke Gedung Parlemen. 
284 Majelis Pertimbangan Pusat Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Memperjuangkan Masyarakat Madan. 
Falsafah Dasar Perjuangan dan Platform Kebijakan Pembangunan PK Sejahtera, p. 53 and p.73. 
285  The spirit of Islam as a solution is also related to the belief that Islam improves all dimensions of 
life, from matters of state ideology, politics, law, economics, even through to the banking sector. Jufri, 
“Pengantar”, pp.18-22.  
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what happens in Indonesia today, the Muslims cannot force the implementation of 
Islamic law let alone the establishment of an Islamic civilisation. Accordingly, the 
main duty of the Muslim today is to ensure that the spirit of Islam grows in society 
and to help other Muslims and all humankind, to understand the advantage of Islamic 
teachings286. PKS acknowledges Indonesia as a product of socio-historical reality, 
including many traditions, beliefs and hundreds of ethnic groups inside287. According 
to PKS, the more important thing is to build a better political system, whatever the 
name, for all humankind, which is entirely fulfilled by the spirit of pluralism, 
democracy, and the rule of law288; and more importantly, the implementation of Islam 
law for the Muslims, in which the Tauhid becomes the foundation of their life289. In 
recent years, the PKS used the term Masyarakat Madani (the civil society) to 
describe such condition290.   
 
Indeed, this requirement featured adaptive approaches reflected by the 
acknowledgment of the existence of Indonesia’s nationalism, democracy, and 
Pancasila as the foundation of the state. This attitude was institutionalised in the 
statutes and rules of association and the platform of the party.291 However, it does 
mean that PKS regards those values in a similar way to the secular camps. As a 
party that believes in the creation of Islamic civilisation, which, in the end, has a 
meaning the implementation of Islamic Syari’ah in every aspects of human life, PKS 
actually sees all these values as just provisional ones at one particular stage of all 
the phase for total Islamisation292.     
 
The next orientation relates to the commitment to conduct a systematic and 
gradual formation of the cadres or kaderisasi (the cadrerization). This process is 
                                                 
286 Majelis Pertimbangan Pusat Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Memperjuangkan Masyarakat Madan. 
Falsafah Dasar Perjuangan dan Platform Kebijakan Pembangunan PK Sejahtera, p. 37. 
287 Ibid, p.28. See also Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Keadilan, Prinsip Dasar Partai Keadilan, 
(Jakarta: Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Keadilan, 1999). 
288 Hilmi Aminuddin, “Kata Pengantar Ketua Majelis Syura”, in Majelis Pertimbangan Pusat Partai 
Keadilan Sejahtera, Memperjuangkan Masyarakat Madan. Falsafah Dasar Perjuangan dan Platform 
Kebijakan Pembangunan PK Sejahtera, p.v. 
289 Ibid, p.34. 
290 Ibid, p.72. 
291 Ibid, pp. 5-76. See also in “Jati Diri Partai Keadilan”, in Sahar L Hassan, Kuat Sukardiyono and 
Dadi M.H. Basri, eds, Memilih Partai Islam, Visi, Misi dan Persepsi, (Jakarta, Gema Insani Press, 
1998), p.58. 
292 Noor, Moderate Islamic Fundamentalism in Indonesia: A Study of Political Thinking and Behaviour 
of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), 1998-2005, p.71. 
 104
dedicated to the formation of zealous individuals who are ready to implement PKS’ 
dakwah method293. In order to implement this, PKS institutionalised cadrerization into 
the statutes of the party, by stating, for instance, that this process as one of the main 
duties of the Managing Board at every level of leadership. This party, through the 
Department of Cadrerization, also formally published their material used for 
cadrerization, in which materials used in Jamaah Tarbiyah became the main 
reference.294 Cadrerization eventually provided an important contribution to preserve 
the sense of togetherness, which horizontally is related to brotherhood spirit, mutual 
trust and the belief in their supreme goal. This situation, as will be explained in 
Chapter X, serves a crucial role in strengthening the ability of the party to maintain 
party cohesion and to avoid prolonged internal conflict.     
 
3.  Organisational Structure 
 
In the PKS’ organisational structure, MS became the most important element. Before 
2003, after the National Congress MS was the second important element in PKS. 
However, since the National Congress only met once a year, it was difficult to have 
an immediate response if the party still relied on this element. Moreover, the party 
eventually concluded that the congress should be a medium or forum in decision-
making process and not as part of the party structure. MS holds position as Ahlul 
Halii wal-Aqdi295 of the party, which gives this body the supreme position. The 
members of this party consist of experts selected by kader inti (the main cadres), the 
most qualified members who posses the highest rank of cadres, through pemilihan 
raya (the election) for five year term. The existence of this body essentially reflects 
two important interests, namely to keep the party for being always proportional to the 
spirit of Islamic teachings and the aspiration of the members.       
 
The main duty of this body is to make fundamental decisions for the party. 
This includes giving political directions to the party over the next five-year period, 
providing responses to actual and important cases, and determining figures that 
would hold important positions in high bodies of the party. These bodies are Majelis 
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Pertimbangan Pusat (the Central Advisory Assembly/MPP), DPP, and Dewan 
Syariah Pusat (the Central Islamic Law Council/DSP). MS has also a role to 
determine the candidates for presidential election and to confirm party’s political 
stance on cases related to the national government situation. Moreover, because its 
basic function as a consultative body with a high spirit of equality, in some cases, 
which will be explained in the next chapters, MS also acts as a medium for conflict 
resolution. These duties provide an executive role for MS, which actually makes MS 
become more than a legislative body.  
 
Musyawarah Majelis Syura (The Conference of the Consultative 
Assembly/MMS) becomes the most important forum as it stipulates the very basic 
policies296. This forum has must be held twice a year. Every member of PKS has to 
obey and to implement any policies produced by this forum. The second important 
forum is the National Conference of MS. This forum is held as a response to the 
current political development and involves elements outside MS. This meeting is held 
once in every five years to promulgate the statutes of the party, the policy direction of 
the party, the strategic plan of the party and to asses other important policies at the 
national level.  
 
To date, MS has been chaired by two prominent figures of tarbiyah 
movement, namely Salim Segaf Al-Jufri and Aminuddin297. Both are part of the first 
generation of the Jamaah Tarbiyah, popularly acknowledged as murrabbi (the 
teacher) for most of senior cadres in Jamaah Tarbiyah and PKS. To some extent, 
this situation reflects the continuation of Jamaah Tarbiyah in PKS. The position of 
both figures also indicates the important role of senior figures, particularly the 
teachers of the seniors, in the decision-making process in PKS. It shows the real 
chain of command inside the party where seniority and the quality of religious 
commitment become the legitimating values to hold the top positions in the party.  
 
However, at the practical level, this situation does not necessarily endorse an 
authoritarian mechanism. The fact that the candidate of the chairperson and the 
majority of the members of this body elected democratically by the members (the last 
                                                 
296 At the very early stage, because of its strategic position, this forum held the highest body in the 
PKS’ organizational structure. However, eventually, partly because of the need to hold consistency, 
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election involved around 30,000 participants), has relatively provided a very large 
opportunity for the establishment of a popular institution. Moreover, the existence of 
more than fifty people, which encourages more plural opinions, relatively reduces the 
possibility of one-man show or authoritarian leadership in this body. In addition, this 
party also provides a systematic mechanism to dismiss the general chairperson and 
the member of MS, which indicates the existence of internal control towards this 
body.   
 
As a working committee of MS, the party forms Dewan Pimpinan Tingkat 
Pusat (the National Board of Directors/DPTP) chaired by the Chairperson of MS298. 
This institution has five members: the chairperson of MPP, the chairperson of DSP, 
the President of DPP, the general secretary of DPP, and the treasure of DPP. The 
main tasks of DPTP are implementing MS’ policies, recommending figures that will 
act as party’s representative at national institutions and very important occasions, 
providing recommendation to DPP on the dismissal of the managing board at the 
regional level, and assessing the performance of MPP, DSP and DPP. With all these 
responsibilities, this body holds a strategic position in the party, including as an 
influential group, particularly prior to decision-making process in MS. However, since 
this body is responsible to MS, DPTP actually cannot make any unilateral policies 
and actions without MS’ approval.    
 
Another important institution is MPP299. The important duty of this body is to 
ensure that any policies produced by DPP and DSP are in line with MS’ decision and 
policies provided at the National Conference. Thus, the main objective of this body is 
to supervise and to give advice to any policy drafts drawn up by DPP and DSP. MPP 
also has duty to socialise pedoman partai (the guidance of the party) to all the 
members, in order to avoid disputes in understanding the statues of the party and 
other fundamental guidance. However, the existence of this body is important for 
avoiding personal or exclusive interpretations on the rules of the game of the party. 
MPP is responsible to MS and has five-year term to conduct its duties.    
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With regard to DSP300, this body’s main functions are to provide fatwa (the 
legal decision based on Islamic law) for all party policies. With this task, DSP 
becomes a reference by which all the members to identify the legal status of certain 
matters or cases before making a judgment or policies. All members of the party 
have to obey any decisions made by this body. DSP is set up as independent body in 
order to avoid any attempts of intervention from any elements and to ensure 
objectivity in the decision-making process. Besides that main function, according to 
the ART, DSP should also act as arbitrary institution that gives a final judgement on 
the legal status of a member in the party301. Hence, this body is responsible for any 
matters related to the provisional dismissal or discharge of the members, where the 
accused members defend their position through this body. As it explained in the next 
chapter, this body plays a salient role and in particular, that related to the cases of 
dismissal and conflict resolution.              
 
The fifth important body in PKS is DPP. The importance of this body is its 
position as the executive body that implements all policies made by MS. Even though 
the chairperson of this body is called the President of the Party, DPP is not the 
highest body in the party. In fact, according to the statues and rules of association of 
the party, DPP should submit a report to MS every six months as a part of control 
mechanism of this body. To date, compare to other parties, this strict mechanism 
relevant to DPP can only be found in PKS. The statutes of the party also mention that 
to hold systematic cadrerization and to implement the method of tarbiyah are part of 
DPP’s main duties302. For this reason, DPP supervises the Department of 
Cadrerization that holds a specific duty as a coordinator of cadrerization303. Each 
Managing Board at every committee level has the obligation to carry out 
cadrerization.  
 
DPP also has duty to set up Managing Board at the provincial and regency 
levels and for certain reasons it has the right to suspend these boards. This body 
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also has the authority to make recommendations for dismissal as a reprimand for any 
member who has committed a major violation. Yet this process is not easy to 
conduct, since according to the statutes of the party, every member of the party has 
a legal right to be protected and to appeal against her or his dismissal. However, as 
described in the next chapters, some important cadres in the party actually have 
been discharged for their violations. It shows that the party is actually keen to hold a 
fair party discipline.   
 
Regarding the local committees, they have a different organisational structure 
to the national committee. The committees of the party at the province (Dewan 
Pengurus Wilayah/DPW) and regency level (Dewan Pengurus Daerah/DPD) have 
only three bodies namely MPP, DSP and Managing Board. As for the committees at 
the sub-district level (Dewan Pengurus Cabang/DPC) and at the village, level 
(Dewan Pengurus Ranting/DPR) only has Managing Board. Each body at every level 
of committee has to report its responsibility to the same body at the higher level. This 
makes MPP, DSP and DP at the national level actually turns to be a centre of 
responsibility. However, each body at the same level develops a collegial relations 
and works under the spirit of equality, as according to the statutes of the party, they 
possess an equal position. Each level of committee is eligible to conduct 
conferences, which would become a reference for it. 
 
4.  Political Activities  
 
Less than one year after its establishment, PKS joined the first election in the reform 
era. In the 1999 Election, PKS gained around 1.4 million votes, which made the party 
the fifth largest Islamic party in Indonesia. PKS subsequently became part of Fraksi 
Reformasi (the Reform Faction), together with PAN304, which was chaired by the 
prominent figure of gerakan reformasi (the reform movement) Prof. Dr. M. Amien 
                                                 
304 PKS initially rejected the offer from minor parties, namely Partai Kebangkitan Ulama (the Ulama 
Awakening Party or PNU), Partai Kebangkitan Ummat (the Ummat Awakening Party or PKU), Partai 
Politik Islam Masyumi (the Indonesian Islamic Political Party Masyumi or PPII-Masyumi), Partai 
Sarekat Islam Indonesia (the Indonesian Islamic Union Party or PSII), Partai Daulat Rakyat (the 
People Sovereign Party or PDR) to create a sort of Muslim Faction in the parliament. Even though the 
possibility to gain the chairperson position in such faction is considerably open, for the reason 
mentioned PKS preferred to join Reform Faction. These Islamic parties later on created their own 
faction namely Fraksi Daulah Ummat (Faction of Ummat Sovereignty). Noor, Moderate Islamic 
Fundamentalism in Indonesia: A Study of Political Thinking and Behaviour of the Prosperous Justice 
Party (PKS), 1998-2005, p. 96.  
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Rais. The decision to join PAN indicated the commitment of PKS to struggle for 
reform agendas, together with Rais.  
 
In the President Wahid Cabinet, the first government in the Reform Era, the 
President of the party, Dr. Nur Mahmudi Ismail, held the position as the Minister of 
Forestry and Agriculture. This position was an important symbol for Jamaah 
Tarbiyah, which indicated the first success to be a part of the national political system 
after long time of having merely existed as an underground movement. Moreover, 
through the performance of Ismail that showed the eagerness to manage 
professionally the organization and to reduce corruption in one of the most corrupted 
departments, it also demonstrated an ability of Jamaah Tarbiyah to provide a positive 
contribution to the national government. However, Ismail happened to be one of 
ministers dismissed by President Wahid in the first reshuffle in 2001. He was 
replaced by Marzuki Usman, one of the president’s close friends, who tended to be a 
more moderate and cooperative figure.  
 
However, the political behaviour of Ismail raised PKS’ image of an anti-
corruption party. In relation to the anti-corruption movement, this party has become 
one of anti-corruption bastions in Indonesia. During the first years of reform, for 
instance, this party has saved the money belonging to government for an amount 
around Rp. 739.6 Millions305, from misused, bribery, and gratification. Later on, this 
image became identified with this party. Due to such commitment, Ricklefs, for 
instance, describes PKS as “the hope for the Indonesian people for an end to 
corruption and for greater competence and morality in government”.306 After the 
dismissal of President Wahid, the party focused its activities on internal improvement 
and kindly rejected joining President Megawati government.                  
 
In addition to these political achievements, in the first five years of the Reform 
Era, PKS appeared to be a non-exclusive Islamic party indicated by the eagerness to 
build strategic relationships with other national elements, including some important 
secular and Christian political groups. The willingness to create a coalition with Partai 
Damai Sejahtera (the Prosperous Peace Party/PDS), one of prominent Christian 
parties, during the first decade of the Reform Era, to win a local election in Papua, 
                                                 
305 Bisnis Indonesia, 29 April 2004.  
306 M.C. Ricklefs, “Islamizing Indonesia: Religion and Politics in Singapore’s Giant Neighbour”, 
Public Lecture in Asian Civilisations Museum, 23 September 2004. 
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one of the most Christian populated regions in Indonesia, for instance, was one case 
that illustrated this situation. In doing so, PKS believed that building strategic 
relations, which is considered as a part of musyarakah (the political participation) with 
other political groups in order to protect the interest of the Muslim307 and to prove 
Islam as a solution308, is not only allowed in Islam, but also actually become part of 
the jihad.309 This interpretation of jihad gave room for PKS to perform confidently 
moderate approaches in implementing political strategy. 
 
During that time, PKS also demonstrated a commitment to take care of the 
humanitarian problems, for instance by independently taking the initiative to collect 
funds for the victims of disasters and sending the cadres to those areas. This 
commitment was also demonstrated by the establishment pos kepedulian (care 
centres) and social activities to help needy people in many areas310. In the global 
context, this party consistently performed demonstrations to show solidarity and 
concern towards the Muslims in the world particularly in conflicted areas such as 
Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan, which was then followed by fund rising to be 
donated to the people in these states. This social and humanitarian concern 
suggests that PKS did not limit its existence to the power game only nor did it merely 
acted as political machine311. Ideologically, these activities were in line with the 
doctrine of syumuliatul Islam, which regards Islam as a solution for humankind. Thus, 
it also related to the efforts to prove their existence as problem solver for social and 
humanitarian problems.   
 
In the 2004 Election, with those positive images behind it and reflected by the 
slogan “Clean and Caring” as the main theme of its campaign, PKS was able to 
increase its number of votes seven times with a gain 8.3 millions of vote. This result 
was equal to 45 seats and made this party the sixth largest party of the 18 parties 
existing in DPR. This significant, political achievement subsequently followed by 
another success when Dr. Hidayat Nur Wahid, the second president of the party, 
                                                 
307 Balda, Ridho and Wahono, Politik Da’wah Partai Keadilan, pp. 135-144. 
308 According to Hidayat Nur Wahid, jihad consists of the attitude of muwajaha (fighting against) as 
well as musyarakah (being involved with) in order to fight for Islamic ideals. See “Meneguhkan Trilogi 
Perjuangan”, Saksi, No.14/VI/12 May 2004. 
309 ibid. 
310 Noor, Moderate Islamic Fundamentalism in Indonesia: A Study of Political Thinking and Behaviour 
of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), 1998-2005, p.112. 
311 Firman Noor, “Kegagalan Partai Politik Menarik Simpati Rakyat: Urgensi Sebuah Paradigma Baru 
Partai Politik”, Jurnal Politik, (Jakarta: LIPI Press, 2007). 
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became the General Chairperson of MPR, which was at that time, one of the most 
prestigious positions in the Indonesia political system. Concerning the Presidential 
Election, PKS established a coalition. It joined forces with PD, the debutant party 
claiming to be advisor of nationalist-religious ideology, together with PBB, which was 
a modernist Islamic party known as the continuation of Masyumi, and Partai Keadilan 
dan Persatuan Indonesia (Indonesia United and Justice Party/PKPI), a nationalist 
secular party formed by fraction group of Golkar Party during the second round of the 
election. This coalition nominated the Retired General Dr. Soesilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono and Muhammad Jusuf Kala, former successful businessman who was 
also a Golkar Party cadre, for President and Vice-President. Yudhoyono won the 
election by a significant margin.  
 
However, the 2004 Presidential Election indicated a new development in this 
party. It was for the first time an internal dispute emerged to the surface. This related 
to the presidential candidate nomination prior to the first round of the election. There 
were two camps with different options responding at this moment. One camp 
supported Rais, the former chairperson of Muhammadiyah. The main reason to 
nominate Rais, former and the “informal leader” of the reform movement in 1998, 
was his commitment to political reform, particularly to the establishment of a clean 
government, and the interest of Islamic communities. Another camp, however, 
preferred the Retired General Wiranto, former Commander of the Indonesian Armed 
Forces during the Soeharto era who was nominated in that election by Golkar Party. 
The reasons behind this preference were in connection with the interest to establish 
a strong and effective government, by regarding Wiranto as the former top figure in 
the Armed Forces who had the ability to conduct this interest.  
 
The existence of these two camps raised speculation on the internal 
fragmentation, considering the fact that both camps had their own rationales, which 
seemed difficult to resolve, and had conducted significant efforts to build strategic 
connections and political deals with each candidate. Although both camps actually 
based their choice on the interests of Islamic communities, the interpretation that 
described this quarrel as a dispute between “idealist camp” that supported Rais and 
“pragmatist camp” that preferred Wiranto cannot be neglected. However, after the 
MS democratically decided to vote for Rais, which will be discussed in the following 
chapters, the dispute among cadres was generally over. PKS then formally declared 
its support for Rais. In the first election, Rais, far from many predictions, finished in 
the fourth position.  
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 In the second round of election, PKS became more solid and decided to vote 
for Yudhoyono. This choice did not raise any disputes. Yudhoyono was willing to sign 
kontrak politik (the political contract) between him and PKS, consisting of reform 
agendas such as to establish democratic and have a clean government. Moreover, 
Yudhoyono, who regarded himself and his party as the representative of the 
“nationalist-religious” standpoint, was more acceptable rather than former President 
Megawati Soekarno Putri who ideologically represented secular nationalism camp. 
PKS then gained three ministerial posts in the Yudhoyono Government312. Although 
PKS tried to be an objective partner and sometimes even criticised the Yudhoyono 
Government, PKS in general became one of important allies of this government and 
continued to be loyal until the end of its term. This term also witnessed the failure and 
the success of PKS’ efforts in local politics. Several cadres, for the first time, won 
local elections and in some areas held position as governors and regents or majors.                   
 
In the 2009 Election, PKS gained 8.2 millions of votes and became the fourth 
largest party in parliament, after three non-Islamic parties (see the Table 7). Prior to 
the 2009 Presidential Election, PKS together with PD, the winner of the 2009 
election, and other Islamic parties, namely PAN, PPP and PKB, established a 
coalition, which nominated Yudhoyono and Prof. Dr. Boediono, former Governor of 
Bank of Indonesia (Indonesia’s central bank) popularly known as to have a pro-liberal 
economic approach. Yudhoyono then won the election for the second time. President 
Yudhoyono then awarded the PKS four ministerial posts in his cabinet313. This 
achievement indicates a continuation of the role of PKS in the national government.  
 
PKS, particularly after the 2004 Election, tried to become an open party to 
confirm its commitment towards pluralism. This was regarded as a contextual 
dakwah. In 2008, PKS celebrated the 100 years of Indonesian nationalism. This 
celebration actually was also to commemorate the birth of Boedi Oetomo, (the High 
Endeavour/BO), established in Jakarta on 20 May 1908, a Javanese-Aristocrat 
group, which for decades was nationally acknowledged as the first organisation that 
struggled for and spread the sense of nationalism.  
                                                 
312 Namely the Ministry of Agriculture (Dr. Anton Apriantono), the Ministry of Housing (M. Yusuf 
Ansyari) and the State Ministry of Youth and Sport (Dr. Adyaksa Dault). 
313 Namely the Ministry of Agriculture (Suswono), Ministry of Social Affairs (Salim Segaf Al-Jufri), 
Ministry of Research and Technology (Suharna Surapranata), and Ministry of Communication and 
Information Technology (Tifatul Sembiring). 
 113
 To some, the involvement of PKS in such celebration was extraordinary. It 
meant that PKS not only acknowledged and celebrated nationalism itself, something 
that was not really welcomed by right wings Islamic groups, but also acknowledged 
the role of BO as an organisation actually having a tendency to be anti-Islamic and 
historically did not really have clear function in developing the sense of nationalism. 
For instance, this organization’s statutes mentioned that its existence was to struggle 
for only the interests of the Javanese and Maduranese people and not for all 
Indonesians314. Based on these reasons, accordingly, PKS’ stance on such a 
celebration triggered negative responses from the people, mainly from 
fundamentalist wing of Islamic activists and some objective historians.  
 
Table 7 
The Comparison of Results the 2004 Election and the 2009 Election 
(Big Ten of Parties) 
 
The 2004 Election The 2009 Election 
Parties Votes % Seats Parties Votes % Seats 
PG 24.480.757  21,6 127 PD 21,703,137   20,1 150 
PDIP 21.026.629  18,5 109 PG 15,037,757   14,5 107 
PKB 11.989.564  10,6  52 PDIP 14,600,091   14,0   95 
PPP 9.248.764    8,2  58 PKS 8,206,955     7,9   57 
PD 8.455.225    7,5  56 PAN 6,254,580     6,0   43 
PKS 8.325.020    7,3  45 PPP 5,533,214     5,3   37 
PAN 7.303.324    6,4  53 PKB 5,146,122     4,9   27 
PBB 2.970.487    2,6  11 Gerindra 4,646,406     4,5   26 
PBR 2.764.998    2,4  14 Hanura 3,922,870     3,8   18 
PDS 2.414.254    2,1  13 PBB 1,864,752     1,8     0 
Others 8.021.758    7,1  12 Others 17,183,901   16,5     0 
Total 113.462.414 100,0   550 Total 104,099,785 100,0  560 
   Source: Indonesia Election Commission  
 
Furthermore, during the 2008 National Conference held in Bali, this party 
opened the discourses to become open party. It meant to be more welcome to the 
non-Islamic elements for them to be involved and to participate in the activities of the 
party315. To some, PKS has reached and properly maintained the image as clean 
                                                 
314 It was stated in the Statutes of BO Chapter 2, using Dutch and not Bahasa Indonesia, that de 
harmonische ontwikkeling van land en volk van Java en Madura (to advance the motherland and the 
nation of Java and Madura harmonically). By acknowledging BO, PKS on the other hand denied the 
role of Sarekat Islam, an Islamic organization that struggle for the interest of all pribumi (indigenous 
people) since the very beginning of its existence.  
315 See R.B. Suryama M. Sastra, “Mukernas PKS 2008”, in images.suryama.multiply.com 
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and caring party316. It is now time to prove this party as friendly political institution 
that can be used by all Indonesian people and in turns accelerate PKS’ integration 
with other national elements317. However, after facing internal dispute, as a reflection 
of the un-readiness of the majority of tarbiyah activists to implement such political 
option, eventually this discourse was not formally declared. However, two years 
latter, at the 2010 MMS, the PKS declared itself as the opened-Islamic party, 
showing its readiness to run this agenda, which would give a chance for non-Muslim 
to become members of the party. According to Aminuddin, the Chair of MS, this 
policy was not merely a strategy to win the election. In fact, for Aminduddin, the 
attitude of openness in politics, based on the spirit of pluralism found its relevance in 
the Islamic teachings318.  
                                                
 
The attempts to build such moderate approaches generated different 
responses. Some people understand this attitude and related it to the process to 
reach ideological and organisational maturity, namely from an ideologically strict 
party to be a more realistic party. They also regarded it as a normal strategy for the 
party that seek more votes and to win the election in a state where most people still 
had an indifferent attitude towards Islamic values, particularly in politics319. They also 
confirmed that such attitude was also backed up by its basic moderate ideology. 
However, to others, PKS’ political stance showed an inconsistency in carrying out its 
basic ideals. They also criticised PKS’ attitude as one of political opportunism that 
sacrifices Islamic agendas for merely temporary political victories. 
 
Furthermore, some people criticised PKS in relation to its political strategies. 
Inconsistency in responding to the policy to reduce the government subsidy for 
petroleum became one of the cases. During the Megawati Government era, PKS 
appeared to be one of active elements that clearly rejected such policy, which was 
popularly regarded as an unfriendly policies mainly for the poor people. However, 
during the Yudhoyono era, when PKS was part of the government, this party slightly 
changed its attitude towards this policy. Although theoretically a reduction in the 
 
316 Majelis Pertimbangan Pusat Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Memperjuangkan Masyarakat Madan. 
Falsafah Dasar Perjuangan dan Platform Kebijakan Pembangunan PK Sejahtera, p. 56. 
317 Ibid, p. 75. Sastra, “Mukernas PKS 2008”. 
318 “Ketua Majelis Syura: Kami Ingin Membangun Kebersamaan dan Keseragmana”, Republika. 22 
June 2010. 
319 Ignacio Sanchez-Cuenca, “Party Moderation and Politician’s Ideological Rigidity”, in Party 
Politics, Vol 10, No.3, pp. 325-342. Saban Taniyici, “Transformation of Political Islam in Turkey, 
Islamist Welfare Party’s Pro-EU Turn”, in Party Politics, vol 9, no.4, pp.463-483. 
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subsidy was needed in order to restore financial efficiency, for the people at the 
grass-root level this policy should be the last option. Most people at that time still 
believed that if the government could reduce inefficiency in its financial management 
and effectively decrease corruption, actually such a policy could be avoided 
temporarily. This would provide them with more time to prepare to face such 
unpopular policy.  
 
In this regard, some idealist groups begun to be impatient with PKS political 
actions, which they regard as insensitive. Some of them then raised the option to 
leave the coalition320. However, PKS tended to avoid such a movement and chose to 
intensify its personal approached in conveying people’s interests to the president. 
This situation created an internal dispute and to some extent generated 
disappointment for several cadres. In addition, the inability to create a significant 
change in some local areas where PKS was the winner also became the object of 
criticism. Although PKS actually did not become a majority group in all local 
parliaments that were won by this party, even some localities became a common 
enemy mainly due to the party’s strict and uncompromising attitude towards 
corruption321, generally, the people still criticised PKS for its lack of endeavours to 
create a significant reform where it is in power322.       
 
People’s criticism became more open of this party, both in regard to the way 
this party was making its interpretation of its ideology and in the way it conducted its 
political strategies. These critiques included people who used to be party’s 
supporters or even the cadres. The existence of Forum Kader Peduli (the Care 
Cadre Forum/FKP) and PKS Watch as medium to mediate the disappointed former 
party’s supporters and members were the example of these people. To them, 
“today’s PKS” was as a different party that implemented great bound in its approach 
to understanding its basic ideology and in conducting political activities. They 
concluded that this party was a victim of its own political interest. However, although 
it gained many critics, PKS was able to maintain its existence properly. The internal 
dispute that occurred in PKS as an inevitable phenomenon did not lead to the 
                                                 
320 The General Secretary of PKS Anis Matta and member of Parliament Mashadi became prominent 
figures who supports of this option. On Matta’s opinion to opt out from the coalition, see ”Tak Ada 
Koalisi Tanpa Perubahan”, in Saksi, No.6/VIII/30 November 2005, pp.7-9. See also “Ini Politik Bos”, 
Tempo, 16 October 2005. 
321 Noor, Moderate Islamic Fundamentalism in Indonesia: A Study of Political Thinking and Behaviour 
of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), 1998-2005, pp.36-37. 
322 Amir J. Piliang, “Manusia dan Politik PKS”, Media Indonesia, 27 July 2005. 
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creation of factions. In these circumstances, PKS enjoyed the opportunity to develop 
its existence in society. It can be seen, for instance, from time to time of the 
improvement of the number of cadres323. 
 
5.  Closing Remarks 
 
The explanation above suggests that PKS as a “dakwah party” has been a party that 
tried to combine Islamic universal ideals with moderate ways in politics. It appears to 
be not an easy task. Although this party has gained some positive images, namely 
anti-corruption and caring party, PKS cultivates many critics mainly due to its political 
strategy. The moderate ways developed by PKS sometime were regarded as 
opportunistic ways that sacrifices the party’s basic idealism. Accordingly, as an 
ideological party, internal dispute cannot be neglected due to this ideology 
interpretation and its related problems. Actually, the internal disputes might 
potentially lead to becoming the main reasons for prolonged conflict and even party 
fragmentation, as it happened in PSII in the years 1920-1930. Nevertheless, PKS still 
can considerably maintain its cohesion. Some aspects mentioned, such as internal 
values and cadrerization, contribute to this situation. The next chapters will explore 
the ability of this party to preserve its cohesion, which during the first decade of the 
Reform Era made PKS the only large Islamic party in Indonesia that could avoid 
internal fragmentation. 
                                                 
323 Rahmat, Ideologi Politik PKS. Dari Masjid Kampus ke Gedung Parlemen, pp. 39-41. 
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Chapter V 
Procedural Leadership in Decision Making Process: 





“The party management, which was far from modern, had provided a 
room for the party to overlook the rules of the game in the decision-
making process, causing the factionalism between the group that were 







This chapter will discuss one of the main elements of party institutionalisation, 
namely procedural leadership. Procedural leadership requires the implementation of 
the rules of the game in all decision-making process. It means that the party should 
not only be aware of its decisions’ legal status and arrive at them transparently, but 
do so consistently as a matter of course. This implies consistency in making and 
implementing policies based on internal rules of the game. The chapter will 
specifically discuss the decision-making process, main actors or elements involved, 
the presence of any constitutional violations in the process and the effects that these 
may have, particularly in the case of cadre dismissals.  
 
The dismissal cases are used to show a real situation on the decision-
making process in PKB that eventually triggered the internal fragmentations. In other 
words, through the explanation of these cases, the relation between the existence of 
procedural leadership and the extent of party fragmentation will be examined, with 
the hypothesis being that absence of such leadership will enhance disappointment, 
reduce the trust among the members, and encourage resistance, thus in turn 
heightening the possibility of fragmentation.  
 
                                                 
324 Interview with Dr. Ali Masykur Musa, Vice Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz of PKB (2005-2010) 
and General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz of PKB-Gus Dur (2008-2009), in Jakarta, 19 October 2010. 
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2. Legal-Formal Aspect and Background  
   
Decision-making process in the PKB consisted of two ways in stipulating a policy, 
namely by musyawarah and voting.325 The acknowledgment of consultation and 
voting indicated that the party put forward the popular based decision-making 
mechanism, where many people, not merely a faction let alone a person, joined to 
stipulate the decision. There were several forums for this process. Of 21 forums of 
Musyawarah326, the forums that directly involve DPP in the decision-making process, 
namely Muktamar, Muktamar Luar Biasa (the Extraordinary Conference/MLB), 
Musyawarah Kerja Nasional (the National Working Conference/Mukernas) and 
Musyawarah Pimpinan (the Conference of the Heads/Muspim).  
 
Muktamar was the highest forum in PKB, which represented the sovereignty 
of members of the party. This national congress was held every five years and 
attended by all members of DPP and representatives of Dewan Pengurus Wilayah 
(the Regional Managing Board/DPW) and Dewan Pengurus Cabang (the Branch 
Managing Board/DPC). Muktamar had many authorities, namely to evaluate the 
report of DPP, to promulgate and/or amend the AD/ART of the party, to promulgate 
the party platform for the next five years, to decree the basic programs of the party 
for the next five years, to elect and to stipulate the General Chairperson of Dewan 
Syura and to elect and to stipulate the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz.  
 
MLB was an extraordinary forum to decree urgent policies as a response to a 
very important and special situation. This forum was based on the demand of more 
that half of the numbers of the DPC and more than half of the numbers of the DPW 
across the nation. The participants of the MLB were similar to the muktamar. After 
2005, the ART of PKB clearly stated that one of MLB’s functions was to dismiss 
permanently the General Chairperson of Dewan Syura and the General Chairperson 
of Dewan Tanfidz; and to select provisional General Chairperson for both 
positions327.   
 
                                                 
325 The 1998 AD of PKB Article 19 (1) - (2); The 2000 AD of PKB Article Article 19 (1) - (2); The 2002 
AD of PKB Article 19; The 2005 AD of PKB Article Article 20 (1) - (2); The 2008 AD of PKB Article 
20 (1) - (2).  
326 The 2005 AD of PKB article 19 (1); The 2008 AD of PKB Article 19 (1). 
327 The 2005 ART of PKB Article 40 (1.b) and 40 (1.c); The 2008 ART of PKB Article 42 (1.b) and 42 
(1.c). 
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Mukernas was a forum that should be held at least twice a year by the party. 
The functions of this forum were to assess the implementation of policies, to discuss 
other policies stipulated in muktamar and to put other relevant issues in debate. 
Participants to this meeting were the members of DPP and the representatives of 
DPW. The meeting will be legal to provide policies if attended by more than half of 
the participants. Muspim was a forum that could be held at any time necessary, 
mainly to discuss current development of the party and the national political situation, 
based on the proposal of at least five members of Dewan Syura. The participants of 
this forum were the members of DPP and the heads of DPW. Muspim could legally 
stipulate policy if attended by more than half of the participants.             
 
The PKB also had Rapat Pleno DPP (the plenary meeting of DPP) and Rapat 
Gabungan DPP (the join session of DPP) to make some strategic decisions328. The 
plenary meeting should be held at least once in every six month. The participants of 
this meeting were the elements of Dewan Syura and Dewan Tanfidz at national level. 
The join session was a limited forum where the members of Dewan Syura and 
Dewan Tanfidz at national level meet in order to conduct debates responding to 
current developments. Since these forums were very limited in terms of participants, 
the decision could not replace the policies that have been stated at the musyawarah 
level. On a more practical scale, however, these meetings took a crucial part in 
making some strategic policies, some of which became controversial policies, or 
triggered internal fragmentation.   
 
The explanation above generally infers that every single decision, that is 
relevant nation-wide, has to involve DPP. The fundamental and very basic policies 
require considerable involvement from the members of the party, while some tactical 
and day-to-day policies can merely involve a limited group, as occur in the Muspim. 
The party’s statute also indicates that DPP is in hold of vast authorities, which 
manage almost all matters, including upholding the party discipline, to determine the 
nomination of members of parliament (MP) candidate and to manage party financial 
activities329. This situation however is not balanced by the existence of an effective 
                                                 
328 The 1998 ART of PKB Article 63 (a); The 2000 ART of PKB Articl 75 (a); The 2002 ART of PKB 
Article 79 (1.a) - (1.b); the 2005 ART of PKB Article 83 (1.a) - (1.b). The 2008 ART of PKB Article 86 
(1.a)- (1.b). 
329 Smita Notosusanto, “Analisa AD/ART Partai Politik”, seminar paper, unpublised, p.7 in 
http://forum-politisi.org/downloads/Analisa_AD_ART_Parpol_-_Smita.pdf. 
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control mechanism330. Moreover, a decree in PKB would have a legal status and 
officially bind all members if signed by four elements namely the General 
Chairperson of Dewan Syura, General Secretary of Dewan Syura, General 
Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz, and General Secretary of Dewan Tanfidz.  
 
In relation to the decision-making process, the statute of the party also 
managed members’ dismissal process. According to the party’s ART, the party could 
dismiss the party’s member if he was to commit actions against the party, for 
instance, breaking the rules of the party, intentionally not carrying his duty as a 
party’s member, violating the discipline of the party, and disgracing the party’s 
honour. Before dismissing a member, the party had to send a warning letter three 
times to the member, keeping in mind that there is a one week delay between a letter 
and the next one331. If said member did not respond to the last warning letter, the 
party temporarily terminated the status of membership. If after one month had 
passed the member did not respond for his status, his party membership 
automatically ended. Each dismissed member had right to defend their position.  
 
Besides above legal-formal situations, it is also important to understand 
PKB’s unique characteristic that will also influence the performance of this party in 
dealing with the decision-making process.  
 
As the organisation that was developed and run by NU and its exponents, 
PKB eventually had a tendency to follow a similar pattern of NU in viewing and 
implementing the rules of the game. In the decision-making process context, it 
means, to some extent, to have a potential to uphold loosely its constitution. One of 
the main traditions of NU was to accommodate and implement the advices of ulama, 
mainly the very senior and respectable ones, in struggling for the interests of NU. In 
the situation where the interest of NU and the opinion of ulama became the prime 
agendas, the rules of the game sometimes appeared to be complementary elements. 
In several monumental decisions of NU, the elite or leaders, using limited forum, 
practically and essentially played a significant role in deciding the policies that 
sometimes disregard the AD/ART332. In this regard, the interest of the respected 
                                                 
330 Ibid, p.7. 
331 The 1998 ART of PKB Article 11 (2); The 2000 ART of PKB Article 11 (2); The  2002 ART of PKB 
Article 11 (2); The 2005 ART of PKB Article 11 (2); The 2008 ART of PKB Article 11 (2). 
332 The decision to leave Masyumi in 1952 that influence the life of the NU in particular and Indonesian 
political constellation in general, for instance, was the result of the great effort of A. Wahab 
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figure sometimes was recognised as the interest of all or jamiyah (the organization or 
association). Eventually, in this circumstance, where supporting the interest of the 
elite was equal to supporting the interest of jamiyah, the rules of the game became 
less of an important element in the party. In this situation, Mustofa Bisri critically 
believed that NU was still not an entity of its own enough to be qualified as a solid 
organisation333.   
 
In its development, the dependency on the charismatic figure found its worst 
scenario since it relied on the fame figure, namely Wahid. As the former General 
Chairperson of PBNU, the initiator of PKB, and a charismatic figure, who was even 
believed to be a wali (person who has special gift from God) for some of his 
devotees, Wahid held an indispensable position that in the end tended to endorse 
power personification in this party. His important position in PKB also related to his 
historical role. According to Junaidi, Wahid was the most important figure that 
determined many important decisions related to PKB establishment including the 
name of the party and the name of General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz334. In 
relation to this, the General Chairpersons of Dewan Tanfidz until 2008 were the 
figures who had personal support from Wahid to win their position335.  
                                                                                                                                            
Chasbullah, Rois Akbar (the Great leader) of NU, who eagerly wanted the NU to have its own party in 
order to struggle for its political agendas. Although the policy to leave Masyumi was decided in the 
1952 Muktamar in Palembang, the muktamar itself essentially became a political tool of Chasbullah to 
attain his political agenda, since the main agenda of the muktamar set up by him was to decide “the 
most proper way to leave Masyumi” and not to decide “whether NU should leave Masyumi or not”. 
The similar situation occurred when some prominent figures of NU led by the General Chairperson of 
Dewan Syuriah NU K.H Ali Maksum and K.H Asa’ad Syamsul Arifin one of first generations of NU 
Ulama in a very limited forum dismissed the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidziyah NU Dr. 
Idham Chalid in 1982. The decision had triggered one of serious internal conflicts in NU. Chalid 
eventually declared that the attempts of those influential ulama to dismiss him was illegal and could 
not be followed since it contradicted the essence of AD/ART of NU. Greg Fealy, Ijtihad Politik Ulama, 
Sejarah NU 1952-1967, (Yogyakarta: LkiS, 2003), p.119. On the process of the Chalid dismissal see 
Mahrus Irsyam, Ulama dan Partai Politik, Upaya Mengatasi Krisis, (Jakarta: Yayasan Perkhidmatan, 
1984), pp.122-132. 
333 “Golkar dan PKB”, in A. Mustofa Bisri, Gus Dur Garis Miring PKB, (Surabaya: MataAir 
Publishing, Surabaya, 2008), p. 38. 
334 H.Z Arifin Junaidi, “Belajar dari Sejarah PKB”, in Yenny Zanuba Wahid, A. Effendy Choirie, and  
M. Kholid Syeirazi, (eds.), 9 Tahun PKB, Kritik dan Harapan, (Jakarta: Panitia Nasional Harlah ke-9 
PKB, 2007), p. 32.  
335 Jalil, the first General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz, was an experienced political activist who was 
asked by Wahid to hold such position. Although initially many NU’s sympathizers and even the PKB’s 
founding fathers rejected his decision, Wahid stubbornly insisted to give Jalil a chance to lead the 
party. Wahid even said that he would leave the PKB if the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz was 
not Jalil. In the first Muktamar of PKB, in 2000, Jalil was elected to be the General Chairperson of 
Dewan Tanfidz with full support from Wahid. The second General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz was 
Prof. Shihab. Even though he was not NU member, he became a popular figure in PKB and had good 
relationship with many important elements in the party, particularly with Wahid. His good relationship 
with Wahid had actually been developed long before he joined PKB, and happened to be more intense 
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 The position of Wahid became more significant after gaining a position as the 
General Chairperson of Dewan Syura. Wahid and also his followers regard such 
position as a legitimate position to have a special status and a set of authorities in 
determining and conducting almost all strategic policies. In addition, Wahid regarded 
himself as a patron that should be followed by the santri. According to Rokhmad: 
“Gus Dur had regarded all party cadres and members of party committee as his 
santri and khadam (the servant) that owed sendika dhawuh (totally obey) and follow 
his will at any time”336. Such an attitude was equal with the opinion of majority of NU 
people that regarded him as a charismatic figure that deserve to follow.    
 
In reality, over time, the leadership based on the charisma and patron-client 
relationship model, which was one of the main characteristics of NU337, became a 
key element in the decision-making process that provided a serous obstacle for PKB 
in conducting procedural leadership. Several procedures violations that would be 
discussed in the next part were motivated to defend or accommodate the political 
agendas of respected figures or the group where such respected people were in.  
 
However, this very situation obviously was not representing the entire picture 
of PKB. The party actually still had some committed people who tried to respect and 
proportionally implement the rules of the game. These people consisted of those who 
had strived for such interest since the beginning of the party existence and 
disappointed cadres whom, after becoming the victim of the system, realised the 
                                                                                                                                            
after he became one of the chairpersons of the party. This close relationship strengthened trust and 
understanding between him and Wahid. For this reason, Wahid gave his support to Shihab for his 
nomination in the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz election in the 2002 MLB. Shihab won the 
election. Iskandar was the third the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz. He was Wahid’s nephew 
and used to be very loyal to his uncle. Iskandar demonstrated his loyalty in any circumstances, 
including when they both facing the strong resistance from Shihab, Yusuf and their followers. He 
appeared to be a person who did not have hesitation to justify his uncle movements and to implement 
Wahid’s wills, including the controversial and unconstitutional ones. His main part in suspending many 
local boards or discharging cadres that were alleged to be disloyal, including to those who backed up 
Shihab and Yusuf prior to the 2005 Semarang Muktamar, proved this commitment. This attitude 
strengthened his relationship to Gus Dur and provided him Gus Dur supports to reach the position of 
General Chaiperson of the party.  
336 Abu Rokhmad, “PPP dan Masa Depan PKB”, Suara Merdeka, 30 January 2007. 
337 Some scholars use the term patron-client relation to describe the real condition of NU, see for 
instance James Scott, “Patron Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia”, American 
Political Science Review, 66, 1, 1972, pp. 91-113. Kang Young Soon, Antara Tradisi dan Konflik: 
Kepolitikan Nahdlatul Ulama, (Jakarta: UI-Press, 2008). Kamarudin, Konflik Internal PKB, (Depok: 
Akses Publishing, 2008). 
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weakness of their own party’s internal system, particularly the non-existence of a 
procedural leadership.  
 
3. The Rule Implementation Condition and Tendencies 
 
3.1.  The Emergence of Unconstitutional Phenomena 
 
Although PKB already had AD/ART to arrange many important matters, in PKB’s 
decision-making process, flexibility and inconsistency in implementing party 
procedures tended to occur. The violation of the party procedure in the case of the 
dismissal of Matori Abdul Jalil, the first General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz, 
signified one of the most important violations towards party’s procedure in the PKB.  
 
The dismissal was triggered by Jalil’s decision to attend the 2001 SI MPR, of 
which the main agenda was to impeach President Wahid for his unconstitutional act 
to dismiss the MPR and the accusation of corruption. Jalil’s decision disappointed 
Wahid, who then asked the party to dismiss him from his position. Wahid’s proposal, 
discussed by only six people and shortly accepted by Dewan Syura, was created at 
the same day with the opening ceremony of the SI MPR on 21 July 2001. It means 
the process the dismissal process of Jalil took less than one day. Two weeks latter, 
rapat pleno of the PKB agreed this policy and on the 14 August 2001, Mukernas 
confirmed the dismissal of Jalil from his position as the General Chairperson of 
Dewan Tanfidz.  
 
According to Wahid’s camp, this decision was correct since Jalil proved his 
disloyalty by disregarding the party’s decision not to attend SI MPR, proposed by 
MPs from PKB in an internal meeting just one day before SI MPR was hold. On that 
meeting, Jalil actually had asked the party to permit him to attend the SI MPR, not as 
the member of the party but as one of the chairpersons of MPR338. Jalil also stated 
                                                 
338 A. Effendy Choirie, PKB Politik Jalan Tengah NU, (Jakarta: Pustaka Ciganjur, 2002), p. 295. Arif 
Shodiq Pujiharto, “Benang Kusut Konflik PKB (1): Pintu Islah pun Kian Menutup”, in www.detik.com, 
15 January 2002. “MLB Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa di Jakarta. Matori Abdul Djalil Ingin Lepas Dari 
Bayangan”, Kompas, 16 January 2002. The Leadership of the MPR 1999-2002 (before Matori was 
appointed by President Megawati as the Minister of Defence) consisted of M. Amien Rais 
(Chairperson), Ginandjar Karta Sasmita (Vice Chairperson), Kwik Kian Gie (Vice Chairperson), Husni 
Thamrin (Vice Chairperson), Matori Abdul Jalil (Vice Chairperson), Jusuf Amir Faisal (Vice 
Chairperson), Hari Sabarno (Vice Chairperson), H.A Nazri Adlani (Vice Chairperson), see Yana 
Indrawan, Aip Suherman, and Tommy Andana, (eds.), Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik 
Indonesia. Sejarah, Realita dan Dinamika, (Jakarta: Sekretariat Jenderal Majelis Permusyawaratan 
Rakyat Republik Indonesia, 2007), p. 41.   
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that his interests to attend SI MPR were related to the attempt to save the president’s 
face from the impeachment and to maintain good relations with other political groups 
in parliament339. However, the party never formally answered Jalil’s proposal.  
 
Moreover, for many PKB’s members, the decision to dismiss spontaneously 
Jalil was reasonable since Wahid, as the General Chairperson of Dewan Syura who 
appointed Jalil to lead the party, had a right to dismiss Jalil directly. Choirie, for 
instance, said that the dismissal was permissible because Jalil was selected by 
Wahid, and not by direct election involving the attendees of Muktamar340. 
 
However, the abrupt decision of Jalil’s dismissal as a response to Dewan 
Syura’s proposal appeared to be questionable since it was principally not in line with 
the ART. According to the ART, the process of dismissal of managing board’s 
member should involve the party’s managing board in which the member was 
registered. This board worked as an institution that would provide dismissal 
recommendation to be approved by the party managing board at the higher level341. 
In this process, moreover, according to the ART every members of party’s managing 
board had a right to defend their case342. This precondition indicates that a dismissal 
process takes a quite long time.  
 
Moreover, the dismissal of the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz who 
was elected in muktamar should be possible if it was conducted in the same 
occasion or in the MLB. The ART stated that the General Chairperson of Dewan 
Tanfidz who was elected in the forum of muktamar should report and take 
responsibility for all his decisions and works in such forum343. In addition, in any 
                                                 
339 Mahrus Ali and MF. Nurhuda Y, Pergulatan Membela yang Benar. Biografi Matori Abdul Jalil, 
(Jakarta: Penerbit Buku Kompas, 2008), p. 249. According to Matori this maintenance is important 
otherwise what he called as, Islamic fundamentalist’s (right wing/non-NU political groups), would take 
over the life of parliament and national politics. Choirie, PKB Politik Jalan Tengah NU, p. 298. “MLB 
Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa di Jakarta. Matori Abdul Djalil Ingin Lepas Dari Bayangan”, Kompas, 16 
January 2002.  
340  Choirie, PKB Politik Jalan Tengah NU, p. 297. Interview with Tohadi, the Member of PKB (1998-
2005) and the Vice Chairperson of PKNU DPP, in Jakarta, 6 October 2010.  
341 The 1998 ART of PKB Article 11 (6); The 2000 ART of PKB Article 11 (6); The 2002 ART of PKB 
Article 11 (6); The 2005 ART of PKB Article 11 (6); The 2008 ART of PKB Article 11 (6). 
342 The 1998 ART of PKB Article 11 (7); The 2000 ART of PKB Article 11 (7); The 2002 ART of PKB 
Article 11 (7); The 2005 ART of PKB Article 11 (7); The 2008 ART of PKB Article 11 (7). 
343 The 2000 ART of PKB Article 19 (2); The 2002 ART of PKB Article 21 (2); The 2005 ART of PKB 
Article 21 (2); The 2008 ART of PKB Article 22 (2). 
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circumstances, the party should give the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz, like 
other members of committees, the opportunity to defend his case.           
 
The situation became worse for Jalil after the party withdrew his party 
membership 15 days after his attendance in the SI MPR. This decision also applied 
to the other members who refused his dismissal, such as Abdul Khaliq Ahmad and 
Agus Suflihat. In terms of organisational procedure, this decision infringed party’s 
constitution. It was because according to the ART the dismissal of the party’s 
member from the membership had to follow some stages, which actually needed 
around four months (around 120 days) to accomplish.344 The ART said that before 
the dismissal, the party must warn formally the member three times, in which the 
period between those warnings was one week. The membership would end 
automatically, if the member did not respond to her or his dismissal after three 
months from the last warning. Although several cadres at that time agreed with the 
party’s decision, these last situations indicated that during the process of a dismissal 
the party had actually broken several procedures and stages.              
 
In 2004, not long after the Jalil’s case, the procedural violation reoccurred in 
the dismissal cases of Alwi Shihab and Saifullah Yusuf, from their positions as the 
General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz and General Secretary of Dewan Tanfidz 
respectively. This case began with the limited meeting held by DPP on 21 September 
2004 as a response to the possibility of some PKB’s cadres to hold ministers’ 
positions in the new elected government. The meeting concluded that in order to 
avoid any conflict of interests and preserve party’s independency, the party 
prohibited every member to have dual positions, including in the governmental 
domain345. Not long after DPP took the decision, Shihab and Yusuf were appointed 
by President Yudhoyono to join his cabinet. Shihab became Coordinating Minister for 
Public Health and Yusuf stood his grounds as the Minister of State for Development 
of Disadvantaged Regions. Their acceptance of those ministerial posts became the 
main reason for DPP to dismiss them from their positions. This decision was 
promulgated through a DPP Plenary Meeting on 26 October 2004346.        
                                                 
344 The 1998 ART of PKB Article 11 (1)-(5); The 2000 ART of PKB Article 11 (1)-(5); The 2002 ART of 
PKB Article 11 (1)-(5); The 2005 ART of PKB Article 11 (1)-(5); The 2008 ART of PKB Article 11 (1)-
(5). 
345 Kamarudin, Koflik Internal PKB, pp. 112-113. 
346 Stated in the decree number SK 01762/DPP-02/II/A.I/X/2004. See also Kamarudin, Ibid, pp. 114-
115. 
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 For Yusuf, it was the second time a DPP’s decision caused him difficulty. The 
first was in 2003. It began when the party held a voting in Dewan Syura Meeting to 
decide his future. The party held such meeting to discuss findings from Tim Tiga 
(Team of Three)347 on negative rumours involving him348. Based on the findings, Tim 
Tiga concluded that Yusuf’s mistakes were minor349. However, although Tim Tiga 
suggested the meeting to give him only a warning, some participants, including 
Wahid, proposed a displacement for Yusuf. After a serious debate, all participants 
agreed to vote on two options: (1) to discharge or (2) to give a stern warning. Of 
sixteen participants, nine persons voted for the first option and the rest voted to give 
Yusuf a stern warning. Based on that result, the meeting decided to transfer Yusuf’s 
position from the General Secretary of Dewan Tanfidz to be one of Chairpersons of 
Dewan Tanfidz. This decision would be effectively implemented after the 2004 
Election.  
 
However, the decision to dismiss Yusuf appeared to be unconstitutional since 
the party’s constitution had stipulated that a heavy violation, and not a minor one as 
concluded by Tim Tiga, was the only rationale to dismiss cadres from their position. 
In this sense, Yusuf and his supporters believed that such decision was unfair and 
unconstitutional. In addition, the fact that only nine of 16 participants, or less than 2/3 
of the participants, agreed to displace Yusuf annulled such a decision’s legality, since 
according to the party’s constitution only the decision that was supported by at least 
2/3 participants that can be stipulated as a legal policy.      
 
The position of Yusuf as the member of managing board was entirely 
terminated after he joined President Yudhoyono’s cabinet. DPP insisted that the 
dismissal of Yusuf and also Shihab were legitimate. To DPP, the plenary meeting 
                                                 
347 The members of this team were Prof. M. Mahfud MD, A.S Hikam and K.H Nur Iskandar Al 
Barsany. 
348 These included (1) the failure to build an effective communication among PKB MPs in Parliament 
that cost on the failure to impeach Akbar Tanjung, the General Chairperson of DPR from Golkar Party. 
Such an impeachment was projected by PKB to be a revenge for Wahid impeachment, (2) using money 
politics in the 2002 MLB, which enabled him to hold General Secretary position, and (3) rejecting to 
support Wahid as president candidate and endorsed Hasyim Muzadi, General Chairperson of PBNU, as 
vice president in in the 2004 presidential election. Kamarudin, Koflik Internal PKB, p. 120-121. See 
also Adhie M. Massardi, “Saifullah Yusuf, Kyai, dan PKB”, in Koran Tempo, 12 September 2003. 
Gatra 21 September 2002.  
349 According to the team leader, Prof. Dr. M. Mahfud MD Saifullah’s mistakes “were not harmful for 
the organisation” see “Reposisi Subhat Cak Iful”, in Gatra, 13 September 2003, p.66. 
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had legal authority to dismiss them as the member of party committee350. Moreover, 
the DPP believed that this dismissal essentially was correctly applied, since both 
Shihab and Yusuf had broken party’s policy on the prohibition of having dual 
positions351. DPP also believed that it did not need to give a warning to them before 
discharging both, because their category of mistake did not make such warning 
necessary352.       
 
The problem was that Shihab was the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz 
who had gained his position through MLB. He was elected by the attendees that 
representing hundreds of boards and thousands of participants around Indonesia in 
the highest forum for decision-making process. According to the ART a general 
chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz that was appointed in the forum of Muktamar or MLB, 
had to report his works in the same forum353. It means the right and legal forum to 
dismiss Shihab as the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz was Muktamar or 
MLB, and not a plenary meeting. 
 
Another problem related to the absence of serial of warnings before DPP 
dismissed them. The ART stated that the party had to provide warning letters three 
times first before the dismissal took place. It indicated that the process of the 
member could not suddenly make354. However, DPP neglected consciously this 
procedure. The case of Shihab and Yusuf, hence, indicated the weak legal basis. It 
showed once again how the creation of important decision was not based on the 
legitimate procedure.  
 
                                                 
350 According to DPP “The dismissal of them was legitimate and legal, because it had filled all the 
provisions in the statutes of the party. The process was also democratic and constitutional, through a 
join meeting that was then confirmed in the plenary meeting. The plenary meeting indeed had an 
authority to dismiss the member of the party managing board, as had been mentioned above. From the 
party’s statutes perspective, therefore, there was no problem on the case of the dismissal of Alwi 
Shihab and Saifullah Yusuf...”. Lukman Edy, et. al, “Kronologi Muktamar II PKB, Fakta Historis, 
Yuridis dan Politis”, (Jakarta: DPP PKB, 2005), pp. 29-30 in Kamarudin, Koflik Internal PKB, pp. 116-
117.  
351 Ibid, p. 118. 
352 Ibid, p. 117. 
353 The 2000 ART of PKB Article 19 (2); The 2002 ART of PKB Article 21 (2); The 2005 ART of PKB 
Article 21 (2) and 22 (3); The 2008 ART of PKB Article 22 (2) and 24 (3). 
354 The 1998 ART of PKB Article 11 (1)-(7); The 2000 ART of PKB Article 11 (1)-(7); The 2002 ART of 
PKB Article 11 (1)-(7); The 2005 ART of PKB Article 11 (1)-(7); The 2008 ART of PKB Article 11 (1)-
(7). 
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The violation of party procedure also occurred in the Muhaimin Iskandar’s 
dismissal. This time the dismissal process was conducted in the limited forum 
involving only members of Dewan Syura and Dewan Tanfidz. This forum, held on 26 
March 2008, initially was even addressed to be a medium for only internal 
consolidation and a kind of “farewell party” for Prof. Muhammad Mahfud MD, one of 
the chairpersons of the PKB, which a couple days before was appointed by President 
Yudhoyono to be The Chief of Mahkamah Konstitusi (the Constitution Court/MK). 
This meeting, therefore, was not conducted to asses the works of Iskandar as 
General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz or to determine the continuation of his 
leadership355.  
 
However, after the prime agenda finished, Wahid began to deliver a speech 
and suddenly expressed his disappointment towards Iskandar. Wahid said that 
based on some reports he found out that Iskandar had stated his readiness to fight 
any attempts that would bring him down from his position, including if he had to fight 
in the MLB356. Wahid considered that Iskandar’s statement was unacceptable, 
arrogant and most of all a challenge to his position.  
 
Iskandar, who attended the meeting, denied that accusation and clearly 
stated that he never made such statement357. Although Iskandar had declared his 
objection, Wahid kept insisting to give him a stern punishment. In doing so, Wahid 
proposed a voting to the participants. The meeting participants, who most of them 
were Wahid’s followers, then approved Wahid’s proposal. The result was 20 of 30 
meeting attendees agreed to dismiss Iskandar from his position358. On the 5th April 
                                                 
355 See the testimony of Nursyahbani Katjasungkana, one of the chairpersons of PKB in “Rapat 
Berlangsung Tragis dan Pilu. Muhaimin dilengserkan dari Ketua Umum PKB”, in 
http://hariansib.com/?p=28694, 28 March 2008. 
356 Wahid even heard issues about conspiracy conducted by Iskandar and Golkar Party to discharge him 
from his position, and replaced him with K.H Hasyim Muzadi, the Chairperson of PBNU. On this issue 
“Muhaimin Iskandar: Mundur atau Dimundurkan”, Jawa Pos, 28 March 2008. Ichwan Arifin, Kiai dan 
Politik. Studi Kasus Perilaku Politik Kiai dalam Konflik Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) Pasca 
Muktamar II Semarang, MA Thesis, (Semarang: Post Graduate Program, University of Diponegoro, 
2008), p.112. 
357 Mahfud said: “In responding to that allegation, The Chairperson of DPP Andi Muarli asked 
Muhaimin to testify proving that Wahid’s accusation was not true. Muhaimin responded that he was 
ready to testify and stated that those allegations were not true. However, Wahid stood still on his 
position”, “Rapat Berlangsung Tragis dan Pilu. Muhaimin dilengserkan dari Ketua Umum PKB”, 
http://hariansib.com/?p=28694, 28 March 2008. 
358 According to Ratnawati three people agreed to the first option, three people chosen the second 
option, two persons abstained and one was broken. Ratnawati, “Beberapa Masalah Pelembagaan Partai 
Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) dan Alternatif Solusi”, p. 103. Another version said five people agreed to 
the first option, three people chosen the last option and two persons abstained, while Wahid, Iskandar 
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2008 DPP formally discharged Iskandar and appointed Ali M. Musa, Vice General 
Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz as the official in charge for General Chairperson of 
Dewan Tanfidz 359. 
 
As a response to that policy, Iskandar and his supporters maintained that 
DPP’s decision had violated party’s constitution. This was because the ART stated 
that a member of DPP who gained his position through the election in Muktamar, the 
party’s highest forum, could only be discharged from his position through the forum of 
MLB360. It means the dismissal process would take a long time, as well as it would 
involve many participants, included hundreds of representatives of local managing 
boards around the country. Furthermore, the ART said that the dismissal was applied 
only to the member that committed to do heavy violation, proven by internal 
investigation361. DPP then should give the member a warning and provide an 
opportunity to defend his case.  
 
In the case of Iskandar, DPP not only had not given him a chance to defend 
his case properly, but also could not prove his wrongdoing. In addition, the meeting 
for Iskandar dismissal, according to Helmy Zaini did not reach a quorum, since only 
30 of 62 members of DPP attended it. According to the ART, the forum would have a 
legal consequence if at least 2/3 of the members of DPP attend it, which was, to be 
said, 41 out of 62 members of DPP362. 
 
The violation of party procedure extended to the cadres and the managing 
boards at the local level. It mainly happened to them whom were accused to be 
disloyal or the supporters of the opponents. According to Choirul Anam, during 2005, 
for instance, Iskandar with Wahid’s back up had suspended 37 DPCs and 2 DPWs 
and fired number of members of managing boards363. DPP sometimes conducted 
these attempts by avoiding democratic approaches and party procedure. Anam 
                                                                                                                                            
and Mahfud were not eligible to vote. See Taufik Al Mubarak, “Pemecatan di Tubuh PKB Bukti 
Superioritas Wahid”, Harian Aceh, 31 March 2008. “Rapat Berlangsung Tragis dan Pilu. Muhaimin 
dilengserkan dari ketua umum PKB”, http://hariansib.com/?p=28694, 28 March 2008. 
359 ”Ali Masykur Pelaksana Tugas Ketum”, Kompas, 6 April 2008. 
360 The 2005 ART of PKB Article 22 (3); The 2008 ART of PKB Article 25 (3 
361 The 1998 ART of PKB Article 19 (2); The 2000 ART of PKB Article 20 (2); The 2002 ART of PKB 
Article 22 (2); The 2005 ART of PKB Article 22 (2). 
362 “Muhaimin Iskandar: Mundur atau Dimundurkan”, Jawa Pos, 28 March 2008. 
363 Until 2008 DPP had suspended around 14 DPWs dan 67 DPCs. “Muhaimin Didukung dan Muspim 
Kukuhkan Muktamar Semarang”, Kompas 7 April 2008.  
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reported that the process of the dismissal happened to be quite outside the 
established procedure.  
 
In the case of DPCs suspension and member dismissal in the East Java 
Province, for instance, DPP did not involve the East Java DPW in deciding the 
policies. According to Anam, DPP had never invited him, as the Chairperson of 
Dewan Tanfidz of the East Java DPW, to discuss and to take a role in decision-
making process on this matter364. This situation, to Anam, had violated the ART that 
mentioned the right and authority of DPW to propose recommendation to DPP on the 
establishment of new DPC and to legalise the structure of the new DPC365. This 
authority also applied on the case of suspension and dismissal, where the DPP had 
to have recommendation from the DPW before concluding such policies366. 
 
As for individual cases, DPP had unjustly fired Erman Hernawan from his 
position as Vice General Secretary of the DPP. His dismissal actually based only on 
rumours about his alleged attempts to manipulate conference rules of the game in 
the Conference of Garda Bangsa (the Nation Guard), one of PKB’s subparts, in 
Banjarmasin367. The violation of the rules of the game also happened in the case of 
Abdul K. Karding. As the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz of the Central Java 
DPW who gained his position in Muswilub (the Special Regional Meeting), Karding 
had a right to report his leadership to the Munaslub. However, DPP took over 
Muswilub’s role and purged him from his position directly through DPP plenary 
meeting. This decision was not in line with the ART, since according to the ART, 
Karding should be released from his position through Muswilub. Moreover, DPP also 
immediately pointed Yusuf Chudlori to be Karding’s replacement. Based on the rules 
of the game, however, Chudlori’s installation process should involve the Central Java 
DPW. According to the ART, the role of DPP in such situation actually was only to 
legalise the recommendation made by the Central Java DPW and not directly in 
charge in such process. Thus, DPP’s acts to dismiss Karding and to point Chudlori 
                                                 
364 DPW PKB Jawa Timur, Data dan Fakta Pelanggaran AD/ART di Muktamar II Semarang, (DPW 
PKB Jawa Timur, 2005), p. 1. 
365 The 1998 ART of PKB Article 13 (2.b); The 2000 ART of PKB Article 13 (2.b); The 2002 ART of 
PKB Article 13 (2.b); The 2005 ART of PKB Article 13 (2.b); The 2008 ART of PKB Article 13 (2.b).. 
366 DPW PKB Jawa Timur, Data dan Fakta Pelanggaran AD/ART di Muktamar II Semarang, p. 1. 
367 Tri Ratnawati, “Beberapa Masalah Pelembagaan Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) dan Alternatif 
Solusi” in Lili Romli, ed., Pelembagaan Partai Politik Pasca Orde Baru Studi Kasus Partai Golkar, 
PKB, PBB, PBR dan PD, (Jakarta: Pusat Penelitian Politik, Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, 
2008), p.93. 
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as Karding’s replacement, by passing the existence of Central Java DPW, were 
unconstitutional368. Above situations shows a flexibility and inconsistency in 
implementing party procedure in PKB. In this regard, the position of the rules of the 
game became secondary.   
 
3.2. Overshadowing Party’s Constitution: The Role of Wahid 
 
Another phenomenon in the implementation of procedure in decision-making process 
was the tendency to rely on charismatic figures rather than on the rules of the game. 
It generally indicates the real position of the leader in PKB that to some extent could 
act quite freely above the party’s procedure. This situation shows one of the 
dimensions of the un-institutionalised party. 
 
In PKB’s case, this special role had been taken by Wahid. His unique position 
in the eyes of many NU people had made him became influential in many aspects, 
particularly in decision-making process. According to Kristiadi “Gus Dur who his ray 
of charisma and influence was very dazzling for everyone in the PKB environment 
became very influential in determining the direction and the development of PKB. 
This situation also happened in terms of decision-making process”369. The 
domination of Wahid in a meeting forum was unavoidable. Khofifah Parawansa 
described that if there were ten people including Wahid attended a meeting forum, it 
was almost likely only Wahid did the meeting370.  
 
The main role of Wahid in the case of Jalil was related to his spontaneous 
reaction to propose a policy to purge Jalil. In this process, he approved the quick 
decision provided by Tim Enam (the Team of Six) led directly by him371, working on 
behalf of the party, to purge the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz, without 
carefully considering Jalil’s rights as one of the elite of the party. The establishment 
of Tim Enam to accommodate the interest of Wahid was actually unconstitutional 
since it was not stated in the constitution. As an influential figure who realised his 
                                                 
368 “Penunjukan Gus Yusuf Tidak Sesuai ART”, Suara Merdeka, 4 May 2007. 
369 J. Kristiadi, ” Pergulatan dan Tantangan PKB Memenuhi Harapan Bangsa”, in Wahid, Choirie, and 
Syeirazi, (eds), 9 Tahun PKB. Kritik dan Harapan, pp. 128-129. 
370 Interview with Khofifah Indar Parawansa, the State Minister for Women Empowerment (1999-
2001), the Chairperson of the Institute for Election Winning of PKB (2002-2005), in Jakarta, 20 
October 2010. 
371 “Melawan Sang Patron”, Koran Tempo, 26 April 2005. 
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special position before his followers and the members of the party, Wahid also never 
gave his clear permission to conduct islah (the reconciliation or peaceful settlement 
of conflict) to deal with the Jalil’s camp. Consequently, a prolonged conflict between 
two conflicting camps became inevitable. On the other hand, the party’s inability to 
implement systematically and consistently its procedure paved the way for Wahid to 
continue his role and actions. The above case indicated that the Wahid’s could 
almost automatically become the party’s will. In this regard, it was not necessarily the 
Wahid’s characteristic that determined the backwardness of party institutionalisation, 
but also the party environment and poor institutionalisation that give an away for the 
emergence of such situation. 
 
In the case of Yusuf, the interest of Wahid also played an important role. It 
related mainly to the interest to pay off Wahid’s disappointments towards Yusuf, 
whom according to Wahid had poorly performed his duties, particularly as a mediator 
to gain support from PDIP, Yusuf’s former party, as the largest group in the 
parliament, to save him from the 2001 impeachment. Wahid also believed that Yusuf 
had committed to do money politics in Semarang Muktamar that provided him 
general secretary position. For these reasons, Wahid did not want his nephew to hold 
continuously his current position. Wahid’s role in Yusuf’s dismissal related to the 
voting in the 2004 held in the plenary meeting to decide Yusuf’s future in the party. 
The voting essentially was not necessary, since according to Tim Tiga Yusuf mistake 
were not harmful372. Wahid, on the contrary, advised to hold a voting. His supporter 
and anti-Yusuf elements in this party praised his action as the best way to eliminate 
Yusuf from his position. Cholil Bisri, one of Dewan Syura members and initiators of 
the PKB establishment, commented that the decision of reposition was indeed 
personal, since it was motivated mainly by Wahid’s distrust towards Yusuf373.  
 
The need to accommodate Wahid’s interest also triggered his loyalist to 
conduct negative political manoeuvres. The 2nd Muktamar in Semarang illustrated the 
situation. The forum that was initially hoped by many cadres to be a channel for 
reconciliation between his camp and Shihab-Yusuf’s group appeared to be merely 
means for the establishment of Wahid and his group’s interests. In that forum, the 
interest to save Wahid’s position and his interests became the violation’s cause. 
                                                 
372 In responding the report, Wahid expressed his upset by knocking the table three times and yelling 
“saya sudah tidak mempercayai Yusuf” (“I had lost my trust on Yusuf”), “Surya”, 3 September 2003 in 
H. Fuad Anwar, Melawan Gus Dur, (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Tokoh Bangsa, 2004), pp. 111-112.  
373 “Jawa Pos”, 30 September 2003, in ibid, p.119. 
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Wahid was elected hastily to be General Chairperson of Dewan Syura by 
acclamation in the report session and not in the election session374. The use of 
wrong session to elect Wahid clearly violated the rules of the game. The supporters 
of Wahid conducted it, in order to avoid the possibility to have a strong figure, namely 
Ma’ruf Amin, former General Chairperson of Dewan Syura (1998-1999) as an 
alterative for Wahid in the election session. The supporters of Shihab-Yusuf selected 
Amin to be a serious competitor for Wahid.375   
 
This forum also annulled the constitutional right of the East Java DPW and 
the Central Java DPW to get additional votes in muktamar, as a reward for their 
achievement in gaining around 80% of the votes and chairs for PKB in the 2004 
Election. This right was stipulated in the ART as an appreciation for the local 
managing boards that gained a good achievement in the election. The ART stated 
that each local board had the right to have one additional vote for every five chairs 
they provided. Wahid’s supporters calculated that East Java DPW, most of DPCs 
from the East Java Province, the Central Java DPW, and several DPCs from the 
Central Java would use this right, which would effectively mean around 255 
additional votes376, to fight against Wahid and Iskandar in the election sessions. For 
this reason, the supporters of Wahid then eagerly annulled such right off.  
 
Moreover, the Shihab-Yusuf faction also observed that many attendees of this 
muktamar were illegal. The East Java DPW reported that, for instance, when a name 
of participant was called to vote in the election session to elect the general 
chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz, someone who had a different name entered the 
election box and voted377. They suspected that Wahid’s supporters invited these 
people to win Iskandar in the session of General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz 
election. On the contrary, this muktamar intentionally did not invite Shihab as an 
important figure who had right and obligation to report his works in this forum378.  As 
                                                 
374 This acclamation was hold by DPWs only and did not involved DPCs, other elements that had right 
to vote in the election, see ”Muktamar dinilai tidak demokratis, Rekonsiliasi PKB makin sulit”, 
Kompas, 20 April 2005. 
375 “Ma’ruf Amin Saingi Wahid”, Koran Tempo, 16 April 2005. 
376 It means the opposition was only need around 80 votes to secure the result from hundreds DPCs 
across the country. “Kubu saiful ingin Muktamar Tandingan”, Koran Tempo, 19 April 2005. 
377 DPW PKB Jawa Timur, Data dan Fakta Pelanggaran AD/ART di Muktamar II Semarang, p. 10. 
”Muktamar dinilai tidak demokratis, Rekonsiliasi PKB makin sulit”, Kompas, 20 April 2005. On the 
problem on this problem see also “Muktamar PKB tanpa Kehadiran Alwi Shihab and Sifullah Yusuf”, 
Kompas, 17 April 2005.  
378 “PKB Terancam Pecah”, Suara Karya, 18 April 2005. 
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a response, the Shihab-Yusuf group considered this muktamar as full of 
transgression379. Some elements, including NU’s ulama expressed similar 
criticism380.  
 
Wahid’s significant role in the Iskandar case could be seen in the forum so 
called as “plenary meeting”. In that forum, Wahid proposed three options for the 
audience. The options were: (1) to hold MLB, (2) not to hold MLB, but Wahid would 
be the only person who controlled the party, (3) asking Iskandar to step down381. 
Many cadres interpreted Wahid’s proposal as “follow me (Wahid) or Iskandar”. One 
of the NU figures commented: 
 
“Many people from inside or outside PKB said that the dismissal of 
Iskandar was legally wrong. Whatever the reasons, a General 
Chairperson of the party who was elected by more than 400 local 
committees in muktamar could not be fiercely stepped down by a 
plenary meeting. Such statement derives from legal point of view. 
However, if we see it through political perspective, there are some 
differences. Muslim Abdurrahman said that if he had to choose 
Wahid or Iskandar, he would certainly choose Wahid. To him, it 
was because if Iskandar did not want to step down, Wahid would. 
Hence, almost all participants agreed to ask Iskandar to step 
down. This is a point of view based on the existence of Gus Dur as 
an important figure”382.      
  
Above statement illustrates cadres’ acknowledgment on the presence of 
constitutional violation in the Iskandar dismissal case. However, they arguably had 
little choice, since they believed that Wahid’s special position was important for the 
party. They also considered that people at the grass roots level would prefer Wahid 
rather than Iskandar. One of Wahid’s supporters said, “PKB without Wahid would 
have few numbers of supporters. This was because when people vote for PKB they 
actually vote for Wahid. Brother Imin (Iskandar) was nothing compared to Wahid”383. 
As a leader, Wahid seemed to realise this advantage situation, which made him 
confident enough to perform his will. On the other hand, the formal mechanism 
seemed to be neglected by many cadres when dealing with Wahid’s desire. This 
                                                 
379 Mengenai pelanggaran konstitusional jalannya Muktamar lihat DPW PKB Jawa Timur, Data dan 
Fakta Pelanggaran AD/ART di Muktamar II Semarang, pp. 8-10. 
380 Kamarudin, Koflik Internal PKB, pp. 152-154. 
381 As mentioned by Prof. M. Mahfud MD, in http://hariansib.com/?p=28694, 28 March 2008. 
382 K.H Salahudin Wahid, “Membaca Konflik PKB”, 9 April 2008, in Ratnawati, “Beberapa Masalah 
Pelembagaan Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) dan Alternatif Solusi”, pp. 103-104. 
383 Ibid, p. 99 
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showed the situation where the internal mechanism essentially “served” Wahid’s 
command.   
 
The previous discussion proved Wahid’s special position in decision-making 
process in PKB. In such situation, the voice of ordinary members in this process was 
limited. In addition, above conditions also reflected the absence of musyawarah as 
the main formula in decision-making process. According to Parawansa, “the decision-
making posture in PKB was not based on the spirit of musyawarah. Each party took 
their own decisions. Such situation surely in the end became the trigger of the 
conflict” 384. These cases also indicate party’s inability to control Wahid’s 
manoeuvres. The lack of institutionalisation had paved the way for him to implement 
his will and made his individual interest appear to become collective interest. This 
situation also made his political manoeuvres easier. In general, it signified the lower 
degree of “systemness” level in this party, which prolonged the party’s dependence 
on the figure rather than system or the rules of the game.  
 
4. The Impact: Towards Fragmentation 
 
4.1.  The Emerge of Internal Resistance 
 
The unconstitutional decisions eventually raised disappointment for many cadres that 
led to a resistance. In the Jalil case, Wahid and his compradors’ unilateral and 
unconstitutional decision disappointed Jalis and his followers. To Jalil, as General 
Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz, he could be discharged from his position legally only 
through the forum of Muktamar or MLB, where he would report all his actions385. 
Therefore, other meetings beside those forums were not eligible to make any 
decision on his position.  
 
Shortly after his dismissal, Jalil took a number of initiatives to show his 
resistance. On 30th July 2001, or nine days after his dismissal, he declared himself as 
still the true General Chairperson of PKB, who would report all his activities in the 
2005 Muktamar or in the MLB386. He also refused to attend any forum to judge his 
                                                 
384 Interview with Khofifah Indar Parawansa, State Minister for Women Empowerment (1999-2001), 
Chairperson of the Institute for Election Winning of PKB (2002-2005), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010. 
385 ”Gamma“, 14-20 November 2001, in Kamarudin, Konflik Internal PKB, p. 92. 
386 “DPP PKB Masih Beri Kesempatan Kepada Matori. Matori Masih Merasa Ketua Umum PKB”, 
Kompas, 31 Juli 2001. 
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performance as General Chairperson of Dewan Syura. Moreover, he discharged 
Wahid from his position as General Chairperson of Dewan Syura, and pointed 
Ibrahim Laconi as provisional replacement387. At a time when Wahid was at the peak 
of his political career and was supported by almost all influential figures of NU, Jalil’s 
resistance was widely regarded as extraordinary. He also took an initiative to 
consolidate the party by establishing many badan pelaksana (the executive 
committees) in local committees. This attempt was part of his anticipations towards 
the possibility to have resistance from local managing boards that refused to 
acknowledge his command388.   
 
In the Shihab and Yusuf Case, their supporter believed that Wahid’s group 
had systematically broken party’s constitution. In responding his dismissal, Shihab 
stated “…the lower forum cannot annul the highest one. If someone said yes it can, 
he or she has to learn again the statues of the party. If then in the Muktamar I was 
dishonourably discharged, so please do it, I have to accept it. But if the decision in 
Muktamar is hampered in the plenary meeting, this has to be corrected in 
Muktamar”389.  
 
As for Yusuf’s case, the quick decision to end his position had shocked him 
and his supporters. He eventually rejected that decision since it was mistaken and 
essentially unconstitutional. Yusuf argued that the result of the voting could not be 
used as the foundation to dismiss him390. According to the ART the decision of 
Dewan Syura should be legal if it was supported by 2/3 of the meeting 
participants391. The fact there were only nine of 16 participants, or less than 2/3 of 
                                                 
387 “MLB Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa di Jakarta. Matori Abdul Djalil Ingin Lepas Dari Bayangan”, 
Kompas, 16 January 2002. Choirie, PKB Politik Jalan Tengah NU, p. 300.  
388 However, some of Jalil’s decisions procedurally also broke the statute of the party. His decision to 
discharge Wahid was illegitimate, since he as General Chairperson of Dewan Syura could only be 
replaced through the highest forum of the party namely muktamar. Moreover, his action to establish 
executive committee was also not in line with on the rules of the game, because the ART did not 
mention and arrange the existence of such institution. Mohammad Muzamil, “Ke Arah Penyelesaian 
Konflik PKB”, Kompas, 17 November 2001. 
389 “DPP PKB Dinilai Langgar AD/ART”, Media Indonesia, 15 April 2005. 
390 Saifullah Yusuf, “Mengapa Saya Menolak Reposisi”, in M. Aminudin, (ed.), “Menyingkap Kemelut 
PKB Kontroversi Reposisi Saifullah Yusuf”, (Jakarta: CV Mulia Sari, 2004), pp. 13-15, in Kamarudin, 
Koflik Internal PKB, p. 106-107. 
391 The 2002 ART of PKB Article 20 (11.a); The 2005 ART of PKB Article 20 (11.a); The 2008 ART of 
PKB Article 21 (12.a).  
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the number of participants, that supported policy to displace him, made voting result 
did not have legal consequence392.  
                                                
 
The supporters of Shihab and Yusuf resisted not only the dismissal of their 
leader, but also on the idea of the dual position prohibition. According to Shihab, one 
of the main objectives for politicians to join political life was to hold public position, 
including ministerial posts. Hence, he felt that the decision to prohibit the members to 
hold dual positions went against this “natural law” and practically impeded the 
opportunity for the cadres to extend their careers and experiences in the political 
world393.  
 
According to Anam the decision to abandon dual position was essentially not 
in line with the spirit of the party’s constitution. He said that the preamble of party 
statute of the party stated that “the party should support all cadres to dedicate their 
life inside or outside party as part of their service to the nation and the state”394. It 
means, according to Anam, the constitution allowed party’s members to gain a 
strategic position outside the party to give service to all people. And for that reason 
the members did not have to resign their position in the party committee. Moreover, 
the fact that during the Wahid presidency era PKB did not account the dual position 
as a problem, permitting Wahid to have dual positions as the president and the 
General Chairperson of Dewan Syura, the decision to prohibit every members to 
have dual positions happened to be inconsistence.  
 
The improper forum that used to dismiss Shihab dan Yusuf then became one 
of the main points for Shihab and his supporters to summon the DPP of PKB to the 
court395. They avoided Wahid and his supporters’ suggestion for not bringing internal 
problem to the court. As former Wahid’s close friend and disciple, Shihab and Wahid 
did not hesitate to voice their interest to find justice. Having similar reasons with 
Shihab, in 2005 Supreme Court won Shihab for the case of dismissal396. 
 
392 Kamarudin, Koflik Internal PKB, p. 106-107. 
393 Decree number 274/Pdt.G/2005/PN.JAKSEL released by Pengadilan Negeri Jakarta Selatan (the 
District Court of South Jakarta) 16 Agustus 2005. Kamarudin, Koflik Internal PKB, p. 125. 
394 DPW PKB Jawa Timur, Data dan Fakta Pelanggaran AD/ART di Muktamar II Semarang, p. 4.  
395 Fuadi, ed., “Tinjauan Ilmu Hukum tentang Keabsahan Kepengurusan Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa 
Pasca Mahkamah Agung”, (Jakarta: Lakumham DPP PKB, 2006), p. 297, in Kamarudin, Koflik 
Internal PKB, p. 123. 
396 Kompas, 19 November 2005. This was stipulated in the MA Decision No. 1896 K/P.dt./2005 on 15 
November 2005.  
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 The similar situation also happened to Iskandar. After a short period of 
thinking, Iskandar and his loyal fellows decided to resist his dismissal policy, which 
opened the third heavy internal conflict in PKB. Initially, Iskandar’s response was 
trying to understand DPP’s decision. However, before long it became clear that he 
had objections to that decision. Iskandar considered that such decision as one-sided 
decision based on wrong information conveyed by his rivals in the party. He then 
formed Tim Kecil (the small team)397 to investigate on the actors behind this smear, 
which had successfully convinced Wahid.398 Iskandar then decided to fight back for 
his position supported by sympathizers. Together with his close-friends and the 
sympathizers, Iskandar established his version of party managing boards across the 
country. Not only that, Iskandar and his loyalist also attacked several figures, who 
had special relationship with Wahid, including Wahid’s daughter, as traitors. Iskandar 
camps considered them as a harmful factor, for their role in destroying the unity of 
party. Iskandar conveyed this message to all PKB’s cadres not only in order to 
defend his position, but also to provide a bad image on his enemy.    
 
4.2. Factions Formation and Fragmentation  
 
In its development, each conflicting group believed that that they represented “the 
real PKB”. The non-Wahid’s groups not long after the declaration of resistance 
obtained supports from many people, including from local committees and branches 
in almost all territories. In such situation, the presence of factionalism became 
inevitable. In fact, the establishment of dual committees was just a matter of time. 
According to Musa “the party management, which was far from modern, had 
provided a room for the party to overlook the rules of the game in the decision-
                                                 
397 The members of this team were Nursyahbani Katjasungkana, Abdul Kadir Karding, and Helmy 
Faizal Zaini.  
398 The team found seven persons who had potentially provided wrong information to Wahid on 
Iskandar. This team regarded them as had a bad intention to crack down PKB from inside. These 
persons were Sigid Haryo Wibisono (member of Dewan Syura), Hermawi F. Taslim (Chairperson of 
Dewan Tanfidz), Zannuba Arifah Chafsoh (General Secretary of Dewan Tanfidz), Ikhsan Abdullah 
(Vice General Secretary of Dewan Tanfidz), Artalyta Suryani (Treasury), Aris Junaidi (Vice Treasury), 
and Moeslim Abdurrahman (The General Chairperson of DKI Jakarta Managing Board Committee). 
“Buntut Kisruh PKB, Gus Dur Bekukan 40 DPC dan DPW”, “www.hariansib.com”; in Ratnawati, 
“Beberapa Masalah Pelembagaan Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) dan Alternatif Solusi”, p. 104. 
“Ali Masykur Pelaksana Tugas Ketum”, Kompas, 6 April 2008. The existence of these people, some of 
them were actually new comers in the party, and their movements, that would be discussed in the 
seventh chapter, actually also reflects the real situation on ineffectiveness of cadrerization conducted by 
PKB.   
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making process, causing the factionalism between the group that were advantaged 
by the situation and they those were not”399.      
 
Over time, factionalism paved the way to strengthening the conflict. It in fact 
entered the phase of formalisation, in which each conflicting group tried to legalise its 
group. This attempt was indicated mostly by the interest to conduct Muktamar or 
MLB as a highest forum that will decide many important things. However, such 
forums were designed primarily not as much to find a comprehensive answer on the 
internal fragmentation possibility with the spirit of win-win solution. Rather, each 
conflicting group conduct these forums as tools to defend their existence and 
undermine the opponents.  
 
For “non-Wahid” groups this was a moment to formalise their disappointment 
and resistance towards Wahid as their “political guru”. The opponent of Wahid used 
MLB also as a forum to show that there were several serious mistakes in the party, 
committed by Wahid and his supporter, which should fix. On the contrary, for Wahid’s 
camp, organising MLB was a normal consequence for a committee reshuffle, 
particularly related to the presence of new General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz 
and General Secretary. For Wahid’s camp the lack or presence of MLB will not 
change anything. However this kind of forum was needed to show that their decision 
was supported by many members of cadres, or at least was not something that 
unpopular in the cadres’ eyes.         
 
As an manifestation on this interest, on 14th–16th January 2002, Jalil’s group 
then held an MLB in Jakarta, which confirmed his position and produced an 
alternative version of PKB, which latter on was popularly known as PKB-Matori or 
PKB-Batu Tulis. Jalil stated that PKB under his leadership would establish 
democratic mechanisms and end the feudalistic mentality. He stated, “we are 
determined to develop PKB to be a truly democratic party”400. According to one of 
founding fathers of this party, the establishment of PKB-Matori in essence was to 
show the malfunction of the rules of the game in previous PKB”401. However, PKB-
                                                 
399 Interview with Dr. Ali Masykur Musa, Vice Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz of PKB (2005-2010) 
and General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz of “PKB-Gus Dur” (2008-2009), in Jakarta, 19 October 
2010. 
400 Nita Nawangwulan, “Muktamar PKB Matori: Menghancurkan Kultur Feodal”, in detikcom 10 
January 2002. 
401 Ali and Hurhuda Y, Pergulatan Membela yang Benar. Biografi Matori Abdul Jalil, p.289. 
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Matori failed to convince the court and lost its case. This condition accordingly then 
paved the way for the PKB-Kuningan to gain acknowledgment from the government. 
Prior to the 2004 Election, PKB-Matori changed its name to PKD.  
 
On the other hand, as a consequence of Jalil’s dismissal, Wahid’s supporters 
conducted an MLB in Yogyakarta 17th-19th January 2002. The participants elected 
Shihab as the new General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz and confirmed the 
position of Wahid as General Chairperson of Dewan Syura during the period of 2002-
2005. Also in this forum, Yusuf was approved by the participants as General 
Secretary of Dewan Tanfidz. This MLB gained full support from very senior ulama 
who attended this forum. This also showed the ulama’s strong support for Wahid and 
Shihab version of PKB, which was henceforth popularly known as PKB-Gus Dur/Alwi 
or PKB-Kuningan. The existence of two versions of PKB represented the first 
fragmentation of this party.  
 
In the Shihab and Yusuf case, the supporter of this group conducted 
Muktamar in 2005 called as “Muktamar yang Benar” (the True Conference) in 
Surabaya, as an alternative for Semarang Muktamar, conducted by Wahid’s 
supporter. In Surabaya Muktamar the supporters of Shihab and Yusuf, including 
“ulama khos”, declared a new committee of PKB, and appointed Abdurrahman 
Chudlori as the General Chairperson of Dewan Syura and Anam as the General 
Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz. This PKB version was sometimes called PKB-Ulama. 
Most of the exponents of this party402 latter on became the figures behind the 
establishment of new party namely PKNU. One of the main aims for the 
establishment of this party was to mend the political party life of NU people that had 
been plunged to the hand of Wahid and his clique. As a refection of such aim, PKNU 
established a Mustasyar (the Advisory Board), as the highest body in this party. To 
control the policy made by the General Chairperson of Dewan Syura was one of its 
functions.  
 
The attempts to formalise its existence also occurred in the Iskandar camp. 
This camp organised a MLB in Mercure Hotel, Ancol, Jakarta, on 2nd-4th May 2008 
that confirmed Iskandar leadership. This MLB also elected Azis Mansyur as the new 
General Chairperson of Dewan Syura. This PKB was then sometimes called as PKB-
                                                 
402 These persons included Abdullah Faqih, Ma’ruf Amin, Abdurrahman Chudlori, Idris Marzuki, A. 
Warson Munawwir, Muhaiminan Gunardo, Abdullah Schal, Soleh Qosim, Nurul Huda Dzajuli, 
Muhammad Subadar, Chairul Anam and Alwi Shihab. 
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Muhaimin or PKB-Ancol. On the other hand, Wahid’s camp held the MLB in 
Pesantren Ashiriyyah Nurul Iman, Parung, Bogor, West Java, on 30th April-1st May 
2008. This forum confirmed the position of Wahid as The General Chairperson of 
Dewan Syura and Musa as the new General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz. This 
PKB then popularly known as the PKB-Parung. These two PKBs still exist when the 
2009 Election was about to come, although eventually only PKB-Ancol was eligible to 
take part in the 2009 Election403. In 2011, PKB-Gus Dur changed its name to Partai 
Kemakmuran Bangsa Nasional (The National Nation Prosperity Party/PKBN). 
 
After the establishment of new committee, as one of the results of MLB, the 
existence of twin committees that indicates party fragmentation could not be avoided. 
This situation would most likely not happen if the party could manage the consistency 
to respect the rules of the game since the beginning and avoid providing any 
unconstitutional decision that opened opportunity for the establishment 
disappointment and devastate internal cohesion. 
 
5.  Overview 
 
The above cases show how easy the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz could 
lose his position in PKB. It indicates in essence the low degree of systemness. On 
the other hand, personal leadership took priority in PKB. Wahid’s central role in this 
party, a phenomenon described by La Ode Ida as “power personification”404, was 
inevitable. Such condition shows the lack of procedural leadership in PKB. On the 
contrary, this situation eventually preserved the personal leadership of Wahid. The 
combination of the low degree of systemness and the absence of procedural 
leadership over time had triggered resistance among cadres and eventually provided 
serious damage for internal harmony. The existence of MLB and the creation of 
alternative committees, as a manifestation of resistances, was an evidence of the 
disappearance of party unity. Through above discussion, PKB’s case proves the 
correlation between the weak institutionalisation, indicated by the low commitment to 
stick to the rules of the game, and the party fragmentation. 
                                                 
403 Through the Minister of Justice and Human Rights, the government finally stated a verdict to win 
Iskandar’s group on 24 July 2008. 
404 Laode Ida, ”PKB dalam Jebakan ’Wahidisme’”, Media Indonesia, 19 April 2005. 
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Chapter VI 
Procedural Leadership in Decision Making Process: 





“In PKS, an extensive dialog precedes every single decision making 
process. Every member of Majelis Syura (the Consultative Board/MS) 
has large room to express their opinions. It is normal to do voting, if the 
conclusion could not be reached by acclamation”. (Mahfudz Siddiq) 405. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
As the only big Islamic party that managed to avoid fragmentation, PKS featured a 
number of characteristics and policies that can help explain this outcome. I shall 
argue below that there was a strong and quite widespread belief among party 
members and cadres in the importance of party institutionalisation, particularly when 
it comes to follow the rules of the game. Here, I will focus in particular on two kinds of 
evidence: first, the commitment that could be observed among the key party figures 
and the cadres to the role of the MS, as the highest decision-making body in the 
party; and second, the implementation of musyawarah as the foundation of decision-
making process. The following discussion of these matters will allow us to assess the 
party’s performance on the criterion of procedural leadership, as one of the elements 
of institutionalisation, and its relation to party cohesion. The discussions cover some 
topics namely legal-formal aspects in decision-making process, mostly related to the 
legal formal aspects and situations behind the decision making process, the situation 
of the implementation of the rules of the game and the spirit of musyawarah, and the 
impacts for the cohesiveness of the party.    
 
2. Legal-Formal Aspects and Background 
 
In the decision-making process, PKS stipulated musyawarah as the main mechanism 
for that purpose. The AD stated that the party implemented the principle of 
                                                 
405 Interview with Mahfudz Siddiq, Head of Cadrerization Department of DPP of PKS (2002-2005) and 
Member of Parliament (2004-2014), in Jakarta, 27 October 2010. 
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musyawarah for decision-making process406. By using this principle, every policy 
could not be decided by only single person or limited group. This principle became 
something fundamental put into the constitution consistently by PKS, even though 
the constitution itself had been amended a couple of times.  
 
The principle of musyawarah derived essentially from the concept of syura407. 
In this regard, the Islamic principles and the opinion of the Islamic law experts were 
the primary source of decision-making process408. However, besides having 
acknowledged the importance of prime role of Islamic teachings as guidance in 
decision-making process, PKS also understood musyawarah as the way to carry out 
the spirit of togetherness and the extension of participation. With this regard, 
although PKS had a tendency to consider the experts’ evaluations as the main 
source to decide a policy rather than merely a “people’s voice”, the decision-making 
institution must not endorse the elimination of the people’s right to participate409. 
Hence, musyawarah played as a bridge between the need to accommodate the voice 
of the people (cadres) and to implement Islamic values in creating party’s policies410. 
Therefore, the commitment towards musyawarah was not only in line with the 
enthusiasm to implement the constitution of the party, but also as an implementing 
mechanism in order to avoid personal leadership.  
 
                                                 
406 The AD of PK Article 8; The 2002 AD of PKS Article 22 (1), 22 (2); The 2005 AD of PKS Article 
24. 
407 Lili Romli, “Model Pelembagaan Partai Politik di Indonesia: Studi Kasus Partai Keadilan 
Sejahtera”, in Edison Muchlis M, Reformasi Kelembagaan Partai Politik Pasca-Orde Baru di 
Indonesia, (Jakarta: LIPI Press, 2007), pp. 62-63.  
408 According to Matta: “The basic difference between secular democracy and the Islamic political 
concept is related to the perspective about the holder of sovereignty. Secular democracy renders the 
sovereignty to the people, and says that the sovereignty is in the hands of the people; they believe that 
the voice of the people is the voice of God. On the other hand, in the Islamic concept, sovereignty 
totally belongs completely to God; therefore, the voice of God must be the voice of the people. As a 
consequence, in secular democracy the law is a general agreement which is produced by constitution, 
while in Islam the law is given and the function of the constitution is to realise it”. Anis Matta, 
“Dakwah, Poltik dan Strategi”, in Saksi, Number 11, Year III, 6 March 2001. 
409 Abu Ridha stated that in the government of the Islamic state, particularly in the era of the four 
Caliphates, people still had an important position as they had the legitimate power to elect their leaders. 
See Abu Ridha, Negara dan Cita-Cita Politik, (Bandung: Syaamil Cipta Media, 2004), p.32. 
410 Majelis Pertimbangan Partai (MPP) Partai Keadilan, Panduan Pengambilan Kebijakan Dalam 
Musyawarah Partai Keadilan, (Jakarta: 2000), p. 34. Firman Noor, Moderate Islamic Fundamentalism 
in Indonesia: A Study of Political Thinking and Behaviour of The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), 
1998-2005, M.A Thesis, (Canberra: Faculty of Asian Studies, Australian National University, 2006), 
p.88. 
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Besides putting forward musyawarah, PKS also implemented acclamation 
and voting mechanism to decide a policy411. This method was used mainly when the 
forum was difficult to find agreement or deadlock. PKS’ constitution inferred that the 
party should apply these principles, including in MS as the highest institution to 
decide strategic policies.  
 
In 2002, the party stated MS to be the ahlul halii wal aqdi of the party. As a 
consequence, this body had a salient role in determining the direction of the party, 
including electing several chairpersons of party’s important bodies at the national 
level, and making fundamental policies412. Before 2002, PKS considered 
Musyawarah Nasional (the National Conference/Munas) as the highest institution, 
which carried out several MS’ main functions413. This party then amend such forum 
to be merely the party’s highest meeting, called as Musyawarah of MS (the 
Conference of Consultative Assembly/MMS). Some institutions were eligible to make 
policies, in particular related to their specific functions414, but MS held the authority 
on strategic and fundamental ones.  
                                                
 
Although MS played an important role and became the most important body, 
the party’s constitution guarantied the independence of Dewan Syariah (the Islamic 
Law Council/DS), at national (DSP) as well as at local level (DSW and DSD), in 
carrying out their functions as fatwa making institution and arbitration body, including 
as appeals committee415. As fatwa making institution, DS gained a special freedom 
to provide advices and to contemplate problem solution within the framework of 
Islamic laws perspective for the party and the cadres. As an arbitration body, which 
the next chapter will explore comprehensively, DS played a role as the independent 
body to reconcile conflicting groups or people and to discharge the membership of 
party members. In this circumstance, MS would act as a supervisor for DS without an 
 
411 The 2002 AD of PKS Article 21 (1); The 2005 AD of PKS Article 24 (2). 
412 The ART of PK Article 18; The 2002 AD of PKS Article 10 and 12; The 2005 AD of PKS Article 11. 
413 The AD of PK Article 9. 
414 The DPP for instance had authority to manage the life of the party committee and in charge in 
creating and suspending local committees. The MPP had an obligation to convey and to socialise the 
result of MMS and other decisions made by MS. In fact this party implemented the separation of power 
by giving a set of authorities for DS to deal with the matters of fatwa making, and as an appeal body 
that could not be intervened by the MS.  
415 The 2005 ART of PKS Article 14 (5). 
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authority to intervene. However, DS, similar to other institutions, had to report 
periodically its activities directly to MS416. 
 
For the fulfilment of members of MS – that would determine the composition 
of other high institutions leadership, including the President of the Party – PKS 
conducted an internal election, that involved the cadres that had reached a status as 
kader inti417. In that occasion, the party provided opportunity for kader inti to 
determine directly the composition of MS. As for the member dismissal, the party 
appointed the DS, as an internal justice court, to provide a recommendation for cadre 
dismissal418. Every cadre had a right to defend their case before DS and to be lawyer 
assisted in that occasion419. In the case where a verdict stipulated by DS at district or 
provincial level was not satisfying for cadres, they could ask DS at the higher level to 
take over the case420. DSP’s decision would be a final verdict. DPP then would 
publish a dismissal letter based on DS’ recommendation, and MS agreement for the 
case that involved in the MS members. 
 
The above discussion inferred some principles in the PKS decision-making 
process. The first was musyawarah. It was the prime mechanism that should be 
implemented when making a decision. With the spirit of acknowledging the 
importance of participation, this party provided the opportunity for cadres to join the 
process directly or indirectly. It indicates that the party did not allow any kind of 
authoritarian tendencies in this process. The second was the absolute position of MS 
as a prime institution in decision-making process, where all of the party’s members 
should follow its decisions. The third was the acknowledgment of “power sharing” in 
terms of fatwa making, where DS had an independency to make a policy based on its 
valuation. The role of MS in this context was merely as an institution that 
legitimatised DS’ decisions. 
 
                                                 
416 The 2002 AD of PKS Article 12 (7); The 2005 AD of PKS Article 15 (2.a). 
417 The 2002 AD of PKS Article 12 (1) and 12 (2); The 2005 AD of PKS Article 18 (1). 
418 The ART of PK Article 12 (3), 12 (4) and 27 (2); The 2002 ART of PKS Article 13 (1), 13 (2); The 
2005 ART of PKS Article 10 (3.b). 
419 The ART of PK Article 10 (3.e); The 2002 ART of PKS Article 13 (1), 13 (2); The 2005 ART of PKS 
Article 6 (3.b.5). 
420 The ART of PK Article 27 (2); The 2002 ART of PKS Article 11 (4), 12 (3); The 2005 AD of PKS 
Article 23 (2.c). 
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Until the first decade of its existence, PKS tried to be consistent in 
implementing its rules of the game when making a policy. The importance of creating 
a solid system along with all of its related maters, including preserving the rules of 
the game, became something that was highly regarded among PKS cadres. This 
consciousness derives from Islamic teachings that advices the Muslim to manage the 
organisation professionally, by putting forward a comprehensive plan and 
consultations421. According to Kamarudin, the belief that God, prophets and pious 
people would witness every single good work provided by Muslim inspired the cadres 
to hold professionalism422.  
 
The consciousness of maintaining the rules of the game related also to 
party’s metode perjuangan (the method of struggle) inspired mainly by Ikhwan 
Muslimin423. In this method, the party encouraged the members to think and act 
systematically to reach the goal. To meet this purpose, the party provided a set of 
systematic code of conduct or guidance and instructions that the all of the members 
had to follow. The party also conveyed the relevant materials through various 
medium, including books, modules and training to preserve discipline and maintain 
systematic behaviour424. In this circumstance, PKS cadres became familiar with the 
efforts to systemise their struggle. This includes the familiarisation with the set of the 
rules of the game that has to be obeyed425. Since the early days of their membership, 
the cadres had been infused by the party to figure out the importance of the party 
                                                 
421 Interview with Amri Yusra, M.Si, the Chairperson of Depok DPD of PKS (2002-2004), Member of 
Parliament of Depok District, West Java, (2004-2009), and Lecturer at Political Sciences Department, 
Faculty of Social and Political Science, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 7 October 2010; with Dr. 
Kamarudin, Indonesian Islamic political party expert and Lecturer at Political Science Department, 
Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 7 October 2010; and with 
Hidayat, MM, Member of Parliament of Tangerang District (2005-2010), in Tangerang, 21 October 
2010. 
422 Interview with Dr. Kamarudin, Indonesian Islamic political party expert and Lecturer at Political 
Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 7 
October 2010. 
423 Interview with Dr. Kamarudin, the Expert of Indonesian Islamic Political Party and Lecturer at 
Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, in 
Depok, 7 October 2010. 
424 The books including, for instance, Tim DPP Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Seri Manhaj Tarbiyah. 
Manajemen Tarbiyah Anggota Pemula (Jakarta: DPP PK Sejahtera dan PT Syaamil Cipta Media, 
2004). Majelis Pertimbangan Pusat PK Sejahtera, Memperjuangkan Masyarakat Madani. Falsafah 
Dasar Perjuangan dan Platform Kebijakan Pembangunan PK Sejahtera, (Jakarta, 2008). Bidang 
Kewanitaan Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Rakornas Bidang Kewanitaan Partai 
Keadilan Sejahtera, (Jakarta: 2001). 
425 Interview with Umar Salim Basalamah, Vice General Secretary of PKS (2002), and personal 
secretary of Hidayat Nur Wahid (former President of PKS and The Chairperson of MPR of Republic of 
Indonesia), in Jakarta, 12 October 2010. 
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procedure as a part of their ideological tasks426. One of the main impacts of this effort 
was the self-discipline development and the awareness to follow the instruction and 
the rules of the game. 
 
Moreover, cadres were also infused by the commitment to value party’s 
system. In this regard, PKS underpinned the importance to be consistent with the 
system and the rules of the game, rather than to rely on the individuals in managing 
and developing organisation. PKS considered itself as the party that free from 
dependency towards any particular person427.  
 
According to Sitaresmi, the party asked cadres to be always consistent in 
following party’s procedure. She said that “we are advised to obey the rules of the 
game, to the institution, to Majelis Syura”428. In addition, she said that Hilmi 
Aminuddin, as the party’s prominent figure, believed that the continuity of the party’s 
existence would more depend on the system rather than people. Aminuddin said that 
the party could not rely on any person that would someday leave the party or die429. 
In this circumstance, according to Yusra, the cadres even could challenge or debate 
any important figures in the party including Aminuddin430. Hence, the respected 
figures in this party were the individuals who maintained consistently the party 
                                                 
426 Interview with Untung Wahono, Head of Department of Research and Development of DPP of PK 
(2000-2003), Head of Department of Politics and Defence of DPP of PKS (2002-2005), and 
Chairperson of MPP of PKS (2010-2015), in Jakarta 27 October 2010; with Selamat Nurdin, MM, 
former tarbiyah activist leader in University of Indonesia, Member of Parliament of DKI Jakarta 
Province (2004-20014), in Jakarta, 22 October 2010. 
427 Satria Hadi Lubis, Yang Nyata dari PK Sejahtera. 35 Manfaat dan Alasan Mengapa Kita 
Mendukung PK Sejahtera, (Jakarta: Misykat Publication in Partnership with LP2U, 2004), p.26. 
Kamarudin, “Fatsoen dari Partai Keadilan”, “Majalah Saksi”, 15th edition third year, in Subhan Akbar, 
Partai Keadilan: Faktor-Faktor Penguat Soliditas, BA thesis, (Depok: Fakultas Ilmu Sosial Ilmu 
Politik Universitas Indonesia, 2004), p.36. Interview with Yon Mahmudi, PKS and Tarbiyah 
Movement observer in Indonesia, Lecturer at Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and 
Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, and one of the cadres who signed PKS establishment 
declaration, in Depok, 11 August 2009; with Selamat Nurdin, MM, former tarbiyah activist leader in 
University of Indonesia, Member of Parliament of DKI Jakarta Province (2004-20014), in Jakarta, 22 
October 2010. Interview with Amri Yusra, Amri Yusra, M.Si, Chairperson of Depok DPD of PKS 
(2002-2004), Member of Parliament of Depok District, West Java, (2004-2009), and Lecturer at 
Political Sciences Department, Faculty of Social and Political Science, University of Indonesia, by 
phone, 13 December 2009. 
428 Interview with Sitaresmi S, M.Psy, Member of Dakwah Department of DPP of PK (2000-2003), in 
Jakarta, 8 October 2010. 
429 Interview with Sitaresmi S, M.Psy, Member of Dakwah Department of DPP of PK (2000-2003), in 
Jakarta, 8 October 2010. 
430 Interview with Amri Yusra, M.Si, Chairperson of Depok DPD of PKS (2002-2004), Member of 
Parliament of Depok District, West Java, (2004-2009), and Lecturer at Political Sciences Department, 
Faculty of Social and Political Science, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 7 October 2010. 
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constitution431. According to Machmudi, in fact some important figures such as Tifatul 
Sembiring or Anis Matta or the group that was suspected to be “the dominant group” 
led by Matta did not have privilege in decision-making process, since they only could 
influence the process and not determine the result432.  
 
3.  The Implementation Situation and Tendencies 
 
3.1. Majelis Syura as the Pre Eminent Body  
 
During the first decade of reform era, PKS’ cadres agreed that MS was the only legal 
institution to create the regulation and policies that guided party’s programs and 
activities433. The cadres also considered that MS should fulfil its role based on the 
procedure. In general, the cadres’ positive attitude towards MS, as a main body in 
the decision-making process, reflected party’s commitment on the procedural 
leadership. 
 
The case of the 2004 Presidential Election illustrated the commitment to 
consider MS as the only legal institution to discuss and to decide strategic policies. 
Prior to the election the cadres were divided into two groups. One group believed that 
Wiranto was the best president candidate for PKS. Another group considered Rais as 
the proper candidate for the party434. Wiranto’s supporters were mostly youth cadres 
                                                 
431 Interview Subhan Akbar with Nur Mahmudi Ismail, the first president of PK, in Akbar, Partai 
Keadilan: Faktor-Faktor Penguat Soliditas, in attachment.  
432 Interview with Dr. Yon Mahmudi, PKS and Tarbiyah Movement observer in Indonesia, Lecturer at 
Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, and 
one of the cadres who signed PKS establishment declaration, in Depok, 11 August 2009. 
433 Interview with Dr. Yon Mahmudi, PKS and Tarbiyah Movement observer in Indonesia, Lecturer at 
Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, and 
one of the cadres who signed PKS establishment declaration, in Depok, 11 August 2009; with Amri 
Yusra, Amri Yusra, M.Si, Chairperson of Depok DPD of PKS (2002-2004), Member of Parliament of 
Depok District, West Java, (2004-2009), and Lecturer at Political Sciences Department, Faculty of 
Social and Political Science, University of Indonesia, by phone, 13 December 2009; with Mahfudz 
Siddiq, Head of Cadrerization Department of DPP of PKS (2002-2005) and Member of Parliament 
(2004-2014), in Jakarta, 27 October 2010. 
434 Sapto Waluyo, Kebangkitan Politik Dakwah. Kosep dan Praktik Politik Partai Keadilan Sejahtera 
di Masa Transisi, (Bandung: Harakatuna, 2005), pp. 210-212. Lili Romli, Islam Yes, Partai Isalm Yes, 
(Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2006). Tempo, 09, XXXIII, 26 April-02 Mei 2004. Kompas, 2 July 2004; 
“Menimba Pengalaman Amien”, Suara Islam, 56th edition, 5-19 December 2008, p.15 These two 
figures became most wanted candidate, stepped aside three others namely incumbent president 
Megawati Soekarno Putri, General (ret) Dr. S.B Yudhoyono and former vice-president Dr. Hamzah 
Haz. 
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and local figures, mainly from eastern part of Indonesia435, led by the General 
Secretary Anis Matta436. They believed that the party had to support a candidate who 
had a better opportunity to win the election. They considered the Wiranto’s 
opportunity to win the election was reasonably open, since he would also be 
supported by Golkar Party that had just won the election437. On the other hand, they 
saw Rais as the figure that had a less opportunity to win, hence would bring nothing 
to the party. Some of them even questioned Rais’ sincere commitment towards 
PKS438. Moreover, they also regarded Wiranto as the figure that had sympathetic 
attitude towards dakwah interests. In fact, his daughters were the member of Jamaah 
Tarbiyah439.  
 
On the other hand, the Rais’ supporters, led by PKS President Hidayat Nur 
Wahid440, regarded him as the most ideal candidate who would provide many 
advantages for the Muslims compared to other candidates441. Rais was the former 
leader of Muhammadiyah and former member of the Expert Board of Ikatan 
Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (the Indonesia Muslim Intellectual Association/ICMI) 
who had a close relationship to the Islamic communities. They also considered his 
strong commitment, as one of the reform movement’s prominent figures, to establish 
clean government, to enact social justice and to clean up militarism in politics. These 
agendas were in line with PKS political agendas. On the other hand, they regarded 
the candidate with military background such as Wiranto will provide a bad reputation 
for PKS and the dakwah movement. This mostly related to his infamous reputation 
                                                 
435 Interview with Aus Hidayat Nur, Head of the II Dakwah Region (2002-2005) and Chairperson of 
BPDO (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 15 October 2010. 
436 Waluyo, Kebangkitan Politik Dakwah. Kosep dan Praktik Politik Partai Keadilan Sejahtera di 
Masa Transisi, p.213. On Matta’s support to Wiranto, see Tempo, 09, XXXIII, 26 April-02 Mei 2004. 
See also Kompas, 2 July 2004. In this case, as a popular and influential figure, Matta was supported by 
young figures, including Fachri Hamzah, Rama Pratama – two central figures of the 1998 student 
movement – and Dr. Zulkifliemansyah a young intellectual€ 
437 “Menimba Pengalaman Amien”, Suara Islam, 56th edition, 5-19 December 2008, p.15. 
438 Waluyo, Kebangkitan Politik Dakwah. Kosep dan Praktik Politik Partai Keadilan Sejahtera di 
Masa Transisi, p. 253.  
439 Defy Ruspiyandi, ”Menebak Arah Dukungan PKS”, Pikiran Rakyat, 21 June 2004. Supporters of 
Wiranto also pointed to the fact that this retired general was supported by Golkar as the strongest party 
in the recent election, with Solahuddin Wahid, an Islamic scholar and NU figure as candidate for the 
vice president. 
440 Hidayat was supported by senior figures such as the late K.H Rahmat Abdullah and Tifatul 
Sembiring. This group established strategic relations to Rais’ other supporter groups and accompanied 
Rais to meet the people, to realise its purpose, see ibid, pp. 209-214.   
441 Interview with Selamat Nurdin, MM, former tarbiyah activist leader in University of Indonesia, 
Member of Parliament of DKI Jakarta Province (2004-20014), in Jakarta, 22 October 2010. 
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during the Soeharto era as the highest leader of Indonesia armed forces. Both camps 
over time developed significant approaches to Wiranto and Rais442. 
 
However, although these two groups tried devotedly to win their candidate, 
they did not see such commitment as the reason to leave party’s procedure. In fact, 
they agreed to use party’s mechanism to solve this problem by handing in it to MS. 
This attitude was in proportion to the party’s statute, which stated that MS had an 
authority to stipulate the strategic policies443, including the names of the president 
and vice-president candidate that would be officially supported by the party444.  
 
These two camps agreed to hold the MMS on 29th June 2004. After MS gave 
each group an opportunity to convey their arguments, MS subsequently made a 
decision. The decision was opposite to the will of Matta or Aminuddin, two important 
figures in this party. PKS formally recommended445 and asked all the cadres and 
sympathisers to support Rais in the election446. After the final decision was declared 
by MS, the supporter of Wiranto committed to realise the result of the MMS.  
 
Another case that showed the commitment towards MS related to the policy 
to remain in the President Yudhoyono Government coalition. Before the party 
stipulated a decision, many cadres actually wanted the party to leave the coalition447. 
Some DPWs, such as in Jakarta and Yogyakarta, had stated the importance to leave 
                                                 
442 Interview with Selamat Nurdin, MM, former tarbiyah activist leader in University of Indonesia, 
Member of Parliament of DKI Jakarta Province (2004-20014), in Jakarta, 22 October 2010. 
443 The 2002 AD of PKS Article 12 (1.d). 
444 The 2005 AD of PKS Article 11 (2.l). 
445 On the comprehensive considerations to recommend M. Amien Rais-Siswono Yudho Husodo as the 
candidate President-Vice President see R. Alex Sandi, Sikap Poitik Partai Keadilan Sejahtera terhadap 
Pilpres 2004 dan Pemerintahan Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Studi Kasus Psikologi Politik Partai 
Dakwah, MA Thesis, (Depok: Islamic Studies and Psychology, Middle East and Islamic Studies 
Program, Post Graduate Program, University of Indonesia, 2006). 
446 On the complete letter of recommendation see “Rekomendasi DPP PK Sejahtera tentang Pemilihan 
Capres-Cawapres”, Waluyo, Kebangkitan Politik Dakwah. Kosep dan Praktik Politik Partai Keadilan 
Sejahtera di Masa Transisi, pp. 368-371. 
447 The research on the attitude of PKS cadres toward the policy to continue the coalition with the 
President Yudhoyono government, which was conducted by Prabowo, indicates that half of his 
respondents actually wanted party to leave the coalition, Triatno Yudho Prabowo, Pengaruh Taklim 
Rutin Terhadap Prilaku Politik Kader Partai Keadilan Sejahtera dana Perspektif Teori Intergroup 
Relation, BA Thesis, (Jakarta: State Islamic University Syarif Hidayatullah, 2006), p. 48. Syihabuddin 
stated that around 60% the cadres preferred PKS to leave coalition, Muhammad Syihabuddin, “Majelis 
Syura, Alternatif “Demokrasi Islam’, dan Ketaatan Kader PKS”, in 
http://syihabasfa.wordpress.com/2007/12/18/majelis-syura-alternatif-
%E2%80%9Ddemokrasiislam%E2% 80%9D/, 18 December 2007, p. 9. 
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the coalition448. For them, the party should perform this manoeuvre to prove its 
commitment as the defender of public interest449. This discourse became more 
popular since the Secretary General Matta stated that the Yudhoyono Government 
had broken the political contract between him and the PKS, particularly in the point 
that he would not repeat any mistake committed by the previous government (the 
New Order Government) that had harmed the life of the people. In light to this 
situation, hence, for Matta, it was the appropriate time for PKS to leave coalition450. 
 
The political option to leave government coalition became one of the most 
important discourses in the PKS’ history. This option related to the government policy 
to raise the price of the Bahan Bakar Minyak (the Petroleum/BBM), as an impact of 
the reduction of government subsidy. For the government, this policy was inevitable, 
since the oil world price became higher, and continually increased. In President 
Yudhoyono and his economic team’s perspective, if the government provided 
continually oil subsidy to the people, the state’s financial would collapse soon451.  
 
Although the reason behind this policy, to some extent, was understandable, 
practical speaking, the policy to reduce BBM subsidy had created anxiety and tense 
among people. Besides the problem of the BBM price, that shook people’s lives, in 
general the performance of Yudhoyono economic team was still far from convincing. 
For many people, Yudhoyono government’s economic reform ran slowly. Several 
government policies still did not provide any good impacts for the people and were 
insignificant for increasing people’s prosperity. With this regard, the President of the 
Party Tifatul Sembiring agreed to withdraw PKS ministers from Yudhoyono 
                                                 
448 Interview with Dr. Kamarudin, Indonesian Islamic political party expert and Lecturer at Political 
Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, in Depok,; with 
Dr. Prihandoko, Chairperson of Depok DPP of PKS (2004-2007) in Depok, 6 December 2005.  
449 This was because for them the Memorandum of Understanding had actually been broken by SBY 
and they were worried PKS would potentially suffer, if PKS still engaged in the coalition. Interview 
with Dr. Kamarudin, Indonesian Islamic political party expert and Lecturer at Political Science 
Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, in Depok,; with Dr. 
Prihandoko, Chairperson of Depok DPP of PKS (2004-2007) in Depok, 6 December 2005. 
450 On Matta’s opinion to opt out from the coalition, see ”Tak Ada Koalisi Tanpa Perubahan”, in Saksi, 
No.6/VIII/30 November 2005, pp. 7-9. 
451 See the reasons behind the policy in the government’s perspective in Dr. Dino Pati Jalal, The Can 
Do Leadership. Inspiring Stories from SBY Presidency (Jakarta: Red and White Publishing, 2008), pp. 
49-54. 
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Cabinet452. The three ministers from PKS even had been warned by their party 
colleagues to leave their positions soon453.  
 
However, not all cadres agreed to the discourse to leave the coalition. For 
this camp, although the party indeed had to be critical towards the government, 
leaving the coalition was not urgent. They believed that PKS’ main duty as the 
partner of coalition was to provide solution and not to make a radical movement by 
leaving the coalition. In relation to this situation, cadres seemed to be fractured into 
two camps.  
 
In facing this situation, cadres once again agreed to conduct the MMS to be 
the medium to solve the problem. Although in that time the endorsement to leave the 
coalition seemed getting stronger, and for some cadres became a correct 
decision454, the party was not taken in by the situation. PKS chose to implement 
procedural mechanism in order to avoid abrupt and unconstitutional policy.  
                                                
 
As a response to this, the MS held the MMS on 26th-27th November 2005. At 
that point, two opposite options were properly discussed. The final decision stated to 
win the choice to stay in the coalition. In order to avoid misunderstandings, PKS then 
held press conference to convey the information on its official position. PKS stated 
that although the party acknowledged the poor performance of Yudhoyono 
government's economic team and for that reason proposed a cabinet reshuffle455, it 
was also its moral obligation to help the government to solve national problem, which 
would not be effectively conducted if PKS left the coalition456. Therefore, the decision 
to stay in the coalition related to maintaining the access in government for the 
effectiveness in giving assistance to solve national problems.  
 
Albeit it sometimes created dissatisfaction, the attitude to follow procedure as 
the way to reach the goals provided a good lesson for the cadres. A reasonable and 
popular idea in the end still had to be struggled through the constitutional ways in the 
party. This attitude did not make MS lost its credibility in the eye of the most cadres. 
 
452 On the Tifatul Sembiring’s attitude see “Isu Penarikan Menteri, Belum ada Pembicaraan di PKS”, in 
www.detik.com 3 July 2006. 
453 “PKS Tetap Dukung Yudhoyono”, Bali Post, 28 November 2005.  
454 Syihabuddin, ”Majelis Syura, Alternatif ”Demokrasi-Islam”, dan Ketaatan Kader PKS”.  
455 “PKS Tetap Mendukung SBY-JK”, Republika 28 November 2005. 
456 “PKS Tetap Dukung Yudhoyono”, Bali Post, 28 November 2005. 
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The cadres realised that MS was the only appropriate media to decide any strategic 
policies457. In addition, this attitude also indicates party’s independency in making a 
policy. PKS happened to be a party that was able to overcome a pressure from its 
political environment, including from seeking popularity and accepting the 
intervention of the interests of individuals or certain groups, when carrying out 
decision-making process. This autonomy according to Randall and Svasand 
indicates the presence of party institutionalisation458.  
 
In relation to the party fragmentation, the cases of dismissal sometime also 
became the main problem that triggered such phenomenon. The phenomenon of 
dismissal also occurred in PKS. This involved cadres from all levels. However, this 
process did not raise tenses among cadres. In general, this happened because the 
party tried to implement the procedure reliably in order to preclude any intervention 
from figures or other institutions – including from the MS that could potentially agitate 
objectivity and created unfairness – and treated members equally. In this case, 
although MS was the most important body in the party, it could not intervene to other 
bodies work domain. In the case of internal court, that supposed to be the domain of 
DS, MS could not determine the result.  
 
For instance, in the case of Syamsul Balda dismissal, one of party’s founding 
fathers and thinkers, and member of MS, DS carried out freely an investigation to 
inspect the accusation on him for having an affair with another cadre. After this 
process finished, DS gave Balda the opportunity to defend himself in a special forum 
held by this body. This forum should be an opportunity for Balda to prove his case. 
However, since Balda could not convincingly prove his case, DS eventually decided 
to dismiss him. During the process, MS kept its objectivity and did not order an 
exceptional treatment for Balda, although he was one of the MS members. The 
chairperson of MS also did not use his position to encourage or to obstruct the 
investigation process towards this one of famous cadres.  
 
DS could also ask MS members to explain their political manoeuvres. It 
happened, for instance, to Matta, who was also the Party’s General Secretary. 
                                                 
457 Interview with Umar Salim Basalamah, Vice General Secretary of PKS (2002), and personal 
secretary of Hidayat Nur Wahid (former President of PKS and Chairperson of MPR of Republic of 
Indonesia), in Jakarta, 12 October 2010; with Dr. Prihandoko, Chairperson of Depok DPP of PKS 
(2004-2007) in Depok, 5 October 2010. 
458 Vicky Randall and Lars Svansand, “Party Institutionalisation in New Democracies”, in Party 
Politics, Vol. 8 January/1/2002, pp. 13-14.  
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Before DSP, Matta had to explain his moderate attitudes particularly in dealing with 
nationalism and pluralism issues that was in that time regarded as ideologically 
confusing and controversial by many cadres459. Ahmad Firman was also a member 
of MS when DS asked him to explain his decision to allow non-Muslims joining the 
party460. In those cases, MS again let the process carried out in line with the party 
procedure, in which DS had right to perform its function freely. DS eventually 
released Matta and Firman from the punishment after they could explain convincingly 
the reasons in conducting their political manoeuvres before the internal court.  
 
In the case of Yusuf Supendi, another MS member, however, DS sentenced 
him with dismissal. He was dismissed from his position as a member of MS in 2006 
after he rejected to implement MS sanction. His special position as a MS member, 
who also at the same time a Vice Chairperson of DS, and one of PKS founding 
fathers did not help him from the party’s sanction. This sanction was given for 
Supendi’s misconduct behaviours, mainly financial corruption, and denied the call of 
BPDO two times in June 2007 and October 2008461. After the party conducted some 
trails to asses his attitudes, the party dismissed him from the party in 2009. Three 
main reasons of his dismissal were (1) avoiding his obligation as MP to make 
financial contribution to the party, (2) his rejection to carry out party’s sanctions for 
his mistakes, and (3) his disloyalty, particularly unwillingness to preserve the image 
of the party and continuously provide negative rumours towards the leaders462. In this 
case, Aminuddin, Chairperson of the MS who had a personal relationship with 
Supendi rejected to provide him a special treatment463.  
 
3.2. Musyawarah as the Main Way 
 
Besides respecting the existence of MS, the attitude to value the party procedure 
was also reflected in the commitment to implement musyawarah consistently. This 
                                                 
459 Interview with Sitaresmi S, M.Psy, Member of Dakwah Department of DPP of PK (2000-2003), in 
Jakarta, 8 October 2010. 
460 Interview with Ahmad Feri Firman Yusuf, the Head of the III Dakwah Region (2002-2005), 
member of Majelis Syura PKS (2002-2010), in Jakarta, 2 November 2010. 
461 Interview with Ahmad Feri Firman Yusuf, the Head of the III Dakwah Region (2002-2005), 
member of Majelis Syura PKS (2002-2010), in Jakarta, 2 November 2010. 
462 http://www.pk-sejahtera.org/content/saksi-pks-bacakan-surat-pemecatan-yusuf-supendi 
463 Interview with Sitaresmi S, M.Psy, Member of Dakwah Department of DPP of PK (2000-2003), in 
Jakarta, 8 October 2010; with Sitaresmi S, M.Psy, Member of Dakwah Department of DPP of PK 
(2000-2003), in Jakarta, 8 October 2010. http://www.pk-sejahtera.org/content/saksi-pks-bacakan-surat-
pemecatan-yusuf-supendi. 
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commitment created the spirit of collectivism in which the leadership of the party was 
not based on elitism or personal interest, but on the spirit of consultation. As 
mentioned by Machmudi, the party’s official policies were always the result of the 
consultation held by MS that involves all members of this institution464. 
 
In the decision-making process, all members of MS, which until 2008 
consisted of 52 people, were treated equally. MS did not bestow special position for 
MS chairperson or some members who held the highest position in other institutions 
such as Chairperson of MPP, Chairperson of DSP, the Party President, the party’s 
General Secretary or the General Treasury. They could not force, individually or 
collectively, other members to follow their interest465. The special right given to the 
chairperson of MS related to the voting process. This right was applied in the 
situation where each proposal of policy had similar number of vote. The proposal that 
was supported by MS chairperson should be the winner466.     
 
Moreover, the senior members or prominent figures did not exploit their 
position to push their interests, let alone to take individual advantages467. These 
figures, regardless their past important contribution to develop Jamaah Tarbiyah and 
the party, in general respected the party constitution and were willing to build up a 
dialog. The behaviour of Aminuddin reflected this situation. According to several MS 
members, Aminuddin in his capacity as the Chairperson of MS had never committed 
to support a policy based on his personal interest468. MS members sometimes even 
did not support his opinion easily in the decision-making process.   
                                                 
464 Interview with Dr. Yon Mahmudi, PKS and Tarbiyah Movement observer in Indonesia, Lecturer at 
Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, and 
one of the cadres who signed PKS establishment declaration, in Depok, 11 August 2009.. 
465 Interview with Mahfudz Siddiq, Head of Cadrerization Department of DPP of PKS (2002-2005) and 
Member of Parliament (2004-2014), in Jakarta, 27 October 2010; with Musa Abdillah, Chairperson of 
Cadrerization Department of Kelapa Dua DPC of PKS, in Jakarta, 23 October 2010; with Sitaresmi S, 
M.Psy, Member of Dakwah Department of DPP of PK (2000-2003), in Jakarta, 8 October 2010; with 
Ahmad Feri Firman Yusuf, the Head of the III Dakwah Region (2002-2005), member of Majelis Syura 
PKS (2002-2010), in Jakarta, 2 November 2010; with Selamat Nurdin, MM, former tarbiyah activist 
leader in University of Indonesia, Member of Parliament of DKI Jakarta Province (2004-20014), in 
Jakarta, 22 October 2010.  
466 The 2005 ART of PKS Article 13 (6). 
467 Interview with Selamat Nurdin, MM, former tarbiyah activist leader in University of Indonesia, 
Member of Parliament of DKI Jakarta Province (2004-20014), in Jakarta, 22 October 2010. 
468 Interview with Sigit Sosiantomo, the Regional Coordinator for East Java and Bali of PKS (2005-
2009), in Jakarta, 25 October 2010; with Ahmad Feri Firman Yusuf, the Head of the III Dakwah 
Region (2002-2005), member of Majelis Syura PKS (2002-2010), in Jakarta, 2 November 2010; with 
Umar Salim Basalamah, Vice General Secretary of PKS (2002), and personal secretary of Hidayat Nur 
Wahid (former President of PKS and The Chairperson of MPR of Republic of Indonesia), in Jakarta, 
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 Moreover, the implementation of musyawarah also did not only enhance the 
spirit of consultation, but also practically sometimes made the process to stipulate a 
policy become difficult to do. MS had initially to pass a profound negotiation or 
hearing before concluding a policy. According to Mardani Sera, the situation of the 
MMS, led by Aminuddin, was dynamic and intense, where each member of MS had 
vast opportunity to convey their opinions and to provide contribution469. In many 
cases, Aminuddin merely took a role as someone who guided the forum or as a 
moderator and not as an absolute determinant factor470. Only in some delicate cases, 
particularly when the forum found a deadlock situation he would play as 
determiner471.  
 
In the case of 2004 election, the strategic position of Aminuddin and Matta 
could not have automatically brought victory. These two irreplaceable figures – that 
gained trust to hold their structural positions more than one time472 – could not push 
easily their interest to be a party’s policy. This situation showed symbolically the 
commitment to prioritise party’s procedure rather than a prominent figures’ opinion. 
Hence, the decision-making process also proves that the party was not directed or 
dictated by a limited group or a few persons and the fame was not everything in this 
party. Related to this situation, Aminuddin acknowledged that as the highest leader in 
this party he had no authority in determining the name of the supported candidate for 
the presidential elections. He clearly stated: “the decision about the presidential 
nomination is in the domain of Majelis Syura, not the Chairperson of Majelis 
Syura”473. The case of the BBM indicates the same situation. In this case, the 
popular persons – such as President of the Party Sembiring and Secretary General 
                                                                                                                                            
12 October 2010; with Selamat Nurdin, MM, former tarbiyah activist leader former tarbiyah activist 
leader in University of Indonesia, Member of Parliament of DKI Jakarta Province (2004-20014), in 
Jakarta, 22 October 2010.  
469 Interview with Dr. Mardani Ali Sera, Vice Chairperson of MPP PKS (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 6 
October 2010. 
470 Interview with Dr. Kamarudin, Indonesian Islamic political party expert and Lecturer at Political 
Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 7 
October 2010; with Amri Yusra, former MP for DPRD Depok from PKS by phone, 13 December 2009. 
471 Interview with Aus Hidayat Nur, Head of the II Dakwah Region (2002-2005) and Chairperson of 
BPDO (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 15 October 2010. 
472 Hilmi Aminuddin, Chairperson of MS for 2005-2010 period was re-elected to hold his previous 
position in the 2010 MMS. Matta held this position since the establishment of PKS in 2002, and was 
re-elected for to hold the position of the secretary general in 2010 MMS.   
473 “Partai Keadilan Sejahtera Menuju Pemilu 2009”, Tribun Timur, 23 Juli 2008.  
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Matta that brought popular opinion – were subjected to the procedure of the party. 
They could not force their opinion to be the party’s opinion, although many cadres 
disappointed by the government’s performance supported their ideas. This situation 
means that procedural leadership exists in this party, where the process was 
prioritised rather than popular interest or popularity.  
 
The debate between two groups in the MMS on 1st July 2004 prior to the 
presidential election illustrates the situation where the decision-making process was 
not artificial. Each group, in fact, had a right to state their position and argument. 
According to “Suara Islam”, the meeting was intense where each camp eagerly tried 
to convince other camp based on factual findings474. After the participants could not 
reach an agreement by consultation, they agreed on a vote. The result was the 
majority of MS members wanted the party to support Rais475, which according to 
Wahid consist of around 70% of 44 participants476.  
 
Similar condition also occurred in the case of coalition with the Yudhoyono 
Government. The situation of MMS on this matter was pictured as sangat alot (very 
though). It was said that, “The meeting to decide the policy was very tough. The 
meeting was initially set up from 10.00 am to 16.00 pm. However, until 17.00 pm 
there were still no signs indicating that the meeting was about to finish. Not until one 
hour latter, the information about the party position on the continuation of the 
coalition was conveyed”477. This situation proved the seriousness of the participants 
in conducting debate. In this situation, where each group had the same opportunity, 
the power of argument most likely would become more influential rather than the 
structural position. The fact that the latter was not always powerful, since not every 
options supported by the people who hold important position in the party – including 
the president of the party or the secretary general of the party – would easily come 
first. 
 
The implementation of musyawarah was also reflected by the involvement of 
cadres in strategic policies making process. This implementation could be seen in the 
                                                 
474 “Menimba Pengalaman Amien”, Suara Islam, 56th edition, 5-19 December 2008, p.15. 
475 Gatra, 2 July 2004. 
476  Sandi, Sikap Poitik Partai Keadilan sejahtera terhadap Pilpres 2004 dan Pemerintahan Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono. Studi Kasus Psikologi Politik Partai Dakwah, p.122. “Menimba Pengalaman 
Amien”, Suara Islam, 56th Edition, 5-19 December 2008, p.15. 
477 “PKS Tetap Dukung Yudhoyono”, Bali Post, 28 November 2005. 
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event to select the person, representing the party in the national and local elections. 
The stipulation process on the candidate for local MP or the head of government 
would depend on the input or evaluation from the local cadres. For this reason, the 
party opened the opportunity for the cadres to participate in this process. 
 
In the case of 2005 Depok Major Election, for instance, the Depok DPD 
provided an opportunity to kader inti and koordinator wilayah (the area coordinator/ 
Korwil), that coordinate the party at the village level, to participate in evaluating and 
determining the candidate for Major of Depok. The hundreds of kader inti were 
involved in selecting ten people from hundreds of names. The selection result (the 
ten names) then was conveyed and socialised by the DPD to Korwils to be 
evaluated478. The comments of Korwils would determine the level of appropriateness 
of each candidate. The result of this process was subsequently evaluated at the DPD 
Depok level in the forum called as Syura of DPD, involved all members of committee. 
The result was a matrix on the quality of each name, which then became the main 
measurement to determine who would be the candidate of the Major of Depok 
representing PKS (See in Appendix 16). In this situation, the main functions of the 
Syura of DPD were merely to make criterion and to score based on that criterion of 
each candidate that had been selected and suggested by hundreds of kader inti and 
Korwils. This mechanism according to Yusra proved the existence of a real 
participative system and freedom of expression, which essentially shows the 
existence of internal democracy in the party479. 
 
The similar situation also occurred at the national level, particularly for the 
presidential election. In this occasion, the party held a national selection process to 
grasp aspiration from the cadres about the candidate to be proposed by PKS for the 
president. To reach a comprehensive result, PKS organised some internal polling, 
which result would became the basis for MS to make a decision in the forum MMS. 
PKS for instance conducted Jaring Capres Emas (the Golden President Candidate 
Selection) to seek the most wanted people in the eye of cadres and sympathisers to 
represent this party in the presidential election.  
 
                                                 
478 Interview with Kemal A. Stamboel Head of Expert Advisory Body of PKS and Member of 
Parliament (2009-2014), in Paris, 14 December 2009. 
479 Interview Amri Yusra with Muhammad Said, the staff of Cadrerization Department of DPP of PKS, 
on Tuesday 22 December 2005 in Depok, in Amri Yusra, Mekanisme Partai Politik dalam Pencalonan 
Kepala Daerah: Studi Kasus Partai Keadilan Sejahtera dalam Pilkada Depok 2005, MA Thesis, 
(Jakarta: Post Graduate Program, Departement of Political Science, University of Indonesia), p. 101. 
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For this purpose, DPP set up some criteria to select the name. The criteria 
included the eagerness to protect wong cilik (the poor), the willingness to work with 
every elements of the nation and accepted by international community. The party 
then asked directly to the cadres and sympathisers by giving them formulir (the open 
questioner) organised by the DPW. In this process, party allowed the cadres to 
nominee any names to be party’s presidential candidate. As the result, several 
names mentioned in this polling, including figures from outside party such as M. 
Amien Rais (reform leader), Abdullah Gymanstyar (famous preacher from Bandung), 
Din Syamsudin (intellectual figure from Muhammadiyah), Wiranto and Soesilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono. After around a week latter, these names were processed by 
the DPP based on the criteria afterwards. DPP subsequently would ask the selected 
person for his willingness to represent the party in the presidential election.  
 
Prior to the 2004 election, the internal polling indicated Dr. Hidayat Nur Wahid 
as the most popular figure to be the next president and mentioned other names as 
proper figure for PKS, including Rais and Yudhoyono480. However, since the party 
only reached around 7.4% of votes, PKS decided not to propose the candidate from 
its own cadres. This decision based on the internal agreement concluded by the 
MMS in January 2004. The agreement stated that the commitment to propose a 
cadre to be a president candidate from internal party would be conducted if the party 
could reach 20% of votes in the 2004 legislative election. Moreover, the party would 
consider joining the government, if the party could reach at least 3% of votes481. 
Therefore, even though the former PKS President Wahid was the most wanted figure 
to be the president482, the party eventually selected Rais as the president candidate 
from PKS in the 2004 presidential election.  
 
The internal selections, to determine party leadership and to fill important 
positions, also indicated the significant involvement of cadres. As mentioned in the 
constitution of the party, the election of MS members involved all kader inti483. In its 
development, the party’s constitution also mentioned a kind of guideline for this 
process. The first step of this process was to set up an election committee, 
                                                 
480 “Kriteria Capres 2004 dari Partai Keadilan Sejahtera”, www.pks-jaksel.or.id, 14 April 2004. 
“Kriteria Capres 2004 dari Partai Keadilan Sejahtera”, Kompas, 1 April 2004. 
481 Bayan DPP Partai Keadilan Sejahtera No. 02/BYN/DPP-PKS/VII/1425 tentang Sikap Politik 
Mendukung Pasangan SBY-JK pada Pemilihan Umum Presiden dan Wakil Presiden Putaran Kedua. 
482  “Menimba Pengalaman Amien”, Suara Islam, 56th Edition, 5-19 December 2008, p.15. 
483 The 2002 AD of PKS Article 11 (2); The 2005 AD of PKS Article 8 (1).  
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conducted by DPTP, to select around 1,000 kader ahli (the expert-cadres) from 
across the country. The selection based on some criteria, mentioned in the AD, such 
as had been a member of the party for at least five years, and had experience in both 
structural and functional party management484. From this step, the election 
committee then decreed hundreds of eligible candidate to be elected as MS member. 
Around thirty thousands kader inti, subsequently elected these candidates to be the 
member of MS485.  
 
The new elected members then held an internal meeting to select some 
experts to become member of MS. The member of the MS also conducted internal 
election to elect the chairperson of this body. In this process, every member of MS 
had an equal chance to be elected. The MMS, held on 26th-29th May 2005 in Jakarta, 
elected Aminuddin as the Chairperson of MS for five-year term. He was elected 
through closed-voting mechanism and gained 29 of 50 votes. (See Table 8).  
 
Table 8 
The Result of the Election for the Chairperson of the MS  
In 2005 MMS II 
 
The Candidates Votes 
K.H Hilmi Aminuddin 29 
K.H Dr. Salim Segaf Al Jufri 12 
K.H Dr. Surahman Hidayat 8 




The result indicates that although Aminuddin was sometimes regarded as 
“the godfather” in Jamaah Tarbiyah and the PKS, 21 members of MS or around 42% 
of total members did not vote for him. It shows to some extent a kind of freedom of 
expression in this party. Democracy in this party, which was supported by the rules of 
the game, revealed in the life of the party. As mentioned by one cadre, “”I think 
internal situation in PKS was fairly democratic. We can see it from the succession of 
the party leaders from the national level to the local level””486. 
 
4.  Impacts to the Party: The Preservation of Cohesion  
                                                 
484 The AD of PK Article 15; The 2002 ART of PKS Article 6 (1); The 2005 ART of PKS Article 7(1). 
485 “Pemira Majelis Syura PKS: Cara Unik PKS Memilih Pemimpin”, in 
http://www.pks.or.id/v2/main.php?op=isi&id=111. 
486 Romli, “Model Pelembagaan Partai Politik di Indonesia: Studi Kasus Partai Keadilan Sejahtera”, p. 
64. 
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 4.1 The Development of Trust  
 
The consistency in implementing the rules of the game in making policy and holding 
the distribution of authority enabled party to prevent distrust and internal conflict.  
Prihandoko believed that the turmoil could be avoided since the party could maintain 
its consistency in implementing party procedure over time487. He stated that there 
were two important things in the eye of the PKS’ cadres related to the decision-
making process, namely the decision should be based on the procedure and was still 
in line with the party’s ideology. The situation would be potentially very chaotic in the 
PKS if the party was not able to prove its commitment to maintain party procedure 
and ideology when conducting decision-making process488.  
 
Some critical perspectives indicated the authoritarian tendencies of this party, 
by mostly establishing their argument on the superiority position of Aminudin, 
Chairperson of MS and Matta, Party’s General Secretary. For some critical persons, 
the role of Matta was very influential in the party, particularly in the decision-making 
process. They even said that the party was actually on his hand, provided no room 
for other elites and ordinary cadres to take a significant participation in the party. 
However, for many cadres the Matta’s important position in decision-making process 
was normal. It was merely the result of his capability to convince other members of 
MS489. They did not see it as the result of manipulation, since his opinion on strategic 
policies should be discussed first by all of the MS’ members. In relation with this 
situation Prihandoko said that “there will be massive exoduses if Anis (Matta) or 
Ustadz Hilmi (Aminuddin) takes policies that were not in line with the party 
principles”490.  
 
Moreover, by proportionally using the mechanism of the MMS, MS was able 
to preserve the respect towards itself, which paved the way the preservation of 
                                                 
487 Interview with Dr. Prihandoko, Chairperson of Depok DPP of PKS (2004-2007) in Depok, 5 
October 2010. 
488 Interview with Dr. Prihandoko, Chairperson of Depok DPP of PKS (2004-2007) in Depok, 5 
October 2010. 
489 Interview with Aus Hidayat Nur, Head of the II Dakwah Region (2002-2005) and Chairperson of 
BPDO (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 15 October 2010; with Dr. Prihandoko, Chairperson of Depok DPP of 
PKS (2004-2007) in Depok, 5 October 2010. 
490 Interview with Dr. Prihandoko, Chairperson of Depok DPP of PKS (2004-2007) in Depok, 5 
October 2010. 
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respecting the party itself. Cadres over time witnessed the consistency of this body in 
upholding the rules of the game proportionally, including treating all the members of 
MS equally. The party still provide some privileges to its leaders, including in the 
decision making process. However, in general such privileges were still tolerable, in 
which they did provided a power for the leaders to overshadow the existence of the 
procedure in making policy. 
 
Under such circumstance, the cadres also believed that the party will not take 
easily unilateral or unconstitutional actions that could endanger their future. Yusra 
stated that since the cadres believed that the party and the elites who were in charge 
in MS would use party mechanism as a mean of action consistently, they felt 
comfortable and secure491. In line with such opinion, Umar Basalamah stated that in 
PKS the cadres felt secure since no one could treat them unfairly including the 
elites492. Mustofa stated that consistency had preserved confidence for cadres at the 
grass root level that they will have an equal treatment if something happened to 
them493. Hence the establishment of trust in this party was not only a result of 
systematic cadrerization, which will be discussed in the Chapter X, but also as a 
consequence of consistency in conducting the rules of the game.     
 
Besides trust, the consistency to implement procedure in decision-making 
process had satisfied a vast majority of the cadres. It related mainly to the 
opportunity to convey their opinion not only in terms of defending their case at the 
internal tribunal but also having a significant role in decision-making process. The 
opportunity to speak up, defend their opinion and even to colour party policies – by 
joining, for instance, the internal election in selecting the members of MS and MP 
candidates and having an opportunity to be heard in the local consultation -- made 
the cadres felt that their existence was in vain.  
 
Although sometimes the party did not implement their opinions, which for 
some cadres became a very disappointing situation, the vast majority of the cadres 
                                                 
491 Interview with Amri Yusra, M.Si, Chairperson of Depok DPD of PKS (2002-2004), Member of 
Parliament of Depok District, West Java, (2004-2009), and Lecturer at Political Sciences Department, 
Faculty of Social and Political Science, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 7 October 2010. 
492 Interview with Umar Salim Basalamah, Vice General Secretary of PKS (2002), and personal 
secretary of Hidayat Nur Wahid (former President of PKS and The Chairperson of MPR of Republic of 
Indonesia), in Jakarta, 12 October 2010. 
493 Interview with Mustofa, cadre of PKS and former reporter of Profetik Magazine, established by 
cadres of PKS, in Depok, 7 October 2010. 
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could understand it. For them at least the party had given the cadres opportunity to 
express their opinions. The opportunity to get involved and influence party’s policies, 
at the local level, through some local consultations and activities, was even wider. It 
happened since they have more direct access to the daily party’s activities, including 
in the policy making process494. Above opportunities actually had convinced PKS’ 
cadres that the party did not leave and underestimate them.    
 
Furthermore, by having the opportunity to join the process of internal 
elections, to Matta, each cadre in essence would bear equal responsibility. They 
could not blame other cadres if the party faced a trouble caused by wrongdoing of 
their leaders495. Furthermore, this mechanism would also build up the sense of 
belonging among cadres. Matta said,” we intentionally use this model of election to 
implement internal democracy that involved all cadres. Therefore, the decision of MS 
was not centralised to some people, but belongs to all cadres” 496. In addition, this 
process was also fundamentally a medium to control the leaders’ quality. Those who 
had not given significant contribution to the party would almost likely be avoided in 
this process. With these all of the situations, the existence of musyawarah and 
internal election made the cadres felt engaged directly with the MS and the party’s 
committee, which eventually also contributed to the internal stability preservation497. 
 
4.2. Upholding Party Cohesion 
 
The existence of trust and satisfaction caused the consolidation of resistance 
towards party and elites or conflict formalisation among cadres became difficult to 
perform. The existence of trust made the negative rumours encounter difficulty to 
trigger cadres to do unproductive actions for the part solidity. Even when the conflict 
potential had existed, it did not automatically provoke the cadres to take unnecessary 
or extreme actions. The trust preserved the consciousness of making confirmation 
before taking actions498. In general, when conflict potential occurred, the cadres 
would report it almost automatically to the party apparatus with the confidence that 
                                                 
494 Interview with Musa Abdillah, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Kelapa Dua DPC of 
PKS, in Jakarta, 23 October 2010. 
495 “PKS Gelar Pemilihan Raya Majelis Syura”, Media Indonesia, 22 Februari 2010. 
496 “PKS Gelar Pemilihan Raya Majelis Syura”, Media Indonesia, 22 Februari 2010. 
497 Syihabuddin, “Majelis Syura, Alternatif ‘Demokrasi Islam’, dan Ketaatan Kader PKS”, p.7. 
498 Interview with Musa Abdillah, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Kelapa Dua DPC of 
PKS, in Jakarta, 23 October 2010. 
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the party would handle it properly499. In the situation where rumours could not easily 
provoke the cadres, the process of reducing conflict potential became easier.  
 
This situation can be seen in the cases related to the national policy making-
process, involving many elements with different points of view. Almost all cases 
ended without tracing a significant and permanent factionalisation, which terminated 
the destructive elements to appear. In the case of the 2004 Presidential Election, 
after the final decision was declared by the MS, different opinions on the president 
candidate ended. Matta commented that even though he initially was the supporter of 
Wiranto, but when the party decided to support Rais, he could not find any reasons to 
neglect the party’s instruction that had been stipulated procedurally. Hence, in its 
development, the “internal factionalism” was eventually ended as well as the conflict 
potential.  
 
A similar situation happened in the case of BBM. Although tension among 
cadres was quite high particularly before the decision was made, it then gradually 
disappeared after the party, through MMS, decided to remain in the government 
coalition. In its development, by being able to preserve trust, the party so far could 
avoid the development of distrust that could endanger the unity of the party and 
terminate it. In the BBM’s case, that triggered a reaction to questioning the position of 
PKS in the government coalition, many cadres, in fact, changed their mind. The 
present of trust towards the leaders had encouraged cadres to support the decision 
to remain in the coalition500. The existence of trust, which was followed by systematic 
socialisation501, had successfully lessened negative assumptions towards party and 
other members. Party fragmentation could be avoided by PKS accordingly. 
 
The case of dismissal also showed similar path. Until 2008, different with 
several other parties, the case of dismissal did not trigger any prolonged internal 
polemics. Although in some cases some critical persons criticised the way the party 
took the decision, it did not shake internal unity. In those cases, the cadres generally 
considered that the process taken by the party was still in line with the spirit of 
                                                 
499 Interview with Nooryanto, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Bekasi DPD of PKS, in 
Bekasi, 7 November 2010. 
500 Prabowo, Pengaruh Taklim Rutin Terhadap Prilaku Politik Kader Partai Keadilan Sejahtera dana 
Perspektif Teori Intergroup Relation, pp. 47-49. 
501 As mentioned by Tifatul Sembiring that after the meeting finished the members of MS travelled to 
their constituent and many local areas to socialise the policy and to explain reasons behind a decision, 
“PKS Tetap Mendukung SBY-JK”, Republika, 28 November 2005. 
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constitution, run through procedural approaches, and had legal justification. For this 
reason, after the party stipulated cadres’ dismissal PKS could avoid conflict 
escalation and maintain internal stability.  
 
In 2011, however, Supendi, expelled by the party back in 2009, summoned 
PKS to the court. This phenomenon was unique and happened for the first time in the 
PKS’ history. Supendi accused some elites of the party for having committed a 
violation to the party procedure when dismissing him. The party denied such 
accusation. According to the party, the entire dismissal process had followed the 
party’s procedure, including by joining DSP as the authoritative body in that 
process502. The party then launched a statement mentioned that the party, based on 
the letter of decision number SK.DPP.No.115/skep/dpp-pks/1430, had formally 
dismissed him in 2009503. Moreover, PKS President Luthfi H. Ishaaq said that PKS 
would unveil such process in detail in the court504. In February 2012, Pengadilan 
Negeri Jakarta Selatan (The South Jakarta District Court) refused Supendi’s lawsuit 
and stated that his dismissal was legal and in line with the party procedure505.        
 
A part of that, Supendi’s manoeuvre did not attract the greater cadres. Some 
people believed that such situation was a reflection of uncritical cadres, formed by 
PKS as a result of systematic indoctrinations. However this phenomenon was 
actually an indication that no significant procedural violation occurred in the 
Supendi’s case. As mentioned by Prihandoko, most of PKS cadres were critical 
personalities with high education backgrounds. In that situation, on the one hand, 
they would react if they found something odd in the implementation of the party 
procedure. On the other hand, they would not easily accept information without 
conducting verification506. Although for some the case of Supendi could be regarded 
as a symptom of the imperfectness of procedure implementation in PKS, the case 
itself was still debatable. Therefore his case could not be used as a finding to 
generalise the real situation in this party. In fact this case was refused by The South 
Jakarta District Court. 
                                                 
502 http://pkspiyungan.blogspot.com/2011/03/sikap-resmi-pks-atas-tuduhan-mantan.html. 
503 http://pkspiyungan.blogspot.com/2011/03/sikap-resmi-pks-atas-tuduhan-mantan.html. 
504 “PKS Siap Layani Yusuf Supendi Lewat Jalur Hukum”, Republika, 2 May 2011. 
505http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2012/02/14/13081586/Gugatan.Yusuf.Supendi.kepada.10.Petinggi.
PKS.Ditolak. http://www.antaranews.com/berita/297312/gugatan-yusuf-supendi-ke-pks-ditolak 
506 Interview with Dr. Prihandoko, Chairperson of Depok DPP of PKS (2004-2007) in Depok, 5 
October 2010. 
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 5.  Overview  
 
The policy to consistently prioritise MS in policy-making process was an important 
characteristic of PKS. However, it did not make this institution enjoy a position above 
the law. The phenomenon of power personalisation, for instance, did not occur. In 
fact, MS respected other institution’s authorities and conducted power delegation. 
The commitment to implement procedural leadership had also been reflected by the 
attitude to prioritise musyawarah. This situation was in line with the party’s 
commitment to build a party based on the spirit of honouring the system rather than 
blindly following the will of the leaders’ interests. In light to this situation, the PKS did 
not recognise any special figures that could enjoy special treatments in the party507. 
During the first decade of its existence, the PKS was, overall, also able to preserve 
its consistency in implementing the rules of the game.  
 
The presence of this commitment, although was not totally perfect, had saved 
the party from internal confrontation. Some objections indeed occurred and in fact 
became unavoidable. Nevertheless, it did not appeal cadres to use these moments to 
develop factions. This indicated that the party’s decision was actually understandable 
and acceptable for most cadres or at least was not something that totally 
contradictory with the rules of the game. The situation would be contra-productive if 
the party intentionally went to different direction in understanding and undergoing the 
constitution. The party’s members, who were continuously encouraged by the party 
to appreciate the internal system, would be very cautious with this matter508. In short, 
the consistency in implementing the rules of the game had maintained the cadres’ 
trust towards the party, elites and other members, which eventually became one of 
the important capitals for PKS to preserve its cohesion. 
                                                 
507 Even, Dr. Hidayat Nur Wahid, ex-president of the party and the General Chairperson of the MPR 
who had a regional reputation, after finishing his duties, today became an ordinary member who has 
similar rights and duties with other members. 
508 Interview with Dr. Prihandoko, Chairperson of Depok DPP of PKS (2004-2007) in Depok, 5 
October 2010; with Mustofa, cadre of PKS and former reporter of Profetik Magazine, established by 
cadres of PKS, in Depok, 7 October 2010. 
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Chapter VII 




“I really believe that fragmentation would not come about if Badan 
Kehormatan (the Council of Honour) existed” (Agus Suflihat) 509. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
This and the following chapter will discuss the role of conflict resolution mechanism 
(CRM), as one of party institutionalisation elements, in the internal fragmentation or 
cohesion. This chapter talks about the situation of CRM in PKB, which indicates the 
absence of the CRM in this party. For such purpose this chapter will elaborate some 
aspects namely the condition of CRM, the development of the internal situations and 
the impact of those situations on the party. The failure of PKB in institutionalising 
CRM eventually contributes to disadvantageous for the creation of proper response 
to internal conflict and localising internal conflict, which diminished the party’s ability 
to evade fragmentation. In addition, this and the next chapter implements the CRM 
as part of attempts that dealing with the conflict termination management and 
containment, which was reflected by the presence of relevant institutions and the set 
of the rules of the game. In this regard the conflict prevention, before the conflict 
happens; and the conflict termination, after the conflict took place were the main 
subjects of the discussion.   
 
2.  The Absence of Formal Conflict Resolution Mechanism (CRM) 
 
One important thing that was overlooked by the founding fathers of PKB was the 
presence of any rules of the game that regulated conflict resolution. Although internal 
conflict tended to prolong, the interesting and crucial point of PKB in relation to CRM 
was that this party did not have clear and direct rules of the game for handling this 
matter. The constitution of the party used circa 1998-2005 did not contain texts that 
related directly to this problem. The constitution of the party only provided regulations 
                                                 
509 Interview with Agus Suflihat, Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz of PKB (1998-2001) and Chairperson 
of Dewan Tanfidz of PKB (1998-2001), via telephone, Jakarta-Bandung, 11 October 2010.  
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that were indirectly related to the conflict containment, namely, firstly, the mechanism 
and medium that could be used by the party’s cadres when facing a dismissal and 
secondly, the requirements for provisional dismissal of the member of DPP and 
relevant matters. 
 
The ART stipulated that the dismissed members could approve a review of 
their case by a meeting of the highest forum at their committee level of committee, or 
to the board of the party’s committee at the higher level, where the plenary meeting 
of the board would decide the status of the cadre510. In the case of the member of 
DPP, the ART stated that the provisional dismissal could only be conducted in the 
forum of a Plenary Meeting of DPP. The decision should be based on strong reasons 
and not contradict the AD/ART, the decrees provided by party meeting forums and 
the party regulations511. 
 
It was in 2005 that the party eventually mentioned in its constitution a Badan 
Kehormatan (Council of Honour/BK), as part of the party board for task forces that 
function as an arbitration body. It was mentioned in Chapter 33 (about other party 
apparatus) article (2) that “DPP creates Badan Kehormatan to conduct arbitration”512. 
Although it was most likely that it had not designed merely to solve the conflict, the 
BK seemed to have a large potential to be used as a medium for conflict 
resolution513.  
 
However, although it clearly stipulated the existence of BK, the constitution of 
the party did not provide any detailed explanations about the specific duty of this 
body. Consequently, this body did not have a clear job domain, including its explicit 
role and function. The ART also did not arrange the membership and mentioned 
institutions that eligible to hold the body as the process of selection for that. The 
issue of independence in executing the policy was also not clearly mentioned. The 
constitution of PKB, then, was not significantly changed. 
 
                                                 
510 510  The 1998 ART of PKB Article 11 (7); The 2000 ART of PKB Article 11 (7); The 2002 ART of 
PKB Article 11 (7); The 2005 ART of PKB Article 11 (7); The 2008 ART of PKB Article 11 (7). 
511 The 1998 ART of PKB Article 19 (2); The 2000 ART of PKB Article 20 (2); The 2002 ART of PKB 
Article 22 (2); 2005 ART of PKB Article 22 (2). 
512 The 2005 AD/ART PKB Article  33 (2) 
513 Interview with Muamir M. Syam, Chairperson of PKB (2005-2010), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010; 
with Ida Fauziyah, Member of Parliament of PKB (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 14 October 2010. 
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On the other hand, members of the party in most cases still recognise the 
forum of Muktamar, including MLB), and Dewan Syura as the party’s formal 
instruments for the resolution of internal conflict. Since muktamar or MLB was the 
highest forum for the decision-making process which can be used as the medium to 
conclude the best policies, including settling disagreements and deciding the results, 
it was the highest legitimate forum to formulate policies and solve conflicts514. As for 
Dewan Syura, its relevance in CRM was mainly due to its strategic position as the 
highest institution in PKB and the position of ulama inside this body, which provided 
this body with a capacity to give direction and advice on conflict resolution matters. 
Kacung Maridjan mentioned that the existence of the ulama in Dewan Syura was 
hoped to be a significant element to solve a conflict and any related matters 515. In 
line with that opinion, according to HZ Arifin Junaidi and Agus Suflihat, Dewan Syura 
was the body that principally should solve problems related to conflict within the party 
516. 
 
However, the party did not explicitly provide both instruments with authority to 
deal with conflict resolution and related problems. In reality, Muktamar, as a national 
forum involving hundreds of people, could not also be a proper medium to resolve 
cases that required an immediate response, as not all cases of conflict could be 
solved in such a large forum. As for Dewan Syura, the serious problem concerned 
the absence of a proper and detailed mechanism and a credible person to contain 
and solve conflict and in particular when dealing in general with the judicial 
administration matters. This problem occurred because the body was not designed 
properly to deal with such subjects and did not require the ability to deal with conflict 
as a prerequisite skill for membership. Moreover, in some important cases of conflict, 
in fact, Dewan Syura was part of them as it was directly involved. The position of 
Abdurrahman Wahid, as the general chairperson of this body, created difficulty in 
creating a fair and objective decision, as in some important conflicts his function was 
                                                 
514 This thinking, for instance, became one of foundations for the cadres to reject some of the dismissal 
policies for the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz that were conducted through limited forum.    
515 Interview with Prof. Dr. Kacung Marijan, the NU policies’ observer and former member of 
Assistance Team of the proposal for the establishment of PKB (Rembang version), in Jakarta, 26 
November 2010. 
516 Interview with H.Z Arifin Junaidi, General Secretary of Dewan Syura of PKB (2002-2005) and 
Chairperson of Dewan Syura of PKB (2005-2010), in Jakarta, 28 October 2010; Agus Suflihat, 
Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz of PKB (1998-2001) and Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz of PKB-
Matori, via telephone, Bandung-Jakarta, 11 October 2010. 
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concerned. The situation appeared to be more discouraging since other members of 
this body tended to be just followers of Wahid’s interests517. 
 
This situation, to some extent, was a reflection of misguided expectations 
regarding the possibility of conflict development in this party. According to Maridjan, 
in the middle of 1998 euphoria situation, most NU members did not think that the 
party would contain conflict518. If there was conflict, they believed that it would be 
easily solved by the senior and charismatic ulama in the party, which traditionally 
plays an important role in conflict resolution through NU ways519. This abandonment 
of a legal mechanism like CRM was also supported by the situation where many NU 
people at that time, including PBNU, as the highest formal institution of NU, who 
projected this party as the main medium to struggle for their interests and agendas. 
Therefore, at that time, it seemed that the majority of NU people believed that there 
would not be other large agendas and interests, which potentially decreased the 
commitment of unity amongst them. The existence of very senior ulama and many 
important NU leaders, including Wahid, with their influence and ability to unite santri, 
also supported this assumption, which increased confidence on the solidity of the 
party520. These general assumptions and situations eventually overshadowed the 
importance of the creation of CRM or at least a body that would tackle conflict 
matters  
 
In its development, significant progress in terms of establishing an advance 
rules of the game to answer internal conflict was still absent in PKB. Some people 
argued that this situation was an impact from difficult situations faced by the party 
                                                 
517 Khofifah Indar Parawansa described that there was actually Gus Dur who alone decided the result, 
although there were ten people in a meeting. Interview with Khofifah Indar Parawansa, State Minister 
for Women Empowerment (1999-2001), Chairperson of the Institute for Election Winning of PKB 
(2002-2005), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010. 
518 Interview with Prof. Dr. Kacung Marijan, the NU policies’ observer and former member of the 
Assistance Team of the proposal for the establishment of the PKB (Rembang version), in Jakarta, 26 
November 2010. 
519 Interview with Prof. Dr. Kacung Marijan, the NU policies’ observer and former member of the 
Assistance Team of the proposal for the establishment of the PKB (Rembang version), in Jakarta, 26 
November 2010, with Abdul Khalik Ahmad, Secretary of PKB Faction in DPR RI (1999-2001) and 
General Secretary of PKB- Jalil (2000-2005), in Jakarta, 11 October 2010. 
520 Interview with Muamir M. Syam, Chairperson of PKB (2005-2010), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010; 
with H.Z Arifin Junaidi, General Secretary of Dewan Syura of PKB (2002-2005) and Chairperson of 
Dewan Syuro of PKB (2005-2010), in Jakarta, 28 October 2010; with Prof. Dr. Kacung Marijan, NU 
policies’ observer and former member of Assistance Team of the proposal for the establishment of 
PKB (Rembang version), in Jakarta, 26 November 2010, with Abdul Khalik Ahmad, Secretary of PKB 
Faction in DPR RI (1999-2001) and General Secretary of PKB- Jalil (2000-2005), in Jakarta, 11 
October 2010 
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during its first years of existence. This situation included defending President Wahid 
from his opponent’s political manoeuvres to overthrow him and facing continuous 
internal conflict521, wasted the party energy and created an impediment to internal 
improvement efforts.  
 
Furthermore, the absence of a formal CRM in PKB could not disassociated  
this party as it stood on NU traditions or cultures and that in the end considerably 
dominated the life of the party. In this case, many traditions in NU tended to be 
implemented in PKB, including the way this organisation solved its internal conflict. In 
its history, NU experienced internal disputes and conflicts several times but could 
escape from internal fragmentation522, creating confidence among its cadres and 
followers on the ways this organisation deal with these problems. 
 
NU, however, did not manage CRM comprehensively, since it did not develop 
any legal procedures to cope with this matter. In general, the organisational tradition 
in NU tends to avoid strict regulations and relies on the personal approach. 
According to Soon in the organisation life, NU tended to put forward the tradition and 
the figure rather than system or management523. Consequently, when facing an 
internal conflict, this organisation implemented informal approach or tradisi (tradition) 
rather than using legal-formal aspects such as AD/ART. 
 
Some “methods” were used in common in NU to address internal conflict. 
Firstly, it uses a personal approach. In this very common attitude, conflicting cadres 
meet each other informally, at home or at some other unofficial venues, to discuss 
the problems between them on a one-to-one basis to find a solution to their dispute. 
The reconciliation between Subchan Z.E, a prominent political figure, and Bisri 
Syansuri, one of NU’s founding fathers, for instance, happened after Subchan had 
                                                 
521 Interview with Ahmad Shodiq Noor, General Secretary of DKI Jakarta DPW of PKB, in Jakarta, 3 
November 2010; with Abdul Khalik Ahmad, Secretary of PKB Faction in DPR RI (1999-2001) and 
General Secretary of PKB- Jalil (2000-2005), in Jakarta, 11 October 2010; with Marinah Hardy, 
Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz of Western Nusa Tenggara DPW of PKB (2002-2005), in Jakarta, 28 
October 2010; with Muamir M. Syam, Chairperson of PKB (2005-2010), in Jakarta 
522 Mahrus Irsyam, Ulama dan Partai Politik, Upaya Mengatasi Krisis, (Jakarta: Yayasan 
Perkhidamatan, 1984). Kang Young Soon, Antara Tradisi dan Konflik: Kepolitikan Nahdlatul Ulama, 
(Jakarta: UI-Press, 2008). 
523 Kang Young Soon, Antara Tradisi dan Konflik: Kepolitikan Nahdlatul Ulama, Ph.D Thesis, 
(Jakarta: Program Pasca Sarjana Ilmu Politik Universitas Indonesia, 2008), p. 400.   
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asked for an islah with Syansuri in Syansuri’s pesantren524. Secondly, NU uses a 
third party. In this case, the conflicting cadres would find and ask the third party to 
mediate for them in handling their conflict. The third party is usually a figure that 
respected and agreed by both sides. The case of reconciliation, after experiencing 
prolonged antagonism between Wahid and his uncle Yusuf Hasyim, showed the role 
of the third party, namely Abdullah Faqih, a main figure in the group of ulama khos, in 
addressing conflict between those two important figures in NU525. 
 
The third method is to retreat, a situation described by Hirschman as “exit 
action”. This mechanism includes (1) definitely ending the relationship with the 
opponent (muffaraqah), by making a clear statement of it and (2) leaving the 
organisation. This mechanism is used when the level of disappointment or the sense 
of being badly hurt reaches a peak or had become intolerable. The decision of 
Asa’ad Syamsul Arifin, one of the first generation NU figures, was to treat the 
muffaraqah Wahid, which is an example for the first mechanism. The case to leave 
the NU such as by Achmad Syaichu, son-in-law of Wahab Chasbullah, one of the 
NU’s founding fathers, is an example of the previous exit case. After being tricked by 
Idham Chalid in the election for the position of General Chairperson of Dewan 
Tanfizdiyah, he left the NU and established the Ittihadul Muballighin526. 
 
The fourth way is by using a muktamar forum. This forum is relevant to act as 
a medium for conflict resolution since it has authority to decide, based on participant 
opinion, which group or person is still acceptable and could continue to perform 
leadership in the organisation. As a kind of arbitrator, a muktamar therefore, could be 
used as a medium to reconcile all conflicting groups, although sometimes it does not 
really reduce the conflict potential. Several important conflicts were solved during this 
forum. These included the case of antagonism between Idham Chalid and Subhan 
                                                 
524 Interview with Choirul Anam, Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz of Eastern Java DPW of PKB (1998-
2005) and General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz of PKB-Alwi (2005-2007), in Jakarta, 13 October 
2010. 
525 This situation shows the importance of seniority based on the religious expertise playing its role in 
conflict resolution. In addition, according to Choirul Anam in the past the NU had institutionalised this 
tradition by the existence of sort of an arbitration body called Islahu Dzatilbain consisting of ulama; 
that concern to protect the NU from prolonged conflict. However the NU never used this institution 
anymore, after many very NU senior ulama who were as pillar of this institution passed away. Such 
phenomenon showed that the role of a person is more important rather than the system in the NU. 
Interview with Choirul Anam, Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz of Eastern Java DPW of PKB (1998-
2005) and General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz of PKB-Alwi (2005-2007), in Jakarta, 13 October 
2010.       
526 Soon, Antara Tradisi dan Konflik. Kepolitikan Nahdlatul Ulama, p. 131. 
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ZE, two important figures with different opinions on the future of NU (in the 1970’s), 
or conflict between the “Cipete Camp” (political oriented group) led by Chalid and the 
“Situbondo Camp” (cultural oriented group) led by Assad Syamsul Arifin and Wahid 
(in 1982)527. 
 
These methods indicate the informality of NU in dealing with its internal 
conflict, as these methods were not stated explicitly in its constitution. A Muktamar is 
the only method written into the constitution, even though it is not directly set up to 
address internal conflict. Sometimes, the combination of these methods can be found 
as real examples. NU members then brought this tradition to PKB, which to some 
extent influences the attitude of PKB’s cadres to conflict resolution. As we will see 
later, the advice to use a personal approach, finding a third party, using a muktamar 
forum and even leaving the party became common suggestions that were proposed 
by the members of PKB in dealing with conflict. In general, the tradition to allow CRM 
to be less formal became one of NU’s traditions existing in PKB.  
 
However, though it appeared to be a kind of PKB tradition, this situation did 
not necessarily always bring an advantage to the party. The important cases related 
to conflict, in fact, somehow showed the need to have formal methods in dealing with 
conflict, including having an authoritative institution that was directly in charge of 
such problems, which, unfortunately, the party could not provide during the first 
decade of its existence. 
 
3.  The Internal Dynamics 
 
3.1.  Inappropriate Responses to Conflict Potential  
 
Due to the absence of an authoritative body or mechanism pertaining to finding a 
conflict resolution, having specific duties and a capable persons inside the party, it 
did not actually have a formal instrument that could legally “force” each conflicting 
group to meet and create a fair and binding decision for all. According to Junaidi 
internal conflict resolution became so difficult to reach due to the absence of an 
institution that legally played as a “sole interpreter” in understanding the 
                                                 
527 Ibid, pp. 244-252. 
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implementation of party constitution528. When a crucial different point of view that had 
a potential conflict trigger occurred, the party could not control and become promptly 
involved to reduce tension. Consequently, this situation not only did not take into 
account the different opinions and rumours without the authoritative and honoured 
body providing a satisfactory explanation, but also encouraged people with different 
opinions to keep believing the truth of their stand and that it was something that must 
be defended and implemented. 
 
When believing his presence in the 2001 Special Meeting (SI) as a legal 
political movement still in line with the interest of the party and as part of his efforts to 
defend President Wahid529, for instance, Matori Abdul Jalil did not find any 
institutions that could voice and advocate his opinion and encourage the party to 
consider his opinion. On the contrary, the party simply disregarded his opinion and 
insisted on it being somewhat inappropriate. Most party elites, instead, tended to 
pressure Jalil directly or indirectly to accept it. They sometimes regarded Jalil as an 
opportunist that deserved to be punished530.  
                                                
 
A similar situation also occurred for Alwi Shihab when different opinions on 
the policy of larangan rangkap jabatan (the prohibition to have dual position) 
emerged in 2004. The critics, including Shihab, regarded this policy to be the 
opposite of the party’s basic policy on the cadres’ right to provide a positive 
contribution through the many roles or position they held, including the minister531. 
This objection became one of Shihab’s reasons to defend his position532. The party, 
however, did not allow the opportunity for Shihab and generally those who rejected 
this opinion, to have a proper medium to discuss their opinions. Following this 
 
528 Interview with H.Z Arifin Junaidi, General Secretary of Dewan Syura of PKB (2002-2005) and 
Chairperson of Dewan Syuor of PKB (2005-2010), in Jakarta, 28 October 2010. 
529 On this Matori’s opinion see Laporan Pertanggungjawaban Ketua Umum Dewan Pengurus Pusat 
Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, presented in Muktamar Luar Biasa Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, Jakarta, 
Hotel Borobudur, 14-16 January 2002, pp. 17-19. A. Effendy Choirie, PKB Politik Jalan Tengah NU. 
Eksperimentasi Pemikiran Islam Inklusif dan Gerakan Kebangsaan Pasca Kembli ke Khitah 1926, 
(Jakarta: Pustaka Ciganjur, 2002), pp. 294-295, 298. Interview with Abdul Khalik Ahmad, the 
Secretary of PKB in DPR RI (House of Representative) (1999-2001) and General Secretary of PKB-
Matori (2000-2005), in Jakarta, 11 October 2010. 
530 Choirie, PKB Politik Jalan Tengah NU. Eksperimentasi Pemikiran Islam Inklusif dan Gerakan 
Kebangsaan Pasca Kembli ke Khitah 1926, pp. 296-297. 
531 DPW PKB Jawa Timur, Data dan Fakta Pelanggaran AD/ART di Muktamar II Semarang, (DPW 
PKB Jawa Timur, 2005), pp.4-5. 
532 Kamarudin, Konflik Internal PKB, (Jakarta: Akses Publishing, 2008), p.125. 
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attitude, instead, the party forced Shihab to resign from his position, and follow his 
preference to join President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s cabinet.  
 
Muhaimin Iskandar also faced a similar situation. The party did not give him a 
proper chance to defend his position concerning any negative rumours that were 
circulating, including the accusation of his conspiracy to overthrow Wahid from his 
position533. The party, particularly Wahid, as the General Chairperson of Dewan 
Syura, simply waived Iskandar’s right, not willing to look for a balanced assessment. 
Eventually Jalil, Shihab and Iskandar did not stop their efforts to find justice. This 
case showed the incapability of the party to eliminate the disappointed cadres to 
confirm and struggle for their opinion and position after stipulating the verdict.  
 
On the other hand, the deficiency of CRM disabled the party in that it did not 
have a standard forum and mechanism to handle a potential conflict. In this regard, 
the party used some different forums to respond to similar problems, including 
determining the future of the cadre. Sometimes, these forums, established abruptly, 
were based on the suggestions of limited people or influential figures like Wahid. In 
some cases, the creation of the forum was simply to legalise the unilateral policy 
rather than to be a forum of discussion, since not all arguments from each side were 
properly presented in that forum.  
 
In the case of Alwi Shihab-Saifullah Yusuf, for instance, the party conducted 
the process of discussing and stipulating their future in a plenary meeting without the 
presence of those people concerned. In the case of Iskandar, the party abruptly held 
limited and unscheduled forums to discuss urgent rumours concerning him. The 
result of such limited forums then became the decision of the party. Jalil faced even 
the worst case, for there was no legal forum of discussion, in determining his future in 
the party. Wahid stipulated the quick decision on Matori’s dismissal at the president 
palace when at the same time Matori was attending the 2001 SI of the MPR. This 
situation, hence, indicated that the absence of CRM provided an opportunity for the 
elite to be inconsistent or even manipulate the ‘rules of the game’ in responding 
conflict potential. In their development, such forums not only created controversial 
policies but also became one of the sources of the problem, which were questioned 
by the unjustly treated cadres.  
                                                 
533 Interview with Zannubah Ariffah Wahid, General Secretary of PKB- Gus Dur, In Jakarta, 20 
October 2010. 
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 Moreover, DPP and particularly Dewan Syura as elements hoped to be part 
of a solution, sometimes reacted defensively without balanced and comprehensive 
arguments and explanations on the objections made towards its controversial 
policies or on the development of the conflict. DPP in many important cases, 
including the cases of the dismissal of Jalil, Shihab and Iskandar, merely stated that 
the decision was already in line with the party’s constitution and had been agreed by 
the majority of the meeting participants through a legal medium and therefore could 
not be contested534.  
 
In addition, the prejudice held by DPP towards the critics worsened the 
situation. The party sometimes regarded these critics as merely the representation of 
inferior, minority or peripheral groups. Sometimes, even Wahid himself stated that 
they were ‘maling” (thief)535, a “pengkhianat” (traitor)536 or a pembohong (liar)537 to 
describe the critic or the opponent. With this attitude, it was most likely that DPP did 
not regard them as partners or friends who deserved to have good treatment, but as 
a rival or even an enemy. In short, the party tended to under-estimate their existence 
by disregarding the critical voices as something that deserved to be properly 
concerned. Instead, DPP sometimes considered them to be insignificant, thus at 
heart avoidable. This situation showed that the absence of a proper CRM had 
reduced the objectivity and the sense of respecting people with different opinions. In 
such environment, it was difficult to find effective ways to contain conflict in its early 
stages.   
  
This entire situation thus tended to increase the potential of conflict rather 
than to decrease it. According to Kamarudin, in this circumstance, it can be 
understood that if many important figures in the party, whose aspiration was unfairly 
abandoned, thus became so disappointed538. Even though they had tried to prove 
                                                 
534 On Shihab and Saifullah see statements made by Muhaimin Iskandar in “Sepucuk Somasi 
Menjelang Muktamar PKB”, Koran Tempo, 12 April 2005; Helmy Faisal Zaini representing the 
committee of Muktamar PKB-Gus in “Konflik PKB Kian Terbuka”, Kompas, 28 March 2005; Prof. 
Mahfud M.D, the Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz, in “Sepucuk Somasi Menjelang Muktamar PKB”, 
Koran Tempo, 12 April 2005. 
535 Interview with Zannuba Ariffah “Yenny” Wahid, the General Secretary of Dewan Tanfidz of PKB-
Gus Dur (2008-2010), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010. 
536 Kamarudin, Konflik Internal PKB, p.103. 
537 Ibid, p 174. 
538 Interview with Dr. Kamarudin, Islamic Political Party Observer, Lecture at Department of Political 
Sciences, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 7 October 2010. 
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their arguments in a correct manner, the party did not offer the positive responses as 
a just internal court. Kamarudin said that it is understandable if people like Shihab, 
who had a deep concern to modernise the party, became so upset and angry with his 
party, since he found it to be managed so carelessly without consideration for the 
others539. This situation, where the cadres could not easily channel their 
disappointment and aspiration, particularly on justice matters, was lamented by 
Khofifah Parawansa540, saying that the situation as “the absence of the canal of 
conflict”, where sufficient room for a rational conflict management existed in which 
every person shared the internal equal rights did not exist541. This situation, finally 
instigated many cadres, as had been predicted by Hirschman, to leave the party. 
 
3.2.  The difficulty to Localise the Conflict 
 
Another problem resulting from the lack of CRM was the inability to localise the 
conflict. The absence of the authoritative body brought self-assurance to many 
cadres to interpret unilaterally the rules of the game. In this situation, it was common 
if the dissatisfied cadres used their interpretation of the AD/ART to challenge DPP’s 
version of interpretation. For instance, Wahid’s supporters believed that the 
constitution granted authority to Wahid, as General Chairperson of Dewan Syura. He 
could dismiss the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz and this without 
necessarily having an initial discussion with the other members of the party as the 
existence of the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz was decided by him542. On 
the other hand, the opponents believed that the constitution of the party implied 
certain steps that first must be taken before deciding the future of the cadres, let 
alone the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz. Therefore, an abrupt decision to 
dismiss the leader of the party was unconstitutional543.  
                                                 
539 Interview with Dr. Kamarudin, Islamic Political Party Observer, Lecture at Department of Political 
Sciences, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 7 October 2010. 
540 Interview with Khofifah Indar Parawansa, State Minister for Women Empowerment (1999-2001), 
Chairperson of the Institute for Election Winning of PKB (2002-2005), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010 
541 Interview with Khofifah Indar Parawansa, State Minister for Women Empowerment (1999-2001), 
Chairperson of the Institute for Election Winning of PKB (2002-2005), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010; 
with Dr. Kamarudin, Islamic Political Party Observer, Lecture at Department  of Political Sciences, 
Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 7 October 2010. 
542 This opinion usually became common for Wahid’s proponents after the dismissal process of General 
Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz. Choirie, PKB Politik Jalan Tengah NU. Eksperimentasi Pemikiran 
Islam Inklusif dan Gerakan Kebangsaan Pasca Kembli ke Khitah 1926, p.297. 
543 See for instance such opinion on Mahrus Ali and M.F Nurhuda Y, eds., Pergulatan Membela yang 
Benar. Biografi Matori Abdul Djalil, (Jakarta: Penerbit Buku Kompas, 2008), p.270. DPW PKB Jawa 
Timur, Data dan Fakta Pelanggaran AD/ART di Muktamar II Semarang, p. 5. 
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 This situation provided the opportunity for any members of the party, not only 
to have their own understanding and interpretation on the core of the issues, but also 
to take part in solving the problem based on their interest. These roles should be 
limited only to authoritative bodies, such as BK, Dewan Syura or the muktamar in the 
case of PKB. Nevertheless, since those bodies for many were not sufficiently reliable, 
the phenomenon of “the distribution of authority”, involved many elements and 
figures, to interpret, decide and instigate an opinion eventually became inevitable. 
The role of personal or limited group points of view eventually challenged and 
surpassed the authoritative body’s opinion.   
 
The next development was, due to the absence of authority that had a 
legitimate right to take control, each conflicting group felt that they were not only 
entitled to keep their interpretation but also had right to distribute it to all members of 
the party. Each group keenly wanted to extend their existence to the level of creating 
committees in all regions in order to establish and defend their interest. In doing so, 
each group revealed issues to discredit the opponent and to establish their stand.  
 
The non-Wahid groups frequently conveyed information on the abuse of 
power, a phenomenon committed by the leader of the party and his companions in 
DPP, particularly about the way the party unjustly treated their cadres including the 
leader of Dewan Tanfidz. They also raised the issue on the existence of inner-circle 
groups popularly called “pembisik” (“the provocative whisperer”). Each dismissed 
leader of the party, namely Jalil, Shihab and Iskandar, had his own version about the 
“pembisik”544. Even though each of them had different persons called as “pembisik”, 
they used this issue as one of the main points to influence people. They attacked the 
“pembisik” as an exclusive group, providing false and manipulated information to the 
                                                 
544 The figures such as Shihab and HZ Arifin Junaidi, General Secretary of Dewan Syura were the 
pembisik that should be responsible for the negative development of the PKB according to Jalil’s camp. 
Jalil then put them as the accused in the court. On the Matori’s opinion about the existence of such 
group, see for instance, Ali and Nurhuda Y, eds., Pergulatan Membela yang Benar. Biografi Matori 
Abdul Djalil, p. 279, 287. Shihab’s group regarded Effendy Choirie and Muhaimin Iskandar as 
pembisik behind the Wahid’s negative attitude towards pro-Shihab Ulama. See DPW PKB Jawa Timur, 
Data dan Fakta Pelanggaran AD/ART di Muktamar II Semarang, p.5-6. As for Iskandar, the team that 
was set up by him concluded ten persons as “pembisik” including Zannuba Wahid (Daughter of 
Wahid), Sigid Haryo Wibisono (Member of Dewan Syura), Artalita Suryani (General Treasury), Aris 
Junaidi (Treasury), Hermawi Taslim (Member of Dewan Tanfidz), Ikhsan Abdullah (Vice of Secretary 
General) and Moeslim Abdurrahman (DPP member). See 
http://www.inilah.com/berita/politik/2008/04/05/21476/investigasi-pkb-tunjuk-10-nama/ 
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leader and ended with the creation of many false and unjust policies545. Thus, they 
regarded it as one of the man problems in the party. On the other hand, DPP, or the 
Wahid group, sometimes used the issue on the necessity to punish untrustworthy 
elements, used by external powers to harm the party from the inside546.  
 
“The war of discourse” to deteriorate the opponent’s image became usual 
during this period. Since the lack of an arbitration body was evident, this kind of 
“campaign activity” continually happened and eventually appealing cadres made their 
own individual assessment and refuge their support to one of two conflicting 
groups547. This situation in reality was in connection to the hope to have a better 
future for cadres, as each group, during “its campaign”, also offered something worth, 
including new better position in the party, besides unpleasant warnings such as 
dismissal. In this situation, sympathy and the rational choices became 
interconnected.            
 
Eventually the split between the elite and the cadres then became 
unavoidable, and spread to local level. At the local level, each group was able to set 
up a network not long after controversial policies were stipulated by DPP. 
Approximately one week after Iskandar’s dismissal, for instance, there were at least 
15 Chairpersons of DPWs, established Kaukus 15 (the Caucus of 15), to defend 
Iskandar’s objection548. On the other hand, 32 DPWs, represented by their leaders, 
declared their support for the Iskandar dismissal549.  
                                                 
545 “Investigasi PKB Tunjuk 10 Nama”, 
http://www.inilah.com/berita/politik/2008/04/05/21476/investigasi-pkb-tunjuk-10-nama/. PKB-
Muhaimin also called these people as “orang luar” (the outsider) that infiltrated to the party through 
unconstitutional mechanism see. “Laporan Pertanggungawaban  Dewan Pengurus Pusat Partai 
Kebangkitan Bangsa 2005-2008. Menyelamatkan Partai dan Konsolidasi Politik Menjelang 2009 dalam 
Dewan Pengurus Pusat Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, Laporan Lengkap Muktamar Luar Biasa Partai 
Kebangkitan Bangsa, Hotel Mercure Ancol, Jakarta 2-4 May 2008. Interview with Andi M. Ramly, 
Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz (2002-2010), Secretary of Dewan Syura PKB- Muhaimin (2008-2010) 
and the writer of “Mabda Syiyasi PKB”, in Jakarta, 15 October 2010.    
546 Interview with Zannuba Ariffah “Yenny” Wahid, General Secretary of Dewan Tanfidz PKB-Wahid 
(2008-2010), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010. Yenny seemed to believe that there was a kind of strategic 
relation between President Yudhoyono and Iskandar. See also for instance, Wahid’s opinion about the 
position of President Yudhoyono as the “boss” of Alwi Shihab, Dokumentasi Hasil Mukatamar II 
Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, Semarang , 16-19 April (Jakarta: DPP PKB, 2005), p. 14. Interview with 
Muamir M. Syam, Chairperson of PKB (2005-2010), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010.  
547 Interview with Anas Nashikin, General Secretary of Garda Bangsa, one of PKB’s onderbows, in 
Jakarta, 26 October 2010. 
548 They also support Iskandar to take any action necessary to save the party from instability as the 
result for the growing unjust dismissal and suspension taken by Wahid’s group in many local areas. 
“Konflik PKB Diyakini Tidak Akan Pengaruhi Konstituen”, Kompas, 2 April 2008. 
549 “Ali Masykur Pelaksana Tugas Ketum”, Kompas, 6 April 2008. 
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 Before formally joining one of the groups, local exponents sometimes voiced 
their opinion on each group, which indicated their tendency. The statement 
condemning the 2005 Muktamar and its results made by Choirul Anam, the 
Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz of East Java DPW of the PKB, for instance, 
demonstrated his position and brought him to be part of the PKB-Alwi550. A similar 
situation also occurred when the Chairperson of Central Java Dewan Tanfidz, M. 
Hanif Muslih made a statement asking the DPP to reinstate the position of Shihab 
and Yusuf551. The involvement of local members showed the very case of inability to 
restrict the potential of the conflict in PKB. Above all, the party’s central board 
committee in the end could not prevent the party from a serious split or 
factionalisation, which, at heart, was the formalisation of the unresolved different 
points of view and disappointments.   
 
4.  The Impact: The Fragmentation Development 
 
The above situation indicates the vulnerability of PKB to be shaken by internal 
conflict. The unresolved conflict potential cements internal antagonism and creates 
faction leading to the development of a fertile zone for fragmentation. The faction, 
gaining in strength, becomes the first link of a chain of a fragmentation crystallisation 
that appeared as an impact of the above situation.       
 
4.1.  Faction Strengthening: Towards Formal Fragmentation   
 
The protracted conflict and the enlargement of faction escalating the potential of 
party fracture, bolstered the existence of each conflicted group. While at the early 
stage of conflict, factionalisation only involved limited individuals and networking, 
most of them were the elite in Jakarta, its upsurge being more complicated with more 
massive support from across the country prior to the fragmentation.          
 
In its development, the faction establishment was dedicated to not only 
protecting the existence of a group at the internal level, but also as a legal entity or 
group that enabled them to stand at the same level as the other political parties at 
                                                 
550 DPW PKB Jawa Timur, Data dan Fakta Pelanggaran AD/ART di Muktamar II Semarang, (DPW 
PKB Jawa Timur, 2005). 
551 “Jateng Minta Posisi Shihab Dikembalikan”, Republika, 22 March 2005. 
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national level. It means to create a very solid and massive institution. The strategy 
used then was almost similar to that when facing an election. Each group committed 
to approach certain groups at the local branches to consolidate its existence and to 
win the power. In this regard, they also valiantly set up many new committees and 
recruited new cadres in the opponent’s stronghold areas552. In addition, to ensure the 
group was sterile from the opponents, members, each group did not hesitate to purge 
“reluctant” cadres. The phenomenon of dismissal became very common at this 
stage553. Thus, one could regard that the first priority, after faction establishment, 
was to set up a complete committee across the country, to show the support and 
power they had. Parawansa regards this situation as an indication of the deterioration 
of the spirit of togetherness554.  
                                                
 
The next step after the faction informally existed was holding a muktamar or 
MLB to legalise and strengthen their existence. To some extent, a muktamar seemed 
to be a refuge for creating a solution for all conflict groups normatively believed by 
many cadres to be the solution. Nevertheless, in reality, the situation was far from the 
essence of reconciliation. It was created merely to defend and formalise the 
existence of one group devoid of the interest to address the core of the problem. 
Consequently, the interest to seek reconciliation was not a foundation of the main 
agenda of muktamar. Even though each group invited some members of an 
opponent group to attend muktamar, at heart it was just lip service. 
 
The agenda and the direction of a muktamar had been set up by the 
organiser in order to have exclusive agendas, mainly to legalise their leaders and 
their existence. The 2005 Muktamar in Semarang demonstrated this situation. The 
pro-Wahid group, as the organiser, manipulated the agenda and the situation of 
muktamar to make this forum the only medium to legalise the leadership of Wahid-
 
552 Interview with Ahmad Shodiq Noor, General Secretary of DKI Jakarta DPW of PKB, in Jakarta, 3 
November 2010; with Marinah Hardy, Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz of Western Nusa Tenggara DPW 
of PKB (2002-2005), in Jakarta, 28 October 2010; with K.H Damanhuri, Chairperson of Dewan Syura 
of Depok DPD of PKB (2002-2004), Member of Parliament of DPRD of Depok (2004-2009), in 
Depok, 31 October 2010 
553 Interview with Choirul Anam, Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz of Eastern Java DPW of PKB (1998-
2005) and General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz of PKB-Alwi (2005-2007), in Jakarta, 13 October 
2010; with Anas Nashikin, General Secretary of Garda Bangsa, one of PKB’s onderbows, in Jakarta, 
26 October 2010; with Muamir M. Syam, Chairperson of PKB (2005-2010), in Jakarta, 20 October 
2010. 
554 Interview with Khofifah Indar Parawansa, State Minister for Women Empowerment (1999-2001), 
Chairperson of the Institute for Election Winning of PKB (2002-2005), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010. 
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Iskandar555, intensifying the anger and disappointment of the Shihab’s group. Many 
legal cadres, including Shihab, indicated as the supporter of the opponent, were 
eliminated in that forum. In this forum, also the constitutional right of the East Java 
and Central Java DPWs, known as strong allies of Shihab, to have additional votes in 
the process election of the General Chairpersons of Dewan Syura and Dewan 
Tanfidz, were eliminated, in order to decrease the chance of the opponent’s 
candidate to win in that forum.  
 
On the other hand, the 2005 Surabaya Muktamar held by Shihab’s camp, as 
the alternative for the 2005 Semarang Muktamar, came to be a similar situation. This 
muktamar, attended mainly by Shihab’s supporters, fundamentally filled by the main 
spirit to fight the existence of PKB-Gus Dur/Muhaimin and to inaugurate the 
existence of PKB-Alwi. The same situation also occurred in the 2002 Muktamar of 
PKB-Matori, which was held by Jalil’s supporters to legalise the leadership of Jalil 
and suspend the Wahid position556. Also in this occasion, Jalil criticised the internal 
situation of PKB, informing the need to create a democratic leadership of PKB, as the 
anti-thesis for oligarchic leadership tendency in the previous PKB557.  
 
A similar situation also occurred in the 2008 MLB-Parung held by PKB-Gus 
Dur, when the main agenda of this Muktamar was actually to confirm the position of 
Wahid and the dismissal of Iskandar. Accordingly, the participants did not give room 
for reconciliation and regarded this MLB only was legitimate to make any decision for 
the party. The similar situation occurred in the 2008 MLB-Ancol. This forum, attended 
only by the supporter of Iskandar, appeared to be mainly a medium to legalise the 
position of Iskandar and to establish PKB-Muhaimin. The participants rejected the 
five-year report of the General Chairperson of Dewan Syura 558, even though Wahid, 
as the leader of Dewan Syura and almost all the member of Dewan Syura,559 did not 
                                                 
555 DPW PKB Jawa Timur, Data dan Fakta Pelanggaran AD/ART di Muktamar II Semarang, pp.7-10. 
556 Abdul Khaliq Ahmad, “Pergumulan Politik Sang Pemberani”, in Ali and Nurhuda Y, eds., 
Pergulatan Membela yang Benar. Biografi Matori Abdul Djail, pp. 393-394. 
557 See Laporan Pertanggungjawaban Ketua Umum Dewan Pengurus Pusat Partai Kebangkitan 
Bangsa, presented in Muktamar Luar Biasa Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, Jakarta, Hotel Borobudur, 14-
16 January 2002. See also ibid, p. 281. 
558 Decree No: 5/MLB/PKB/V/2008 on Penolakan Laporan Pertangungjawaban Ketua Umum Dewan 
Syura PKB Periode 2005-2010 (The Rejection of The Report of General Chairperson of Syura Board. 
2005-2010 Period). 
559 Of 24 members of the Dewan Syura, only Prof. Dr. Cecep Syarifudin who confessed to his presence 
in the MLB-Ancol. This confession was regarded by Zannuba Wahid as a lie, since she and her camp 
believed that Syarifuddin actually did not attend the MLB. In reality, the confession brought the 
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attend this MLB. The rejection signified the interest of this camp to remove Wahid 
from his previous position. The interesting thing about this MLB was that even though 
the spirit of this forum was to fight all of the important decisions made by Wahid, 
including Iskandar’s dismissal, the MLB decided to crate a consultation team560 
consisting of seven ulama561, to meet Wahid in NU Head Quarters on 3 May 2008 to 
offer “peaceful ways” for dispute settlement562. As had been predicted before, Wahid 
rejected such an offer. 
 
These situations indicated the failure of the implementation of CRM in all PKB 
muktamar or MLB forums during their first decade of existence. The main 
characteristic of muktamar and MLB is their position as an exclusive forum to 
accomplishing unilateral agendas of one group sometimes by manipulating the 
process created and so discouraging a situation where any attempts to find a conflict 
resolution. The fact that a muktamar in itself was the last shelter of the long process 
of one group to establish its existence and to some extent removing officially the 
opponent, it can be understood that if the sprit of legalisation rather than 
reconciliation became something common that motivated each group to hold it. 
However, since the constitution of the party did not clearly arrange this matter, the 
unproductive situation happening in MLB was predictable, for there was no institution 
that could legally stop each group from creating it. Hence, as the failure of Dewan 
Syura to be a haven of conflict resolution, due to its involvement in the conflict, 
reduced its ability to hold fairness, muktamar or MLB faced the similar situation since 
it was merely a political tool to defend the interests of one group.        
 
4.2. The Disappearance of Constructive Dialogue: the Fragmentation Affirmation 
 
                                                                                                                                            
opportunity for Syarifudin to join the election and became one of the MPs representing PKB-
Muhaimin. Interview with Zannuba Ariffah “Yenny” Wahid, General Secretary of Dewan Tanfidz 
PKB-Wahid (2008-2010), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010.   
560 Decree No: 3/MLB/PKB/V/2008 on Tim Utusan Muktamar Luar Biasa untuk Penyelesaian 
Perselisihan Politik PKB melalui Musyawarah (the Envoy Team of Special Conference for the 
Political Conflict Resolution through Consultation). 
561 These ulama are Abdul Azis Mansyur, Syakir Chubaib, Abdussalam Mujib, Muqorrobin, Lukman 
Hakim, Mas Yazid Bustomi and Nidzom Tolhah. 
562 See “Berita Acara tentang Upaya Penyelesaian Perselisihan Politik Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa oleh 
Tim Utusan Muktamar Luar Biasa untuk Upaya Penyelesaian Perselisihan Politik PKB melalui 
Mekanisme Musyawarah”, in Dewan Pengurus Pusat Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, Laporan Lengkap 
Muktamar Luar Biasa Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, Hotel Mercure Ancol, Jakarta 2-4 May 2008. 
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The next impact following the strengthening of factionalisation was the absence of 
constructive dialogue. In this situation, the reconciliation dialogues or islah became 
something difficult to carry out. Before Muktamar or MLB, some people voiced and 
encouraged each conflict group on the importance of reconciliation563. In fact, after a 
bitter and painful Muktamar or MLB finished, there were people that still voiced for 
reconciliation and really hoped that it would happen. Some people still put their 
confidence in the possibility of the emergence of constructive dialogue between 
conflicting elements564. 
 
However, people soon realised that this kind of hope was not easy to realise. 
After Muktamar or MLB, the sense of confrontation tended to increase. The difficulty 
to bring together each conflict group to discuss indicated this. One group neglected 
the invitation from its opponent, sometimes by asking or criticising the legal matters 
of an invitation, including the legal status of the forum used, the discussion agenda or 
the legal position of the initiator. Jalil, for instance, regarded that he was not obliged 
to accept Wahid group’s invitation to discuss his position in the party, since for Jalil 
was the legal leader that should hold such a forum and decide on that matter565. 
Each conflict group felt cautious of the motivation behind its opponent’s invitation. 
The supporters of Jalil considered that it would not be a good prospect to attend a 
meeting held by the opponent, including ulama’s tendency to support Wahid, since 
there was a possibility to use such a forum to be a unilateral court for judging Jalil 566.  
 
These situations could have been avoided if the party had had a legal and 
binding regulation, implemented by an independent body, which could ensure that 
                                                 
563 Yusuf Hasim, one of the very senior figures in NU who also the son of Hasyim Asyhari, one of 
NU’s founding father, for instance, stated the need to have islah around three weeks before the 2005 
Muktamar. “Pak Ud Sarankan DPP PKB Islah dengan Shihab”, Media Indonesia, 28 March 2005. 
“Jateng Minta Posisi Shihab Dikembalikan”, Republika, 22 March 2005. A similar spirit was also 
stated by Khofifah Indar Parawansa, who suggested each conflicting group to undergo a meeting dalam 
suasana kekeluargaan (in spirit of the mutual cooperation) and ask one figure of ulama to be a 
mediator. “Persoalan Internal PKB Sebaiknya Libatkan Kiai”, Media Indonesia, 29 March 2005.  
564 People like Andi M. Ramly Sunrawa, former Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz of PKB-Gus Dur and 
the writer of Mabda Siyasi, for instance, endorsed to all PKB’s members to do reconciliation to solve 
the problem. After the 2005 Semarang Muktamar, he stated that each group should patient and put 
forward party’s interest as the main priority in order to be able to resolve the difficult situation. “Kubu 
yang Tak Puas Dianjurkan Islah”, Republika, 23 April 2005.  
565 Interview with Abdul Khalik Ahmad, Secretary of PKB Faction in DPR RI (1999-2001) and 
General Secretary of PKB- Jalil (2000-2005), in Jakarta, 11 October 2010. 
566 Interview with Abdul Khalik Ahmad, Secretary of PKB Faction in DPR RI (1999-2001) and 
General Secretary of PKB- Jalil (2000-2005), in Jakarta, 11 October 2010. 
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the presence of each conflict group was not only an obligation but also a key element 
of a fair reconciliation.  
 
In its development, each group awkwardly voiced islah, stressing the 
possibility to open a chance for dialogue. However, in reality, this appeared to be a 
lip service statement. The political gesture of each conflict group, in many cases, did 
not reflect such an attempt. It can be seen, for instance, from the statement delivered 
by other members of each group that showed opposition for islah or at least inferred 
the impossibility to conduct an islah. Moreover, each group sometimes offered 
requirements that were impracticable to fulfil by the opponent in dealing with conflict 
resolution. Thus, in general, it was not easy to find a sincere attempt to hold islah, 
since the interest to reach a meaningful reconciliation was absent  
 
In the case of Jalil, Wahid required three unconditional prerequisites for Jalil 
before islah, namely (1) to acknowledge the existence of PKB-Alwi, (2) to dismiss his 
PKB and (3) did not ask for any single position in the PKB-Alwi when joining that 
party567. These kinds of unilateral and unfeasible requirements, particularly for Jalil, 
had ruined the possibility to have an islah. On the other hand, Jalil and his group 
maintained his early stand, that the islah would be possible if the Wahid’s group were 
willing to acknowledge the leadership of Matori and dissolve their existence568. In this 
situation, some informal meetings held to find the ways to an islah, including informal 
meeting between him and Wahid in Singapore569 became ineffective.    
    
The attempts to make an islah were also endorsed by Shihab’s group, 
including some influential ulama that backed him up. Initially, it seemed promising. 
Both sides agreed to meet to discuss the core of the problem. Several ulama pro-
Shihab met Wahid, tabling their points of concern, including the proposal to review 
the decision of Yusuf’s replacement570. However, in its development, Wahid 
abandoned such proposals and continued his policies, creating a big blow for the 
ulama. Afterwards, no meeting was held. There were some implorations from ulama 
suggesting the same points, which again were neglected by the Wahid group. Wahid 
took a more progressive manoeuvre by establishing Majelis Silaturahmi Ulama 
                                                 
567 “Tiga syarat Abdurrahman Wahid untuk Berdamai dengan Jalil”, Kompas, 21 June 2002. 
568 Interview with Abdul Khalik Ahmad, Secretary of PKB Faction in DPR RI (1999-2001) and 
General Secretary of PKB-Matori (2000-2005), in Jakarta, 11 October 2010. 
569 “Wahid dan Jalil Bertemu di Singapura”, Kompas, 25 August 2002. 
570 “Gus Dur Enggak Mau Mendengar”, Tempo, 2 Oktober 2005.  
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Rakyat (the Assembly of People’s Islamic Scholar Meeting/MASURA) forum, to show 
the critical position towards these ulama, which, according to him, had been driven 
by the interest of the political elite rather then the people571. After some failures to 
hold a constructive meeting, ulama stopped any efforts to approach Wahid. 
Consequently, islah became more difficult to carry out.  
 
In fact, after the supporters of Shihab had successfully set up an alternative 
party committee for PKB, it was ulama’s turn to neglect some meetings initiated by 
Wahid’s group572. Abdullah Faqih, the informal leader of the senior ulama, for 
instance, rejected some invitations to gather him with Wahid, discussing any 
possibilities for an islah. He even refused to see Wahid when trying to visit him in 
hospital573. In addition, this group also developed a similar, impracticable 
requirement to having an islah in Wahid’s camp. According to Abdurrahman Chudlori, 
one of the senior ulama, their agreement to effect an islah depended on the 
willingness of Wahid to fulfil several requirements, of which one of them was “to 
acknowledge their defeat in the legal process and to follow all decisions made by the 
PKB-Surabaya”574. After facing a very difficult situation with Wahid, the ulama then 
took a more rigorous stand against him. They decided to end their relationship with 
the former “favourite son” in all cases, reducing the huge numbers of the respected 
persons left for Wahid. In that time, there were no more people whose voice was 
respected and heard by Wahid and could bridge the attempts for an islah. 
                                                
 
In the Iskandar case, the role of ulama sharply decreased. Only a small group 
of less influential ulama sent by Iskandar as an envoy to meet Wahid to discuss the 
possibility for an islah, which was rejected by Wahid. In the case of Iskandar, the 
attitude of Wahid was harder. Wahid tightly closed any attempts from Iskandar’s side 
to conduct an islah. To underscore his position, Wahid said that Iskandar was “a 
thief”, who has no right to ask for an islah. To Wahid, an islah, as a method to find a 
 
571 On the information on the background of the establishment and the activities of Masura see for 
instance “Tujuh Ribu Kiai Kampung Ngaji bersama Wahid”, newsletter www.dpp-pkb.org, first 
edition, March 2007, p.8-9. “Wahid: Kiai Harus Senantiasa Bersama Rakyat”, newsletter www.dpp-
pkb.org, first edition, March 2007, p.8-9. “Masura Jawa Timur. Kiai Kampung Padati Masjid Sunan 
Ampel”, newsletter www.dpp-pkb.org, second edition, May 2007, p.5. “Masura Jawa Tengah. Kaum 
Muslimin Harus Juga Mengetahui Makna Al-Qur’an”, newsletter www.dpp-pkb.org, second edition, 
May 2007, p.5. 





middle way, is only possible between two groups at same level. The police and the 
thief of course could not attend an islah, he said, commenting his stand on 
Iskandar575. In this case, Wahid appeared to be influenced deeply by several 
rumours concerning his nephew, establishing a very bad image in his mind about 
Iskandar. Iskandar’s decision to remove him from his position endorsed that thought. 
Such a decision also intensified his anger against Iskandar576. On the other hand, 
Iskandar showed his stubborn determination. In this case, he did not only remove his 
uncle, but also keenly eliminated several very close figures of Wahid from the party, 
including Zannuba Wahid, the daughter of Wahid. 
 
The policies then reflected an uncompromising attitude conducted by each 
group to dismiss and suspend suspected “enemy supporters” cadres or local 
committees. This attitude extended disappointment and a sense of rivalry. 
Sometimes, these polices were implemented in unconstitutional ways, involving only 
some people in the limited forum577. Certain people believed that if each group could 
refrain from its stubborn attitude, the problem could be handled. However, this 
situation actually indicates the need for a more systematic and authoritative 
mechanism or a body that can not only proportionally solve the conflict since its 
formative stage, but also prevent the party being involved in a prolonged and 
unproductive rivalry between the cadres. 
 
4.3.  The Third-Party “Resolution”: the Fragmentation Strengthening 
 
The situation above finally deepened distrust between the conflicting groups. To 
change the standpoint was something impossible to do for each conflict group, while 
the failure of traditional methods persisted. The difficulty to find neutral and capable 
medium internally and the non-existence of the spirit of true reconciliation worsened 
the situation. The need to have a third party eventually as an arbitrary body became 
unavoidable in PKB. 
 
Jalil sent his claim against Wahid and Shihab to the South Jakarta District 
Court on 4th July 2002, almost one year after the party fired him from his position. 
                                                 
575 Interview with Zannuba Ariffah “Yenny” Wahid, General Secretary of Dewan Tanfidz PKB-Gus 
Dur (2008-2010), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010. 
576 Interview with Zannuba Ariffah “Yenny” Wahid, General Secretary of Dewan Tanfidz PKB-Gus 
Dur (2008-2010), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010. 
577 ”Jelang Muktamar PKB, Pembekuan DPW Marak”, Media Indonesia, 5 April 2005. 
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Jalil sued for his rehabilitation and asked the Court to suspend PKB-Gus Dur/Alwi578. 
After the court at the District and Provincial level rejected his claim, Jalil continued his 
appeal to MA level, where he found the same verdict579. However, before the MA 
stated its verdict, Jalil and his lawyers made a second plea to the South Jakarta 
District Court580. Interestingly, even though using the same materials and only adding 
one more person, namely H.Z Arifin Junaidi, as the accused, the South Jakarta 
District Court this time accepted Jalil’s appeal, apparently upsetting Wahid and his 
group581.  
 
Jalil’s supporters regarded this second decision of the South Jakarta District 
Court as validation of their rightness582. They used it as a medium to sustain their 
existence and to increase their confidence to defend their rights. After having learnt 
of his victory, Jalil then asked Wahid and his supporter to accept this verdict 
respectfully. He even sympathetically offered reconciliation and stated that he was 
still the pupil of Wahid whatsoever583. However, after the MA rejected his claim, and 
asked the South Jakarta District Court to review and cancel its second verdict, Jalil’s 
group seemed to lay low its confrontation, even though they did not totally end it. For 
his supporter, this was part of Jalil’s fair attitude in respecting the verdict of the 
court584.      
 
Shihab and Yusuf also made a claim against Wahid with a similar reason and 
to some extent, situation585. Shihab and Yusuf submitted their appeal to the court on 
11th April 2005. About six months after their dismissal, on 27th October 2004, or 18 
months for Yusuf’s reposition case, Shihab, Yusuf and their supporters eventually 
concluded that the party could not handle problem internally and needed a third party 
to handle it. Similar with Jalil’s case, it also had to be decided at the MA level. 
                                                 
578 “Jalil Minta Pengadilan Status Quo kan PKB Wahid”, Koran Tempo, 5 July 2002. 
579 Ahmad, “Pergumulan Politik Sang Pemberani”, pp. 396-397. 
580 “Kubu Jalil Ajukan Gugatan Baru”, Pelita, 5 Ocotober 2002. 




584 Interview with Abdul Khalik Ahmad, Secretary of PKB Faction in DPR RI (1999-2001) and 
General Secretary of PKB- Jalil (2000-2005), in Jakarta, 11 October 2010. 
585 On the reasons behind the appealed see “Shihab and Syaifullah akan Gugat DPP PKB”, Suara 
Karya, 28 March 2005. 
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Interestingly, this time the MA stipulated a sort of an ambiguous verdict, which 
created a double understanding.  
 
On the one hand, MA decided that the policy to dismiss Shihab and Yusuf via 
a plenary session was against the law. This verdict then became a main source to 
defend their previous position and their group’s existence. In fact, this was a verdict 
that was expected by Yusuf and his supporters. On the other hand, however, MA 
rejected their appeal to rehabilitate their position. It means that MA did not allow them 
to hold their previous positions. The main reason was that the party had had new 
persons to hold these positions through the 2005 Muktamar in Semarang. Wahid’s 
group used this verdict to legitimise and continue its previous decision on Shihab. In 
addition, MA also indirectly suggested all groups conduct islah586. This suggestion 
indicated that the best decision to solve the problem, according to MA, lay in the 
party itself. 
 
However, all the MA’s verdicts appealed to each group to stay in their 
position, regarding their group as the only legal element that had a right to use PKB’s 
symbol, name, and all assets. Not until two years latter, no group was willing to 
surrender its stand. These conflicting groups remained party in the middle of 
antagonism and cementing fragmentation. However, after a prolonged and severe 
dispute, in November 2006, ulama and many elements on the Shihab side decided to 
leave PKB and established a new party namely PKNU. As there was some 
anticipation regarding a similar situation in PKB, PKNU established Dewan 
Muhtasyar (the Advisory Council), consisting of several senior ulama, as the highest 
body in this party587, where one of its functions was to be an arbitration body to 
handle the conflict588.   
 
As a person who had experience in dealing with internal conflict, which 
involved Wahid, Iskandar seemed to have a better understanding of what he must 
do. His experience led him to make a quick conclusion to appeal the claim on Wahid 
before the court. This action was most likely to avoid a prolonged quarrel and to have 
a clear situation on his group’s future as soon as possible. On 14th April 2008, or 18 
days after the party removed him from his position, Iskandar filed his case with the 
                                                 
586 According to Harifin A. Tumpa, one of the Judges in Supreme Court, said that in the end MA 
believed that “the decision was on their (conflicting group) hand”, Republika, 19 November 2005.  
587 The AD of PKNU Article 17 (1). 
588 The ART of PKNU Article 21 (16.c). 
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South Jakarta District Court as his attempt to find justice589. Similar to two previous 
cases, MA became the last harbour to end the antagonism.  
 
However, MA also created an ambiguous decision this time, establishing a 
multi interpretation of its verdict. MA declared that both PKB-Parung and PKB-Ancol, 
as the result of MLB-Parung and MLB-Ancol, were not attended by the whole 
members of the national committee, representing both Dewan Syura and Dewan 
Tanfidz were unconstitutional, hence illegal. According to MA, based on the situation, 
both camps had to return to the previous committee, set up after the 2005 Semarang 
Muktamar, where Wahid held the position of General Chairperson of Dewan Syura 
and Iskandar was the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz 590.  
 
This decision should have been a gateway to reconciliation. However, instead 
of using this verdict as a tool to mediate the conflict, each group used it as the 
justification for its stand. For Wahid and his group, MA decision confirmed that the 
legal PKB was the one led by Wahid as the General Chairperson of Dewan Syuro. In 
other words, the PKB led by other members was illegal. On the other hand, this 
opinion was also valid for Iskandar. His camp felt that MA had indirectly supported 
his existence by acknowledging Iskandar as the only legal General Chairperson of 
Dewan Tanfidz of the PKB. They also regarded MA’s decision as the verification for 
illegality of the decision to remove Iskandar.  
 
The role of the third party did not always provide a satisfying result. The 
justice process involving the court of justice always presented the opportunity for 
each group to defend its case and existence. In the case of PKB, this situation to 
some extent was predictable, since the result of the process still left a gap that could 
be exploited by each conflicting group to preserve its existence. Hence, the 
ambiguous decision of the court became another source of problem. This situation 
has been predicted by Ho-Wong Jeong who said,591 “Although their (court) verdict is 
supposed to be final, sometimes it continues to generate tension when one of the 
contending parties is reluctant to accept the verdicts”592.  
 
                                                 
589 Danu Kusworo, “Jalan Panjang Konflik PKB”, Kompas, 19 Juli 2008. 
590 “Kasasi Wahid Ditolak”, Kompas, 18 Juli 2008 
591 Ho-Won Jeong, Conflict Management and Resolution. An Introduction, (New York: Routledge, 
2010), p. 14. 
592 Ibid. 
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In addition, the insensitive decision due to lack of comprehensive 
understanding on the internal culture of a group, created a ”value free” attitude, 
developed confusion and resistance among people, particularly the ulama, who had 
been culturally disappointed. In this regard, for ulama any decisions that obligated 
them to acknowledge the position of Wahid, the person that had upset them, were 
unacceptable. This situation according to Jeong makes the verdict established based 
on the facts and laws does not always become “suitable means to sort out emotional 
problems or incompatible values”593. This was the moment when the unity of the 
party could no longer be preserved.  
 
The use of the court as the third party symbolised the deep distrust among 
the conflicting groups, indicating the summit of their antagonism. Hence, by letting 
the court decide, the fragmentation reached its final stage.   
 
5.  Overview  
 
The presence of institution like Badan Kehormatan was not a guarantor for the 
establishment of the conflict resolution that could tackle all the problems at once. In 
most cases, other factors contributed to the development of the conflict impede such 
process and even worsened the internal fragmentation potentials. However, the 
existence of such a body as one of the forms of a CRM, at least, would bring more 
opportunities for the party to enhance its capability in relocating and answering 
conflict potential at a very early stage thus providing a worthwhile chance for the 
cadres to express their objections and opinion, which in the long period would help 
party to avoid the accumulation of disappointments. In addition, the existence of 
Badan Kehormatan, as an authoritative body would potentially assist the party to 
maintain proper behaviour through a set of code of conduct and ensures the 
assistance for them when facing internal turmoil. By the absence of this kind of body, 
PKB not only became incapable in handling conflict escalation, with deepening 
hatred, but also in avoiding factionalisation enhancement, which over time became 
main foundation for an internal fragmentation.                








“With the existence of internal mechanism of tribunal (in PKS), party 
solidity and dignity could be protected” (Mahfudz Siddiq)594 
 
 
1.  Introduction  
 
This chapter will discuss the condition of the conflict resolution mechanism (CRM) in 
PKS. During the first decade of its existence, PKS could considerably manage CRM 
through the presence of the elements of CRM and the consistency during its 
implementation that brought a capability that could detect any conflict potential at a 
very early stage and localise it. Although PKS was still encountering some difficulties, 
it was able to build up a trust between the internal system and the weakening of the 
factionalisation potential in the party that became conducive to the preservation of 
the party’s cohesion.  
 
2. The Elements of CRM 
 
In PKS, some institutions had direct or indirect involvement in the conflict resolution 
matters. These institutions played relevant roles, such as an arbitration body, internal 
tribunal and an islah institution, which provided a set of important policies to end the 
conflict. The next discussion explores their presence and role in PKS, which had 
enabled party to avoid any serious internal conflict that could endanger the unity of 
the party. This capability to identify and to impede conflict potential was one of the 
indicators of the existence of CRM. 
 
2.1.  Dewan Syariah (DS) as the Main Institution 
 
DS was the main constitutional institution that had special authority in conflict 
prevention or its resolution. It was, for the main part, related to one of the main 
                                                 
594 Interview with Mahfudz Siddiq, Head of Cadrerization Department of DPP of PKS (2002-2005) and 
Member of Parliament (2004-2014), in Jakarta, 27 October 2010. 
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functions of this body, namely as a judicial institution595, which in its development, 
based on the 2005 AD/ART, were concurrently an arbitration body and reconciliation 
institution (at the district level)596. These three main functions made this body the 
inevitable element in the conflict resolution and related matters in PKS. DS had a 
hierarchy consisting of three committee levels597, namely DSP at national level, DSW 
at province or state level, and DSD at district or municipality district level. DS of each 
level had to report to DS at one level higher. It was hoped that DS at the province 
and the district level would be responsive in handling the potential of conflict at the 
local level so that the party could solve the problem immediately598. However, DSP 
played a crucial role for its authority to be the final institution that could finalised a 
verdict. 
 
DS had the privilege of being an independent body. Although the party had 
DPTP as a supervising body, no institution could intervene in DS, including DPTP, in 
its decision making process599. DSP had an equal position with other higher 
institutions in the party, such as MPP and DPP. The DS’ verdict had to be submitted 
to MS as the highest body in PKS. DS had also to provide recommendations to MS 
on the subjects related to its scope of duties. In terms of the memberships, the 
constitution of the party required certain roles, which must be filled by members of 
DS, and have a deep understanding of Islamic and national law600. Such 
requirements were relevant since the body would handle problems that related to 
certain theoretical and legal points. In this regard, specific competence was more 
important than a political background. 
 
Initially, DS handled almost all the problems. However, after the 
establishment of Badan Penegak Disiplin Organisasi (the Board for Organisational 
Discipline Enforcement/BPDO) in 2005, it had a partner or a supporting body when 
conducting its functions, particularly on matters that involved the cadres’ 
                                                 
595 The ART of PK Article 27 (3); The 2002 ART of PKS Article 12 (3).  
596 The 2005 ART of PKS Article 23 (2.c), Article 23 (2.f), Article 5 (d). 
597 The ART of PK Article 22; The 2002 AD of PKS Article 15 and 16; The 2005 AD of PKS Article 15 
(1.a), (1.b), (1.c); The 2005 ART of PKS Article 23. 
598 Interview with Mahfudz Siddiq, Head of Cadrerization Department of DPP of PKS (2002-2005) and 
Member of Parliament (2004-2014), in Jakarta, 27 October 2010. 
599 The 2005 ART of PKS Article 14 (5). Interview with Aus Hidayat, Head of the II Dakwah Region 
(2002-2005) and Chairperson of BPDO (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 15 October 2010. 
600 The ART of PK Article 23; The 2002 ART of PKS Article 10 (5),(6); The 2005 ART of PKS Article 
25 (1.d), (1.e), (2.d), (2.e); Article  35 (2.a.4), (2.b.4); Article 48 (2.a.3), (3.a.3). 
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wrongdoings and disciplinary acts. Nevertheless, DS’ areas of duty as the internal 
court body, arbitration medium and an islah institution still covered various matters 
from personal ones such as divorce, moral abuse, financial problems and disputes 
on religious understanding, up to organisational matters such as the implementation 
of the rules of the game and constitutional violation. In its capacity as the internal 
court or arbitration body, DS held the authority to assess and decide the future of the 
cadres and to be the arbitrary for any conflict resolution. DS also had a duty to be the 
peacemaker in its capacity as the islah body, to respond on the different points of 
view and conflict potential among the cadres. 
 
2.2.  Other Supporting Institutions  
 
Besides DS, PKS also had other institutions that had direct involvement in the 
prevention of matters of conflict and their resolution. MS was the supporting element 
for conflict containment and resolution, particularly at the policy-making process 
level, involving party elites at the national level. As the highest body having 
constitutional duties to discuss and decisions on national policies and political 
guidelines601, its role mainly related to bridge the different points of view and then 
determined the result, which bind all the elements of the party. MS also had a role of 
an arbitration body to find a resolution to delicate problems, including internal 
disputes at the elite level. The characteristic of MS as a consultative body consisted 
of elected prominent figures, which became a large opportunity for this body to be a 
proper forum where it would make the final decision thus ending the disagreement. 
On the other hand, the consultative mechanism that constitutionally was part of this 
institution where the members of MS had an equal chance to make their voice heard, 
opened an opportunity for the party to avoid a unilateral decision 
 
Another supporting institution was BPDO602. This body was designed 
fundamentally to be a part of the cadre supervision, particularly to monitor the cadres’ 
discipline in performing their duties and obligations603. Although the name of the body 
                                                 
601 The ART of PK Article 18; The 2002 AD of PKS Article 12 (1.d), The 2002 ART of PKS Article 7 
(5), (6), (9); The 2005 AD of PKS Article 11 (2.c), (2.l). 
602 This body established in 2005 by PKS as one of institutions at the party higher institution level. 
However, in 2010 this body became one of the DPP’s departments, led by Aus Hidyat Nur, one of the 
senior figures in tarbiyah movement. Lutfi Hasan Ishaaq, who then became the fourth President of PKS 
for the period of 2010-2015, was the first leader of this institution. 
603 Interview with Aus Hidayat Nur, Head of the II Dakwah Region (2002-2005) and Chairperson of 
BPDO (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 15 October 2010; with Hidayat, MM, Member of Parliament of 
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was not stated clearly in the constitution, its presence and duty were relevant and 
related to it with indirect mention made of this body as the institution conducting 
justice and particularly related to a disciplinary problem604 and as the body providing 
recommendations to the MS before dismissing the cadre605. In relation to this 
constitutional mandate, therefore, the main aim of the establishment of BPDO was to 
enhance the party’s ability in discipline enforcement and to make a recommendation 
to the MS on the actions that party should take in relation to the matters of party 
discipline606. BPDO also had an arbitrary function to end the quarrel between cadres 
or between a cadre and the party that could harm the party607.  
 
Its authority to hold investigations, as part of its tribunal and arbitrary function, 
gave BPDO a chance to know the core of the problem in its very early stage. 
Accordingly, the party projected BPDO could comprehend the background of the 
problem or the reasons behind the negative acts or behaviour of the cadres, 
including anti-discipline attitudes. The investigation results then would be used as the 
main reference for this body to decide if any further action was to be taken. It 
included the determination of the level of punishment, ranging from giving warning, 
demotion up to dismissal608, at the same time hoping that BPDO’s investigation 
                                                                                                                                            
Tangerang District (2005-2010), in Tangerang, 21 October 2010; with Mustofa, cadre of PKS and 
former reporter of Profetik Magazine, established by cadres of PKS, in Depok, 7 October 2010; with 
Selamat Nurdin, MM, former tarbiyah activist leader in University of Indonesia, Member of 
Parliament of DKI Jakarta Province (2004-20014), in Jakarta, 22 October 210; with Amri Yusra, M.Si, 
Chairperson of Depok DPD of PKS (2002-2004), Member of Parliament of Depok District, West Java, 
(2004-2009), and Lecturer at Political Sciences Department, Faculty of Social and Political Science, 
University of Indonesia, in Depok, 7 October 2010; with Sitaresmi S, M.Psy, Member of Dakwah 
Department of DPP of PK (2000-2003), in Jakarta, 8 October 2010; with Umar Salim Basalamah, Vice 
General Secretary of PKS (2002), and personal secretary of Hidayat Nur Wahid (former President of 
PKS and Chairperson of MPR of Republic of Indonesia), in Jakarta, 12 October 2010. 
604 The 2005 ART of PKS Article 6 (3 b. 5). 
605 The 2005 ART of PKS Article 10 (3 b). 
606 Interview with Aus Hidayat Nur, Head of the II Dakwah Region (2002-2005) and Chairperson of 
BPDO (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 15 October 2010; with Ahmad Feri Firman Yusuf, Head of the III 
Dakwah Region (2002-2005), member of Majelis Syura PKS (2002-2010), in Jakarta, 2 November 
2010. 
607 Interview with Aus Hidayat Nur, Head of the II Dakwah Region (2002-2005) and Chairperson of 
BPDO (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 15 October 2010; with Ahmad Feri Firman Yusuf, Head of the III 
Dakwah Region (2002-2005), member of Majelis Syura PKS (2002-2010), in Jakarta, 2 November 
2010. 
608 Interview with Aus Hidayat Nur, Head of the II Dakwah Region (2002-2005) and Chairperson of 
BPDO (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 15 October 2010; with Selamat Nurdin, MM, former tarbiyah activist 
leader in University of Indonesia, Member of Parliament of DKI Jakarta Province (2004-20014), in 
Jakarta, 22 October 2010; with Sitaresmi S, M.Psy, Member of Dakwah Department of DPP of PK 
(2000-2003), in Jakarta, 8 October 2010; with Umar Salim Basalamah, Vice General Secretary of PKS 
(2002), and personal secretary of Hidayat Nur Wahid (former President of PKS and Chairperson of 
MPR of Republic of Indonesia), in Jakarta, 12 October 2010; with Ahmad Feri Firman Yusuf, Head of 
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would protect the party from false information or slander, which could potentially 
deteriorate the trust and jeopardise the unity of the party609, protecting it from 
incorrect policies made and based on false information. 
 
Besides those elements that had formal authority to hold a consultative 
forum, internal court and investigation, the party has also an institution that 
performed a less formal role in dealing with conflict resolution, namely halaqah or 
sometimes was also called as liqo’, which literally means meeting610. In its 
development, this institution is also known as unit pembinaan (the development 
unit)611. Halaqah was setup as a meeting event to transmit party ideals to all cadres, 
through educational materials systematically established by the party. This event’s 
main aim was to develop a similar understanding of the party ideology and to 
establish standard behaviour and thinking of all the cadres. The cadres should 
conduct halaqah at least once every two weeks in a 2-3 hours meeting, where the 
participants (mutarabbi)612 were no more than 12 cadres with one senior as a 
supervisor or teacher (murabbi)613. The spirit of knowing each other (ta’aruf), 
understanding each other (tafahum) and helping each other (tafakul) were the spirits 
to be conducted and conveyed by the participants in halaqah614. For PKS, as a cadre 
party, halaqah was one of main pillars in this party for its function as a medium for 
conducting cadrerization. PKS established the concept of halaqah based on the 
ideas and method that had developed by Egyptian Ikhwan Muslimin. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
the III Dakwah Region (2002-2005), member of Majelis Syura PKS (2002-2010), in Jakarta, 2 
November 2010. 
609 Interview with Aus Hidayat Nur, Head of the II Dakwah Region (2002-2005) and Chairperson of 
BPDO (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 15 October 2010; with Selamat Nurdin, MM, former tarbiyah activist 
leader in University of Indonesia, Member of Parliament of DKI Jakarta Province (2004-20014), in 
Jakarta, 22 October 2010. 
610 Ali Said Damanik, Fenomen Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di 
Indonesia, (Bandung: Teraju, 2002), p.125.  
611 Hurriyah, Sistem Kaderisasi Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (1998-2003), BA thesis, (Depok: 
Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, 
2004). 
612 The party hopes that, not long after joining the halaqah, the mutarabbis could also be able to 
become a murabbi and set up their groups to help the party to develop new or sophomore cadres. The 
murabbi decide whether a mutarabbi could or could not yet establish a halaqah. Damanik, Fenomen 
Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia, p. 126. 
613 Tim Departemen Kaderisasi PK Sejahtera, Manajemen Tarbiyah Anggota Pemula, (Jakarta: DPP 
PK Sejahtera and PT Syaamil Cipta Media, 2004), p. 28.  
614 Ibid, pp. 128-129. 
 197
The party’s constitution mentioned that every level of committee was obliged 
to conduct and evaluate halaqah, as a unit of cadre development615. For PKS as a 
cadre party, the existence of halaqah, as a vanguard for cadre recruitment and 
development was necessary. The implementation of this obligation was carried out 
under the thorough supervision of Badan Kaderisasi (the Cadrerization Body), which 
existed at every level of the committee board (from Branch to Central Level). 
Therefore, in the structural context, halaqah was an element of the committee board.  
 
Although it had a main function as the medium for cadre development, 
halaqah as a forum had to be attended by all the cadres and eventually became part 
of the cadre’s life616, brought the spirit of consultation into the party. This entity 
enhanced personal relationships between the cadres and cemented the tradition of 
sharing in many ways, particularly for good advice and deeds among the cadres617. 
Halaqah became a discussion forum, talking about many subjects, including personal 
matters, politics and the latest situation in the party618. Such discussions, governed 
by the spirit of brother-hood, usually in the end, encouraged the participant to 
organise meeting points rather than establish differences among them and lessen the 
sense of holding self-seeking orientation.  
 
In this situation, several delicate problems were solved thus reducing tension 
among the cadres or between a cadre and the party619. Moreover, halaqah was also 
a place to develop certain values that advantaged the reduction of the conflict, such 
as insisting on them having positive thinking and belief in the leaders, avoid 
unnecessary conflict and protecting the spirit of Muslim brotherhood, all contributing 
                                                 
615 The ART of PK Article 22 (15); The 2002 ART of PKS Article 17 (3); The 2005 AD of PKS Article 
14 (3.b), The 2005 ART Article 22 (c), Article 34 (c), Article 47 (c), Article  56 (h), Article 59 (h). 
616 Prihandoko described this situation: “Halaqah became a sanctuary to express hope, worries and 
want. Place to talk many things. Place to clean yourself. Place to discuss. Place to absorb information. 
Place to evaluate the life and many things. The cadres made this place the most important thing in their 
lives”. Interview with Dr. Prihandoko, Chairperson of Depok DPP of PKS (2004-2007) in Depok, 5 
October 2010. 
617 Ali Said Damanik, Fenomen Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di 
Indonesia, (Bandung: Teraju, 2002), pp. 128-129. Interview with Dr. Prihandoko, Chairperson of 
Depok DPP of PKS (2004-2007) in Depok, 5 October 2010. 
618 Interview with Dr. Prihandoko, Chairperson of Depok DPP of PKS (2004-2007) in Depok, 5 
October 2010; with Kemal A. Stamboel, Head of Expert Advisory Body of PKS and Member of 
Parliament (2009-2014), in Jakarta, 8 October 2010; with Hidayat, MM, Member of Parliament of 
Tangerang District (2005-2010), in Tangerang, 21 October 2010. 
619 Interview with Dr. Prihandoko, Chairperson of Depok DPP of PKS (2004-2007) in Depok, 5 
October 2010. 
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to the development of conflict potential reduction. In this way, the character building 
process in halaqah provided an indirect impact for conflict resolution  
 
The presence of these bodies indicated that this party is an advocate for the 
existence of CRM due to several reasons. Beside the practical aspects, such as 
conflict prevention and resolution, the creation of these institutions related to the 
efforts to protect their cadres, as a real asset of the organisation, from harmful 
actions and to protect the party from negative impacts. According to Yon Mahmudi, 
since its beginning, PKS had realised the importance of developing these bodies to 
protect the cadres from unjust and unilateral actions by the other cadres or the 
party620. Moreover, by having these bodies, the party could also preserve its good 
image and reputation, since they enabled PKS to avoid endorsing a wrong person to 
hold a public position621.  
 
In addition, Siddiq reckoned that one of the important aspects of having these 
kinds of bodies in the party was to have a responsive conflict management that could 
serve as a comprehensive problem-solving tool, protecting the party from open 
conflict. Due to the existence of DS, BPDO and these bodies, according to Siddiq, 
“party solidity eventually could be protected”622. According to Nur, the importance of 
these elements was to prevent the party from having a “pembangkangan massif” 
(“massive disobedience”), which could potentially deteriorate the unity of the party623. 
From these thoughts, one can see that besides the practical reasons, the 
consciousness to protect the party’s solidity became one of the fundamental reasons 
for PKS to set up these justice institutions.    
 
3.  The Implementation of CRM 
 
The party had its own pattern in conflict resolution. In general, there were two stages 
in the process involving all the mentioned institutions. This general stage became a 
                                                 
620 Interview with Dr. Yon Mahmudi, PKS and Tarbiyah Movement observer, Lecturer at Political 
Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, and one of the 
cadres who signed PKS establishment declaration, in Depok, 6 October 2010. 
621 Interview with Dr. Yon Mahmudi, PKS and Tarbiyah Movement observer, Lecturer at Political 
Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, and one of the 
cadres who signed PKS establishment declaration, in Depok, 6 October 2010. 
622 Interview with Mahfudz Siddiq, Head of Cadrerization Department of DPP of PKS (2002-2005) and 
Member of Parliament (2004-2014), in Jakarta, 27 October 2010. 
623 Interview with Aus Hidayat Nur, Head of the II Dakwah Region (2002-2005) and the Chairperson 
of BPDO (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 15 October 2010. 
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common pattern, creating its own “code of conduct” for the party in solving internal 
conflict problems and related matters. 
 
3.1. The First Stage of Conflict Prevention 
   
The first stage of conflict containment usually happened at the halaqah level624. With 
its function as a regular meeting forum for the cadres, halaqah became the party’s 
first tool to conduct conflict prevention before the party took further formal action. As 
mentioned by Selamat Nurdin “If there was a conflict, it could be expressed (by the 
cadres) in the development units (halaqah). If the cadres were not satisfied, their 
dissatisfaction could be channelled into the party’s structure. Even when the cadres 
found difficulty in adapting, the party gave them a chance to be non-active for a 
while. But if they committed to doing harm, they would face the BPDO”. 625 In line 
with such a statement, Nur stated that halaqah was the premier body dealing with 
conflict resolution in the PKS626. 
                                                
 
In halaqah, the role of murabbi (the mentor) became essential in CRM in 
order to grasp the anxiety and apprehensiveness of mutarabbi (the student)627, 
detecting the earliest signal of a possible conflict potential and to find some 
appropriate solutions. If there was a conflict between cadres, it was a duty of murabbi 
to terminate it, including calling upon a third party to assist with the reconciliation 
process. Based on his experience, Mahmudi said that it was common for murabbi to 
have somebody to help him in solving the dispute and even the cadres’ 
 
624 Interview with Kemal A. Stamboel, Head of Expert Advisory Body of PKS and Member of 
Parliament (2009-2014), in Jakarta, 8 October 2010; with Hidayat, MM, Member of Parliament of 
Tangerang District (2005-2010), in Tangerang, 21 October 2010; with Mustofa, cadre of PKS and 
former reporter of Profetik Magazine, established by cadres of PKS, in Depok, 7 October 2010; with 
Amri Yusra, M.Si, Chairperson of Depok DPD of PKS (2002-2004), Member of Parliament of Depok 
District, West Java, (2004-2009), and Lecturer at Political Sciences Department, Faculty of Social and 
Political Science, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 7 October 2010; with Sitaresmi S, M.Psy, 
Member of Dakwah Department of DPP of PK (2000-2003), in Jakarta, 8 October 2010; with Dr. 
Prihandoko, Chairperson of Depok DPP of PKS (2004-2007) in Depok, 5 October 2010; with Mahfudz 
Siddiq, Head of Cadrerization Department of DPP of PKS (2002-2005) and Member of Parliament 
(2004-2014), in Jakarta, 27 October 2010. 
625 Interview with Selamat Nurdin, MM, former tarbiyah activist leader in University of Indonesia, 
Member of Parliament of DKI Jakarta Province (2004-20014), in Jakarta, 22 October 2010. 
626 Interview with Aus Hidayat Nur, Head of the II Dakwah Region (2002-2005) and Chairperson of 
BPDO (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 15 October 2010. 
627 Murabbi sometimes could solve the problems at once, including on the critics towards the policy of 
the party or the problem emerged among cadres. Interview with Mustofa, cadre of PKS and former 
reporter of Profetik Magazine, established by cadres of PKS, in Depok, 7 October 2010. 
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disappointment628. On the other hand, since all the participants of halaqah had a kind 
of moral obligation to share their feelings, to hear and to remind, every participant 
had a chance to convey his opinions freely to other members of halaqah and to gain 
input from them, as a response. Occasionally, in such situations, a potential conflict 
was discussed and the solution agreed.  
 
Halaqah also became a medium to prevent its participants from receiving 
erroneous information or slander. This would eventually protect the party from having 
the same problem. Although in reality this situation was not always easy, the 
existence of the halaqah had justly helped the party to preserve its capacity to avoid 
such potential. The Members of Parliament of the Bekasi District, for instance, used 
halaqah as a medium to remind each other that a slander potential relating to the 
parliament’s tricky political activities could destroy the party’s image and unity629. 
Accordingly, the institutionalisation of this tradition related to the essence of CRM, 
considering its ability to avoid conflict escalation at an early stage. In this situation, 
since halaqah was also part for the institutions that worked for ideology preservation, 
as discussed mainly in chapter twelve, the capability of conflict containment in PKS 
had a relation to the existence of shared values, filled by the spirit of unity, 
collectivism and solidarity, which was developed through halaqah.  
 
The quality of their commitment and the loyalty of the cadres, including the 
level of dedication when performing their duties, could also be measured in a 
halaqah. This required murabbi to assess the cadres and report their situation to the 
party structure. Sometimes a halaqah even acted as an informal tribunal to solve the 
problem immediately, which sometimes ended in a dismissal recommendation. As 
mentioned by Kemal Stamboel, Member of the Expert Board and Member of 
Parliament, the dismissal advice sometimes came from the members of halaqah630 
 
3.2.  Advanced Mechanism of Conflict Prevention 
 
                                                 
628 Interview with Dr. Yon Mahmudi, PKS and Tarbiyah Movement observer in Indonesia, Lecturer at 
Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, and 
one of the cadres who signed PKS establishment declaration, in Depok, 6 October 2010. 
629 Interview with Nooryanto, Chairperson of the Cadrerization Department of the Bekasi DPD of the 
PKS, in Bekasi, 7 November 2010. 
630 Interview with Kemal A. Stamboel, Head of Expert Advisory Body of PKS and Member of 
Parliament (2009-2014), in Jakarta, 8 October 2010. 
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Nevertheless, not all the problems could be solved at the halaqah level. Many cases 
tended to carry more risky and were sensitive thus requiring further attention from the 
party. Many cases reported by halaqah required handling by the party’s structure and 
others mainly related to the party’s elite were reported or enquired into directly by MS 
and DPP. In this regard, the party would make an assessment on how to conclude on 
the gravity of the case and the institution that would handle it. DSP would play its 
role, either as an arbitration body or as an internal tribunal, where DPP (or MS for the 
problems related to the party’s elite at a national level) were asked to solve some of 
the cases. Some special cases were reported directly to DSP to be solved. In 
general, however, before a case was transferred to DSP, DSW or DSD as the 
institutions handled it first. In some cases, DSW or DSD would act once the local 
committees (DPW or DPD) had submitted some of the undecided delicate and 
complex cases to these bodies. 
 
At DS forums, in order to be able to understand the background of the case 
and to have a comprehensive argumentation before making any conclusions, a 
comprehensive dialogue process was used. For this reason, the members of DS 
would give the cadres a set of questions about the reasons behind their actions631. In 
the case of Syamsul Balda, PKS vice president (1998-2002), for instance, DSP, as 
the main institution that was directly involved in the Balda case due to his important 
position in the party, invited him to report and to defend his standpoint on the 
accusation made against him for committing inappropriate behaviour involving other 
cadre632. After having a long discussion, including putting to him several options, 
DSP found him guilty and decided to recommend MS to remove him from the party. 
The main reason was not only that he was guilty but that he also refused to accept 
the DSP’s advice633. This situation became a lesson for the cadres, particularly 
regarding the consistency of DSP in implementing its duty objectively for all party’s 
                                                 
631 Interview with Aus Hidayat Nur, Head of the II Dakwah Region (2002-2005) and Chairperson of 
BPDO (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 15 October 2010; with Selamat Nurdin, MM, former tarbiyah activist 
leader in University of Indonesia, Member of Parliament of DKI Jakarta Province (2004-20014), in 
Jakarta, 22 October 2010; with Sitaresmi S, M.Psy, Member of Dakwah Department of DPP of PK 
(2000-2003), in Jakarta, 8 October 2010; with Umar Salim Basalamah, Vice General Secretary of PKS 
(2002), and personal secretary of Hidayat Nur Wahid (former President of PKS and Chairperson of 
MPR of Republic of Indonesia), in Jakarta, 12 October 2010; with Ahmad Feri Firman Yusuf, Head of 
the III Dakwah Region (2002-2005), member of Majelis Syura PKS (2002-2010), in Jakarta, 2 
November 2010. 
632 Interview with Sitaresmi S, M.Psy, Member of Dakwah Department of DPP of PK (2000-2003), in 
Jakarta, 8 October 2010. 
633 Interview with Sitaresmi S, M.Psy, Member of Dakwah Department of DPP of PK (2000-2003), in 
Jakarta, 8 October 2010. 
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members, including the vice president of the party. The case of Balda, which for 
some was supposed to be a personal affair, also demonstrated the range of the 
problems that should be handled by DSP.  
 
A similar situation also occurred in the case of Yusuf Supendi, one of the 
party’s senior figures and among the more prominent figures of Jamaah Tarbiyah 
and a member of DSP. After a long internal process held by DSP, MS then decided 
to dismiss him from the party based on DSP’s recommendation. The main reason 
was his persistence to remove MS Chairperson, Hilmi Aminuddin and Secretary 
General of the Party Anis Matta for their misconduct and the violation of the party’s 
constitution634 without providing sufficient evidences635. In the DSP’s opinion, 
Supendi’s appeal was impossible to be heard, since it was not backed up by 
convincing evidence. In addition, his dismissal was based on his attitude neglecting 
his obligation as a PKS Member of Parliament to make a financial contribution to the 
party and his denial to accept the party’s punishment for his mistakes, including 
paying off his financial debts636. For some, the dismissal proved to be the anti-critic 
situation in the party. Nevertheless, for other cadres, due to the proper process 
behind the dismissal, it was something acceptable. 
 
At the local level, the case of Saleh Matapermana demonstrated a similar 
process. Although Matapermana had known that PKS’ policy supported the former 
party president Nur Mahmudi Isma’il, in the local election for Mayor of Depok, 
Matapermana made his decision to vote for Badrul Kamal, the incumbent, and even 
nominated himself to be the Badrul’s Deputy Mayor637. Before deciding on his 
dismissal, the party called Matapermana to explain his choice in the informal forum 
held by DPP. The party then conducted a formal forum led by DSD, after 
Matapermana ignored DPD’s convocation, to hear his explanation and ask him to 
change his mind. DPD then served him with three successive warning letters, which 
                                                 
634 Yusuf accused Hilmi to be committed to the constitutional violation for accepting the offer from the 
MMS to be the leader of the PKS for three times, which according to Yusuf was out of limit. He used 
“other materials” and his personal interpretations to prove his arguments. As for Matta, he accused him 
to have interest to bring the party to his own agenda. Interview with K.H Yusuf Supendi Lc, Member 
of DSP of PKS (2000-2005) and Member of Parliament (2004-2009), in Jakarta, 3 November 2010. 
635 Interview with Sitaresmi S, M.Psy, Member of Dakwah Department of DPP of PK (2000-2003), in 
Jakarta, 8 October 2010. 
636 http://www.pk-sejahtera.org/content/saksi-pks-bacakan-surat-pemecatan-yusuf-supendi 
637 Amri Yusra, Mekanisme Partai Politik dalam Pencalonan Kepala Daerah: Studi Kasus Partai 
Keadilan Sejahtera dalam Pilkada Depok 2005, Master Thesis, (Jakarta: Program Pasca Sarjana Ilmu 
Politik, Universitas Indonesia, 2006), pp. 140. 
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he again ignored. This situation called for and appealed to DPD to ask DSW to take a 
legal decision on this case. After having made an assessment and carried out an 
investigation, DSW stipulated that its recommendation to dismiss Matapermana from 
party membership should be upheld638.        
 
The islah institution, as the body having a constitutional commitment to 
mediate for conflicting cadres, thus acted as a medium to bridge the interim. 
According to Ahmad Yusuf, in islah forum, DS would confirm acts done by the guilty 
cadre, besides obliging them to acknowledge his mistakes. On the other hand, the 
cadre who files the case against another cadre had to accept a pardon from the 
accused and declare the end of conflict between them639.  
 
A similar mechanism and situation also occurred in BPDO. After 2005, every 
cadre suspected by the party of having committed or had a potential to be 
undisciplined or carried out misdeeds, would face BPDO640. After receiving a report 
from MS, for the cases involving the elites in MS body, or DPP for the cases of 
indiscipline and other related matters, BPDO would conduct a meeting with several 
participants, including the accused cadre, to confirm the information and findings. In 
this case, BPDO would play as arbitrator to decide the future of the cadre. At local 
level, sometimes BPDO was required to help local committees to decode a 
punishment for famous public figures or very senior party persons in their domains. 
The case of the dismissal of Alwi Sahlan here below illustrates such a role.  
 
The case of Sahlan, a high senior cadre who was also a famous local public 
figure, emerged when he resisted party policy. Sahlan, holding the position as 
Deputy Mayor of Banjarmasin City, insisted on running for Vice Governor of the 
South Kalimantan in the local election. According to Nur, Sahlan argued that as a 
                                                 
638 Interview with Dr. Prihandoko, Chairperson of Depok DPP of PKS (2004-2007) in Depok, 5 
October 2010. 
639 Interview with Ahmad Feri Firman Yusuf, Head of the III Dakwah Region (2002-2005), member of 
Majelis Syura PKS (2002-2010), in Jakarta, 2 November 2010. 
640 Interview with Aus Hidayat Nur, Head of the II Dakwah Region (2002-2005) and Chairperson of 
BPDO (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 15 October 2010; with Selamat Nurdin, MM, former tarbiyah activist 
leader in University of Indonesia, Member of Parliament of DKI Jakarta Province (2004-20014), in 
Jakarta, 22 October 2010; with Sitaresmi S, M.Psy, Member of Dakwah Department of DPP of PK 
(2000-2003), in Jakarta, 8 October 2010; with Umar Salim Basalamah, Vice General Secretary of PKS 
(2002), and personal secretary of Hidayat Nur Wahid (former President of PKS and Chairperson of 
MPR of Republic of Indonesia), in Jakarta, 12 October 2010; with Ahmad Feri Firman Yusuf, Head of 
the III Dakwah Region (2002-2005), member of Majelis Syura PKS (2002-2010), in Jakarta, 2 
November 2010. 
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senior cadre of PKS, who helped the establishment of the party in South Kalimantan 
Province, he deserved to be promoted by the party to hold the governor position. 
However, the party had its own calculation. The party not only rejected the seniority 
argument but also in fact, was not really impressed by his job as the Banjarmasin 
Deputy Mayor. Hence, PKS decided to select another figure to run for that position.  
 
Sahlan, however, kept insisting on running for that position, neglecting any 
attempts from the local board (DPW) and the informal meeting with the President of 
PKS Tifatul Sembiring to persuade him to follow the party’s policy641. Concerned with 
this situation, the party asked BPDO to handle this case642. After holding several 
discussions, BPDO then decided to ask Sahlan to leave the party due to his 
disobedience concerning the party’s policy. Eventually, Sahlan agreed this 
decision643. In this case, BPDO’s role was not only to terminate the problem 
immediately and to remove the potential of having an internal clique, but also to help 
the party to preserve the trust of the local cadres by mainly blocking the sense of 
favouritism, which would possibly deteriorate if the party abandoned the case related 
to its senior figures. 
 
BPDO’s role in conflict management is similar to that of DS, namely to 
prevent party from seeing its conflict potential escalate due to either being treated 
unfairly or to the lack of trust in the party. The prevention function was carried out by 
conducting an investigation and inviting the involved members to discuss before 
forming its conclusion. Moreover, the party, in general, tried to avoid making an 
abrupt decision for removing the cadres. Generally, the cadres’ right to have a 
protection was something familiar in the party. According to Umar Basalamah, there 
is no such unilateral decision made for the cadres without their being aware of it644. 
In this mechanism, the cadre constitutionally should have protection for any unilateral 
decision from DS. This also gave both the party and the cadre the opportunity to hear 
and even take stock of the other’s opinion and sensibilities. According to Mahmudi 
                                                 
641 “Sanksi Alwi tergantung DPP PKS”, http://sijaka.wordpress.com/2010/02/12/sanksi-alwi-
tergantung-dpp-pks/. 
642 Interview with Aus Hidayat Nur, Head of the II Dakwah Region (2002-2005) and Chairperson of 
BPDO (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 15 October 2010. 
643 Interview with Aus Hidayat Nur, Head of the II Dakwah Region (2002-2005) and Chairperson of 
BPDO (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 15 October 2010. 
644 Interview with Umar Salim Basalamah, Vice General Secretary of PKS (2002), and personal 
secretary of Hidayat Nur Wahid (former President of PKS and Chairperson of MPR of Republic of 
Indonesia), in Jakarta, 12 October 2010. 
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“the right to have self-defence had been comprehensively understood by the majority 
of the cadres” 645. This enhanced the cadres’ confidence in the party. They tended to 
believe that the party would avoid any kind of unilateral decision created and based 
only on the one-side interest. 
 
In addition, BPDO could ask the halaqah to join the investigation process646. 
The aim of this action was to know the level of the cadres’ commitment in following 
party’s activities, including the commitment to halaqah. Sometimes the BPDO related 
the lack of ability to preserve the commitment to implement and follow the instruction 
of the party with their less commitment towards halaqah. The basic assumption was 
the cadres’ commitment to be consistent in halaqah would lead to discipline 
enhancement647. In some cases, those two variables met. According to Aus Hidayat 
“the mistake of the cadre could be seen through his commitment to halaqah. Hence, 
when punishing the cadre we would conclude that this person had failed to 
consistently join halaqah”648. However, in developing such an argument, BPDO did 
not try to generalise all cases applying with single perspective and conclusion. BPDO 
realised that other factors were involved in the disciplinary actions. For this reason, a 
comprehensive investigation remained relevant. 
 
3.3.  A Special Case of the National Policy Making Process 
 
MS, as the highest body, became the institution that took responsibility to impede the 
possibility of conflict in the processes for the drafting of vital policies at the national 
level. MS followed the internal mechanism provided by the constitution to conclude 
the consultation process and stipulate the policy. In doing so, MS tried to 
accommodative, accepting many inputs from the cadres and provide a proportional 
opportunity for the meeting participants to speak and to be heard. Sometimes, MS 
                                                 
645 Interview with Dr. Yon Mahmudi, PKS and Tarbiyah Movement observer, Lecturer at Political 
Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, and one of the 
cadres who signed PKS establishment declaration, in Depok, 6 October 2010. 
646 Interview with Aus Hidayat Nur, Head of the II Dakwah Region (2002-2005) and Chairperson of 
BPDO (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 15 October 2010; with Sitaresmi S, M.Psy, Member of Dakwah 
Department of DPP of PK (2000-2003), in Jakarta, 8 October 2010; with Ahmad Feri Firman Yusuf, 
Head of the III Dakwah Region (2002-2005), member of Majelis Syura PKS (2002-2010), in Jakarta, 2 
November 2010. 
647 Interview with Aus Hidayat Nur, Head of the II Dakwah Region (2002-2005) and Chairperson of 
BPDO (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 15 October 2010. 
648 Interview with Aus Hidayat Nur, Head of the II Dakwah Region (2002-2005) and Chairperson of 
BPDO (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 15 October 2010. 
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used voting to decide upon a policy. This was to make the policy became more 
acceptable and MS could avoid adopting controversial or unpopular ones. On the 
other hand, this was also to ignore the sense of discrimination in this process. Hence, 
since CRM was a method to meet a “win-win solution” for all, based on the interests 
of the participant, the consultative mechanism upheld by MS to bridge and 
accommodate the difference, was actually a way to implement that value at the elite 
level in PKS. 
 
In the case of the 2004 Presidential Election, candidate preference was the 
source of the dispute. Those who rejected Amien Rais considered that he had a 
limited chance to be elected649, while for those who supported him, it emphasised his 
role in the initial reform process and his position as one of the Indonesian Islamic 
central figures650. The eternal meetings held by MS lasting almost two days to 
discuss this issue651, then had to be decided through voting so ended this dispute. 
The party decided to go with Rais.  
 
In the case of BBM subsidy reduction, several of the Jakarta elites, including 
the Secretary General, Anis Matta652, was supported by several local committees. 
They proposed a policy to leave the coalition, resulting from the development of a 
negative feeling towards the government and, to some extent, the government’s 
failure to fulfil its promise to the party653.However, other cadres felt that the decision 
to reduce the BBM subsidy was unavoidable and having taken the national financial 
situation into consideration, challenged this idea. This camp believed that leaving the 
                                                 
649 Interview with Ahmad Feri Firman Yusuf, Head of the III Dakwah Region (2002-2005), member of 
Majelis Syura PKS (2002-2010), in Jakarta, 2 November 2010; with Aus Hidayat Nur, Head of the II 
Dakwah Region (2002-2005) and Chairperson of BPDO (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 15 October 2010. 
650 Interview with Ahmad Feri Firman Yusuf, Head of the III Dakwah Region (2002-2005), member of 
Majelis Syura PKS (2002-2010), in Jakarta, 2 November 2010; with Aus Hidayat Nur, Head of the II 
Dakwah Region (2002-2005) and the Chairperson of BPDO (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 15 October 2010. 
651 Interview with Mahfudz Siddiq, Head of Cadrerization Department of DPP of PKS (2002-2005) and 
Member of Parliament (2004-2014), in Jakarta, 27 October 2010. 
652 On Matta’s opinion to opt out from the coalition, see “Tak Ada Koalisi Tanpa Perubahan”, in Saksi, 
No.6/VIII/30 November 2005, pp.7-9 
653 Before coalition establishment, President Yudhoyono agreed to implement five points to have PKS’ 
support in turn. These points of agreement are: 1) to establish a clean, caring and professional 
government, 2) to protect the existence of the unitary state of Republic of Indonesia from any foreign 
interventions, 3) to avoid the establishment of military state, 4) to hold law enforcement and human 
rights, 4) to support the struggle for Palestinian independence and will not establish any diplomatic 
relations with Israel. Those who rejected the continuation of coalition with Yudhoyono established 
their argument by referring the first point, in which the government’s policy towards BBM had 
contradicted with the promise to establish a caring government.         
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government in this situation was not wise and would limit the party’s chance to 
contribute something significant to the country from within the government. 
Therefore, the important action for PKS to take was to increase the quality of the 
coalition654. The situation temporarily shook the cadres at grassroots level for quite 
some time and increased the dispute potential. However, afterwards, MS decided to 
stay in the coalition with its consultation mechanism655, and socialise it through all the 
networks, as the dispute was terminated. 
 
Chart 1 
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Source: AD/ART of PKS and Interview 
 
 
As for the case of an “open party” discourse, MS played a role in reducing the 
conflict potential by merely keeping it as a discourse656. Although that discourse was 
regarded by several important figures as imperative to broaden people’s acceptance, 
the party considered that for some cadres the idea was still controversial to it being 
                                                 
654 http://www.suaramerdeka.com/harian/0511/28/nas03.htm 
655 http://www.suaramerdeka.com/harian/0511/28/nas03.htm 
656 See Bayan of PKS, 6 Februari 2008. 
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implemented657. The discourse was one of the most delicate issues in the history of 
the party. Several cadres considered it as something that would potentially reduce 
the very character of PKS as an Islamic party. On the other hand, several cadres did 
not see Islam as an exclusive religion that prohibits Muslims to be open-minded and 
hold inclusive relations with other groups658. For them, in fact, dakwah itself required 
open-minded attitudes. This situation to some extent created tension among the 
cadres. In such circumstances, the decision of MS to hold this discourse until the 
majority of the cadres shared a similar perspective saved the party from a prolonged 
dispute659.  
 
As previously discussed in this chapter, the important role played by MS, in 
the main, was to be the one of an arbitration body. In this case, MS would create a 
final decision to bind all the cadres of the party and thus end disputes and any 
difference of points of view. 
 
When the aspiration of any parties had the opportunity to be voiced through 
an internal CRM, like in PKS, it prevented the party from prolonged conflict. As 
mentioned by James H. Laue “when conflict resolution mechanism is working 
smoothly, all the parties with a stake have adequate representation in the forum and 
can create a win-win outcome…contributes to the ability of the system to resolve 
other conflict as they arise”660.   
 
However, this does not mean that everything always ran well in PKS. In 
reality, the party could not entirely escape from failure when dealing with such a 
situation. The case of Supendi was the example of the failure of the tribunal element 
to be an entire independent body. The long process in deciding the future of Supendi 
                                                 
657 Interview with Amri Yusra, M.Si, Chairperson of Depok DPD of PKS (2002-2004), Member of 
Parliament of Depok District, West Java, (2004-2009), and Lecturer at Political Sciences Department, 
Faculty of Social and Political Science, University of Indonesia, via telephone 13 December 2009. 
658 See some statements supporting this idea in www.munaspks2010.org. See interview R Ferdian Andi 
R with the Genarl Chairperson of MS Hilmi Aminuddin in “Partai Terbuka Bukan Strategi PKS”, 
www.inilah.com. Interview with Dr. Yon Mahmudi, observer of PKS and Tarbiyah Movement, 
Lecturer at Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of 
Indonesia, and one of the cadres who signed PKS establishment declaration, in Depok, 6 October 2010. 
659 However, in the 2010 National Consultation Forum, held in Jakarta, PKS decided to implement that 
idea, which was reflected in the possibility on non-Muslim to be member of the party. 
http://munaspks.info/ 
660 James H. Laue, “The Emergence and Institutionalisation of Third-party Roles in Conflict”, in John 
Burton and Frank Dukes, Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution, (Hampshire: Macmillan, 
1990), p. 258. 
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reflected this. The very close relationship between Supendi and Aminuddin, and the 
fact that Supendi was also a very senior figure in Jamaah Tarbiyah, whose last 
position as a member of DSP, created awkwardness. According to one of MS 
members, this was a difficult and exceptional case, which, to some extent, showed 
the inability of DSP to respond normally. This also indicated the existence of a sense 
of awkwardness in PKS when dealing with very senior and close figures, like 
Supendi. Even though the party finally removed Supendi for his insistent attitude that 
Aminuddin and Matta should be removed from the party, this particular case 
demonstrated that an awkwardness was not entirely unavoidable in PKS. 
 
4.  The Internal Situation 
 
The existence of a safety net for conflict potential became one of the significant 
points resulting from the work of these institutions. The ability to reduce conflict 
potential related to its capacity to detect every single aspect of the problem at the 
grassroots or cadre level and to localise the conflict had become a characteristic that 
developed in the party as consequence result of above situation.  
  
4.1.  The Capability to Detect Conflict Potential. 
 
The presence of CRM elements played an important role in supporting the ability to 
detect conflict potentials at an early stage. The very close position of these elements, 
DS as the main element and BPDO and halaqah as supporting elements, had for 
most activities or even the life of the cadres, covered issues such as morality, family, 
financial, political strategy, dismissal, and discipline, providing the occasion to know 
and anticipate any conflict potential at an early stage. In such a range of duties, 
almost all conflict potential and related matters were known and a way was found to 
terminate them.  
 
In addition to the range of problems covered, the constitutional authorities 
owned by these elements had made it possible to monitor conflict development from 
its early stage. Halaqah, as the smallest unit of the party and for cadre development, 
became the main institution for this role, due to its ability to observe the situation of 
the thoughts, responses, and attitudes of the cadres. A communication network 
developed between the teacher and the students or among cadres and it obliged the 
elements of the party in halaqah to disclose their opinions and feelings, including 
their disappointment and hope. In such a circumstance, the internal networking 
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developed inside halaqah could thus grasp any vital signals from across the nation, 
which could be followed-up by any proper response.  
  
The characteristic and the authority of halaqah, as the medium for cadre 
intensive development, made this institution an effective medium for discussing and 
detecting conflict potential. This institution also had a first-hand opportunity to seize 
the confusion. In some cases, the bewilderment appearing at the grassroots level 
encouraged the party to make internal policy adjustments as a response to the 
situation. The official announcement, conveyed by PKS through a public channel, to 
ask the Government formally to pay great attention to the government subsidy cuts 
compensation was part of the party’s response to any confusion at grassroots 
level661.         
 
At the other level, DS became the institution, which played the same role as 
the halaqah in terms of detecting conflict potential. Its existence in almost all the 
districts and municipalities in Indonesia enable it to be aware of and asses the 
development of conflict potential became possible. To some extent, DS played a 
more rigorous role compared to halaqah’s, since the conflict potential at its level 
tended to be more concrete, hence the party had to reply to it more seriously. 
Moreover, the existence of DS, up to the local level, could provide a significant 
assistance to the party to gain overall picture or map of the conflict potentials 
anatomy through its routine report. At the local level, the Tangerang DPW of PKS 
used reports and lessons learnt from the conflict containment process and involved 
DSD to develop economic assistance policy for some cadres as part of the conflict 
resolution. The party ran this policy due to the assessment of the source of the 
conflict in that area662.        
 
BPDO was still part of important party machinery to develop the ability to 
detect conflict potential, although it played only an indirect role in detecting conflict 
potential. In reality, this body sometimes gave the assistance and advice to a local 
committee in dealing with the conflict and any related matters663. It became a haven 
                                                 
661 Interview with Mahfudz Siddiq, Head of Cadrerization Department of DPP of PKS (2002-2005) and 
Member of Parliament (2004-2014), in Jakarta, 27 October 2010. 
662 Interview with Hidayat, MM, Member of Parliament of Tangerang District (2005-2010), in 
Tangerang, 21 October 2010. 
663 In the case of one of the areas in East Kutai District, for instance, such BPDO’s role was revealed. 
One of the public figures in that area who gained PKS’ support in election inclined to disregard several 
commitments, including enhancing the dakwah movements. Not only that, some cadres heard that this 
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for some cadres to consulate on delicate problems when facing difficulty. In its role, 
BPDO could support the party in detecting people who presumably had a potential to 
endanger the party’s unity and take an action on them to at the very early stage. 
  
Another important factor in the ability to detect and to respond to conflict 
potential was the capacity to stop a long process by responding and solving a 
problem. Hence, it could quickly access the canalisation process in handling the 
conflict as one of the crucial elements in CRM. The failure of the party to obtain 
immediate action in handling conflict potentials would possibly intensify antagonism 
and eventually escalate the conflict to a dangerous level. Nevertheless, under the 
condition that the party was responsive, which occurred in PKS, conflict development 
there was a possibly to terminate it. This would be helpful for the development of 
CRM as the process that needed a comprehensive understanding of the problem 
core and offer proper responses to avoid conflict escalation by addressing and 
removing the deep-rooted source of conflict664. According to Hidayat, by having the 
opportunity to table any claims, the process of conflict resolution and its containment 
with the possible solutions actually had been discussed and, hence, was about to 
halfway to completion665. This situation was conducive to reduce the conflict, helped 
party to secure its potential to escalate. 
 
4.2. The Capability to Localise the Conflict 
 
The existence of CRM elements at the different level in the work domain and 
hierarchy made the party have a more complete and complicated networking for 
conflict resolution. The specialisation and specification of those elements, worked in 
the standardised rules of the game and spirit, provided an opportunity for any conflict 
localising efforts to be more effective and touchable. This diversity could be seen at 
                                                                                                                                            
figure in some occasions stated that his position today had not to do with the PKS. Over time, he also 
refused to join some party’s activities including halaqah. However, because of his position today, the 
party at local level preferred asking BPDO to handle the case, rather than trying to finish it by itself. 
After some investigation and dialogues, BPDO eventually decided to ask that figure to leave the party, 
to prevent party from prolong anxiety. Interview with Aus Hidayat Nur, Head of the II Dakwah Region 
(2002-2005) and Chairperson of BPDO (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 15 October 2010. 
664 Hugh Mial, Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, (eds.), Contemporary Conflict Resolution: the 
Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts, (Cambridge: Polity Press-Blackwell 
Publishers Ltd, 1999), p.21. 
665 Interview with Hidayat, MM, Member of Parliament of Tangerang District (2005-2010), in 
Tangerang, 21 October 2010. 
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the horizontal aspect (related to the topic of issues), and vertical aspect (related to 
the working hierarchy).          
 
The horizontal aspect, the diversity or specialisation in handling conflict could 
be seen to be the domain of advanced conflict resolution, covering three main 
subjects of conflict. (1) morality, ethics, attitude and other aspects related to the 
implementation of Islamic laws handled by DSP; (2) the matters relating to discipline 
and obedience in implementing a party’s order, handled by BPDO (particularly after 
the implementation of  the 2005 AD/ART); and (3) the policy making process for 
national issues, which was the domain of MS.   
 
With this specialisation, each type of conflict potential and related matters 
would be handled by the appropriate institutions for it to be treated with precision. 
Such mechanisms, which became the code of conduct in the party, reduced the 
party’s dependence on one institution or even figures when dealing with potential 
conflict, creating more objective and effective policies. For this situation, it would be 
hard to find any central figure or group that could solve all the problems on their own 
and unilaterally. 
 
As for the vertical aspect of the “division of labour”, enhanced by the 
implementation of the 2005 AD/ART, the presence of DS at the district level (DSD) 
reflected the situation. This development indicated the willingness of the party to be 
more responsive in handling conflict potential and able to contain it immediately at 
the local level. This not only assisted DSP in maintaining its duty as the tribunal body, 
but also helped it in localising conflict potential.  
 
The delegation of authority did not appeal to the “distribution of authority” with 
its negative manner that could create uncertainty among cadres, since this 
delegation was conducted under DSP’s formal and centralised supervision. Although 
PKS did not entirely succeed in developing the quality of human resources at the 
local level and answering the problems properly, the existence of such a hierarchy 
mechanism and the institutions had pushed the party to have more power in terms of 
anticipating and localising the conflict.   
 
The above situations made the escalation of the potential conflict and related 
matters became difficult. The presence of domains of conflict resolution scattered 
across the nation with relevant apparatus and networks strengthened PKS’ capability 
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to respond appropriately to the development of conflict potential. This led to the 
limitation of harmful efforts from any elements to decrease party solidity. For 
instance, in this atmosphere, PKS could limit the opportunity for the third party to 
develop its solidarity inside the party that could obliterate party solidity. The 
immediate response to several of the potential conflict problems happened to Sahlan 
and Matapermana or those who had objections to the party, which prevented the 
party from any efforts of intervention by the third party.  
 
To some extent, the phenomenon of Forum Kader Peduli (the Caring Cadre 
Forum/FKP) indicated the situation where such solidarity could gain support from 
inside. This group led informally by some former prominent figures of Jamaah 
Tarbiyah and party, such as Mashadi, attracted some cadres mainly from the Jakarta 
Province. The mission of this group remained unclear, but mainly focussed on 
criticising some of PKS elites leading a “hedonistic” way of life and their “moderate-
pragmatist” political approaches and movements.  
 
In facing FKP, PKS in general did not develop a special treatment or policy. 
PKS even saw the existence of such a community as a part of the auto-critics to be 
more consistent in struggling for idealism666. From this point, the conflict potential 
was localised to be just a matter of interpretation differences between cadres and ex-
cadres in understanding the strategy to be put forward by the party, and to be 
terminated at that level. Eventually, the situation did not create an extraordinary 
situation, let alone a prolonged conflict. The party could control the situation and 
continue to maintain good relations with FKP’s sympathisers. 
   
5.  The Impact: Party Cohesion Maintenance 
 
The generally effective functioning of CRM encouraged the cadres to believe in the 
system that they had in the party. Such belief or trust for instance was reflected by 
the absence of efforts to find alternative mechanisms, which might potentially have 
overshadowed the decision of the party, such as an alternative court to conduct 
tribunal process that might have triggered dualism inside the party. In fact, the 
homogeneity or consistency in implementing its duties appeared to persist in the 
                                                 
666 Interview with Dr. Prihandoko, Chairperson of Depok DPP of PKS (2004-2007) in Depok, 5 
October 2010. 
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party667. DS, BPDO and MS had generally performed their tasks without giving much 
attention to the background of the cadre, such as the membership status or level of 
seniority. Although there were exceptional cases, in general, the level of punishment 
was based on the state of mistake and its potential to create internal destruction.  
 
In reality, during its first decade of existence, DS had punished some party 
elites, including Balda, the first vice president of the party and one of the famous 
thinkers of the party and Supendi, one of the senior activists from the initial 
generation of the Indonesia Jamaah Tarbiyah and Member of Parliament (2004-
2009). DS also had invited some elements from the elite group, including Anis Matta, 
the General Secretary of the Party, to explain their movements, behaviours, or 
thoughts, regarded by other cadres to be not in line with the party idealism, or 
creating a kind of upsets or upheaval at the grass root level668. 
  
Some objections indeed occurred and in fact were unavoidable, nevertheless 
it did not appeal to the cadres to use these moment to call the third party or court to 
intervene the conflict resolution process. This indicated that the party’s decision was 
actually understandable and acceptable for most cadres or at least was not 
something that was entirely contradictory to the rules of the game. Moreover, under 
the above situation, the party could avoid any controversial decisions made by the 
third party, including the policies that essentially contradicted the tradition or norms of 
the party and which potentially created other controversies and prolonged the 
conflict. Therefore, the party could also avoid any intervention efforts that could 
reduce its autonomy and independence in determining further required actions 
                                                 
667 Interview with Dr. Mardani Ali Sera, Vice Chairperson of MPP PKS (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 6 
October 2010; with Dr. Prihandoko, Chairperson of Depok DPP of PKS (2004-2007) in Depok, 5 
October 2010; with Hidayat, MM, Member of Parliament of Tangerang District (2005-2010), in 
Tangerang, 21 October 2010; with Mahfudz Siddiq, Head of Cadrerization Department of DPP of PKS 
(2002-2005) and Member of Parliament (2004-2014), in Jakarta, 27 October 2010; with Mustofa, the 
cadre of PKS and former reporter of Profetik Magazine, established by the cadres of the PKS, in 
Depok, 7 October 2010; with Nooryanto, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Bekasi DPD of 
PKS, in Bekasi, 7 November 2010; with Selamat Nurdin, MM, former tarbiyah activist leader in 
University of Indonesia, Member of Parliament of DKI Jakarta Province (2004-20014), in Jakarta, 22 
October 2010; with Untung Wahono, Head of Department of Research and Development of DPP of PK 
(2000-2003), Head of Department of Politics and Defence of DPP of PKS (2002-2005), and 
Chairperson of MPP of PKS (2010-2015), in Jakarta 27 October 2010. 
668 Interview with Dr. Yon Mahmudi, PKS and Tarbiyah Movement observer, Lecturer at Political 
Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, and one of the 
cadres who signed the PKS establishment declaration, in Depok, 6 October 2010; with Sitaresmi S, 
M.Psy, Member of Dakwah Department of DPP of PK (2000-2003), in Jakarta, 8 October 2010; with 
Ahmad Feri Firman Yusuf, Head of the III Dakwah Region (2002-2005), member of Majelis Syuro 
PKS (2002-2010), in Jakarta, 2 November 2010. 
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relevant to the conflict resolution. This situation had protected PKS from the 
emergence of alternative internal or external tribunals that could become a stepping-
stone in the enhancement of distrust and even a fertile zone for fragmentation.  
 
By the presence of trust, the party could neglect any negative rumours that 
had the potential to trigger huge reactions and endanger party solidity. The presence 
of trust also preserved the cadres’ consciousness to seek valid information and 
confirm negative issues before taking actions. In general, when a kind of conflict 
potential occurred, the cadre would report or issue it to the party through their 
murabbis or directly party structure with the confidence that the party would handle it 
properly. In such situation, PKS had relatively been able to maintain its cohesion. 
 
The capability to reduce factionalisation, or the development of some groups 
with a tendency to resist against the party, was another result of the presence of 
CRM that supported internal cohesion development. It became possible since the 
development of solidarity or being part of a group, as the result of unfair treatments 
or discrimination found their irrelevance. The prolonged unjust situation that could 
provoke the cadres into have similar point of view on several of the prominent 
figures, or the party, who continued to commit to the malfunctioning and wrongdoing, 
was in general absent in PKS. Actually, there was not a significant result to convince 
a large number of cadres on the tendency of the party to discriminate and prefer to 
favouritism.  
 
In addition, the fact that the internal justice and arbitration bodies were not set 
up for protecting some people or groups, created confidence among the majority of 
cadres on the merit of their party’s internal system. The system was created to be in 
line with the interest of the party rather than to be the tool of the elite. Basalamah 
said, “This situation preserves the confidence among the cadres that the party 
leaders or other members would not treat them unfairly, which eventually helped the 
party to rid itself of internal friction”669. Although some people believed that the 
system was implemented inconsistently and applied only to the cadres at the 
grassroots level and to the critics670, the majority of cadres did not see any clear 
                                                 
669 Interview with Umar Salim Basalamah, Vice General Secretary of PKS (2002), and personal 
secretary of Hidayat Nur Wahid (former President of PKS and The Chairperson of MPR of Republic of 
Indonesia), in Jakarta, 12 October 2010. 
670 Interview with K.H Yusuf Supendi Lc, Member of DSP of PKS (2000-2005) and Member of 
Parliament (2004-2009), in Jakarta, 3 November 2010. 
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attempts by the elite to use these bodies for illegal ends, exclusive or personal 
interests, including the removal of any critical persons671. According to Nurdin, the 
fact was with the presence of such institutions, the elites could not take advantage of 
the ordinary cadres672. Some critical cadres, considered collectively by the cadres 
could endanger the party’s image and unity, in fact, the critical cadres were removed 
using a mechanism that was acceptable in constitutional terms. In the situation where 
the number of unjustly treated cadres was very limited, the presence of a powerful 
opposition or resistance group representing an alternative for the party found it 
difficult to exist. 
 
The reduction of factionalisation also became possible as the party could 
detect and remove the factionalisation supporting or potential elements from an early 
stage. In this case, halaqah played a salient role. With its capability to influence 
cadres through intensive meetings and personal approach, this element of CRM 
played a role as “the filter of the conflict” and a reminder to the cadres on the 
importance to hold and preserve sense of togetherness.  
 
Moreover, the capability to reduce factionalisation potential also related to the 
main role of the halaqah as a medium to explain and socialise the ideological and 
strategic considerations behind a decision. Through that function, the party could 
provide the cadres with the logical explanations and considerations behind its actions 
and policies thus reducing curiosity and complaints. The potential tension between 
some cadres and the party at the issue of the BBM, for instance, could be reduced 
once halaqah had played its role. Eventually, the presence and the work of halaqah 
in almost all the regions limited the possibility of factionalisation and, on the other 
hand, preserved party’s cohesiveness. By the absence of a permanent 
factionalisation where there was a tendency to resist, there was a lesser possibility of 
fragmentation occurring in the party. 
 
                                                 
671 Interview with Dr. Prihandoko, Chairperson of Depok DPP of PKS (2004-2007) in Depok, 5 
October 2010; with Mustofa, cadre of PKS and former reporter of Profetik Magazine, established by 
cadres of PKS, in Depok, 7 October 2010; with Dr. Yon Mahmudi, PKS and Tarbiyah Movement 
observer, Lecturer at Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University 
of Indonesia, and one of the cadres who signed the PKS establishment declaration, in Depok, 6 October 
2010. 
672 Interview with Selamat Nurdin, MM, former tarbiyah activist leader in University of Indonesia, 
Member of Parliament of DKI Jakarta Province (2004-20014), in Jakarta, 22 October 2010. 
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The last situation that removed the possibility of internal fragmentation was 
the opportunity to voice an opinion and have it heard by the party. This situation was 
in line with the Hirschman’s opinion on the role of voice in maintaining loyalty. DS, 
BPDO, MS and mainly halaqah at the practical level, became the channel for the 
cadres to speak and voice their opinion and interests, including suggesting 
alternative thinking on topics and explaining their position. Although, in general some 
weakness could not be entirely neglected, the party had provided a sufficient access 
for all the cadres to be heard. The interest to support Rais was one of the cases. 
Moreover, the eagerness of several cadres to leave Government Coalition in 2005 
had triggered the elites and the party to conduct an MMS. In other words, the party 
through those elements provided the cadres essentially with the facility to be 
protected from discrimination thus creating trust and certainty.  
 
The CRM institutions were also not created to destroy differences, but to 
realign mistaken assumptions back on track and fostering common perceptions. For 
PKS, differences were something inevitable673, especially in a party like PKS where 
most of the cadres came from the middle class and had had a higher education674. 
As mentioned previously, the party could not escape from some delicate debates that 
could potentially lead the party to an internal conflict. The 2004 presidential election 
included these with the case of BBM and the decision to continue the coalition and 
the discourse on the importance to be an open party that allowed a non-Muslim to be 
party’s member. In these cases, the people could detect the differences between the 
pros and the cons camps.  
 
However, these situations did not lead to a permanent factionalisation as 
each cadre realised that the party had given a proper chance to each group to voice 
its opinion without restraint. According to Siddiq, the institutionalisation of a syura in 
PKS, implemented as the elements of CRM and entire policy-making process, 
showed a collective model of leadership in the party, in which democratic mechanism 
became something common when stipulating a policy. He stated, “There is no policy 
unless (it) had been carried out through a process of using the ideas from many 
                                                 
673 PKS tidak Monolitik, http://www.kompas.com/read/xml/2008/12/17/14544853/pks.tidak.monolitik. 
674 Interview with Dr. Prihandoko, Chairperson of Depok DPP of PKS (2004-2007) in Depok, 5 
October 2010. See also “Tifatul: PKS itu Solid”, http://politik.vivanews.com/news/read/58449-
tifatul_pks_itu_soli.d  
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people”675. Throughout such a mechanism, he believes that the sense of solidarity 
that led to the solidity of the party became strong because the process of the policy-
making process was not dominated by the thought of one person676.             
 
If there was a kind of grouping in the party, it did not last long, let nor was it 
permanent. This tendency reflected the consciousness of most cadres on the real 
chance to voice their opinion. The negative efforts such as manipulation and 
discrimination were almost not founded on that process, since it was the process 
where the constitution and not personal ambition became the main reference. The 
internal mechanism of MS, for instance, provided an opportunity for people to 
struggle for their beliefs.  
 
As for the grassroots level, similar to the elite level, the members and cadres 
or the sympathisers also had various opinions on these cases. Some critical 
elements conveyed their concern about the possibility of the collapse of the party 
image if the party committed to the wrong decisions or directions. This concern 
emerged mainly with the case of BBM and the continuity of the coalition with 
Yudhoyono’s government. Nevertheless, even in these delicate cases, strong 
factionalisation appeared to be absent in PKS. For some people, this situation 
indicates the symptom of an apathetic attitude among the cadres towards their own 
party. However, it could no be ignored that the party had a mechanism that 
influenced the absence of the tendency to factionalise.  
  
6. Overview  
 
The above discussion showed that PKS’ constitution had mentioned some 
institutions that were relevant to be elements of CRM. Those bodies had the 
authority, such as a reconciliation body, to conduct internal tribunals and 
investigations, or as the medium to find a resolution for any different points of view. 
The party also in reality had a standard pattern in dealing with conflict prevention and 
its resolution. The presence of theses bodies and the standard mechanism 
eventually made the party an authoritative guide and reference in dealing with 
conflict, even though it could not entirely escape some of its weaknesses. As the 
                                                 
675 Interview with Mahfudz Siddiq, Head of Cadrerization Department of DPP of PKS (2002-2005) and 
Member of Parliament (2004-2014), in Jakarta, 27 October 2010. 
676 Interview with Mahfudz Siddiq, Head of Cadrerization Department of DPP of PKS (2002-2005) and 
Member of Parliament (2004-2014), in Jakarta, 27 October 2010. 
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result, PKS, over time, was able to detect the conflict potential and respond to it from 
an early stage. This party, hence, had the capability to contain the conflict practically 
immediately and prevent the party from prolonged disputes that potentially led to 
factionalisation, even though the presence of faction or factionalism itself is not totally 
a bad news for the party, since it sometimes provides a good competition that can 
develop the quality of the party. Some crucial and delicate moments that had a 
tendency to create internal conflict did not make prolong disputes and enhance 
conflicts. This situation maintained the trust and weakened the factionalisation 
tendency that eventually preserved the cohesiveness of the party. The discussion 
above indicates a very fundamental role of CRM as one of the indicators of party 
institutionalisation and mainly relates to the work of legal institutions in creating the 
ability to preserve party cohesiveness.  
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Chapter IX 





“Since we did not perform it (cadrerization) systematically, it was easy for 
turmoil to take root”. (A. Muhaimin Iskandar)677.  
 
 
1.  Introduction  
 
This chapter discusses another of the party’s institutionalisation elements, namely 
systematic cadrerization and its relation to PKB’s fragmentation. This and the 
following chapters regard systematic cadrerization as including the presence of 
systematic and gradual training, systematic evaluation of cadres, and fair recruitment 
in recruiting new members and elites. In other words, the result of the cadrerization 
process should eventually be the basic standard for party recruitment and selection. 
 
A proper cadrerization should provide some basic information and orientation, 
including ones on the ideology and the mission of the party, the party’s management 
and other rules of the game and its respective internal values that have to be written 
clearly on the statute of the party or on other official documents and conveyed to all 
members of the party. The party at least should have a clear parameter that is easy 
for all the cadres to understand. Moreover, consistency and continuation in its 
implementation are the prerequisites of systematic cadrerization in order to maintain 
the quality of the recruitment process and regeneration. The importance of 
cadrerization is firstly to avoid any kind of unilateral and exclusive understanding, 
including towards party’s constitution, ideology, or values. Hence, it could avoid 
misinterpretation and prevent the elites from manipulating this activity for their 
personal interest. Secondly, it is to enhance the cadres’ loyalty towards the party. 
Thirdly, the significance of systematic cadrerization is to develop a spirit of 
meritocracy by which cadres would be evaluated based on their performance. 
                                                 
677 Interview with Interview with Abdul Muhaimin Iskandar, General Secretary of PKB (2000-2002), 
Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz (2002-2005), General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz (2005-2013) and 
Minister of Man Power and Transmigartion, in Jakarta, 13 October 2010.   
 221
Moreover, the presence of fairness and transparency in the recruitment process 
would boost the cadres’ respect toward the party’s rules of the game.  
 
The following discussion explores the cadrerization situation in the PKB and 
its implication for the party’s cohesion. For this purpose, the discussion will cover four 
topics, namely (1) the legal-formal aspect, discussing legal formality related to 
cadrerization, (2) the implementation aspect, exploring the party’s efforts and failure 
to implement cadrerization, (3) the emergence of tendencies towards fragmentation 
as the impact created by the absence of systematic cadrerization within the party, 
and (4) the impact of those tendencies on party unity.      
 
2.  Cadrerization in Its Legal-Formal Aspect 
 
In the party constitution, used before 2008, the cadrerization issues were not directly 
stated. In fact, the party did not clearly define the name of the body or institution that 
should handle this problem. However, after 2008, or one decade after the party‘s 
establishment, the new party constitution created by PKB-Muhaimin started to 
mention cadrerization and its related matters. The ART Article 87 stated three things, 
namely (1) member recruitment was to be held through a gradual, structured and 
systematic system of cadrerization, (2) cadrerization was a main precondition for all 
members to gain promotion to a strategic position in the party or the government, and 
(3) cadrerization was an inseparable part of the evaluation process of the party 
committee board’s performance at every level of the committee678.The article 
indicates what the party should do and maintain dealing with cadrerization.   
 
Before 2008, however, cadrerization was regarded as a part of DPP duty or 
responsibility. The cadrerization institution, under the supervision of DPP, handled 
this matter. Although the constitution of the party did not clearly mentioned or 
arranged cadrerization, the party created some documents or guide books discussing 
the meaning, the purpose and the model of cadrerization679. These documents also 
                                                 
678 The 2008 ART of PKB Article 87 (1), 87 (2) and 87 (3). 
679 Menumbuhkan Kader Bangsa. Investasi Politik Bersama Rakyat. Kosepsi Dasar dan Metodologi 
Sistem Kaderisasi Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, (Jakarta: DPP PKB, 2000). Menjadi Politisi 
Negarawan. Modul Pelatihan dan Orientasi Politik DPC-DPW PKB Modul Orientasi Ideologi DPP 
PKB, (Jakarta: DPP PKB, 2000). Menggerakan Roda Partai da Perubahan Sosial di Tingkat Basis. 
Modul Pendidikan Dasar Politik Tingkat Anak Cabang Sistem Kaderisasi Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, 
(Jakarta: DPP PKB, 2000). Mufid A. Busyaeri, Menjadi Politisi Organiser Masyarakat. Panduan 
Pendidikan Kader Basis Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, (Jakarta: Lembaga Kaderisasi dan Pendidikan 
Politik, 2003). M. Hanif Dakhiri, Eman Hermawan and Marwan Ja’far, (eds.), Workshop Penguatan 
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discuss the recruitment for a public position, including becoming a Member of 
Parliament (MP).    
 
In PKB’s perspective, as mentioned in the first PKB’s Muktamar Document in 
2000, cadrerization was” the totality of learning attempts that were conducted 
systematically, gradually and continually in order to develop the potential, attitude, 
dignity and prestige, insight and skill of the members so that they could become 
civilized, skilful, smart, loyal, brave, and capable people, who are also firm in running 
the party and attaining their objectives”680. The objective of the cadrerization was “to 
develop commitment/militancy, loyalty and dedication of the cadres towards the 
party“681. The objective of cadrerization was to develop loyal cadres who were not 
only understood the party’s vision, but had an ideological commitment and 
managerial skills; but also had a broad way of thinking, good behaviour and 
commitment to take a role in social life682. Moreover, PKB also realised that the 
success of having a good cadrerization would support the accomplishment of 
carrying out the party’s functions and programs, including providing a positive 
contribution to the state683. In addition, the party also realised that fair recruitment 
would prevent the party from internal conflict684.     
 
PKB set up a Pengkaderan Formal Dasar (the Basic Formal Cadrerization) 
method consisting of different training programmes685, namely (1) Basic Level 
Training (PTD), that was set up for all member candidates, mainly as a medium to 
                                                                                                                                            
Sistem dan Manajemen Partai. Menyongsong Pemilu 2009, (Jakarta: Dewan Pengurus Pusat Partai 
Kebangkitan Bangsa, 2007). “Sistem Kaderisasi PKB”, in Dokumen Muktamar I PKB. “Membangun 
Persaudaraan Sejati Antar Manusia Sebagai Esensi Rekonsisliasi Nasional”, (Jakarta: Dewan 
Pengurus Pusat PKB, 2000), pp. 123-133.  
680 “Sistem Kaderisasi PKB”, in Dokumen Muktamar I PKB. “Membangun Persaudaraan Sejati Antar 
Manusia Sebagai Esensi Rekonsisliasi Nasional”, p. 126. Menumbuhkan Kader Bangsa. Investasi 
Politik Bersama Rakyat. Kosepsi Dasar dan Metodologi Sistem Kaderisasi Partai Kebangkitan 
Bangsa, (Jakarta: DPP PKB, 2000), p.27. 
681 “Sistem Kaderisasi PKB”, in Dokumen Muktamar I PKB. “Membangun Persaudaraan Sejati Antar 
Manusia Sebagai Esensi Rekonsisliasi Nasional”, p. 123. 
682 “Sistem Kaderisasi PKB”, in Dokumen Muktamar I PKB. “Membangun Persaudaraan Sejati Antar 
Manusia Sebagai Esensi Rekonsisliasi Nasional,”pp. 125-127. Menumbuhkan Kader Bangsa. Investasi 
Politik Bersama Rakyat. Kosepsi Dasar dan Metodologi Sistem Kaderisasi Partai Kebangkitan 
Bangsa, pp.56-65. 
683 “Sistem Kaderisasi PKB”, in Dokumen Muktamar I PKB. “Membangun Persaudaraan Sejati Antar 
Manusia Sebagai Esensi Rekonsisliasi Nasional”, p. 131. 
684 “Rekrutmen Caleg”, in PKB dalam Pemilu 2004, (Jakarta: DPP PKB), p. 71. 
685 “Sistem Kaderisasi PKB”, in Dokumen Muktamar I PKB. “Membangun Persaudaraan Sejati Antar 
Manusia Sebagai Esensi Rekonsisliasi Nasional”, pp. 129-130 
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introduce PKB, including its ideology and values; (2) Advanced Level Training (PTL), 
for cadres who had joined PTD. The aim of this training is to have a cadre with 
militancy and moral commitment and practical capability in conducting useful 
activities; (3) Expert Level Training. After joining this training, it was hoped that the 
cadres could take up a role as social workers and politicians having a strong 
ideological commitment. In addition to this training, the PKB also established a 
Pengkaderan Formal Kejuruan (the Vocational Formal Cadrerization) covering some 
practical training, such as training in democracy, training in labour, peasant and 
fisherman avocation, training in the social health service, training in legislative 
system, training in public relations and training in lobbying techniques686.    
 
PKB also underpinned the importance of cadrerization to be taken into 
account as part of the consideration for the selection of its Members of Parliament 
(MP)687. In terms of MP recruitment, PKB stated that the results of cadrerization 
became one of the main criteria. In this regard, ideally, only a cadre who had passed 
cadrerization could become a party representative in parliament. This situation also 
indicates that cadrerization was not something worthless for cadres’ career 
development. However, the party also opened opportunity to public figures and 
professionals to be representatives of PKB in the election and run for MP positions 
represented this party688. This opportunity was based on the consideration that a 
proper competence in dealing with the policy making process in parliament was not 
                                                 
686 Ibid, pp. 130-131 
687 For this recruitment, the party set up a selection committee, called the Council for the Member of 
Parliament Candidate Fulfilment (MANTAP), consisting of the General Chairperson of Dewan Syura 
(Consultative Board), the Secretary of Dewan Syura, the General Chairperson of the Dewan Tanfidz 
(Executive Board), the General Secretary of Dewan Tanfidz and women’s representation. This team 
existed at every level of the committee (DPP/State, DPW/Province and DPC/District). Its main duty 
was to conduct the selection of candidates, where the result of the selection would become the basis in 
drawing up the candidates of the MP list. Once the list finalised, the team then conveyed it to the 
society to have it evaluated or with input from them in return. After passing this process, the MANTAP 
team made a final evaluation, which would determine the formation of the Provisional List of 
Candidates (DCS). The team then submitted the DCS to the DPP to be clarified and legalised as the 
Permanent List of Candidates (DCT). The DPP returned this DCT to every local committee to be 
passed by each Local Election Commission 687. In the case of the national MPs, the DPP defined the 
DCT and submitted it to the Election Commission. In the selection process, MANTAP evaluated and 
scored each candidate based on several criteria, such as seniority, loyalty, behaviour, experience, level 
of popularity, education background, and political knowledge. The score then determined the rank of a 
candidate in the list687.. “Rekrutmen Caleg”, in PKB dalam Pemilu 2004, pp. 75-81. Interview Moch. 
Nurhasim with one of the Chairs of the PKB DPC in Sampang, December 2003, in Moch. Nurhasim, 
“Pengaruh dan Kekuatan Kyai dalam Rekrutmen Politik. Kasus Kabupaten Sampang dan Pasuruan”, in 
Syamsuddin Haris, ed, Pemilu Langsung di Tengah Oligarki Partai. Proses Nominasi dan Seleksi 
Calon Legislatif Pemilu 2004, (Jakarta: Gramedia, LIPI and IMD, 2005), p. 62. 
688 “Rekrutmen Caleg”, in PKB dalam Pemilu 2004, p. 73. 
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something that had been attained evenly by all party’s cadres.689 The party realised 
that there were many persons outside the party, who deserved to be MPs, as they 
were capable to defend the people’s interest.   
 
3. Implementation  
 
3.1.  Inconsistency in Conducting Cadrerization  
 
Although the party had tried to develop a set of cadrerization methods, the 
implementation of a cadrerization process in the PKB during the first decade of the 
Reform Era was not in line with its own method. Sometimes, the implementation of 
formal cadrerization was overshadowed by the “informal” or indirect cadrerization, 
which were held by non-party institutions. The role of NU, as a socio-religious 
organization that had a salient role in establishing the PKB, played a very crucial role 
in the PKB’s cadre development, particularly during the first years of party’s 
existence.  
 
NU cadres, who had joined and passed the NU’s cadrerization, could almost 
automatically transform their status to be cadres of PKB. PKB regarded individuals 
who had joined NU’s cadrerization or who had become cadres of NU as people who 
had understood the essence and the purpose of the PKB’s cadrerization and hence 
could attain status as party cadres. In the first years of the party’s existence, the 
majority of the PKB’s members of committees were former cadres of NU or its 
subparts, and they could reach their position in the party without passing by a tiered 
selection. In addition, it continually happened until the first decade of the PKB’s 
existence690. The General Secretary of PKB-Gus Dur, Zannuba Wahid (Yenny) 
acknowledged that “the PKB cadrerization actually derives from the cadrerization in 
NU’s subparts” 691.   
 
Over the first decade of its existence, the party seemed to feel comfortable to 
be in this situation. NU’s cadrerization in its development became an important part 
in PKB’s cadrerization continuation. The majority of the party’s committee members 
                                                 
689 Ibid, pp. 71-72. 
690 Interview with Muamir M. Syam, Chairperson of PKB (2005-2010), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010. 
691 Interview with Zannuba Ariffah “Yenny” Wahid, General Secretary of Dewan Tanfidz PKB-Wahid 
(2008-2010), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010. See also Nurhasim, “Pengaruh dan Kekuatan Kyai dalam 
Rekrutmen Politik. Kasus Kabupaten Sampang dan Pasuruan”, p. 50. 
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and cadres regarded this situation to be in line with the NU people’s aspirations, who 
wanted to have a party that provided a strategic position for NU people in the party in 
order to guarantee the continuation of the struggle of the NU’s interests. Moreover, 
this situation was also supported by the lack of a constitutional role in this matter. 
The party’s constitution actually did not have the power to oblige the implementation 
of a proper cadrerization, as until 2008 it did not specifically arrange this process.       
 
On the other hand, this situation also opened a chance for the patron-client 
relation, as one of the main characteristics in NU’s internal relationship, to reveal in 
this process. The special position of ulama or NU elites provided these figures the 
chance to influence the implementation of cadrerization. However, these figures 
sometimes ran this process using their own understanding and capacity, rather than 
using the standardized modules and curriculums692, which could be controlled and 
evaluated by the party and its apparatus. Eventually the cadrerization instruments 
and concepts could not be implemented correctly, since the dependency on the 
respectable ulama, rather than the system continued. The party could not guarantee 
the quality of cadres, since in reality it tended to depend on other organization’s 
cadrerization and informal figures693. 
 
The party also could not establish a regular and fixed forum to conduct 
cadrerization. During the first decade of reform era, PKB’s cadrerization took place in 
informal forums. In local areas, PKB’s cadrerization depended on the NU’s activities, 
particularly in activities related to the Islamic days’ commemorations. On such 
occasions, the party’s political messages and agendas were conveyed and the 
consciousness to regard PKB as the only party that will struggle sincerely for NU 
peoples’ interests were recalled by ulama or party apparatuses to the participants, 
who usually were also PKB’s cadres or sympathizers. Such occasions were also 
used as a medium to gather the party’s cadres together. Even though the local 
committees in some local areas indeed held a cadrerization at least once or twice, in 
general they really depended on NU’s calendar of activities, which sometimes 
became the only chance for the implementation of cadrerization for local committees 
in other areas.    
 
                                                 
692 Interview with Khatibul Umam Wiranu, Vice General Secretary of PKB (1999-2005) and Member 
of Parliament (1998-2004), in Depok, 17 October 2010. 
693 Interview with Zannuba Ariffah “Yenny” Wahid, General Secretary of Dewan Tanfidz PKB-Wahid 
(2008-2010), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010. 
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Marinah Hardy observed that during his five years as chairperson of the 
Western Southeast Nusa (NTB) DPW of PKB only conducted cadrerization less than 
four times, which used religious celebration momentous as the medium694. According 
to Damanhuri, the PKB actually never did any kind of systematic and structured 
cadrerization. He said, “A structured cadrerization had never taken place in the PKB 
from the beginning until today, never”695 By having this situation, where the intensity 
of the cadre meeting was very low, one can understand if the cadre’s loyalty and 
ideology comprehension was not properly developed. 
 
Besides having a problem with the appropriate forum to conduct 
cadrerization, the continuity of cadrerization was another significant problem. 
According to Hardy “cadrerization was not conducted on the routine basis…the party 
at the national level conducts programs, such as educations, trainings and 
assignments…but over time these processes vanished gradually”696. Some cadres, 
including Hardy, believed that at the local level the financial difficulty hardened this 
situation697. In many remote areas, where the presence of transportation facilities 
became the main issue to hold party activities, the condition of party’s finance, which 
was not handled correctly698, had provided the very obstacle for the existence of 
routine cadrerization699. The cadrerization over time also lost its objectivity and 
tended to serve one particular group’s interest in the party. According to Sulistyo 
“…the education forums and training for the party’s cadres grew when the party had 
just been established. But internal education over time became more exclusive and 
                                                 
694 Interview with Marinah Hardy, Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz of Western Nusa Tenggara DPW of 
PKB (2002-2005), in Jakarta, 28 October 2010. 
695 Interview with K.H Damanhuri, Chairperson of Dewan Syura of Depok DPD of PKB (2002-2004), 
the Member of Parliament of DPRD of Depok (2004-2009), in Depok, 31 October 2010.  
696 Interview with Marinah Hardy, Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz of Western Nusa Tenggara DPW of 
PKB (2002-2005), in Jakarta, 28 October 2010. 
697 Interview with Marinah Hardy, Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz of Western Nusa Tenggara DPW of 
PKB (2002-2005), in Jakarta, 28 October 2010. 
698 Tri Ratnawati, “Beberapa Masalah Pelembagaan Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) dan Alternatif 
Solusi” in Lili Romli, ed., Pelembagaan Partai Politik Pasca Orde Baru Studi Kasus Partai Golkar, 
PKB, PBB, PBR dan PD, (Jakarta: Pusat Penelitian Politik, Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, 
2008), pp. 101-103. 
699 Interview with Marinah Hardy, Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz of Western Nusa Tenggara DPW of 
PKB (2002-2005), in Jakarta, 28 October 2010; with K.H Damanhuri, Chairperson of Dewan Syura of 
Depok DPD of PKB (2002-2004), Member of Parliament of DPRD of Depok (2004-2009), in Depok, 
31 October 2010. 
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even implicitly worked as a medium for factionalism strengthening in the PKB’s body” 
700.   
 
In such a situation, comprehensive cadre development actually became 
something difficult to establish, since the exclusive motives to enhance groups or 
elites’ interest sometimes took over the purpose of cadrerization itself. According to 
Kristadi “the party also failed to play a role as the medium for political education, 
since political practices inside the party did not provided an ideal education for the 
cadres that is in line with the party’s principles” 701.   
 
3.2 Party Recruitment and Subjectivism 
 
In an ideal condition, cadrerization was an important element that played a significant 
part in the recruitment process for internal or public posts. However, in PKB, party 
recruitment was not determined directly by the result of cadrerization.  
 
Some phenomena in PKB’s internal position on recruitment indicate the 
absence of systematic and objective recruitment. The first was that recruitment was 
based partially on heredity and nepotism. In this case, someone who was the relative 
of charismatic ulama had more chance to hold a strategic position in the party, even 
though he or she actually had never been involved in the cadrerization process. At 
the national level, the case of Yenny, the daughter of Wahid who could attain 
strategic positions as the Vice General Secretary and then the General Secretary in a 
short time, without having sufficient experience in the party’s cadrerization, was the 
example of this case. The case of Saifullah Yusuf, the nephew of Wahid, also 
indicated a similar pattern. Yusuf, who was a former member and a MP from PDIP 
(1998-2001), in the 2001 MLB, could be one of the candidates for the General 
Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz, although he never joined the party’s cadrerization 
and just terminated his PDIP membership a couple weeks before the MLB. On that 
occasion, Yusuf, who just became a member of the PKB for one week eventually 
succeeding to be PKB’s new secretary general702.  
 
                                                 
700 Hermawan Sulistyo, “PKB Masa Kini dan Masa Datang”, in Yenny Zanuba Wahid, A. Effendy 
Choirie,and  M. Kholid Syeirazi, (eds.), 9 Tahun PKB, Kritik dan Harapan, (Jakarta: Panitia Nasional 
Harlah ke-9 PKB, 2007), p. 94. 
701 J. Kristadi, “Pergulatan dan Tantangan PKB Memenuhi Harapan Bangsa”, in  ibid, p. 129. 
702 “Tarik Ulur Pendatang Baru di Muktamar Luar Biasa PKB”, Koran Tempo, 18 January 2005.  
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A similar condition also happened at local level, where several relatives of 
influential ulama or NU’s founding fathers could easily become party elite. Some 
grandchildren and close relatives of the late Bisri Syamsuri, one of NU’s founding 
fathers, for instance, became the holder of a strategic position in several local 
committees, including Jombang and Jakarta703. Musa believed that the heredity or 
collegial role was still very crucial in his party. He concluded satirically that the 
condition in his party with three “N”s, saying, “In the PKB nisab (the asset) or nasab 
(the descent) was needed to meet nasib (the destiny)”704. 
 
The party also had serious trouble with the party or NU elites’ attitudes in 
promoting their colleagues or close friends to the recruitment process, which 
occasionally side stepped cadrerization705. The pattern of recruitment based on the 
elite’s collusion was the second phenomenon that happened in this party. In the 
earlier years of PKB’s existence, this kind of recruitment mechanism was commonly 
understood to be a normal procedure, since cadrerization was still in its initial 
process. However, over time, such mechanism happened constantly. It reached its 
peak during the post 2005 Semarang Conference, when party’s elites, including 
Wahid, plotted some unpopular or even strange names to hold several strategic 
positions in PKB. These figures included Sigid Wibisono706, former member of the 
Golkar Party, and Artalyta Suryani707, a businesswoman who was an unknown figure 
                                                 
703 This including Iskandar and his relatives. Interview with Khofifah Indar Parawansa, State Minister 
for Women Empowerment (1999-2001), Chairperson of the Institute for Election Winning of PKB 
(2002-2005), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010.   
704 Interview with Dr. Ali Masykur Musa, Vice Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz PKB (2005-2010) and 
General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz PKB-Versi Parung (2008-2009), in Jakarta, 19 October 2010. 
705 Interview with Muamir M. Syam, Chairperson of PKB (2005-2010), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010. 
706 Wibisono, former member of Golkar Party, was set up to hold one of members of Dewan Syura in 
the 2005-2010 Party Committee. His position in the party was based on Yenny’s recommendation, 
agreed by Wahid. However according to Yenny, it was Iskandar the figure behind the scenes, who 
introduced and recommended Wibisono to her father. Asides the different opinions around the 
introducer, many cadres believed that Wibisono was actually still a member of Golkar Party when 
joining PKB. Interview with Zannuba Ariffah “Yenny” Wahid, General Secretary of Dewan Tanfidz 
PKB-Gus Dur (2008-2010), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010; with Andi M. Ramly, Chairperson of Dewan 
Tanfidz (2002-2010), Secretary of Dewan Syura PKB-Muhaimin (2008-2010) and writer of “Mabda 
Syiyasi PKB”, in Jakarta, 15 October 2010; with Ahmad Shodiq Noor, General Secretary of DKI 
Jakarta DPW of PKB, in Jakarta, 3 November 2010. 
707 Suryani was one of important Indonesia businesswomen, who was the owners of many important 
enterprises in Jakarta and Lampung. She was introduced by Aris Junaidi, party’s treasury, to Wahid to 
hold the new Party’s General Treasury. Although Wahid did not really know her, he agreed Junaidi’s 
recommendation to plot Suryani, a strange figure for most of PKB’s cadres, to hold such important 
position. This exclusive agreement had successfully placed Suryani’s name in the 2005-2010 party 
managing board. The name of Suryani was still recorded in Lembar Negara (the State Document), an 
official document and the authentic and fixed document from the party, legally acknowledged by the 
government. In addition, some people believed that the party had put her name as a new General 
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to the majority of PKB’s cadres; and Muslim Abdurrahman708, prominent figure of the 
Muhammadiyah for the Jakarta DPW of PKB. 
 
At the local level, the political advices of ulama or NU key figures, rather than 
internal party discussion, also played a salient role in the establishment of the local 
board management. These ulama and figures usually asked the party committee to 
consider their students, colleagues or family members to be put in strategic positions 
in the party’s management, as the representation of their interest and support for the 
party709. In this regard, Nurhasim believed that PKB did not have real stages of 
cadrerization that could be used as a fair parameter in the formation of the party 
structure. He said that “By the absence of the cadre stages, it becomes possible for 
even new cadres to hold positions in the party executive committee, if they have a 
close relation with the party’s chair” 710.      
 
The third was the recruitment based on the possession of NU background. In 
this case, someone with NU background, mainly having experience in the NU as a 
committee member, would have a better chance to hold strategic positions in PKB. 
The party that clearly claimed to be an open party, not only for the NU people and 
this situation indicates inconsistency. In doing so, PKB sometimes did not use a clear 
and objective parameter when selecting the persons to hold important positions. The 
candidates’ background then became a main priority rather than their capacity. At the 
national level, several key figures of PBNU became members of the PKB DPP 
almost automatically. Several prominent figures in PBNU such as Ma’ruf Amien, 
Ahmad Bagja and H.Z Arifin to name a few, held important positions in the PKB as 
the General Chairperson of Dewan Syura, the Chairperson of Dewan Syura and 
Secretary of Dewan Syura respectively. In its development, PKB constantly practised 
such patterns of recruitment.      
 
                                                                                                                                            
Secretary before actually having Suryani’s personal permission. On the process of Suryati being the 
Treasury of The Party see “Akhir Kisah sang Bendahara”, Tempo, 23 March 2008, p. 28.  
708 Abdurrahman was the member of Muhammadiyah, a modernist Islamic organization, who also one 
of Wahid’s very close friends. As prominent figures of the NU and Muhammadiyah, Wahid and 
Abdurrahman had similar visions and shared liberal perspective on Islam which tightened their 
relationships. Even though he was not NU’s cadres, and had never joined PKB’s cadrerization, his 
relation with Wahid paved Abdurrahman a way to be one of the chairpersons in the Jakarta DPW of 
PKB. 
709 Interview with Muamir M. Syam, Chairperson of PKB (2005-2010), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010. 
710 Ibid, p. 49. 
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At the local level, this pattern of recruitment also worked. Many PKB leaders 
could obtain the important positions in the PKB because of their influential position in 
NU. Hardy, for instance, was General Secretary of the NTB DPW of NU, which then 
held an important position in the NTB DPW of PKB as the General Secretary of 
Dewan Tanfidz. He could reach his strategic position in the PKB simply because of 
his previous position in NU. Damanhuri, a charismatic ulama and the owner of 
pesantren in Depok, was a member of Dewan Syuriah in the Depok DPC of the NU. 
Although he used to belong to the PPP, zealous activist in the Soeharto era and was 
not really active in the PKB’s initial establishment in Depok, in the 2004, mainly due 
to his position in the NU community, he was selected to be the Depok DPC of the 
PKB Chairperson of Dewan Syura.    
 
However, the existence of such patterns did not really close the opportunity 
for common people and people with a non-NU background to join the party and hold 
a strategic position. The existence of some important figures, including Imam 
Nachrawi711, one of the chairpersons in PKB-Muhaimin DPP who reached his 
position based on his quality, proved that the chance was still open. At the local level, 
similar situations also happened. In some non-NU areas, such as in East Southeast 
Nusa or Papua, the people without NU background indeed could lead. However, the 
proportion of these areas was limited compared to the total number of PKB 
committees around the country, which mainly were concentrated in the NU basis 
areas, where the role of NU background and heredity aspects still play a salient role.  
 
Having the above situations, some elites realized that the party actually still 
faced a very complicated situation in performing cadrerization. Muhaimin Iskandar, 
for instance, acknowledged that almost one decade after its establishment the PKB’s 
cadrerization was still not systematic and on the track712. The party failed to abandon 
the role of the NU’s ulama and their networking, including NU management and 
pesantren in the cadrerization and the recruitment process. A privileged position of 
ulama sometimes became very influential in those processes.  
 
                                                 
711 Nachrawi states proudly that his existence shows that cadrerization in the PKB was not totally in 
vain. Interview with Imam Nachrawi, the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz of East Java DPW of 
PKB (2005-2007) and the Member of Parliament (2009-2014), in Jakarta, 25 October 2010.   
712 A. Muhaimin Iskandar, “Fundamental Politik Partai Kerja Modern: PKB Lima Tahun Ke Depan”, in 
A Muhaimin Iskandar, Melampaui Demokrasi Merawat Bangsa dengan Visi Ulama. Refleksi Sewindu 
Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, (Jogjakarta: Klik.R, 2006), pp. 57-58. 
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Above situation corresponded to Angelo Panebianco’s opinion on the one of 
the characteristics of a weak institutionalized party. According to Panebianco ”In 
weakly institutionalised parties, on the other hand, few ”careers” of this type exist; 
there is greater discontinuity at all levels; and while there are few “conventional” 
careers, in the strict sense, there are many rapid careers involving immediate entry to 
the middle-high ranks…In weakly institutionalized organizations, on the other hand, 
there is a “horizontal integration” of elites: people enter the party at high levels from 
the outside environments in which they already occupy positions”713. Since people 
could relatively attain a strategic position in the PKB simply because of their NU 
background, in particular as the members of the NU’s board, the PKB actually 
experienced such a “horizontal integration” phenomenon. Someone that had become 
elite in NU or even just a son of the famous NU ulama could be an important person 
in the PKB without passing an objective cadrerization or tiered selection714. In short, 
those people could occupy important positions in the PKB because of their status 
and activities outside the party.  
 
4. The Emergence of Supporting Tendencies for Fragmentation 
 
The lack of establishing systematic cadrerization results in three inclinations in this 
party, which, over time, cemented fragmentation establishment. These three 
tendencies are (1) the failure to preserve common understanding on the rules of the 
game, (2) esprit de corps weakening or the decreasing sense of togetherness, and 
(3) the fail to maintain cadre’s respect towards the rules of the game.    
 
4.1. The Failure to Preserve Common Understanding on The Rules of The Game  
 
The discontinuity of cadrerization that indicated the absence of systematic 
cadrerization provided diversity and incompleteness in the knowledge transfer of the 
party’s values and the rules of the game to all cadres. This condition led to the 
emergence of multi-interpretations of the rules of the game and values.   
                                                 
713 Angelo Panebianco, Political Parties: Organization and Power, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988), pp. 61-63. 
714 Interview with Muhammad Tohadi, Member of PKB (1998-2005) and Vice Chairperson of PKNU 
DPP, in Jakarta, 6 October 2010; with Dr. Ali Masykur Musa, Vice Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz 
PKB (2005-2010) and General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz PKB-Versi Parung (2008-2009), in 
Jakarta, 19 October 2010; with Khofifah Indar Parawansa, State Minister for Women Empowerment 
(1999-2001), Chairperson of the Institute for Election Winning of PKB (2002-2005), in Jakarta, 20 
October 2010; with Choirul Anam, Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz of Eastern Java DPW of PKB 
(1998-2005) and General Chairperson of DT of “PKB-Alwi” (2005-2007), in Jakarta, 13 October 2010. 
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 Khatibul Wiranu, former General Secretary of the Party, believes that a 
proper cadrerization would bring solid interpretation among cadres. He said, “if the 
cadrerization ran well in PKB, I think the differences in understanding rules of the 
game would be minimal”715. However, in the PKB, he believes, such situation was 
not the case716.  
                                                
 
The debate on the proportion of the General Chairperson of Dewan Syura’s 
role in the dismissal process of the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz, for 
instance, continued during the first decade of PKB’s existence. Even though the party 
constitution had mentioned this matter, over time a common understanding on that 
issue did not strongly occur among cadres. In dealing with such issue, several cadres 
believe that it was the right of Dewan Syura to dismiss the General Chairperson of 
Dewan Tanfidz. Thus, dismissals could be conducted in many forums and not only in 
Muktamar, on condition that the Chairperson of Dewan Syura had agreed it. On the 
other hand, many cadres believed that Muktamar or the MLB was the only eligible 
forum for the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz impeachment process. Over 
time, there was no solid and one interpretation on this matters that could be used as 
final reference, which was transmitted or socialised by the party to all cadres.717 Until 
the end of the first decade of reform era such difference still exist among the cadres. 
To some extent, this situation also indicates the different perspectives on the real role 
of Muktamar.  
 
A difference also occurred in terms of understanding the party ideology, 
particularly on the implementation of pluralism as one of important values in this 
party. Some people believe that the party should implement a kind of restricted 
pluralism by providing more opportunity for NU members and the teachings of 
ahlussunah wal jamaah to develop. This camp believed that the party should be a 
protector for the development of traditionalist Muslim people’s teaching and interests. 
They also championed for the rights of the NU people to become involved in the 
party’s structure and activities.  
 
715 Interview with Khatibul Umam Wiranu, Vice General Secretary of PKB (1999-2005) and Member 
of Parliament (1998-2004), in Depok, 17 October 2010. 
716 Interview with Khatibul Umam Wiranu, Vice General Secretary of PKB (1999-2005) and Member 
of Parliament (1998-2004), in Depok, 17 October 2010. 
717 Interview with H.Z Arifin Junaidi, General Secretary of Dewan Syura of PKB (2002-2005) and 
Chairperson of Dewan Syuor of PKB (2005-2010), in Jakarta, 28 October 2010. 
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 On the other hand, many members believe that the party should provide pure 
equality towards all Indonesian people. They agreed for instance that the party 
should provide the significant chance for the non-NU members, even the non-Muslim 
ones, to be active in the party.  
 
The absence of cadrerization impeded the party to develop and maintain 
common understanding on such basic issue. Maridjan considers that the 
unsystematic cadrerization had weakened the ideological socialization, which 
eventually weakened the PKB cadres’ understanding on the essence of the party 
ideology718. In line with such an opinion, Wiranu acknowledges that the failure in 
creating a systematic cadrerization had pushed the cadres to individually find the 
meaning of party ideology, which over time provided the very chance for different 
interpretations of this matter among them719.  
 
In its development, the sole interpretation of those problems had gradually 
vanished in this party, which paved the way to the continuation of different 
interpretations. This situation not only indicated the absence of common 
understanding on party’s constitution but also became eventually one of the main 
triggers to three large conflicts that led to internal fragmentations. In this regard, 
Kristiadi concludes that in almost one decade of its existence, different interpretations 
had generated important conflict in this party720.  
      
4.2. The Weakening of Esprit de Corps   
 
Since cadrerization relied on many institutions, mainly pesantren and NU’s sub-
groups, cadres became scattered into the hands of many patrons without effective 
control from the party’s apparatus. In this atmosphere, the party could not maintain 
esprit de corps properly, since the cadres tended to belong to one particular 
institution or patron. The party could not cut such unique and to some extent effective 
                                                 
718 Interview with Prof. Dr. Kacung Marijan, NU policies’ observer and former member of Assistance 
Team of the proposal for the establishment of PKB (Rembang version), in Jakarta, 26 November 2010. 
719 Interview with Khatibul Umam Wiranu, Vice General Secretary of PKB (1999-2005) and Member 
of Parliament (1998-2004), in Depok, 17 October 2010. 
720 Kristadi, “Pergulatan dan Tantangan PKB Memenuhi Harapan Bangsa”, p. 127. 
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relations721. The cadres, as the result, did not really feel a sense of togetherness 
among or an obligation to prioritize the unity of the party. Rather, in this situation, 
many cadres sometimes preferred to follow their ulama722. Sometimes they respect 
the statements or follow the instruction of their patron or ulama more than the party’s 
statement or instruction.  
 
In this situation, the decision of a patron became a kind of obligation to do 
and was followed sincerely by the cadres. The decision of Fawaid Syamsul Arifin, 
charismatic ulama in Situbondo who was also a former the General of Dewan Syura 
Situbondo DPC of PKB, to leave the party which was then followed by thousand of 
PKB cadres in 2003, for instance, indicated such a phenomenon. Staquf considers 
santri loyalty towards Arifin as their patron was the main reason for the santri to 
perform such political manoeuvre723. Arifin’s decision indeed eventually created 
heavy lost for the party in 2004 Election in Situbondo724. However, the Situbondo 
case according to Staquf was not unique or exceptional in PKB725. 
 
Furthermore, in such circumstance it was possible that in PKB, cadres follow 
their “direct patron” in a particular issue without initially trying to understand the real 
situation. The cadres would still follow their ulama without any reservation, even 
though it meant they had to fight with other cadres726. Parawansa describes this 
situation as the readiness to abolish (meniadakan) each other727. They even 
sometime expressed their loyalty by treating their patrons’ opponents as enemy 
rather than as their fellows who simply had different opinion with them728. The 
presence of such loyalty indicates that the role of ulama or patron of PKB’s cadres to 
                                                 
721 Interview with Yahya Cholil Staquf, Vice of General Secretary of PKB (1998-2005) and President 
Abdurrahman Wahid Spokesperson (2001), in Rembang, 11 November 2010. 
722 Interview with Anas Nashikin, General Secretary of Garda Bangsa, one of PKB’s onderbows, in 
Jakarta, 26 October 2010. Ramlan Surbakti, “Tingkat Pelembagaan Partai Politik”, Kompas, 6 January 
2003. 
723 Interview with Yahya Cholil Staquf, Vice of General Secretary of PKB (1998-2005) and President 
Abdurrahman Wahid Spokesperson (2001), in Rembang, 11 November 2010. 
724  “Menakar Ancaman Partai Sempalan”, Gatra, 28 May 2008, p.89. 
725 Interview with Yahya Cholil Staquf, Vice of General Secretary of PKB (1998-2005) and President 
Abdurrahman Wahid Spokesperson (2001), in Rembang, 11 November 2010. 
726 “Makin Panas Menjelang Muktamar PKB”, www.tempointeraktif.com, 23 September 2005. 
727 Interview with Khofifah Indar Parawansa, State Minister for Women’s Empowerment (1999-2001), 
Chairperson of the Institute for Election Winning of PKB (2002-2005), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010. 
728 Interview with Khofifah Indar Parawansa, State Minister for Women’s Empowerment (1999-2001), 
Chairperson of the Institute for Election Winning of PKB (2002-2005), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010. 
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a certain extent was still significant. The fact was the sense of being tied to their 
respected ulama could not be easily replaced by the party729.  
 
This situation was boosted by the fact that the party also became a medium 
to perpetuate the power of groups and a channel for power transaction between 
elites in PKB and NU and their followers. In this regard, nepotism was something that 
could not be effectively avoided by PKB, which highlighted the role of mutualism 
symbiosis between those actors rather than cadrerization in the process of 
recruitment. According to Koirudin at the local level, NU’s elites still became the real 
power730. This kind of relation maintained the loyalty of santri as the party’s cadres 
towards their ulama as patron. Cadres hence tended to look beyond groups or elites, 
who had provided them with real advantages, as the main source of legitimate power 
and put their loyalty in them, rather than strictly in the party with the result that dual 
loyalty could not be effectively avoided.  
  
In this atmosphere, many cadres, particularly at senior and elite levels, had a 
deep sense that their success story in politics had nothing to do with the party rather 
was mainly due to their important position in NU or society. This situation, according 
to Wiranu, had strengthened the sense of independence among the vast majority of 
the ulama or local elites towards the party, to the extent that the party eventually 
could not entirely and effectively direct and control their tendencies or activities731. 
Staquf stated that one of the consequences was if they felt mismatched with Jakarta, 
they would easily leave the party732. Staquf describes this situation as being “the 
party consisting of several independent pouches. It was like a puzzle in which each 
of the pieces was relatively established and self-governing”733. The absence of 
systematic cadrerization had fertilized and cemented such a situation rather than 
deteriorated it. 
 
4.3. The Loose Attitude towards Party’s Rules of the Game  
                                                 
729 Interview with Khatibul Umam Wiranu, Vice General Secretary of PKB (1999-2005) and Member 
of Parliament (1998-2004), in Depok, 17 October 2010. 
730 Koirudin, Menuju Partai Advokasi, p. 185. 
731 Interview with Khatibul Umam Wiranu, Vice General Secretary of PKB (1999-2005) and Member 
of Parliament (1998-2004), in Depok, 17 October 2010. 
732 Interview with Yahya Cholil Staquf, Vice of General Secretary of PKB (1998-2005) and President 
Abdurrahman Wahid Spokesperson (2001), in Rembang, 11 November 2010. 
733 Interview with Yahya Cholil Staquf, Vice of General Secretary of PKB (1998-2005) and President 
Abdurrahman Wahid Spokesperson (2001), in Rembang, 11 November 2010. 
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 The absence of systematic cadrerization also caused the party lost its capability to 
manage cadres’ discipline on the rules of the game. The party could not avoid the 
fact that many of the cadres had undervalued the rules of the game. According to 
Wiranu, “over time the administration discipline in this party had vanished. The 
members of committees tended to put forward a subjective approach rather than 
being consistent with the party constitution or AD/ART”734. In general, he believes 
that the absence of systematic cadrerization had championed personal approach in 
managing the party, since basically the party’s members did not respect internal rules 
any longer735.  
 
Nepotism, for instance, has been a common phenomenon in the process of 
filling strategic positions inside the party at all level of committee. Parawansa stated 
that the very foundation of the party structure was still determined mainly by heredity 
rather than by objective achievements736. Parawansa acknowledged that “PKB was 
the most frequent party that put forward the family aspects in the party structure of 
committee without a gradual process”737. Moreover, the presence of new faces in the 
PKB in the DPP structure, which was simply due to their closeness to some of the 
important figures in the party, showed another aspect of the failure of the merit 
system. The presence of people like Wibisono, Suryani and Abdurrahman was the 
very example of this situation, where unknown people in PKB, mainly cadres at the 
middle and grass root level, could hold several strategic posts in this party.  
 
On the other hand, it was also easy for the party to dismiss members even 
though there was a lack of evidence to support it. Under such circumstance, many 
cadres also felt insecure because their positions could easily be lost due to 
subjective judgment738. Gradually many cadres did not really see that their 
achievement in cadrerization and other formal events would bring positive 
                                                 
734 Interview with Khatibul Umam Wiranu, Vice General Secretary of the PKB (1999-2005) and 
Member of Parliament (1998-2004), in Depok, 17 October 2010. 
735 Interview with Khatibul Umam Wiranu, Vice General Secretary of the PKB (1999-2005) and 
Member of Parliament (1998-2004), in Depok, 17 October 2010. 
736 Interview with Khofifah Indar Parawansa, State Minister for Women Empowerment (1999-2001),  
Chairperson of the Institute for Election Winning of PKB (2002-2005), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010. 
737 Interview with Khofifah Indar Parawansa, the State Minister for Women Empowerment (1999-
2001), Chairperson of the Institute for Election Winning of the PKB (2002-2005), in Jakarta, 20 
October 2010. 
738 Ratnawati, “Beberapa Masalah Pelembagaan Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) dan Alternatif 
Solusi”, pp. 94-95. 
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implications for their career development739. The Chair of Dewan Tanfidz of the 
Central Sulawesi DPW of PKB Samsudin Pay said that such a situation made the 
PKB unable to guarantee a political insurance for their cadres, including himself740.  
 
Also in this situation, ordinary cadres that had performed their best eventually 
thought that the situation in the party was not favourable for them, since they 
sometimes had to give way to blue-blooded persons and their colleagues to lead and 
regarded this circumstance as a normal situation741. Such atmosphere provided a 
serious impact for the cadres to have the opportunity to attain higher stages in their 
career development. According to Choirie, “the tradition of honouring “Gus”, as a kind 
of “the highest caste” and “the main race” in the NU’s body with their all privileges, 
had sometimes disabled the cadrerization system based on a meritocracy spirit and 
therefore hampered the “common NU people” cadres to enjoy the vertical 
mobility”742. This situation also obstructed the cadres’ motivation to sincerely perform 
their duties in this party and follow the rules of the game, since fairness was not the 
important measurement for career development.  
                                                
 
In the end, this situation discouraged most of the cadres and made them 
disrespect to the party system743. This situation, on the other hand, also supported 
the freedom of actions among cadres to secure their exclusive interests, including 
protecting the interest of their political patron. This situation also pushed them 
towards building relations with powerful figures based on the exclusive with a self-
seeking interest744. The situation generally taught cadres that being loyal to figures 
that could bring those advantages to them rather than to follow the system, was a 
reasonable choice in order to survive.  
 
 
739 Interview with Ahmad Shodiq Noor, General Secretary of the DKI Jakarta DPW of PKB, in Jakarta, 
3 November 2010. 
740 M. Hernowo and M. Zaid Wahyudi, “Konflik PKB. MLB dan Ketidakpastian Karier Politik“, 
Kompas, 9 May 2008. 
741 Interview with Muhammad Tohadi, Member of PKB (1998-2005) and Vice Chairperson of PKNU 
DPP, in Jakarta, 6 October 2010. 
742 Choirie, “Menjadikan PKB Partai Nasional dan Terbuka”, p.204. 
743 Interview with Dr. A. Effendy Choirie, Member of Parliament from PKB (1998-2011) and 
Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz PKB-Versi Parung (2008-2009), in Jakarta, 19 October 2010.  
744 Interview with Prof. Dr. Kacung Marijan, NU policies’ observer and former member of Assistance 
Team of the proposal for the establishment of PKB (Rembang version), in Jakarta, 26 November 2010; 
with Khatibul Umam Wiranu, Vice General Secretary of PKB (1999-2005) and Member of Parliament 
(1998-2004), in Depok, 17 October 2010. 
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In general, the absence of a merit system and the failure of cadrerization 
discouraged the cadres to value the rules related to the party recruitment. In this 
regard, cadres did not really see a strict correlation between joining cadrerization and 
attaining a better position in the party, which made them feel free to accept a 
proposal from conflicting groups to hold strategic positions in the party. The important 
thing for the cadres therefore was about how far such political manoeuvre could bring 
significant advantages for them745. In this situation, it was common if the supporters 
of conflicting groups could easily ask any persons that they liked to join the party, and 
a cadre to accept such a proposal746.  
 
5. The Impact of the Above Tendencies towards Party  
 
The above three tendencies namely the failure to preserve common understanding 
mainly towards the rules of the game, the weakening of the esprit de corps and the 
loose attitude towards party’s constitution contributed to the emergence of three time 
fragmentations.  
 
5.1. The First Fragmentation 
 
In the 2001 the different perceptions, particularly on the appropriate basis to stipulate 
the dismissal policy towards the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz, had become 
one of the backgrounds for party fragmentation. In this matter, Matori Abdul Jalil and 
his supporters believed that the role of Wahid should be limited. The only eligible 
forum to decide the future of Jalil, in their opinion, was a Muktamar or MLB which 
was attended by all committees’ representatives across the country. In this regard, 
hence, Jalil dismissal according to Jalil was unconstitutional. On the other hand, 
Wahid and his followers believed that it was the authority of Wahid, as the General 
Chairperson of Dewan Syura, to dismiss the General Chairpersons of Dewan 
Tanfidz, since Jalil could only be the general chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz after 
having Wahid’s permission. Therefore, the dismissal process could actually be held 
                                                 
745 Interview with Prof. Dr. Kacung Marijan, NU policies’ observer and former member of the 
Assistance Team of the proposal for the establishment of the PKB (Rembang version), in Jakarta, 26 
November 2010; with Anas Nashikin, General Secretary of the Garda Bangsa, one of the PKB’s 
onderbows, in Jakarta, 26 October 2010; with H.Z Arifin Junaidi, General Secretary of Dewan Syura of 
PKB (2002-2005) and Chairperson of the  Dewan Syura of PKB (2005-2010), in Jakarta, 28 October 
2010 
746 Interview with Zannuba Ariffah “Yenny” Wahid, General Secretary of Dewan Tanfidz PKB-Wahid 
(2008-2010), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010. 
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in many forums, as long as it had been authorised by the general chairperson of 
Dewan Syura.  
 
Each conflicting group over time preferred to hold their perspective rather 
than to compromise it, let alone be willing to follow the opponent’s opinion. They 
believe in the correctness of their opinion. Such an unbridgeable difference 
hampered any attempts for reconciliation and tended to be a source of a prolonged 
conflict and eventually fragmentation.  
 
On the other hand, the lack of esprit de corps also caused problem for 
internal unity preservation. Cadres tended to be easily spread about because they 
tended to follow one particular patron or institution. Several cadres, particularly those 
who attained important positions during Jalil 1998-2001 leadership, supported 
Jalil.747 On the other hand, many more cadres decided to defend Wahid, who was 
not only the former leader of NU but also at that time still supported by many 
prominent and highly respected figures of the NU’s ulama. The absence of esprit de 
corps raised the sense of detestation between the supporters of each conflicting 
group. The cadres regarded their fellows in opposite groups as an enemy who should 
be removed. This attitude was reflected by the desire to sack each other, or to make 
negative statements or accusation publicly sometimes by using mass media, towards 
the opposition. However, many cadres regarded their patron’s position or order as 
the main consideration before making any political actions.  
                                                
  
Their loyalty towards certain ulama played a significant role. In this situation, 
cadres became some kind of easy targets to be mobilised to support one of the 
groups that was in the middle of conflict. The presence of thousands cadres who 
were also actually santri of certain ulama in the MLB indicated their eagerness to 
express their support and defence towards the group supported by their patron. Each 
conflicting group exploited such a phenomenon to gain support in establishing party 
committee and the MLB. Jalil for instance stated that the presence of thousands of 
santri in his MLB would not be possible if the ulama did not instruct them to attend 
the MLB748. Jalil also used his close relation with Dimyati Rais, one of the charismatic 
ulama, to back up his group existence.   
 
747 Interview with Abdul Khalik Ahmad, Secretary of PKB Faction in DPR RI (1999-2001) and 
General Secretary of the PKB- Jalil (2000-2005), in Jakarta, 11 October 2010. 
748 “Benang Kusut Konflik PKB (1). Pintu Islah pun Kian Menutup”, www.detik.com, 15 Januari 2002. 
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 In terms of the lack of respect towards the system, it facilitated the creation of 
supporting groups of each conflicting group including hundreds of local party 
committees. During the intense quarrel and prior to the “fragmentation formalisation” 
through the MLB in 2002, held by each conflicting group, each camp could create 
party committees across the country. The creation of such party committees was 
mainly to show the public and the competitors that all of the legal cadres from the top 
to grass-roots level supported their presence. Jalil and his supporters could set up 
those committees not long after his dismissal749. The result was that a hundred 
delegations from 29 DPWs and 307 DPCs attended MLB held by the PKB-Matori on 
14th-16th January 2002 in Jakarta. While Jalil could prove his party’s existence in all 
provinces and more than three hundreds districts, Wahid’s version of the PKB 
existed in 33 provinces and in 330 DPCs. These committees attended the MLB of 
PKB-Gus Dur/Alwi on 17th-19th January 2002 in Yogyakarta.  
 
With such large creation of committees in a very short period, the violation of 
the rules of cadrerization rules or recruitment became possible. In fact, each 
conflicting group accused its opponent to be committed to manipulate the recruitment 
rules. Wahid’s camp for instance accused that the person that represents East Java 
DPW of the PKB who attended the PKB-Matori’s Muktamar held dual membership, 
since he was actually still a member of Partai Umat Muslim Indonesia (the Party of 
Indonesia Muslim Ummah/PUMI) at that time750. They also noticed that many 
important and legal members actually did not participate in Jalil’s muktamar and 
preferred to join the Wahid camp.  
 
Jalil clearly rejected this opinion stating that the participants of his MLB were 
pure cadres that had been members of committees for a long time751. Jalil then 
attacked the Wahid camp as being unconstitutional for its policy to provide a chance 
                                                 
749 Jalil’s capability to establish such complete committees was a surprise, since the influence of Wahid 
was still at its peak with most of the NU people or committees and the fact that the most influential 
ulama were still on Wahid’s side. Dudung Abdul Muslim, “Meneropong Masa Depan PKB”, Suara 
Merdeka, 14 November 2001. 
750 Choirie for instance stated that one of the representations of the East Java DPW of the PKB-Matori, 
namely Nico Ainul Yakin was still a member of the Party of Indonesia Muslim Ummah (UMI). See 
footnote in Choirie, PKB Politik Jalan Tengah NU, p. 300. This accusation was also indicated by 
Wahid in his speech during the opening ceremony of the 2002 PKB-Gus Dur/Shihab MLB see K.H 
Abdurrahman Wahid, “Sambutan Pembukaan Muktamar Luar Biasa Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa 17-19 
January 2002”, in AD/ART Anggaran Dasar dan Anggaran Rumah Tangga Partai Kebangkitan 
Bangsa, (Jakarta: Dewan Pengurus Pusat Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, 2002), p. XIV. 
751 “Matori Dikukuhkan Kembali Hingga 2005”, Kompas, 16 January 2002. 
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for unknown person or newcomer such as M.A.S Hikam to be active participants in 
PKB-Matori. Hikam, a newcomer, was then elected to be one of the chairpersons of 
PKB-Gus Dur/Alwi. In responding Wahid’s accusation, the General Secretary of PKB-
Matori, Abdul Ahmad stated that all participants in the PKB-Matori MLB were legal 
members, which were still loyal and put their hope in Jalil752. 
 
The presence of the rapidly formed groups tended to deteriorate the situation, 
since it raised the confidence of each group that a massive and organized people 
had given their support to them. They also believed that the cadres supported them 
and hence were already on the track to fight for the truth and to continue the 
objectives of the party.753 This situation eventually made a compromise become 
more difficult to achieve. Instead of reaching a conflict resolution, over time, each 
conflicting group with their hundreds of committees and thousands of members 
across the country preferred to legalize their presence through MLB, which then 
played the formal occasion for internal fragmentation in this party. 
 
5.2. The Second Fragmentation 
 
In the case of second fragmentation in 2005, the dissimilarities in understanding the 
rules of the game also became a kind of a catalyst that fostered internal conflict, 
which led to party fragmentation754. In terms of deciding on a proper medium to 
dismiss the general chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz, similar with the previous case that 
has been mentioned above, the conflicting groups held diametrical opinions755.  
 
Alwi Shihab and the cadres that follow him believed that Muktamar or MLB 
was the only appropriate and legal medium to discuss and evaluate the achievement 
and the future of the general chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz. Moreover, since a 
                                                 
752 Interview with Abdul Khalik Ahmad, Secretary of the PKB Faction in DPR RI (1999-2001) and 
General Secretary of PKB- Jalil (2000-2005), in Jakarta, 11 October 2010. 
753 See for instance Laporan Pertanggungjawaban Ketua Umum Dewan Pengurus Pusat Partai 
Kebangkitan Bangsa, presented in Muktamar Luar Biasa Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, Jakarta, Hotel 
Borobudur, 14-16 January 2002, p. 29. 
754  Kamarudin, Konflik Internal PKB, (Depok: Akses Publishing, 2008), pp. 236-238. 
755 The first opinion believed that the muktamar was the exact medium to conduct such interest. The 
non-Wahid groups held this populist opinion and did not see any other way as an alternative. On the 
other hand, Wahid’s supporter believed in a more exclusive perspective. In their opinion, the party 
could use any kind of forum to dismiss the general chairperson of the Dewan Tanfidz, as long as the 
dismissal proposal had been agreed by the General Chairperson of the Dewan Syura. The position of 
Wahid therefore was important. 
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general chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz was elected in Muktamar involving many 
participants across the country, then it was also Muktamar, and not an exclusive 
forum that should be the eligible forum to dismiss the general chairperson. On the 
other hand, the Wahid camp believes on the prerogative right of Wahid in the 
dismissal of General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz. Both Wahid’s camp and its 
opponents believed that they were the party’s elements that fought for the truth.  
 
In this second case of fragmentation, the difference between both camps also 
touches ideological matter. It was related to the way the party should deal with 
pluralism as one of important values in this party. Several cadres, mainly from Wahid 
camp, wanted the party to implement this idea totally and constantly. Consequently, 
the party should open a greater opportunity for non-NU or even non-Muslim elements 
to take part in the party committee756. In addition, the party should sincerely be the 
protector of the minority757.  
 
On the other hand, other cadres, mainly who eventually supported the 
existence of PKB-Ulama still believed in the historical rights of NU people in PKB. It 
meant that the party had to put NU people as the priority in the party activities and 
management, including the party management formation758. They worried that the 
non-NU people would have the opportunity to build their influence in the party in the 
name of pluralism and eventually once again stepped aside and reduced the role of 
NU people in the party, similar to what happened in the Masyumi and the PPP759. 
Moreover, they were also afraid that the eagerness to protect pluralism would 
decrease the ahlul sunnah wal jamah (Aswaja) values in the PKB. Some figures were 
concerned that PKB over time tended to be purely a secular party rather than a party 
based on Islamic standards760.  
 
                                                 
756 Choirie, “Menjadikan PKB Partai Nasional dan Terbuka”, pp. 196-197. 
757 Interview with Andi M. Ramly, The Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz (2002-2010), Secretary of 
Dewan Syura “PKB- Muhaimin” (2008-2010) and writer of “Mabda Syiyasi PKB”, in Jakarta, 15 
October 2010; with Ahmad Shodiq Noor, General Secretary of DKI Jakarta DPW of PKB, in Jakarta, 3 
November 2010. 
758 Choirie, “Menjadikan PKB Partai Nasional dan Terbuka”, p. 196. 
759 Greg Fealy, Ijtihad Politik Ulama, Sejarah NU 1952-1967, (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2003), pp. 97-194. 
Syamsuddin Haris, PPP dan Politik Orde Baru, (Jakarta: Grasindo, 1991), pp. 54-77 and 117-120. 
Koirudin, Menuju Partai Advokasi, (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Tokoh Bangsa, 2005), p. 3. 
760 Interview with Marinah Hardy, Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz of Western Nusa Tenggara DPW of 
PKB (2002-2005), in Jakarta, 28 October 2010; with Muhammad Tohadi, Member of PKB (1998-
2005) and  Vice Chairperson of PKNU DPP, in Jakarta, 6 October 2010. 
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Even though this issue was not the main reason for the internal conflict, it had 
enhanced the difference and the antagonism between the conflicting groups. The 
proponents of the second opinion used this opinion to criticize the Wahid group as 
the group that had betrayed the interest of the NU people, the ulama and Aswaja 
values761. As a supporter of Shihab, this group legitimized themselves as the group 
that would consistently proceed and implement the real ideology of the PKB. 
According to Kamarudin, the possibility of enduring a prolonged conflict was open in 
the case of 2005 internal conflict since from an early stage, each faction had 
developed and held different understandings. Both groups regarded their position as 
constitutional and should be implemented by the party’s cadres.  
 
The absence of an esprit de corps had preserved cadres’ dependency to their 
patron. In this circumstance the existence of “local hegemony”762 on PKB cadres 
could not easily be replaced by the party. In facing an internal conflict, as 
consequence, the cadres who were also the followers of the ulama at the same time 
could be instructed to back up the patron’s interest, including supporting one of the 
conflicting groups to set up a committee. The cadres could be easily motivated to 
follow any instructions of their ulama without being critical.  
 
According to Staquf, the cadres at the grass-roots level were easy to be 
motivated to support one group if their patron or respected figures were in that 
group.763 By using words like “in the name of Gus Dur” the Wahid’s camp could 
easily motivate the cadres to act. It also occurred in other groups. Staquf believes 
that over time each conflicting group used this situation to establish their existence, 
including establishing a committee prior to the MLB.764 On the other hand as a group 
that really depended on the charismatic figure of the ulama, the Shihab’ camp was 
not free from the patron-client mechanism rather than using just cadrerization in 
building committees. The presence of charismatic ulama – active in supporting every 
movement that should be taken to win the conflict – in the Shihab front made the 
creation of committees in a very short time possible. Using their position, some 
                                                 
761 Interview with Marinah Hardy, Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz of the Western Nusa Tenggara DPW 
of PKB (2002-2005), in Jakarta, 28 October 2010. 
762 Interview with Yahya Cholil Staquf, Vice General Secretary of PKB (1998-2005) and President 
Abdurrahman Wahid Spokesperson (2001), in Rembang, 11 November 2010. 
763 Interview with Yahya Cholil Staquf, Vice General Secretary of the PKB (1998-2005) and President 
Abdurrahman Wahid Spokesperson (2001), in Rembang, 11 November 2010. 
764 Interview with Yahya Cholil Staquf, Vice General Secretary of the PKB (1998-2005) and President 
Abdurrahman Wahid Spokesperson (2001), in Rembang, 11 November 2010. 
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charismatic ulama, including those who joined the Kyai Langitan Group, had 
motivated their santri and people to support their camp.765 
 
The above attitudes eventually hampered any attempts to seek an objective 
solution for all parties, since the elites or prominent figures decision became 
something to follow by all cadres and individuals that felt close to or respected such 
figures. Cadres on the other hand believed that they were on track because the fact 
that their act was supported by respected figures. According to Latif, the dependency 
on the ulama figures on cadrerization eventually weakened the organization’s 
competence in managing contestation and conflict through the institutionalized 
procedure766. In such situation, the compromise became somewhat difficult to be 
concluded, since the interest of charismatic figures became prominent rather than an 
objective, conflict resolution mechanism.  
 
The absence of the respect towards party’s rules of the game enabled each 
conflicting groups to act freely in protecting their supporters and establishing 
networks across the country. They could easily clean local party committees from 
opponent elements and set up local committees. In such situation, the establishment 
or the dismissal of a committee sometimes was conducted by passing the rules of 
the game767.  
 
By having a chance to develop the group in the situation where respect 
towards party’s system and consciousness to preserve unity were low, each 
conflicting group over time was able to establish a committee quickly. In this regard, 
each group could rapidly create committees in almost all of the provinces and more 
than three hundred districts prior to 2005 Muktamar. Shihab group could set up 
committees in 31 provinces and 350 districts, not long after Shihab’s dismissal, 
before the Muktamar of PKB-Alwi held on 1st-2nd October 2005 in Surabaya. On the 
other hand, Wahid’s camp existed in 33 provinces and 394 districts, claimed as the 
only legal PKB committee in the country, held 2005 Muktamar 16th-19th April 2005 in 
Semarang.  
                                                 
765 “Laporan Pertanggungjawaban Dewan Pengurus Pusat Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa Masa Bakti 
2002-2005”, in Membangun Demokrasi Berbasis Tradisi: Ketetapan-Ketetapan Muktamar II Partai 
Kebangkitan Bangsa  Tanggal 1-2 Oktober 2005 di Surabaya, p. 6. 
766 Yudi Latif, “Transformasi PKB: Dari Jaringan Kulturan Ke Jaringan Fungsional”, in 9 Tahun PKB. 
Kritik dan Harapan, p. 148. 
767 Interview with Khatibul Umam Wiranu, Vice General Secretary of the PKB (1999-2005) and 
Member of Parliament (1998-2004), in Depok, 17 October 2010. 
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 The presence of those Muktamars attended by complete party committees 
and thousand cadres across the country motivated each conflicting group to continue 
their objectives768. Similar to the previous case, Muktamar had become an entry 
point for the legalization of the existence of each conflicting group, which essentially 
formalized internal fragmentation in this party. 
 
5.3. The Third Fragmentation 
 
In 2008, when the party experienced fragmentation for the third time, the different 
opinions of the medium and the process of dismissal reappeared and generated 
factionalism among party’s members. The Wahid group, including the elites and 
seniors cadres took the same position with Wahid in supporting the use of an 
unscheduled forum that was named later as a “plenary meeting” to dismiss Iskandar. 
Although the forum used to decide such a dismissal was not proposed initially to 
discuss Iskandar’s leadership performance, this limited forum later on became a trial 
for Iskandar.  
 
However, besides having different interpretation on the rules of the game, 
another problem that had motivated Iskandar and his followers to be involved in the 
intense opposition to the Wahid group was the violation of the recruitment process. 
They believed that unfair recruitment that open an opportunity for unknown persons 
to attain important position in the party would endanger the party’s life769. This 
because under exclusive or personal mechanism of recruitment the party could not 
systematically measured the motivation and the commitment of those unknown 
persons. According to them the fall of Iskandar, for instance, which then generated 
severe tension among the cadres, was the result of negative rumours about him, 
questioning Iskandar’s loyalty to Wahid, which was conveyed by unknown 
newcomers, such as Wibisono or Abdurrahman770.  
 
                                                 
768 Dokumentasi Hasil Mukatamar II Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, Semarang , 16-19 April (Jakarta: 
DPP PKB, 2005). 
769 Ibid, pp. 97-98 
770 ”32 DP PKB Nyatakan Dukung Pencoptan Muhaimin Iskandar”, in http://hariansib.com/?p=29268. 
“Investigasi PKB Tunjuk Sepuluh Nama”, in 
http://www.inilah.com/berita/politik/2008/04/05/21476/investigasi-pkb-tunjuk-10-nama/. “Konflik 
PKB. Tim Investigasi Harus Tunjukan Bukti”, 
http://www.sinarharapan.co.id/berita/0804/04/nas02.html. 
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On the other hand, the Wahid camp did not see the presence of those people 
as a major problem, regarding it as still acceptable and in accordance with the party’s 
constitution. The policy to keep newcomers at the top of the party’s structure was the 
very evidence on this position that also indicated a significant different opinion 
between the Wahid camp and Iskandar group on the way the party should perform 
cadrerization and recruitment. This situation once again proved that an unbridgeable 
perspective among conflicting groups existed. Moreover, the absence of meritocracy, 
which had triggered disappointment, also became an issue for attacking the Wahid’s 
position and had motivated critical and disadvantaged cadres to make hard 
corrections to the party’s policies. This situation generally confirmed that the failure to 
have cadrerization and the establishment of meritocracy had eventually raised 
tension among the cadres771.  
 
The absence of esprit de corps on the other hand caused chasm between 
groups with different views. Each conflicting group forced their opinion on each other 
and was not willing to build common perception. Rather they prefer to consolidate a 
group to protect and voice their interests. Not long after Iskandar’s dismissal, a group 
called Kaukus 15 (the Caucus of 15) consisting of 15 DPW leaders, declared its 
support to Iskandar and claimed that his dismissal was unconstitutional772. Only just 
after the establishment of such as caucus, several persons claimed to be the 
representative of 32 DPWs declared their support to Wahid’s decision773. Both 
camps then regarded themselves as the right and constitutional group. Instead of 
solving the problem, the presence of such groups tended to stimulate the 
factionalisation strengthening among cadres. Each group tried to convince other 
cadres and tried to gain support from them. Over time, the presence of those kinds of 
groups hampered any attempts to create internal reconciliation between Wahid and 
the Iskandar group. 
 
                                                 
771 Interview with Muhammad Tohadi, Member of PKB (1998-2005) and Vice Chairperson of PKNU 
DPP, in Jakarta, 6 October 2010. Ratnawati, “Beberapa Masalah Pelembagaan Partai Kebangkitan 
Bangsa (PKB) dan Alternatif Solusi”, p. 109. 
772 They also supported Iskandar to take any actions necessary to save the party from instability as the 
result for the growing unjust dismissal and suspension taken by Wahid’s group in many local areas. 
“Konflik PKB Diyakini Tidak Akan Pengaruhi Konstituen”, Kompas, 2 April 2008. 
773 ”32 DP PKB Nyatakan Dukung Pencpoptan Muhaimin Iskandar”, in 
http://hariansib.com/?p=29268. “Investigasi PKB Tunjuk Sepuluh Nama”, in 
http://www.inilah.com/berita/politik/2008/04/05/21476/investigasi-pkb-tunjuk-10-nama/. “Konflik 
PKB. Tim Investigasi Harus Tunjukan Bukti”, 
http://www.sinarharapan.co.id/berita/0804/04/nas02.html. 
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During its development each conflicting group conducted unilateral dismissal 
towards cadres who oppose their idea, in order to secure their position and 
weakened the enemy position. Both Wahid and the Iskandar group claimed that their 
group were the only legal one, hence deserved to have support from all the cadres. 
On the other hand, they also set up many news committees across the country or re-
established committees that had been dissolved by the opposing group, to support 
their existence. However, many people believe that all those activities were 
conducted under unconstitutional ways, where each conflicting group tended to set 
aside party procedures774. This situation not only impeded the preservation of party 
unity but also eventually paved the way for the internal fragmentation establishment. 
 
Moreover, similar to the previous situation, the establishment of the factions 
happened fast. This time Wahid’s PKB had fewer committees than the opponent, 
namely PKB-Muhaimin, led by Iskandar. MLB Parung, held on 29th April-1st May 2008 
attended by delegations representing 30 DPWs and 396 DPCs. On the other hand, 
Iskandar’s group could hold MLB called the MLB Ancol that was attended by 
delegations from 32 DPWs and 429 DPCs.  
 
The Wahid camp accused many participants in PKB-Muhaimin MLB as 
illegal, which had come to that occasion without having any legal surat keterangan 
pengangkatan (the official letter of appointment/SK). Yenny believed that “the MLB 
Ancol was illegal, since it was attended by illegal DPW and DPC members. The 
number of legal members of committees in that occasion was less than 5%. The 
other 95% were false. The people that attended the MLB were appointed, not 
elected, and were abruptly given the SK. The SK itself was valid for only one year 
and signed only by Iskandar and Lukman Eddy. Actually the SK should be signed by 
four people, like we do”775.  
 
However, although Yenny had claimed that their SK had been signed by four 
people, Iskandar and Edy as the General Chairperson and General Secretary of the 
party who should sign these SK were not amongst these four people. Consequently, 
the SK of Yenny’s camp was actually also still problematic legally.  
                                                 
774 Ratnawati, “Beberapa Masalah Pelembagaan Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) dan Alternatif 
Solusi”, pp. 94-95. Interview with Khatibul Umam Wiranu, Vice General Secretary of PKB (1999-
2005) and Member of Parliament (1998-2004), in Depok, 17 October 2010.  
775 Interview with Zannuba Ariffah “Yenny” Wahid, General Secretary of the Dewan Tanfidz PKB-
Wahid (2008-2010), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010. 
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 In relation to the capability of each conflicting group to have committees from 
across the country that attended each muktamar or MLB, some cadres believed that 
it was also a result of the manipulating policy of several local committees in 
responding to the invitation to attend muktamar or MLB from both conflicting 
groups776. They believed that several key elites in local committees agreed to send 
an envoy to attend each muktamar and MLB. These elites then ordered different 
members of committees to be present at each muktamar or MLB. They hoped that by 
doing such manoeuvre the existence of their committees will be safe, no matter who 
would win the conflict. According to some interviewees this phenomenon happened 
not only in the case of MLB Parung versus MLB Ancol, but in all muktamars or 
MLBs777. Although, Nashikin believed that not all local committees committed to such 
initiative, he believed that such phenomenon could not be neglected778. This 
phenomenon confirmed the situation where loyalty to the exclusive interest could 
exceed the loyalty to the party. This also indicates the presence of authority 
manipulation that reflects the very fact of how the member could easily 
underestimate and disrespect the party system. Junaidi believed that the above 
phenomenon was a result of the failure of cadrerization779. 
 
The above dispute on legality indicates how the violation of the rules became 
something common in this party. Even though each conflicting group claimed to be 
consistent in following the standard mechanism in attaining their purpose, the 
absence of proper cadrerization, that indicating the absence of party 
institutionalisation, over time had lessened the commitment to put forward party 
constitution.  
 
                                                 
776 Interview with H.Z Arifin Junaidi, General Secretary of Dewan Syura of PKB (2002-2005) and 
Chairperson of Dewan Syuor of PKB (2005-2010), in Jakarta, 28 October 2010; with Ahmad Shodiq 
Noor, General Secretary of DKI Jakarta DPW of PKB, in Jakarta, 3 November 2010; with Anas 
Nashikin, General Secretary of Garda Bangsa, one of PKB’s onderbows, in Jakarta, 26 October 2010. 
777 Interview with H.Z Arifin Junaidi, General Secretary of Dewan Syura of PKB (2002-2005) and 
Chairperson of Dewan Syuor of PKB (2005-2010), in Jakarta, 28 October 2010; with Ahmad Shodiq 
Noor, General Secretary of DKI Jakarta DPW of PKB, in Jakarta, 3 November 2010; with Anas 
Nashikin, General Secretary of Garda Bangsa, one of PKB’s onderbows, in Jakarta, 26 October 2010. 
778 Interview with Anas Nashikin, General Secretary of Garda Bangsa, one of PKB’s onderbows, in 
Jakarta, 26 October 2010. 
779 Interview with H.Z Arifin Junaidi, General Secretary of Dewan Syura of PKB (2002-2005) and 
Chairperson of Dewan Syuor of PKB (2005-2010), in Jakarta, 28 October 2010 
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Moreover, similar to the previous ones, the presence of the 2008 MLB, 
attended by local committees across the country, had paved the way for each 
conflicting group to claim its existence780. The creation of MLB which was basically 
not designed to be a medium for reconciliation, as has been discussed also in 
Chapter VII, had become a legal forum to discredit the opponent and as 
consequence, strengthen internal fragmentation. In other words, the rapid grouping 
of factions prior to MLB had eventually accelerated the emergence of fragmentation. 
 
6.  Overview  
 
The systematic cadrerization should be a key for the development of loyalty, 
perception synchronisation and meritocracy. However, that was not the case for 
PKB. The absence of systematic cadrerization during the first decade of its existence 
failed the party to build a common and solid perception. Instead, the dissimilarity in 
interpreting the party’s constitution and to some extent its vision spread out among 
the elites and cadres. The party also failed directly and exclusively to maintain 
cadres’ loyalty towards the party, since the continuation of patron-client relations in 
the cadre development could not effectively be terminated. It reduced internal esprit 
de corps that played as a catalyst for emerging the spirit of disunity. Moreover, PKB 
was also far from being successful in building meritocracy, thus creating 
disappointment and disrespect towards the rules of the game. These situations that 
is, the failure to preserve a common understanding of the party’s constitution, the 
weakening of the esprit de corps’ and the failure of the meritocracy, eventually 
became the main foundation for the emergence of internal conflict, resistance and 
later on, factionalisation, which not only had paved the way for the decline of the 
sense of togetherness and raised tension among conflicting groups, but eventually 
also fragmentation. The presence of MLB as a medium to legalize the committee 
restoration indicated the fall of party cohesion. In short, PKB’s case indicates a 




                                                 
780 “Perjalanan Muktamar Luar Biasa Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa. Jakarta, 2-4 ei 2008”. Dewan 
Pengurus Pusat Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, Laporan Lengkap Muktamar Luar Biasa Partai 
Kebangkitan Bangsa, Hotel Mercure Ancol, Jakarta 2-4 May 2008. 
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Chapter X 





“We believe that a solid cadrerization is the most important prerequisite 
for the organization’s solidity” (Mahfudz Siddiq)781. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
This chapter discusses PKS’ efforts to implement systematic cadrerization and its 
relation to the party cohesion. As a part of the party’s institutionalisation, the 
systematic cadrerization in PKS’ case has a salient role in helping the party to 
establish party solidity. This chapter will firstly explore the legal-formal aspects of this 
process, in which the party’s constitution and other relevant rules of the game are 
discussed to show mainly the complexity and coherence of the process. The 
following discussion examines the implementation of cadrerization in PKS, describing 
the commitment to conduct cadrerization and fair recruitment in this party. This 
discussion also examines the important position of the rules of the game in this 
process. The next part talks about several important tendencies occurring in the 
above situations within the party, namely the existence of loyalty, the preservation of 
common understanding of the rules of the game and the development of trust. The 
last part of this chapter will discuss the impact of those tendencies on the 
preservation of the party’s cohesion.    
 
2. Legal-Formal Situation 
 
As a party that acknowledges the importance of cadrerization, the PKS’ constitution 
indicates the party’s commitment to this matter. It can be seen from the existence of 
the party’s instruction to provide a cadre development or cadrerization at every level 
of the party’s committees, from DPP at the national level to the Sub-Branch 
Committee (DPRa) as the lowest party structure. The ART of PK and the 2002 ART 
of PKS stated that one of the main obligations of the DPP was mempersiapkan (to 
                                                 
781 Interview with Mahfudz Siddiq, Head of Cadrerization Department of DPP of PKS (2002-2005) and 
Member of Parliament (2004-2014), in Jakarta, 27 October 2010. 
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prepare) the cadres, which in the 2005 ART the words “to prepare cadres” were 
transformed to kaderisasi (cadrerization)782. In the 2005 Constitution the 
cadrerization became officially stronger than before. This constitution clearly stated 
that “to hold cadrerization for party’s members” as a duty that has to be performed by 
each level of committee783. The 2005 ART of PKS stated that every DPRa had to 
have Bidang unit Pembinaan kader (the Development Board), which one of its main 
duties was to be cadrerization organiser784.     
                                                
 
PKS cadrerization objective was to create individuals who had a strong 
Islamic personality and consciousness and who had a commitment to realise Islamic 
visions and values in life785. In this regard, cadrerization was also regarded as a 
process to form an Islamic personality (takwin asy syakhysyiyyah al islamiyah) that 
would be played as a foundation for civilisation786. It happens to be relevant since the 
creation of an alternative civilization needs committed people with a strong militant 
character. This process is dedicated also to the formation of individuals who are 
ready to implement PKS’ dakwah method787. Moreover, this process was eventually 
related also to the cadres’ duty to protect their faith and righteous behaviour, to 
strengthen brotherhood and to give advice to each other788.    
 
The commitment to cadrerization related also to PKS’ beliefs in the strategic 
position of the cadre as one of the important sources of the success in developing 
dakwah and for the revivalism of Muslims789. According to Mahfudz Siddiq” the cadre 
 
782 The ART of PK Article 20; The 2002 ART of PKS Article 17. 
783 The 2005 ART of PKS Articles 22 (c), 34 (c), 47 (c), 56 (h), and 59 (h) 
784 The 2005 ART of PKS Article 57 (1.d.1) 
785 Hurriyah, Sistem Kaderisasi Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (1998-2003), BA thesis, (Depok: 
Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, 
2004), p. 232. 
786 Majelis Pertimbangan Pusat Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Memperjuangkan Masyarakat Madan. 
Falsafah Dasar Perjuangan dan Platform Kebijakan Pembangunan PK Sejahtera, (Jakarta: MPP PKS, 
2008), p. 36. 
787 Ibid, p. 36. Firman Noor, Moderate Islamic Fundamentalism in Indonesia: A Study of Political 
Thinking and Behaviour of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), 1998-2005, MA Thesis, (Canberra: 
Faculty of Asian Studies, ANU, 2006), p.32. 
788 Satria Hadi Lubis, Yang Nyata dari PK Sejahtera. 35 Manfaat dan Alasan Mengapa Kita 
Mendukung PK Sejahtera, (Jakarta: Misykat Publication in Partnership with LP2U, 2004), p, 26.  
789 This opinion to some extent becomes one of important aspects that differentiate this party with other 
Islamic movements, since such an opinion infers the importance to build individuals (cadres) before 
establishing the Islamic system or syariah. In some Islamic movements, including for instance Hizbut 
Tahrir, the establishment of an Islamic system (syariah) is a prime objective that should be prioritized 
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is the secret of life and the revival of many ummats. The history of the ummat is the 
history of militant cadres who have a strong sprit and determination. The strength or 
weakness of an ummat could be measured by its productivity to provide cadres with 
the characteristic of mujahid (the Islamic warrior)”790. This opinion indicates that 
cadrerization was actually part of efforts to create militant individuals who were 
committed to develop Islamic civilization. Such ideological commitment, namely to 
develop a civilization influencing the development of the cadres was the main reason 
to set up cadrerization in the PKS791. The party hoped that through these activities 
the cadres could deepen their understanding of party ideology and values, party 
management, and political insight, and could strengthen their consciousness of the 
creation of solidity and meaning when joining the party792. Hence, besides being a 
medium to strengthen organization management, such tiered cadrerization was 
designed also to obtain qualified cadres and capable leaders793. 
 
PKS’ cadrerization had two main functions, firstly to perform cadre 
development and secondly to perform cadre development and to be the basis for 
recruitment for internal party positions and MP in which the implementation of these 
functions was very open through all the party’s infrastructures and institutions794. The 
party realised that the main strength of the party depended on the growth of the 
cadres, both in terms of quality and quantity795.   
 
As part of the implementation of the party’s commitment to cadrerization, 
PKS developed a selective cadre development method. According to the party’s 
constitution there are six levels of cadrerization, namely (1) Anggota Pemula (the 
Beginner), (2) Anggota Muda (the Junior), (3) Anggota Madya (the Intermediate 
Member), (4) Anggota Dewasa (the Advanced Member), (5) Anggota Ahli (the 
                                                                                                                                            
in any conditions. They believed that the development of individuals will automatically follow the 
success of the syariah installment in the state constitution.   
790 Interview with Mahfudz Siddiq, in http://keadilan.or.id/pk/article.php?sid=933, in Aay Muhammad 
Furkon, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Ideologi dan Praktis Politik Kaum Muda Kontemporer, (Bandung: 
Teraju, 2004), p.219 
791 Hurriyah, Sistem Kaderisasi Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (1998-2003), p. 212 
792 Ibid, pp. 223-226.  
793 Mahfudz Siddiq, “Normalkan Piramida Kader: Seri Siyasah Tarbiyah”, in Saksi, No. 17, VI, 23 Juni 
2004. 
794 Departemen Kaderisasi Partai Keadilan,”Manhaj Kaderisasi Anggota Partai Keadilan”, special 
document, unpublished, in Hurriyah, Sistem Kaderisasi Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (1998-2003), p.144.  
795 Mahfudz Siddiq, “Posisi Tarbiyah dalam Dakwah Partai Keadilan Sejahtera”, Saksi, No. 20, IV, 4 
August 2004.  
 253
Expert), and (6) Anggota Purna (the Elder) (see Table 9). The PKS gave both the 
Beginner and the Junior the title of kader pendukung (the supporting cadre) and the 
four following levels of cadre as kader inti. The PKS also stipulated that there would 
be an Anggota Kehormatan (the Honorary Cadre). The Honorary Cadres were 
people who had significantly contributed to the party, although they were not always 
party cadres. A special committee consisted of members of MS which selected the 
persons who deserved to hold this kind of membership796.  
 
Table 9 
PKS’ Membership Grades  
 
The Type of 
Member Description 
Beginner The cadres who requested to be a party member and had were registered by the DPC after passing the TOP. 
Junior The cadres registered by the DPD as members who passed the First Basic Training (TL-I). 
Intermediate 
The cadres who registered by the DPD as party 
members who passed the Second Basic Training (TL-
II). 
Advanced The cadres registered by the DPW as party members who passed the training at the advanced level. 
Expert The cadres registered by the DPP as party members  who passed the training at the higher level. 
Elder The cadres registered by the DPP as party members who passed the training at the expert level. 
Honour The people who had provided a significant service to the party and were confirmed by the MPP 
              Source: ART of PK Article 8. 
 
 
In order to be able to hold a higher rank, or formally have his membership 
status upgraded, a cadre must join and pass several different levels of trainings and 
activities. The party’s constitution stated that every cadre had to join the party 
development process, education, and trainings programmes and pass them797. As for 
the member candidates, the party obliged them to join the Party Orientation Training 
(TOP) held every three months to upgrade their status to be Beginners. Beginners 
                                                 
796 The ART of PK Article 8. 
797 The 2005 ART of PKS Article 5 (2).  
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have to join the First-Basic Training (TD-I), to reach Junior Level. Juniors had to join 
the Second-Basic Training (TD-II) to hold Intermediate status. The Intermediate 
Members attended the party’s Advanced Training-I (TL-I) which was used as a base 
for the evaluation and selection of the Intermediate cadres to become Advanced 
Members.  
 
The TL-II was an advanced level of training and selection for Advanced 
Members to upgrade their status to be an Expert Member. For the Expert Members 
the PKS conducted Management and Social Leadership Training (TMKS), used as a 
base for the evaluation and selection of the Expert Members to raise their status to 
become Elder/Senior Members. Honorary Members candidates underwent a process 
carried out by the party called Analysis for Capacity and Personal Integrity (AKIP) 
where it investigated and examined their background, personal attitude and political 
potential. The party also conducted Party and Figure Orientation (OPT) for the 
Honorary Candidates as a type of catalyst to introduce the party.           
 
In addition to these trainings courses, it was compulsory for the cadres to join 
other formal party activities, namely: (1) Party Routine Training (TRP), held monthly, 
(2) Cadre Routine Training (TRK) that was conducted at least once a week, (3) Party 
Training (PPK) held at any time needed, (4) Social and Political Science Studies 
(KISP), conducted by the cadres at least once at every level of their membership and 
(5) Member Internal Activities (KIA)798. For Beginners who had passed the TOP 
evaluation process, the party introduced them to the halaqah activities and 
mechanisms, in which at the practical level was a main institution of the PKS 
cadrerization. The halaqah implemented some informal activities including daurah 
(intensive study), rihlah (physical activity), mabit (night activity to improve spiritual 
capacity), joining seminars and reading books as part of cadrerization799.  
 
These activities, as a part of tradition in Jamaah tarbiyah, were supporting 
activities that must be joined by the cadres. This tradition was based on the concept 
of cadrerization that was related strongly to or part of the PKS’ history of 
development as a continuation of Jamaah Tarbiyah model of cadrerization developed 
by this group since the 1980s. The transformation of this movement into a party did 
                                                 
798 Hurriyah, Sistem Kaderisasi Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (1998-2003), pp. 179-187. 
799 Ibid, pp. 187-200. 
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not change the characteristics of the cadrerization model of Jamaah Tarbiyah, 
inspired mainly by Egyptian Ikhwan Muslimin800.  
 
In the above trainings programme and activities, the party implemented the 
curriculum established by the Department of Cadrerization, which consisted of 
subjects such as the basic knowledge on Islam, dakwah, social knowledge, 
administration and technical skills801.   
 
In terms of internal recruitment, PKS used the cadrerization results as a 
guide. The party’s constitution had mentioned the lowest status must be held by the 
cadres to be eligible to hold strategic positions in this party (See Table 10). It shows 
that the cadres’ status played a salient role in the recruitment process and indicates 
that only senior and qualified cadres could hold strategic and important positions in 
the party.       
 
PKS holds internal elections to appoint the MS’ members802. All kader inti had 
the right to vote803. However, only a member that had been an expert member for at 
least 5 years was eligible to be a member of MS. MS members decide the other 
important positions in the party, such as the member of MPP, President of the Party, 
member of DS. However, to fill the strategic positions in the local committees, such 
as the Chairperson of DPW, DPC and DPRa, the party held internal elections 
involving the main cadres at each level804.    
 
Table 10 
Membership Grades for Holding a Party Position  
At National, Provincial and District Level 
 






                                                 
800 Interview with Mahfudz Siddiq, Head of Cadrerization Department of DPP of PKS (2002-2005) and 
Member of Parliament (2004-2014), in Jakarta, 27 October 2010. Ali Said Damanik, Fenomena Partai 
Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia, (Bandung: Teraju, 2002), pp. 109-
125. 
801 Departemen Kaderisasi Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Manajemen Tarbiyah Anggota Pemula, 
(Bandung: Penerbit Asy-Syaamil, 2004), pp. 22-23.  
802 The AD of PK Article 11; The 2002 AD of PKS Article 2; The 2005 ART of PKS Article 8 (1). 
803 The 2002 AD of PKS Article 2; The 2005 ART of PKS Article 8 (1). 




The Chair of MS Expert 10 
The Member of MS Expert 5 
The Chair and Secretary of MPP Expert 5 
The Chairpersons in MPP’s Commissions Expert 1 
President, General Secretary and Treasury of 
DPP 
Expert 5 
Other Positions and Members of DPP Expert 1 
The Chairperson of DSP and Secretary of 
DSP 
Expert 5 
The Chairpersons of Lajnah and DSP 
Members of DSP 
Expert 1 
PROVINCIAL LEVEL 
The Chairperson of MPP, Secretary of MPP 
and The Chairpersons in MPP’s Commissions 
Expert 1 
General Chairperson, General Secretary, 
General Treasury, The Chair of Development 
and the Deputy of Cadrerization  
Expert 1 
The Chairperson of DSW and the Secretary 
of DSW 
Expert 1 
The Chair of Departments, Vice General 
Secretary and Vice General Treasury. 
Advanced 2 
Other Positions and the Members of DPW Advanced 1 
The Members of MPP Advanced 2 
The Chairpersons of Lajnah of DSW Advanced 2 
Other positions in DSW Advanced 1 
DISTRICT LEVEL 
The Chairperson of MPP, Secretary of MPP 
and The Chairpersons in MPP’s Commissions 
Advanced 2 
General Chairperson, General Secretary, 
General Treasury, The Chair of Development 
and the Deputy of Cadrerization  
Advanced 2 
The Chair of Departments, Vice General 
Secretary and Vice General Treasury. 
Advanced 1 
The Chairpersons of Lajnah of DSD Advanced 1 
The Chairperson of DSD and The Secretary 
of DSD 
Advanced 2 
Other Positions and the Members of DPD Intermediate  2 
Other positions in DSD Intermediate 2 
          Source: the 2005 ART of PKS 
 
The Member of Parliament (MP) recruitment process consists of five 
stages805. (1) The first stage was a screening process. In this stage, the party 
evaluated the candidates’’ personal integrity, including their record of 
accomplishment and productivity. (2) The second one was the evaluation process on 
the candidates’ political ability and knowledge, which was followed by (3) the third, in 
which the special capabilities of the candidate relevant to their duty as a MP were 
                                                 
805 “The Documentation for Member of Parliament candidate, Dhawabith, Tawazun, Tanzhimi 
(Keseimbangan Struktural) in Proyeksi Keanggotaan Legislatif (2003)”, unpublished in Furkon, Partai 
Keadilan Sejahtera, Ideologi dan Praktis Politik Kaum Muda Kontemporer, pp. 216-217. See also 
Interview Aay Muhammad Furkon with Anis Matta, in ibid, p.212. 
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assessed. Those who had passed this stage then faced (4) the fourth stage, where 
the small team called a “projection team” scrutinised the prospect of a candidate for 
the party. If this team considered the party still needed the candidate to remain in the 
party, this candidate could not proceed to the next stage. (5) The last stage was an 
election where all the cadres participated. Only the cadres who gained the highest 
votes could represent the party in the national election. In general, PKS’ recruitment 
mechanism opened up the opportunity for every cadre to be elected based on their 
capability, which was acknowledged by the other cadres (election) who were not only 




3.1  Cadrerization: Halaqah and Cadres Maintenance  
 
The PKS’ DPP through the Cadrerization Board provides curriculum and general 
practical guidance for the implementation organisation of this process, communicated 
to all the cadrerization boards and departments in Indonesia, which was conducted 
through several trainings programmes and activities held in all branches. According 
to PKS President (2005-2010), Tifatul Sembiring, every cadre had to join the 
programmes and activities806. Of the many events that should be joined by the 
cadres was halaqah (sometimes called formally TRK). In this compulsory weekly 
training, attended by a maximum of 12 cadres, the cadres were infused, instructed 
and socialised using standard materials by the murabbi. Halaqah mainly constituted 
the focus of each activity in the party807, founding its root in Jamaah Tarbiyah. It was 
formed by tarbiyah activists as the continuation of halaqah model before PKS’ 
establishment in 1998.  
 
The party tried to preserve the continuation of halaqah, as one of the main 
cadrerization institutions. The Department of Cadrerization in every local committee 
had to guarantee the continuation of halaqah808. Sometimes cadres at the municipal 
                                                 
806 Interview with Tifatul Sembiring, President of PKS (2005-2008), in “PKS Masih Seperti yang 
Dulu”, Koran Seputar Indonesia, 10 December 2007.   
807 Interview with Hurriyah MA, cadrerization of PKS observer and Lecturer at Political Science 
Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 29 October 
2010. 
808 For this purpose, the party obliged the cadres to hold this meeting once in every week. However, in 
the areas where the number of the cadres were very low and faced geographical problems, such as in 
several very remote areas in the Papua Province and the Moluccas Province, the party lessened the 
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level must help the enforcement of halaqah at the village level to ensure the 
continuity of this activity in particular and cadrerization in general809. This high 
commitment to this weekly meeting then became a trademark of this party, which 
also differentiated PKS to other Islamic parties in Indonesia810. 
 
In halaqah, the cadres were given information pertaining to the party’s 
policies on contemporary political development, including the reasons behind such 
policies. The party provided an opportunity for the cadres to obtain official information 
related to the party’s policies811. Murabbi communicated the party’s tendencies and 
its rationales to the cadres, in the hope that the cadres would understand and have 
similar tendencies. In this regard, this meeting acted as a medium of socialisation 
and clarification of the party’s political choices812.    
 
The next section of this meeting related to ideology maintenance, which 
delivered and recalled the party’s ideology to the cadres, including the vision and 
mission of dakwah. Also in this part, murabbi reminded the cadres about the party’s 
code of conduct, including the concept of loyalty and trust to the party and its 
leaders813, where the spirit of loyalty was upheld. Moreover, the party also provided 
                                                                                                                                            
frequency of the meetings. The party permitted the cadres in these areas to make their own deal to 
perform halaqah. However, even though the exception was possible, principally, the continuation of 
halaqah was a must. Interview with Untung Wahono, Head of Department of Research and 
Development of DPP of PK (2000-2003), Head of Department of Politics and Defence of DPP of PKS 
(2002-2005), and Chairperson of MPP of PKS (2010-2015), in Jakarta 27 October 2010; with Mahfudz 
Siddiq, Head of Cadrerization Department of DPP of PKS (2002-2005) and Member of Parliament 
(2004-2014), in Jakarta, 27 October 2010. 
809 Interview with Musa Abdillah, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Kelapa Dua DPC of 
PKS, in Jakarta, 23 October 2010. Interview with Nooryanto, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department 
of Bekasi DPD of PKS, in Bekasi, 7 November 2010. 
810 Interview with Hurriyah MA, cadrerization of PKS observer and Lecturer at Political Science 
Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 29 October 
2010.  
811 Interview with Dr. Yon Mahmudi, PKS and Tarbiyah Movement observer, Lecturer at Political 
Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, and one of the 
cadres who signed PKS establishment declaration, in Depok, 6 October 2010. 
812 Interview with Umar Salim Basalamah, Vice General Secretary of PKS (2002), and personal 
secretary of Hidayat Nur Wahid (former President of PKS and Chairperson of MPR of Republic of 
Indonesia), in Jakarta, 12 October 2010; with Musa Abdillah, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department 
of Kelapa Dua DPC of PKS, in Jakarta, 23 October 2010; with Akmal Burhanuddin, former tarbiyah 
activist and student in Egypt who joined PKS after finishing his study, in Jakarta, 24 October 2010; 
with Nooryanto, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Bekasi DPD of PKS, in Bekasi, 7 
November 2010; with Hidayat, MM, Member of Parliament of Tangerang District (2005-2010), in 
Tangerang, 21 October 2010. 
813 Interview with Mustofa, cadre of PKS and former reporter of Profetik Magazine, established by 
cadres of PKS, in Depok, 7 October 2010. 
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materials for individual development, as part of the attempts to help the cadres to 
improve their character and behaviour and to be a high-qualified cadre. The last 
section of this activity related to the attempts to increase the spirit of brotherhood and 
togetherness. During this moment, each cadre was asked to share his knowledge, 
experiences, aspirations and even difficulties, not only in terms of party matters but 
also as personal issues. Through this activity, it was hoped that the relation between 
the cadres would became stronger814. In this regard, halaqah played a role not only 
as political institution, but also as a medium to enhance the spirit of brotherhood, 
touching on some personal aspects of each cadre. According to Sembiring, halaqah 
was something that had been implemented since the party’s establishment, by each 
party committee across the country and had preserved the cadres’ spirit815.  
 
However, some critiques concluded that, although halaqah was a political 
party institution, religious subjects and agendas dominated the discussion in this 
institution, endangering the cadre’s quality of understanding and capability in 
politics816. Apart from such a conclusion, the party, through cadrerization institutions, 
continually controlled and evaluated the existence of halaqah, including the materials 
conveyed by murabbis. 
 
In order to maintain the quality of cadres, the party establish cadre evaluation 
in halaqah. Each halaqah, through murabbi817, reported the development of their 
cadres to the Department of Cadrerization. In this case, murabbi had a special 
evaluation note or form on the cadres’ activities. This note reported the progress of 
the cadres in their religious qualities and the commitment towards the party’s 
                                                 
814 Interview with Musa Abdillah, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Kelapa Dua DPC of 
PKS, in Jakarta, 23 October 2010; with Akmal Burhanuddin, former tarbiyah activist and student in 
Egypt who joined PKS after finishing his study, in Jakarta, 24 October 2010; with Nooryanto, 
Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Bekasi DPD of PKS, in Bekasi, 7 November 2010; with 
Hidayat, MM, Member of Parliament of Tangerang District (2005-2010), in Tangerang, 21 October 
2010. ”Presiden Partai Keadilan Sejahtera Tifatul Sembiring: Tarbiyah, Menjaga Moral dan Semangat 
Berpartai”, Kompas, 25 June 2005. 
815 ”Presiden Partai Keadilan Sejahtera Tifatul Sembiring: Tarbiyah, Menjaga Moral dan Semangat 
Berpartai”, Kompas, 25 June 2005. 
816 Hurriyah, Sistem Kaderisasi Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (1998-2003), p.237. Interview with 
Hurriyah MA, cadrerization of PKS observer and Lecturer at Political Science Department, Faculty of 
Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 29 October 2010.  
817 Those who were selected to hold the Chair of Cadrerization Department usually were the most 
respected murabbsi in a region of committee. The murabbi were the top rank cadres that were trusted 
by the party to bring the mission of the PKS as a party apparatus. In the hierarchical context, the 
murabbi at the lower level, for instance at the DPRa level, was a mutarabbi (supervised cadres) of the 
murabbi at the higher level, at the DPC level.     
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activities, had to be reported periodically, at least once a month818. PKS called the 
party evaluation forum as a taqwim, of which the spirit of honesty, objectivity, balance 
and accuracy became the essence of evaluation819. In some areas, the result of 
evaluation was compiled and recorded into a “report book”820. All the party’s 
branches then reported their evaluation to DPP, where all information and data was 
complied821.  
 
The evaluation conditions made halaqah to some extent operate as a school, 
in which it had an obligation to periodically report on the progress of students822. In 
having this systematic evaluation, the party was able to supervise all cadres’ 
development, including the cadres’ capacity to absorb cadrerization subjects through 
murabbi as the party apparatus.   
 
In this transparent situation, where the rules of the game was revealed and 
measured openly, the cadres had an equal opportunity to develop their careers fairly. 
The future of cadres in PKS was determined mainly by their own hard work and was 
not due to their close relations with the elites. However, Anis Matta believed, in 
general, that it was not merely career development that motivated the cadres in 
halaqah, but also the improvement of their personal qualities823.  
 
In terms of other party formal trainings, such as TOP, TD I-II, TL I-II, and 
TKSM, the implementation intensity of such trainings programmes had increased 
                                                 
818 Interview with Musa Abdillah, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Kelapa Dua DPC of 
PKS, in Jakarta, 23 October 2010; with Akmal Burhanuddin, former tarbiyah activist and student in 
Egypt who joined PKS after finishing his study, in Jakarta, 24 October 2010; with Nooryanto, 
Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Bekasi DPD of PKS, in Bekasi, 7 November 2010; with 
Umar Salim Basalamah, Vice General Secretary of PKS (2002), and personal secretary of Hidayat Nur 
Wahid (former President of PKS and The Chairperson of MPR of Republic of Indonesia), in Jakarta, 
12 October 2010. Hurriyah, Sistem Kaderisasi Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (1998-2003), pp. 206-207. 
819 Departemen Kaderisasi Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Manajemen Tarbiyah Anggota Pemula, 
(Bandung: Penerbit Asy-Syaamil, 2004), p. 64. 
820 Interview with Nooryanto, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Bekasi DPD of PKS, in 
Bekasi, 7 November 2010. 
821 Interview with Umar Salim Basalamah, Vice General Secretary of PKS (2002), and personal 
secretary of Hidayat Nur Wahid (former President of PKS and The Chairperson of MPR of Republic of 
Indonesia), in Jakarta, 12 October 2010; with Musa Abdillah, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department 
of Kelapa Dua DPC of PKS, in Jakarta, 23 October 2010. 
822 Interview with Selamat Nurdin, MM, former tarbiyah activist leader in University of Indonesia, 
Member of Parliament of DKI Jakarta Province (2004-20014), in Jakarta, 22 October 2010. 
823 Interview Aay Muhammad Furkon with Anis Matta, in Furkon, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Ideologi 
dan Praktis Politik Kaum Muda Kontemporer, p.212. 
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after the 2004 Election and in line with the growth of the number of the party’s 
cadres824. In these programmes, the party assembled eligible cadres in a predefined 
place for one or two days and trained them in several subjects, based on the party’s 
standardised curriculum825. As well as being a means of education, the training 
programmes also became a basis for the evaluation of the cadres’ understanding of 
the party curricula. Moreover, the cadres’ membership grade was also determined in 
this process, in which murabbi’s advice, as a figure who directly supervises the 
cadres, played an important role. The result of this process became a sort of party 
formal acknowledgement of each cadre’s commitment and his new status. 
 
3.2 Recruitment: Finding The Proper Cadres 
 
Membership status became a main benchmark for the party in the process of 
recruitment826. In this regard, new cadres with insufficient or a low grade of 
membership could not hold strategic positions in PKS. The party tried to be 
consistent in implementing this mechanism. In the terms of MS member composition, 
it was decided through internal election827. The existence of internal elections 
provided an exact opportunity for popular cadres with good reputation to be elected. 
In this circumstance, the party actually preserved an internal control to maintain the 
quality of MS members. Furthermore, candidates could not depend on exclusive 
relations with the elites; rather they had to prove their personal capability before all 
kader inti.  
 
At the local level, the party, through a small team, consisting of seniors and 
murabbi, monitored cadres with the potential to hold strategic positions in the party’s 
local committee. Murabbi, as the person who was in charge of the monitoring 
                                                 
824 Interview Musyaffa A. Rahim, Head of Department of Cadrerization of PKS DPP (2010-2015) with 
Hurriyah in Hurriyah, Sistem Kaderisasi Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (1998-2003), p.210. 
825 Interview with Musa Abdillah, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Kelapa Dua DPC of 
PKS, in Jakarta, 23 October 2010. 
826 Departemen Kaderisasi Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, “Sekilas tentang Sistem Kaderisasi Partai 
Keadilan Sejahtera”, unpublished, (Jakarta, 2004). in Hurriyah, Sistem Kaderisasi Partai Keadilan 
Sejahtera (1998-2003), p. 205. 
827 The party decided one special day to hold the election, where eligible cadres should join it. 
Interview with Mustofa, cadre of PKS and former reporter of Profetik Magazine, established by cadres 
of PKS, in Depok, 7 October 2010. On the latest situation on this occasion see “Pemira Majelis Syura 
PKS: Cara Unik PKS Memilih Pemimpin”, in http://www.pks.or.id/v2/main.php?op=isi&id=111. 




process, could advise the team, based on his opinion on the quality of the cadres828. 
The small team then discussed that opinion and checked the cadre’s weekly report to 
evaluate the cadres’ level of quality. After informal discussion, the minor conference, 
which consisted of seniors, the representatives of the cadrerization department and 
the murabbis, was held in order to list the names of potential cadres. The party then 
conveyed the selected names to all of the cadres, followed by the internal election to 
elect one person who deserved to lead the party829. The result of such an election 
would be one of the important points for candidates. The elites then held a 
conference once again to determine the composition of the party committee, using 
the result of the election as one of the criteria. In this situation, the opportunity to 
have the best cadres to lead the party was quite possible, as only qualified cadres 
could join the election and passed the other seniors’ judgments. In general, figures 
that held the elite positions such as those in MPP, the top figures of DPP and DPS, in 
PKS were cadres with a high level of commitment and capability and consequently 
pre-eminent cadres.  
 
A similar situation would also occur in the case of MP recruitment. In deciding 
which person would represent the party in the election, PKS made several stages of 
evaluation, scrutinising the personal and political capability of the candidate, to 
determine those eligible830. The party also held an internal election as part of process 
to decide on MP candidate831. Through such a transparent process involving many 
people, the party could relatively protect this process from collusion and nepotism 
tendencies. Elites could not solely determine the result since they have to involve 
and consider thousands of kader inti’s opinions. Until 2008, there was no serious 
objection from the cadres regarding this process. 
 
Besides proposing its own cadres to be the MP, the party also opened an 
opportunity for outsiders, mainly experts or public figures, to represent PKS in the 
legislative body. For this type of recruitment, the party would establish a team that 
                                                 
828 Interview with Musa Abdillah, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Kelapa Dua DPC of 
PKS, in Jakarta, 23 October 2010. 
829 Interview with Musa Abdillah, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Kelapa Dua DPC of 
PKS, in Jakarta, 23 October 2010. 
830 Interview with Hidayat, MM, Member of Parliament of Tangerang District (2005-2010), in 
Tangerang, 21 October 2010. Interview Aay Muhammad Furkon with Anis Matta, in Aay Muhammad 
Furkon, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Ideologi dan Praktis Politik Kaum Muda Kontemporer, (Bandung: 
Teraju, 2004), p.216-218. 
831 “Caleg PKS Ditentukan Melalui Pemilu Internal”, Republika, 30 December 2003. 
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monitored and checked the personal quality and the Islamic commitment of the 
figures that had a potential to be the MP candidate832. After a formal discussion to 
decide the name of the candidates, the party then would develop a personal 
approach to those candidates to convince them and to establish an agreement 
between them and the party. For those candidates who eventually succeeded in the 
election, the party then asked them to join, or at least contribute to the party’s 
agendas and activities, including joining halaqah833.    
 
4. Internal Supporting Tendencies for the Party Cohesion 
 
4.1. Preserving a Common Approach and Understanding 
 
The implementation of cadrerization, as a vital medium to introduce the rules of the 
game, affected the establishment of a common understanding of the way in which 
the party system should work and similar perception and understanding towards the 
AD/ART. This situation eventually prevented the serious gap on these matters 
between the cadres or between the elite and the cadres from happening834.  
 
In terms of terminating internal disputes or establishing conflict resolutions, 
for instance, the cadres would refer them to DS as the main institution in charge of 
such matters. The cadres did not take such problems to other bodies in the party or 
                                                 
832 Interview with Mahfudz Siddiq, Head of Cadrerization Department of DPP of PKS (2002-2005) and 
Member of Parliament (2004-2014), in Jakarta, 27 October 2010; with Hidayat, MM, Member of 
Parliament of Tangerang District (2005-2010), in Tangerang, 21 October 2010. 
833 Interview with Mahfudz Siddiq, Head of Cadrerization Department of DPP of PKS (2002-2005) and 
Member of Parliament (2004-2014), in Jakarta, 27 October 2010; with Hidayat, MM, Member of 
Parliament of Tangerang District (2005-2010), in Tangerang, 21 October 2010; with Aus Hidayat Nur, 
Head of the II Dakwah Region (2002-2005) and Chairperson of BPDO (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 15 
October 2010. 
834 The party also published some books related to the cadrerization, so that the cadres and the people 
could properly understand the whole process of the cadrerization. Through the Department of 
Cadrerization, the PKS also published cadrerization teaching materials for the cadres and society. 
These materials mainly explained the concept, the objective, the curricula of cadrerization. By 
providing the society these books, the PKS actually not only tried to disprove the misunderstanding 
around the its cadrerization, but also to show its readiness in managing systematic cadrerization. These 
books including Tim Departemen Kaderisasi PK-Sejahtera, Manajemen Tarbiyah Anggota Pemula, 
(Jakarta: DPP PKS Departemen Kaderisasi and PT Syaamil Cipta Media, 2005). Tim Departemen 
Kaderisasi PKS, Profil Kader Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, (Bandung: Syaamil Cipta Media, 2004). 
Majelis Pertimbangan Pusat PK sejahtera, Memperjuangkan Masyarakat Madani. Falsafah Dasar 
Perjuangan dan Platform Kebijakan Pembangunan PK Sejahtera, (Jakarta, 2008). Bidang Kewanitaan 
Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Rakornas Bidang Kewanitaan Partai Keadilan 
Sejahtera, (Jakarta: 2001). Dr. Ahmad Satori et. Al Taujihat Ri’ayah Ma’nawiyah Kader PKS 
Sejahtera, (Jakarta: Departemen Kaderisasi DPP PKS, 2003).  
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to external institutions to find a solution835. In the decision-making process, the 
cadres believed that this process should be based on a consultation mechanism and 
therefore could not be an individual policy. As for strategic policies at the national 
level, they understood that MS should be the main institution to decide and decided 
collectively. 
 
Besides having unity in understanding the rules of the game, the cadres also 
shared any similar understanding of their ideology. The intensive internalisation of 
the party’s ideology and its values had preserved the cadres’ ideological 
consciousness. The idea of being “a tool of dakwah” or as “a dakwah soldier” that 
committed to establish Islamic interests and not personal interest through political life 
was understood quite evenly among the cadres836. It was reflected in the absence of 
significant differences on the basis and the objective of the party during the first 
decade of the party’s existence. Mardani A. Sera believed that such a situation was a 
result from the solidity of the ideological understanding among the cadres837.   
 
The above situation eventually pushed the cadres to becoming aware of the 
role of the rules of the game and the ideology in daily activities. On the one hand, this 
situation had reduced the possibility for the elites to make a unilateral interpretation 
of those matters838. Prihandoko said that there would be a massive exodus if the elite 
                                                 
835 In 2011, Yusuf Supendi one of party’s senior figures, appealed against ten party seniors including 
Hilmi Aminuddin, and Anis Matta, to the court on the accusation of party’s mistreatment on him. 
However, the party actually had dismissed him in 2009; hence the official status of Supendi was no 
longer a PKS cadre when taking such legal action. It was interesting to note that Supendi not long after 
submitting his case to the court, asked those seniors to reconcile, which was rejected by those seniors. 
“Alasan Yusuf Supendi Laporkan Petinggi PKS ke KPK”, Republika, 21 March 2011. “Pemecatana 
Bikin Istri Stroke. Yusuf Supendi Gugat 10 Petinggi PKS 42,7 Miliar”, Republika, 2 May 2011. See 
also “Sikap Resmi PKS atas Tuduhan Mantan Kader”, pkspiyungan.blogspot.com, 18 March 2011.      
836 Interview with Amri Yusra, M.Si, Chairperson of Depok DPD of PKS (2002-2004), Member of 
Parliament of Depok District, West Java, (2004-2009), and Lecturer at Political Sciences Department, 
Faculty of Social and Political Science, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 7 October 2010; with Musa 
Abdillah, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Kelapa Dua DPC of PKS, in Jakarta, 23 October 
2010; with Sitaresmi S, M.Psy, Member of Dakwah Department of DPP of PK (2000-2003), in Jakarta, 
8 October 2010; with Hidayat, MM, Member of Parliament of Tangerang District (2005-2010), in 
Tangerang, 21 October 2010. 
837 Interview with Dr. Mardani Ali Sera, Vice Chairperson of MPP PKS (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 6 
October 2010. 
838 The differences among cadres were most likely to happen since the aim of the caderization was not 
to create a solid similarity at the level of detailed policy implementation strategy. In fact, the party 
provided an opportunity for cadres to develop their creativity. The party realized that a very strict 
guidance or homogeneity would bring disadvantages for cadres to implement the policies properly, 
since at the practical level the cadres will face very different and plural context and situation. With this 
regard, the opportunity to have different interpretations and understandings in attaining the objective of 
a policy among cadres was still open and sometimes brought debates among cadres. However, during 
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conducted an exclusive interpretation or understanding of the rules of the game or 
ideology, which contradicted with the real essence and objective interpretation of 
these matters839. On the other hand, with this awareness the cadres would not be 
attracted easily by external or internal elements, using the rules of the game or 
ideology interpretation as reasons to fight each other. Cadres could not be moved 
easily to resist or defect from a party’s decision or their commitment to its ideology.  
 
4.2. Preserving Loyalty  
 
The presence of the systematic cadrerization also implanted the sense of loyalty for 
the cadres. Through halaqah and other training subjects, which also discussed 
loyalty issues, the development of loyalty was conducted gradually. Loyalty to the 
party was based on the belief that the function of the party was to realise Islamic 
idealism and not to serve as personal tools. Musa Abdillah stated that the party told 
the cadres that in the end the party was a path to realise our religious dream840. 
 
The code of conduct to obey the party’s leaders became another developed 
instrument that supported the strengthening of mono-loyalty. In this case, the party 
developed a tradition to regard the leaders’ decision as the best policy for all, since 
the leaders were the best cadres who had a better knowledge and commitment. The 
decisions made by the elites become a kind of fatwa (religious command) that must 
be implemented by all the cadres. Sembiring emphasised that the enjoyment of being 
a party cadre will not exist without obedience.841  
 
In this situation and to a certain extent and it happened in many developed 
parties, the cadres tended to put the elites and the party as the main decision makers 
who have to be followed. It closed the possibility for the development of dual loyalty 
in the party. The party could maintain its position as the only authoritative institution 
that was solely in charge of all aspects, assisted by the party apparatus, which 
                                                                                                                                            
the first decade of its existence, the difference among cadres on the strategy, let alone ideology actually 
was quite rare. Interview with Dr. Prihandoko, the Chairperson of Depok DPP of PKS (2004-2007) in 
Depok, 5 October 2010. Interview with Dr. Mardani Ali Sera, Vice Chairperson of MPP PKS (2010-
2015), in Jakarta, 6 October 2010. 
839 Interview with Dr. Prihandoko, Chairperson of Depok DPP of PKS (2004-2007) in Depok, 5 
October 2010. 
840 Interview with Musa Abdillah, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Kelapa Dua DPC of 
PKS, in Jakarta, 23 October 2010. 
841 See in Nur Hasan Zaidi, “Resepsi PKS”, Republika, 30 Juli 2005. 
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should be respected by the cadres. During the first decade of its existence, this 
situation also enabled PKS to maintain the chain of command for discipline. On the 
other hand, this situation was supported also by the elites’ attitude to honour their 
position by trying to do their best in fulfilling their duties towards the party procedure 
and its ideology. The control among the elites and cadres through halaqah had 
helped the elites to meet this commitment.   
 
Hence, although murabbis played a central role in cadrerization, it did not 
appeal to them to act above the party’s procedure. The murabbis realised that their 
presence was merely a representation or a party apparatus that the party controlled 
and evaluated continually842. Hence, they regarded themselves as persons who 
could not escape from the party’s standards and rules. On the other hand, the cadres 
also did not regard murabbi as an independent person, but as part of the party’s 
system. To ensure the healthy relations between the cadres and murabbi and to 
avoid deep dependency among them, even the party sometimes transferred murabbi 
to other halaqah843.   
 
In addition, the party recruitment based on the objective process 
strengthened the cadres’ dependency on the system and the party rather than on the 
individual. This situation, over time, secured the cadres’ loyalty to the party. The 
cadres believed that their individual efforts would be more influential in determining 
their career promotion rather than an elite’s exclusive recommendation. In this 
situation, the cadres did not feel that they should depend upon certain figures but on 
the objective mechanism. The merit system in place had assisted the party to 
develop professionalism and reduced personal or like-dislike situations, which 
eventually strengthened the cadre’s work to be orientated only towards the party. 
 
4.3. The Development of Trust 
 
Another important tendency of the intensive cadrerization was the development of 
tsiqoh (trust) towards the party and the leaders. Through the weekly meeting of the 
halaqah, this attitude was gradually developed by murabbi to a level where the 
                                                 
842 In the hierarchical context, the murabbi at the lowest level was a mutarabbi at the higher level, 
which had to follow and implement the task and instruction of his or her murabbi.    
843 Interview with Dr. Yon Mahmudi, PKS and Tarbiyah Movement observer, Lecturer at Political 
Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, and one of the 
cadres who signed PKS establishment declaration, in Depok, 6 October 2010. 
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cadres could share their personal problems with murabbi and other cadres without 
hesitation844. Overall, the cadres regarded murabbi, who was a party apparatus, 
more as a teacher but also sometimes as an elder brother or even a parent. This 
attitude indicated the level of trust towards the leaders and the party through 
murabbi. Moreover, halaqah also raised the spirit of brotherhood between the cadres 
and strengthened the spirit of trusting each other. The President of PKS (2001-2005) 
Hidayat Nur Wahid said, “In the party there is cadrerization, both formal and 
individual. There is a common understating among the cadres that we must be a 
good and professional person. It makes us meet, remind and strengthen each 
other”845. In such situations, halaqah, eventually did not only reinforce the relations 
between the elites and the cadres, but also maintained relations between the cadres 
by providing the spirit of brotherhood, which supported the development of trust in 
the party. Under such circumstance, the cadres tended to build similarities instead of 
difference with other party members846.    
 
Furthermore, through the recruitment process, the cadres witnessed a good 
commitment and hard work, which became the main tools to have a better rank and 
position in the party. In this situation, the cadres believed that only the best people 
could lead the party, regardless of their background, which in the long term 
contributed to cementing the trust in the party’s system.   
 
The case of Matta, the General Secretary of PKS for three periods 
demonstrated such values. Although he was not part of the first or the second 
generation of the tarbiyah movement847, also popularly known as a “kader baru” (new 
cadre)848, the core element of PKS, he attained one of the most prestigious positions 
in the party. For some, it was the result of his close relations with Hilmi Aminuddin, 
one of the main leaders and founding fathers of the tarbiyah movement. However 
many cadres regarded Matta as deserving to hold such a position for his exceptional 
                                                 
844 Interview with Hurriyah MA, cadrerization of PKS observer and Lecturer at Political Science 
Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 29 October 
2010; with Noviyanti Utaminingsing, cadre of PKS, in Jakarta, 9 October 2010. 
845 ”Kompas” 25 November 2002, in Lubis, Yang Nyata dari PK Sejahtera, p, 26. 
846 Interview with K.H Yusuf Supendi Lc, Member of DSP of PKS (2000-2005) and Member of 
Parliament (2004-2009), in Jakarta, 3 November 2010. 
847 Interview with Selamat Nurdin, MM, former tarbiyah activist leader in University of Indonesia, 
Member of Parliament of DKI Jakarta Province (2004-20014), in Jakarta, 22 October 2010. 
848 Interview with Aus Hidayat Nur, Head of the II Dakwah Region (2002-2005) and Chairperson of 
BPDO (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 15 October 2010. 
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capability and large commitment to the party849. Prihandoko said that although he 
acknowledged himself as one of the people who was not always in line with Matta’s 
opinions, he considered Matta as was one of the best cadres in PKS who deserve to 
be one of party’s elites850. In line with this opinion, Aus Hidayat Nur, one of the senior 
cadres of Jamaah Tarbiyah, said that although he was a new cadre, Matta was a 
clever cadre with a brilliant vision, strong idealism and a significant contribution to the 
PKS851. For such reasons, elected members of the MS agreed to select Matta, one of 
the young, brightest cadres to be the general secretary. In other words, the 
phenomenon of Matta was an indication of the presence of a merit system in the 
party. 
 
The gradual recruitment combining the elites’ evaluations, included the 
murabbi’s opinion and the internal election involving many cadres, was a unique 
pattern of recruitment in PKS that maintained the quality of the party’s representation. 
This mechanism ensured its objectivity, where the individual quality and not the 
closeness to the elites played a key role. This had not only continued the existence of 
the merit system that satisfied the cadres’ sense of justice and made them feel 
secure852; but also preserved the cadres’ trust of the system and their respect for it 
as the guidance for party daily life853.       
                                                
 
5. The Impact of the above Tendencies on the Party Cohesion  
 
The above situations eventually served as a crucial role in strengthening the 
capability to avoid prolonged internal conflict and to maintain party cohesion. 
Although during its first decade of existence this party could not entirely escape form 
serious internal disputes, some of them having the potential to trigger fragmentation, 
PKS could still maintain its cohesion. 
 
849 Interview with K.H Yusuf Supendi Lc, Member of DSP of PKS (2000-2005) and Member of 
Parliament (2004-2009), in Jakarta, 3 November 2010. 
850 Interview with Dr. Prihandoko, Chairperson of Depok DPP of PKS (2004-2007) in Depok, 5 
October 2010. 
851 with Aus Hidayat Nur, Head of the II Dakwah Region (2002-2005) and Chairperson of BPDO 
(2010-2015), in Jakarta, 15 October 2010. 
852 Interview with Selamat Nurdin, MM, former tarbiyah activist leader in University of Indonesia, 
Member of Parliament of DKI Jakarta Province (2004-20014), in Jakarta, 22 October 2010; with 
Mustofa, cadre of PKS and former reporter of Profetik Magazine, established by cadres of PKS, in 
Depok, 7 October 2010. 
853 Interview with Dr. Mardani Ali Sera, Vice Chairperson of MPP PKS (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 6 
October 2010. 
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 In several crucial cases, the impact of the cadrerization system, namely the 
establishment loyalty, common approach and understanding; and trust had saved the 
party from prolonged conflict and faction creations. The delicate dispute to determine 
the presidential candidate in the 2004 Presidential Election did not become an entry 
point for internal fragmentation. The dispute ended well when all the cadres 
eventually agreed to recommend all party sympathizers and people to support Rais 
as the next president854. This situation could be attained since the cadres had a 
similar perception of the mechanism and the forum that they should use to decide on 
this process, which had been in accordance with the party constitution. They avoided 
unilateral actions and put problems into MS’ hands. Accordingly, the party was able 
to avoid one-sided decisions and the issue of unconstitutionality in the process, 
which could potentially trigger the cadres’ resistance855.  
 
Moreover, the strong commitment to preserve loyalty brought the cadres to 
respect the result of MS. They had the opportunity to express their opinion freely. 
Once the leaders had decided a policy, the cadres should follow it completely. This 
code of conduct came into being in the case of the 2004 Presidential Election. All the 
cadres accepted the decision of the party leaders to support Rais. Even Matta, the 
proponent of Wiranto, agreed to follow entirely such a decision. No cadres rejected 
this decision although at heart they did not agree.  
 
In terms of having a deep trust between each other, the cadres in both 
groups trusted each other regardless of the fact they had two different options. They 
actually still shared a similar main interest and commitment to the success of dakwah 
struggle856. They did not see that such options were designated to facilitate any 
individual or group’s interests. Over time, the consciousness to believe that they still 
shared the same ideological interest encouraged cadres to easily establish the 
reconciliation easily between pro-Wiranto group and pro-Amien group.  
                                                 
854 “PKS Resmi Dukung Amien-Siswanto”, Republika, 1 July 2004. 
855 Interview with Dr. Prihandoko, Chairperson of Depok DPP of PKS (2004-2007) in Depok, 5 
October 2010. 
856 Interview with Ahmad Feri Firman Yusuf, Head of the III Dakwah Region (2002-2005), member of 
Majelis Syuro PKS (2002-2010), in Jakarta, 2 November 2010; with Sigit Sosiantomo, Regional 
Coordinator for East Java and Bali of the PKS (2005-2009), in Jakarta, 25 October 2010; with Aus 
Hidayat Nur, Head of the II Dakwah Region (2002-2005) and Chairperson of the BPDO (2010-2015), 
in Jakarta, 15 October 2010. See also “PKS Resmi Dukung Amien-Siswanto”, Republika, 1 July 2004. 
“Menimba Pengalaman Amien. Amien Rasi Mengaku Pernah Dibohongi PKS dalam Pemilu Presiden 
2004”, Suara Islam, 56th Edition, 5-19 December 2008. 
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 In 2005, two contradictive opinions on the policy whether or not the party 
should respond to the controversial and unpopular policy of President Yudhoyono’s 
Government to reduce BBM subsidy, triggering massive protests across the country 
and had created tension among the cadres. Some cadres believed that leaving the 
coalition was the best way to save the party face857. On the other hand, several 
cadres wanted the party to continue in the coalition because they thought that it was 
still the effective medium to influence government policy in the future858. However, 
this tension did not lead to a prolonged dispute or conflict.  
 
The strong attitude to trust the party leaders, finally deciding to stay as a 
coalition, had helped the party to avoid a prolonged internal dispute. At the practical 
level, the cadres followed the party’s decision without creating any tension. The 
functioning halaqah, as a medium of cadrerization also played a salient role in 
socialising the party’s decision to remain in the government, had successfully 
convinced the cadres to understand and support the party’s choice. Murabbi, with the 
assistance from other cadres who agreed with this policy through halaqah, 
succeeded in convincing the other cadres on the brighter sides of remaining in the 
government859. According to Nooryanto, in facing this delicate situation, cadrerization 
bridged any misunderstanding between the elites and the cadres, which could have 
generated a serious conflict860. In line with this opinion, Prabowo believed that the 
consciousness to obey leaders or a party decision after the party decided to stay in 
the coalition and to preserve unity as the key factors to avoid fragmentation was one 
of the main results of cadrerization, particularly the existence of halaqah861.   
                                                 
857 According to Kamarudin and Prihandoko, there were at least two Provincial Boards (in DKI Jakarta, 
DI Yogyakarta) and one Branch of PKS (in Solo) that wanted PKS to leave the government coalition, 
they were worried PKS would potentially suffer, if PKS was still engaged in the coalition Interview 
with Dr. Kamarudin, Indonesian Islamic political party expert and Lecturer at Political Science 
Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 30 November 
2005; with Dr. Prihandoko, Chairperson of Depok DPP of PKS (2004-2007) in Depok,, 6 December 
2005. On Matta’s opinion to opt out from the coalition, see”Tak Ada Koalisi Tanpa Perubahan”, in 
Saksi, No.6/VIII/30 November 2005, pp.7-9. “Ini Politik Bos”, Tempo, 16 October 2005. 
858 . Interview with Mahfudz Siddiq, Head of Cadrerization Department of DPP of PKS (2002-2005) 
and Member of Parliament (2004-2014), in Jakarta, 27 October 2010. 
859 Interview with Mahfudz Siddiq, Head of Cadrerization Department of DPP of PKS (2002-2005) and 
Member of Parliament (2004-2014), in Jakarta, 27 October 2010. 
860 Interview with Nooryanto, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Bekasi DPD of PKS, in 
Bekasi, 7 November 2010. 
861 Triatno Yudho Prabowo, Pengaruh Taklim Rutin Terhadap Prilaku Politik Kader Partai Keadilan 
Sejahtera dana Perspektif Teori Intergroup Relation, BA Thesis, (Jakarta: State Islamic University 
Syarif Hidayatullah, 2006). 
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 This situation was also supported by the commitment of preserving loyalty to 
the party.  Although the case had created a split opinion among the elites and 
cadres, it did not become the entry point for the establishment of factionalism. This 
type of conflict of opinion was regarded mostly as a normal situation. The 
disappointment that may have occurred with some of the cadres did not lead them to 
resist the decision, let alone try to develop an alternative faction or block. The critical 
elites also could not convince the vast proportion of the cadres to follow their 
exclusive opinion.     
 
In 2008, the party faced once again a serious dispute among its cadres, after 
some important figures announced the idea on PKS as being “an open Islamic party”. 
This idea, which at the practical level provided the opportunity for non-Muslims to be 
members and even join the party committee occurred as a response to the unique 
development in some non-Muslim areas, such as in Papua, where some non-
Muslims proposed themselves to be members of the party in their area862. At that 
time, several cadres, mainly those in DPP and some elites at the DPW level, 
believed that this idea was understandable and did not betray the principles of 
dakwah863. Save for the vast majority of the cadres, this idea was still beyond 
imagination. For several cadres this issue was still unacceptable and even had even 
created a certain degree of anxiety864.  
 
Despite the fact that this idea had triggered an internal dispute, it did not force 
the party into fragmentation. The systematic cadrerization, creating a similar 
perception of the party’s rules of the game, had pushed the cadres to put forward 
party’s mechanism in dealing with the issue rather than individual’s opinion. At the 
very early stage, they believed that such important idea should be discussed first at 
the MS level where several elites, who had different opinions, would voice their 
opinions or perspectives of that matter. 
                                                 
862 Cahyadi Takariawan, “Anggota PKS Non-Muslim di Papua”, in Helvy Tiana Rosa, Izzatul Jannah, 
dkk, Bukan di Negeri Dongeng Kisah Nyata Para Pejuang Keadilan, (Jakarta: Penerbit Syaamil, 
2003), pp. 124-126. Interview with Ahmad Feri Firman Yusuf, Head of the III Dakwah Region (2002-
2005), member of Majelis Syuro PKS (2002-2010), in Jakarta, 2 November 2010.  
863 Interview with Ahmad Feri Firman Yusuf, Head of the III Dakwah Region (2002-2005), member of 
Majelis Syuro PKS (2002-2010), in Jakarta, 2 November 2010. 
864 Interview with Amri Yusra, M.Si, Chairperson of Depok DPD of PKS (2002-2004), Member of 
Parliament of Depok District, West Java, (2004-2009), and Lecturer at Political Sciences Department, 
Faculty of Social and Political Science, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 7 October 2010. 
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 Moreover, in this delicate case, the trust in the party was reflected by the 
eagerness to listen and follow the reasons of the leaders about such ideas. Most 
cadres held the initiative to ask the elites of such issues. In respecting the chain of 
command, the cadres used halaqah as a medium to have the party committee’s 
confirmation and explanation on the development of this issue865. Some local 
committees even invited competent party elites to explain this issue to prevent 
misperception and an unproductive collective response to that idea. The Bekasi DPD 
of PKS, for instance, held a discussion with important and relevant prominent leaders 
to give a comprehensive explanation of such an open party idea866. Such an attitude 
would logically disappear if trust was missing in this party. By having this 
understanding, the cadres could not be influenced easily by any negative rumours 
relating to the way this idea was perceived. The cadres also did not take any 
unconstitutional or extraordinary movements to respond to such a “controversial” 
idea.  
 
Eventually, through effective communication, a common understanding 
between the pros and cons on such issue could be developed and it preserved 
solidity among them. In the end, the party understood the main problem and 
postponed this idea, waiting for the cadres’ readiness to accept this idea867.  
 
However, the fact that the party was not free from disputes, over time, several 
people indicated a symptom of “factionalisation” in the PKS. They then built a 
perspective on the PKS’ “factionalisation”868, even fragmentation, by indicating the 
emergence of two contradictory factions that were named as “the justice group” and 
“the prosperous group”869. They regarded the previous group to be more idealistic 
                                                 
865 Interview with Musa Abdillah, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Kelapa Dua DPC of 
PKS, in Jakarta, 23 October 2010; with Nooryanto, the Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of 
Bekasi DPD of PKS, in Bekasi, 7 November 2010. 
866 Interview with Nooryanto, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Bekasi DPD of PKS, in 
Bekasi, 7 November 2010. 
867 Such open party idea eventually was formally stipulated by the party almost two years latter in 
2010, after all MS members agreed to support it.   
868 Arief Munandar, Antara Jemaah dan Partai Politik Dinamika Habitus Kader Partai Keadilan 
Sejahtera dalam Arena Politik Indonesia Pasca Pemilu 2004, Ph. D Thesis, unpublished, (Depok: 
Program Pasca Sarjana Sosiologi, Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik, 2011).  
869 On this discussion see for instance “Sabit Kembar di Simpang Jalan”, Monitor, 37th Edition, Year 
I/11-17 March 2009. Interview with Mahfudz Siddiq, Head of Cadrerization Department of DPP of 
PKS (2002-2005) and Member of Parliament (2004-2014), in Jakarta, 27 October 2010.  
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with the tendencies to be puritan in pursuing the party’s goal, while the latter, as a 
group with tendencies of pragmatism and moderation in developing the party’s 
influence in national politics. This kind of categorization emerged particularly after the 
2004 Presidential Election, when two different opinions of the presidential candidates 
occurred among cadres.    
 
Yet PKS and its members had never formally claimed the presence of such 
categorisation870. Sembiring, who rejected the presence of faction in the PKS, stated 
“there is no such A’s group or B’s. There were no factions, neither Justice Faction nor 
Prosperous Faction”871. In line with such an opinion, Wahid, the President of the PKS 
(2002-2005), said that the factions, whether between young and old factions or 
prosperous and justice factions, did not exist in his party. He concluded, “PKS is one. 
There is no faction inside”872. Some members indeed indicated different approaches 
that were used by members in evaluating the political situation and actions; 
nevertheless they did not see this as the symptom of faction establishment. Nurdin 
acknowledged that the “factionalisation” in terms of thinking, to some extent, might 
occur, but not on in terms of grouping873. In fact, there was no single group or faction 
that declared itself as a distinct group inside the party that had a different objective 
and vision to the rest of the members on certain fundamental matters, such as 
ideological interpretation, similar to what usually happened in certain British 
parties874.   
 
The grouping among cadres was temporal and flexible, which was mainly 
determined by specific issues. They could, for instance, be in a different group on the 
issue of Wiranto versus Rais in 2004, but had a similar tendency in the case of BBM 
and the continuation of coalition with the Yudhoyono government in 2005. Such a 
situation occurred in the case of Matta, labelled as the representative of “the 
                                                 
870 Some observers believed that internal dispute and division existed. The study conducted by 
Munandar, for instance, indicates an acknowledgement of some cadres on internal division. However, 
in general, the PKS’ cadres and the majority of the interviewees see such differences as something 
normal and that should led to permanent division let alone internal fragmentation. See Munandar, 
Antara Jemaah dan Partai Politik Dinamika Habitus Kader Partai Keadilan Sejahtera dalam Arena 
Politik Indonesia Pasca Pemilu 2004.    
871 “Tifatul: Tidak ada Konflik Internal di PKS”, Republika, 24 March 2011. 
872 “Hidayat Nur Wahid: Tidak ada Faksi di PKS”, 22 March 2011. 
873 Interview with Selamat Nurdin, MM, former tarbiyah activist leader in University of Indonesia, 
Member of Parliament of DKI Jakarta Province (2004-20014), in Jakarta, 22 October 2010. 
874 Moshe Maor, Political Parties, and Party Systems, Comparative Approaches and the British 
Experience, (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 55-162. 
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prosperous group”, versus Mashadi, one of the so-called main figures in “the justice 
group”. In general, the situation in PKS was close to the tendencies created875 rather 
than faction establishment. In this case, the grouping was far from solid and not 
dedicated to be a separate group inside the party. In the situation where the 
tendencies rather than factionalism which tended to occur, the party eventually had a 
better opportunity to restore the unity. 
 
During the first decade of PKS’ existence, however, there were indeed very 
critical persons that quite constantly articulated different opinions and approaches, 
such as Abdhi Sumaiti (Abu Ridha), Daud Rasyid, Mashadi or Yusuf Supendi. 
However, they could not develop their opinions in the party, let alone gain a massive 
support from the cadres. Their presence in the end was simply representing 
individual interests or a small critical group’s concerns. Until today, they could not 
initiate the emergence of faction in PKS. Eventually they tended to be a kind of 
“inactive member” like Sumaiti, or preferred to leave, or be dismissed by the party 
like Rasyid, Mashadi and Supendi. However, to a certain extent, their critical opinions 
of PKS were not entirely insignificant and had triggered awareness among many 
cadres on the way the party should perform its political manoeuvres.       
 
Those persons’ difficulty in gaining support from the vast majority of cadres 
was also evidence of the cadres’ maturity in facing differences and rumours by not 
believing easily negative rumours about the party or the leaders. The systematic 
cadrerization had developed a consciousness among the cadres to develop intensive 
consultation constantly with the party’s apparatuses, through murabbi, the 
cadrerization department, or other institutions, before taking any action876. Therefore, 
generally speaking, the cadres could not be influenced easily by a third party to 
implant its opinions or movements inside the party. In this atmosphere, through its 
own cadres, PKS actually could maintain an effective resistance to any interventions 
or harmful influences that could destroy the party’s unity. 
 
                                                 
875 See the discussion on the differences between factions and tendencies in R. Rose, ‘Parties, Factions 
and Tendencies in Britain’, Political Studies, 12(1): 33-46. 
876 Interview with Musa Abdillah, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Kelapa Dua DPC of 
PKS, in Jakarta, 23 October 2010; with Nooryanto, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Bekasi 
DPD of PKS, in Bekasi, 7 November 2010; with Aus Hidayat Nur, Head of the II Dakwah Region 
(2002-2005) and Chairperson of BPDO (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 15 October 2010; with Selamat 
Nurdin, MM, former tarbiyah activist leader in University of Indonesia, Member of Parliament of DKI 
Jakarta Province (2004-20014), in Jakarta, 22 October 2010; with Mustofa, PKS cadre and former 
reporter of Profetik Magazine, established by cadres of PKS, in Depok, 7 October 2010. 
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Furthermore, the existence of the brotherhood spirit and loyalty, as other 
results of systematic cadrerization, had encouraged the cadres to maintain unity 
among themselves as a family. They preferred to terminate the conflict and reunite 
as soon as possible. The differences in understanding and proposing political options 
did not motivate them to stop their interactions with the party or other members877. 
When facing disagreement with party’s policy, the cadres tended to keep trying to 
understand the reasons behind them and maintain togetherness with the 
apparatus878. Tsiqoh maintained through halaqah, became an effective tool in this 
situation, preserving trust and containment of conflict with the leaders. In this 
situation, it was normal in PKS when the cadres followed the party decision even if 
they did not totally agree with it879. Those who could not support their differences with 
the party would generally leave the party in a good manner880.  
 
There were several cadres, who became very critical and showed an open 
resistance mainly to the party’s elites. In fact, some of them also created a kind of 
“resistance group” called FKP. For them, PKS had violated the main idealism and 
objective of dakwah, by not only taking a pragmatic and compromised policies but 
also had left its main duty as a dakwah tool by letting the party be a political 
machinery merely seeking power and public positions881. However, this kind of 
resistance had never become a major movement in PKS. Even in Jakarta Province, 
as the centre of FKP movement, this forum had only attracted around less than 5 
percent of the total of the cadres and over time, the number decreased gradually882. 
                                                 
877 Prabowo, Pengaruh Taklim Rutin Terhadap Prilaku Politik Kader Partai Keadilan Sejahtera dana 
Perspektif Teori Intergroup Relation. 
878 Ibid. 
879 Muhammad Syihabuddin, “Majelis Syura, Alternatif “Demokrasi Islam”, dan Ketaatan Kader PKS”, 
http://syihabasfa.wordpress.com/2007/12/18/majelis-syura-alternatif-%E2%80%9Ddemokrasi-
islam%E2%80%9D/. Interview with Hidayat, MM, Member of Parliament of Tangerang District 
(2005-2010), in Tangerang, 21 October 2010; with Dr. Prihandoko, Chairperson of Depok DPP of PKS 
(2004-2007) in Depok, 5 October 2010.  
880 Interview with Hurriyah MA, cadrerization of PKS observer and Lecturer at Political Science 
Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 29 October 
2010. 
881 Interview with Hurriyah MA, cadrerization of PKS observer and Lecturer at Political Science 
Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 29 October 
2010; with K.H Yusuf Supendi Lc, Member of DSP of PKS (2000-2005) and Member of Parliament 
(2004-2009), in Jakarta, 3 November 2010. 
882 Interview with Umar Salim Basalamah, Vice General Secretary of PKS (2002), and personal 
secretary of Hidayat Nur Wahid (former President of PKS and The Chairperson of MPR of Republic of 
Indonesia), in Jakarta, 12 October 2010; with Musa Abdillah, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department 
of Kelapa Dua DPC of PKS, in Jakarta, 23 October 2010. 
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Out side Jakarta, the percentage of the supporter was much lower. In the Bekasi 
District, for instance, FKP could only attract around 4-5 cadres from approximately 
10,000 cadres883. In Tangerang City, the number of the exponents of this group was 
insignificant. They “could be counted on the fingers” according to Hidayat884. Outside 
Java Island, the supporters of this movement were almost none885.  
 
In spite of having a significant success in containing internal factionalisation 
and the development of critical groups with dissident tendencies, the above 
conditions also proved that PKS’ cadrerization was not perfect. Although, to certain 
extent, differences among cadre were normal phenomena and, in fact, inevitable, the 
emergence of resistance indicated that the gap of understanding between the party 
and certain cadres could still not be handled entirely by the cadrerization. The main 
issue on this problem was to convince the cadres that the political dynamic outside 
the party required a set of adjustments, in which the moderation of thought and 
attitudes, including being more integrated with the people and their contextual reality, 
were required as a foundation for these adjustments.  
 
In addition to this situation, however, the presence of systematic 
cadrerization, in general, had provided safety nets for the party, namely its strong 
ideological commitment, the loyalty to the party and its idealism, the preservation of 
the sense of brotherhood and the understanding unity of the values that third parties 
could not influence easily. Through the presence of these matters during the first 
decade of its existence, PKS was able to avoid internal fragmentation         
 
6. Overview  
 
The systematic cadrerization, which related to the institutionalisation of cadre 
development and recruitment, was one of the crucial elements for the development of 
party cohesiveness. The above discussion explores how the situation of systematic 
cadrerization in PKS, which had been part of the party’s life, had provided a 
                                                 
883 Interview with Nooryanto, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Bekasi DPD of PKS, in 
Bekasi, 7 November 2010. 
884 Interview with Hidayat, MM, Member of Parliament of Tangerang District (2005-2010), in 
Tangerang, 21 October 2010. 
885 Interview with Umar Salim Basalamah, Vice General Secretary of PKS (2002), and personal 
secretary of Hidayat Nur Wahid (former President of PKS and The Chairperson of MPR of Republic of 
Indonesia), in Jakarta, 12 October 2010; with Aus Hidayat Nur, Head of the II Dakwah Region (2002-
2005) and the Chairperson of BPDO (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 15 October 2010. 
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significant contribution for the development of mono-loyalty, trust and the unity in 
understanding the ideology and the rules of the game. These basic capitals enabled 
PKS to avoid sharp differences of perception, the emergence of antagonistic 
grouping, the rules of the game and vision violation that could generate 
disappointment and resistance. By having those capabilities during the first decade of 




Chapter XI  
The Commitment to Shared Values:  





“Actually there is no ideology in PKB…the only thing that united the 
cadres was the ulama or patrons… which made the “phenomenon of 
federalism” became unavoidable in this party” (Yahya Staquf)886.  
 
 
1.  Introduction  
 
Chapter XI and Chapter XII discuss the correlation between the commitment to 
shared values as one of the elements of the institutionalisation and the phenomenon 
of the party’s fragmentation and cohesion. Chapter XI explores the limited role of 
shared values in PKB and its implications in the difficulty to maintain party 
cohesiveness. Chapter XII, on the other hand, discusses the extensive position of 
shared values in PKS and its role in preserving the party cohesiveness. The 
discussion in both chapters explores the role of shared values that exist in the party’s 
ideology on the development of identity, code of conduct and uniformity of thought 
and action of the cadres.  
 
This concerns what has been called the “value infusion” process where a 
party is infused by “value beyond technical requirement of the task at hand”887 that 
eventually provides, not only a commitment and the sense of taken for granted, but 
also guidance for the cadres to act coherently based on the interest of the party. In 
this regard, the cadres would see the party not merely as a dispensable tool but as 
part of their “valued personal satisfaction”. The chapters apply these insights from the 
literature relevant to the cases of PKB and PKS.  
 
                                                 
886 Interview with Yahya Cholil Staquf, Vice of General Secretary of PKB (1998-2005) and President 
Abdurrahman Wahid Spokesperson (2001), in Rembang, 11 November 2010 
887 Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration. A Sociological Interpretation, (New York: Row, 
Peterson and Company, 1957), p. 17. 
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Each chapter covers several subjects. Firstly, there is a discussion on the 
existence of shared values in each party, the reason behind the absence or presence 
of such shared values in the party and the state of the ‘value infusion,’ including the 
party’s ways to preserve its shared values as this will influence the quality of loyalty 
to the ideals or existence of the party. A second section examines the impact of the 
presence or absence of the shared value and value infusion of the internal life of the 
party. The last section discusses the relation between the shared values and the 
party’s fragmentation and its cohesion. The following chapter undertakes this 
exercise for the case of PKB. 
 
2. Shared Values and their ‘infusion’ in PKB 
 
2.1.  Nationalism, Aswaja and their limitations as factors of cohesion  
 
The constitution of PKB stated that the basis of the party was Pancasila (Five 
Pillars)888, as the very foundation of Indonesia nationalism, which indicated its 
commitment to a nation state and not an Islamic/religious state. This party also stated 
that one of its main characteristics was nationalism889. Nationalism in this context 
relates to the consciousness to acknowledge Indonesia as a nation united by its 
common history and general will of the people, regardless of their ethnics and beliefs, 
to create prosperity for all in the spirit of togetherness and humanity890. For PKB, 
Indonesia as a plural country was the reality that the Muslims could not neglect.  
 
The characteristic of the country that allows and protects Muslims to 
implement their religion freely and acknowledges the principle of one God, is stated 
                                                 
888 The 1998 AD of PKB Article 3; The 2000 AD of PKB Article 3; The 2002 AD of PKB Article 3; The 
2005 AD of PKB Article 3; The 2008 AD of PKB Article 3. 
889 The 1998 AD of PKB Article 5; The 2000 AD of PKB Article 5; The 2002 AD of PKB Article 5; The 
2005 AD of PKB Article 5; The 2008 AD of PKB Article 5.  
890 On the concept of nationalism, see Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1983). Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, (London: Verso Editions and NLB, 1983). Montserrat Guibernau dan John Rex, (eds.), 
The Ethnicity Reader Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Migrations, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997). 
About Indonesia Nationalism see George McTurner Kahin, Nasionalisme dan Revolusi di Indonesia, 
(Jakarta: UNS Press & Sinar Harapan, 1995). Akira Nagazumi, Bangkitnya Nasionalisme Indonesia. 
Budi Utomo, 1908-1918, (Jakarta : Grafitipers, 1989). Taufik Abdullah, Nasionalisme dan Sejarah, 
(Jakarta: Satya Historika, 2001). A. Sartono Kartodirdjo, (et. Al), Negara dan Nasionalisme 
Indonesia : Integrasi, Disintegrasi dan Suksesi, (Jakarta : Pusat Studi dan Dokumentasi Sejarah 
Indonesia, Jurusan Sejarah, Fakultas Sastra, Universitas Sanata Dharma dan Gramedia Widiasarana 
Indonesia ,1995). Firman Noor, ed., Nasionalisme, Demokratisasi dan Identitas Primordialisme di 
Indonesia, (Jakarta: LIPI Press, 2007).  
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as the first pillar of Indonesia’s national ideology, Pancasila indicates that the very 
essence of the country was in line with the spirit of Islamic teachings, namely Tawhid 
(theology of the oneness of God). Hence, although Indonesia is not an Islamic State 
for Islamic traditionalist people in general and including NU and PKB, the existence 
of Indonesia as a nation state and Pancasila as national ideology was final891. For 
PKB, nationalism was the foundation of a struggle for the party that should be held 
eternally. In this regard, PKB believed also that the nation would not reach its 
objective if the people abandoned the spirit of nationalism892.   
 
Using nationalism, however, as the foundation of the party did not mean that 
PKB abandoned the Islamic values in its purpose and as being purely a secular 
party. In fact, the party had a concern to implement and enact Islam in the spirit of 
Aswaja values in the political life. The AD Article 4, stated, “The principle of struggle 
of the party is to serve God, to hold the truth and honesty, to enact justice, to 
preserve unity, to develop brotherhood and togetherness based on the values of 
Ahlul Sunnah wal Jamaah (Aswaja)”893.  
 
Islam, in the light of the Aswaja spirit, itself was the main identity of the NU894. 
The establishment of NU was, for the main part, motivated by the interest to defend 
this teaching895. Aswaja literally means group of Muslims that understands and 
practices Islam and the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad by following the path, 
rule, method or tradition which had been established by jamaah, namely first the 
generation of the close-friends (sahabah and tabiin) to the next generations of the 
followers, represented by ulama. In the Islamic world context, Aswaja, or sometimes 
also called as Sunni, was established by Islamic scholars such as Abu Hasan Al-
                                                 
891 A.Effendy Choirie, Islam-Nasionalisme, UMNO-PKB, Studi Komparasi dan Diplomasi, (Jakarta: 
Pensil 234, 2008), pp. 26-27. The discussion on the relation between NU and the Nationalism see 
Eimar Martahan Sitompul, NU dan Pancasila, (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2010). Faisal Ismail, “Komitmen 
NU terhadap Perjuangan Bangsa”, in Faisal Ismail, NU, Gusdurisme dan Politik Kyai, (Yogyakarta: 
Tiara Wacana Yogya, 1999), pp. 3-10.  
892 DPP PKB, “Membangun Politik Rahmatan Lil’Alamin: Hasil-Hasil Musyawarah Kerja Nasional I 
PKB dan Silaturahmi Alim Ulama” (Jakarta: DPP PKB, 1999), p. 132, in Choirie, Islam-Nasionalisme, 
UMNO-PKB, Studi Komparasi dan Diplomasi, p. 129. 
893 The 1998 AD of PKB Article 4; The 2000 AD of PKB Article 4; The 2002 AD of PKB Article 4; The 
2005 AD of PKB Article 4; The 2008 AD of PKB Article 4. 
894 Choirul Anam, Pertumbuhan dan Perkembangan NU, (Solo: PT Duta Aksara Mulia, 2010), p. xvii 
895 Ibid, p. 19, 38. Kacung Marijan, Quo Vadis NU. NU setelah Khittah 1926, (Surabaya: Penerbit 
Erlangga, 1992), Greg Fealy, Ijtihad Politik Ulama. Sejarah NU 1952-1967, (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 
2003). 
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Asy’ari and Imam Al-Maturidi896. This Islamic stream acknowledges the main role of 
syariah (text) besides the rational reasons, in which the rational reasons is inferior to 
syariah, to found the answer of a problem and generally in implementing Islamic 
teachings. Aswaja also acknowledges the existence of four important sahabahs of 
Prophet Muhammad, namely Abu Bakr as-Shiddiq, Umar Ibn al-Khathab, Usman ibn 
Affan and Ali ibn Abi Thalib as the Muslim leaders and follows their teachings and 
habits.   
 
In the Indonesian context, although most of the Muslims were Sunni, NU 
sometimes claimed itself as the real representation of Aswaja. Over time, NU 
established its own understanding of Aswaja. It then tended to reduce the 
understanding of Aswaja by mainly insisting on the importance to follow at least one 
of the four mazhabs (schools of thought) that were developed by the medieval age 
jurists namely Hanafi, Syafii, Maliki and Hambali897. In reality, although welcomed all 
Muslims with different mazhabs to join NU, almost all NU’s members are actually the 
followers of Syafii. As an implementation of that understanding, NU then became a 
pioneer of the Islamic community in Indonesia that suggested Muslims follow a 
mazhab. NU’s constitution stated that one of the main aims of the establishment of 
the organization was to devote itself to one of the four schools of thought 898. 
 
Thus, the meaning of “based on values of Aswaja” in the constitution of the 
party was close to “the interest of NU”. Hence, the presence of Aswaja as one of the 
main elements in the PKB’s ideology indicated the influence of the NU in the PKB‘s 
vision. In political life, Aswaja’s characteristics were moderation, honouring pluralism 
and prioritizing political stability899. The Aswajan regarded its moderate attitude as a 
proper medium to gain objectives peacefully. In this regard, the Aswajan tended to 
follow the political mainstream or system and rejected any kind of extremism. Aswaja’ 
characteristic to honour social and cultural context was the entry point for this 
organisation to accept Indonesia as a plural country. Thus, Aswaja and nationalism 
were values that supported each other.  
 
                                                 
896 Munawir Abdul Fattah, Tradisi Orang-Orang NU, (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pesantren, 2006), p.7. 
897 Zamakhsyari Dhofier, Tradisi Pesantren: Studi tentang Pandangan Hidup Kiai, (Jakarta: LP3ES, 
1982), p. 149. Anam, Pertumbuhan dan Perkembangan NU, p. 146.  
898 “Anggaran Dasar NU 1926, Article 2”, in “Attachments”, ibid, p. 12. 
899 Choirie, Islam-Nasionalisme, UMNO-PKB, Studi Komparasi dan Diplomasi, p. 144. 
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Nationalism and Islam in the Aswaja’ perspective took a salient position in the 
PKB’s ideology. According to Kacung Marijan, one of the earliest drafters of the party 
constitution, the ideology of the PKB at heart was a synthesis between nationalism 
and the spirit of Aswaja900. Choirie, one of the senior cadres, concluded that 
nationalism and Islamic Aswaja is an “identitas ganda” (“the dual identity”) of PKB901. 
In such a situation, both values became shared values acknowledged by the party 
and its members. 
 
However, the development of nationalist ideas in the realm of religion did not 
only belong to NU or PKB. The majority of Islamic organizations and political parties, 
including those that had an Islamic traditionalist mind-set, acknowledged the 
inextricable relationship between Islam and nationalism. Some important Islamic 
traditionalist parties such as Partai Kebangkitan Ummat (the Party of Islamic 
Community Awakening/PKU), Partai Nahdlatul Ummat (the Islamic Awakening 
Party/PNU), Partai Solidaritas Uni Nasional Indonesia (Indonesia National Union 
Solidarity Party/ Partai SUNI) and PKNU hold the same thinking or idealism on that 
matter902. 
 
Since the idea was acceptable to the other groups, the situation provided a 
chance for the traditionalists to install this value in many parties and organisations. It 
inspired NU people to believe that PKB was not the only channel through which they 
could express the value of nationalism. This situation eventually created a “sense of 
relativism” among the NU members where PKB’s supporters could not claim their 
party as the only user of these values. In a critical situation, this situation provided 
them with an opportunity and the freedom to implement and channel its nationalism 
aspiration to other organizations or parties.  
 
Moreover, although the Aswaja was the norm that had an important role in 
PKB and, in particular, showed that the NU’s community established this party but 
this value had been less relevant in the day-to-day party’s internal activities. A similar 
situation occurred also in nationalism, since this value mainly related to the problems 
                                                 
900. Interview with Prof. Dr. Kacung Marijan, NU policies’ observer and former member of Assistance 
Team of the proposal for the establishment of PKB (the Rembang version), in Jakarta, 26 November 
2010.  
901 Choirie, Islam-Nasionalisme, UMNO-PKB, Studi Komparasi dan Diplomasi, p. 147. 
902 On the ideology of Partai SUNI, PNU and PKU see Tim Penelitian dan Pengembangan Kompas, 
Partai-Partai Politik Indonesia, Ideologi dan Program,  (Jakarta: Penerbit Buku Kompas), pp. 385-
387, 441-443, 529-532. On the Ideology of PKNU, see the AD of PKNU Article 3 and Article 4. 
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on how the party dealt with the existence of Indonesia as a nation state and all 
related matters. The position of these values in PKB, to some extent, opened an 
opportunity for the emergence of a “situation without norms” phenomenon in the 
internal life of the party. In other words, although PKB had a vision on the relation 
between the state and religion and matters related to pluralism and democracy, this 
party was a party with limited shared values to deal with its daily activities. 
 
Ali M. Musa, General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz of PKB-Gus Dur (2008-
2009), described the core problems related to the shared values or ideology in PKB, 
namely the gap between the role of ideology as a guide for external matters and 
internal matters. He said, “In this situation, PKB had been regarded as solid for 
external matters, but this party could not implement solidarity among its cadres”903.  
 
2.2.  The Limited Efforts towards Shared Values’ Development 
 
The generality problem was one that could be properly handled by the party. 
However, until the first decade of the PKB’s existence, the proportion activities 
related to value development and infusion, particularly to simplify the shared value, 
was limited. Comprehensive studies that discussed the implementation of these 
values at the internal organisational level including the discussion on the code of 
conduct development and the management of the organisation and the cadres’ 
behaviour was also not easy to find.  
 
Some forums, which studied and simplified the shared values, were held 
mainly during the PKB’s first years of existence. In 1999, for instance, PKB discussed 
the Mabda’ Siyasi. The result of the discussions was the book entitled “Garis 
Perjuangan Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa” (the Lines of Struggle of the PKB/GPP) that 
became the party’s platform, which talked mainly about the vision and mission of the 
party and matters related to the Indonesian political reform and democracy904. The 
interpretation of the party’s shared values focused mainly on explaining the 
ideological position of PKB in its relation to other groups and the state and to defend 
                                                 
903 Interview with Andi M. Ramly, Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz (2002-2010), Secretary of Dewan 
Syura PKB-Muhaimin (2008-2010) and writer of the “Mabda Syiyasi PKB”, in Jakarta, 15 October 
2010. 
904 “Laporan Pelaksanaan Kebijakan-Kebijakan DPP PKB Masa Bakti 1998-2000” in  Dokumen 
Muktamar I PKB. Membangun Persaudaraan Sejati Antar Manusia Sebagai Esensi Rekonsiliasi 
Nasional, (Jakarta: DPP PKB, 200), p. 27. 
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the policies taken by this party905. With this “outward-looking orientation”, a 
comprehensive standard and evaluation for the implementation of these values for 
internal matters was still absent.  
 
Most cadres believed, however, that this situation was a result of insufficient 
time to handle and manage the problem of shared values906. Not long after its 
establishment, PKB had to face an immediate election, which pushed the party into 
devoting most of its activities to win the people’s vote, rather than to its internal 
organisation development. After the 1999 Election, PKB’s political orientation focused 
mainly on practical matters, which were on the protection of President Wahid’s 
position from his opponents’ political manoeuvres907. Hence, party attention 
dedicated most of it effort to defend and support President Wahid’s political 
movements. After the fall of President Wahid, a series of internal conflicts worsened 
the party’s internal situation, since they reduced the party’s energy and time to deal 
with the conflict rather than to broaden the scope of the role of shared values908.  
 
In its development, the party tried to improve this type of situation by the 
creation of several modules relating to the party’s ideology909. The party also held a 
                                                 
905 See for instance the discussion on the role of PKB’s ideology in Choirie, “Menjadikan PKB Partai 
Nasonal dan Terbuka”, pp. 193-209. Interview with Andi M. Ramly, Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz 
(2002-2010), Secretary of Dewan Syura PKB-Muhaimin (2008-2010) and writer of “Mabda Syiyasi 
PKB”, in Jakarta, 15 October 2010. 
906 Interview with Abdul Khalik Ahmad, Secretary of PKB Faction in DPR RI (1999-2001) and 
General Secretary of PKB-Matori (2000-2005), in Jakarta, 11 October 2010; with Agus Suflihat, 
Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz PKB (1998-2001) and Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz PKB (1998-
2001), via telephone, Jakarta-Bandung, 11 October 2010; with Prof. Dr. Kacung Marijan, NU policies’ 
observer and former member of Assistance Team of the proposal for the establishment of the PKB 
(Rembang version), in Jakarta, 26 November 2010. See also the acknowledgement of the party on the 
election as the main focus of party activities during the first two years, Ketua Dewan Syuro DPP PKB, 
“Pidato Pertanggungjawaban Dewan Pengurus Pusat Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, Masa Bakti 1998-
2000” in  Dokumen Muktamar I PKB. Membangun Persaudaraan Sejati Antar Manusia Sebagai 
Esensi Rekonsiliasi Nasional, (Jakarta: DPP PKB, 2000), p. 18.   
907 Interview with Dr. Ali Masykur Musa, Vice Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz PKB (2005-2010) and 
General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz PKB-Gus Dur (2008-2009), in Jakarta, 19 October 2010; with 
Abdul Khalik Ahmad, Secretary of the PKB Faction in DPR RI (1999-2001) and General Secretary of 
PKB-Matori (2000-2005), in Jakarta, 11 October 2010; with Agus Suflihat, Chairperson of Dewan 
Tanfidz PKB (1998-2001) and the Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz PKB (1998-2001), via telephone, 
Jakarta-Bandung, 11 October 2010. 
908 Interview with Prof. Dr. Kacung Marijan, NU policies’ observer and former member of the 
Assistance Team of the proposal for the establishment of the PKB (Rembang version), in Jakarta, 26 
November 2010; with Tohadi, the member of PKB (1998-2005) and Vice Chairperson of PKNU, in 
Jakarta, 6 October 2010; with Agus Suflihat, Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz PKB (1998-2001) and 
Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz PKB (1998-2001), via telephone, Jakarta-Bandung, 11 October 2010. 
909 See Menumbuhkan Kader Bangsa. Investasi Politik Bersama Rakyat. Kosepsi Dasar dan 
Metodologi Sistem Kaderisasi Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, (Jakarta: DPP PKB, 2000). Menjadi Politisi 
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forum in 2007, called as Workshop for the Strengthening of Party System and 
Management for the 2009 Election. In this forum, the PKB discussed the background 
of NU Establishment, the Dynasty of Hasyimiah (where Wahid was part on it) and 
Mabda Siyasi as the values of party platform that to be held by all cadres in their 
daily political activities910. Again, the essence of the elements was the exploration of 
the spirit of Aswaja and nationalism in relation to developing a political guide for the 
PKB in dealing with national political matters. However, such efforts could not entirely 
affect wide-ranging discussions to specify and simplify the shared values then to 
apply to their internal affairs. In addition, these efforts were not followed-up by the 
creation and development of the institution or rules of the game that could preserve 
the continuation of these efforts and endorse a strong commitment to consistently 
implementing them.  
 
Apart from the limited efforts to simplify the shared values, the process of 
shared values for socialization or transformation also found difficulty in its application. 
For example, the main medium of shared values infusion and maintenance of cadre 
development or cadrerization was not correctly developed. In this type of forum, 
discussions mostly related to the strategy to win the election (including local 
elections), the development of the understanding of nationalism and the 
establishment of good relations with others911, which eventually overshadowed the 
discussion on the shared values’ implementation, including the development of the 
code of conduct. The proportion of the teaching and training in this particular forum 
on value infusion became limited compared to the discussion on external problems. It 
is difficult to find, for instance, the real schedule and systemic process on the cadre 
development and including the value infusion process912. Many leaders of the party 
                                                                                                                                            
Negarawan. Modul Pelatihan dan Orientasi Politik DPC-DPW PKB Modul Orientasi Ideologi DPP 
PKB, (Jakarta: DPP PKB, 2000). Mufid A. Busyaeri, Menggerakan Roda Partai da Perubahan Sosial 
di Tingkat Basis. Modul Pendidikan Dasar Politik Tingkat Anak Cabang Sistem Kaderisasi Partai 
Kebangkitan Bangsa, (Jakarta: DPP PKB, 2000). Menjadi Politisi Organiser Masyarakat. Panduan 
Pendidikan Kader Basis Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, (Jakarta: Lembaga Kaderisasi dan Pendidikan 
Politik, 2003). Andi Muawaiyah Ramly, ed., Saya Bekerja Maka PKB Menang. Modul Pelatihan 
Kader Penggerak Partai untuk Pemenangan Pemilu 2009, (Jakarta: DPP PKB, 2008). M. Hanif 
Dakhiri, Eman Hermawan dan Marwan Ja’far. Workshop Penguatan Sistem dan Manajemen Partai 
Menyongsong Pemilu 2009, (Jakarta: DPP PKB, 2007). 
910 Ahsanul  Minan and Sulthonul Huda, Workshop Penguatan Sistem dan Manajemen Partai. 
Menyongsong Pemilu 2009, (Jakarta: Dewan Pengurus Pusat Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, 2007), pp. 
50-57. 
911 Interview with Andi M. Ramly, Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz (2002-2010), Secretary of Dewan 
Syura PKB-Muhaimin (2008-2010) and writer of “Mabda Syiyasi PKB”, in Jakarta, 15 October 2010.  
912 Interview with Marinah Hardy, Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz of Western Nusa Tenggara DPW of 
PKB (2002-2005), in Jakarta, 28 October 2010; with Damanhuri, Chairperson of Dewan Syura of 
 286
acknowledged that the party did not smoothly implement the cadrerization913. The 
financial problem became one of the most important reasons behind this situation, 
since the party still, in general, lacked formulating fund raising and was less 
disciplined in collecting its members’ contributions914.  
 
On the other hand, at the practical level, the party and the elites tended to 
eventually submit this process to each cadre on an individual basis915. It means the 
party simply used many NU onderbows as main “providers” for the party’s cadres916. 
In such situation, PKB regarded and treated members who had a background as a 
member of NU, including NU onderbows, such as Gerakan Pemuda Anshor (Youth 
Movement of Anshor/ GP Anshor) and Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia 
(Indonesia Islamic Student Movement/PMII), as people who had been developed 
with similar orientation hence, they already understood the norms or shared values in 
the party. As a result, the attitude of “take-for-grantedness” now appeared in this 
party. The assumption behind this attitude most probably related to the 
“homogeneity” between NU and PKB in which these organisations had similar shared 
values.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
Depok DPD of PKB (2002-2004), Member of Parliament of DPRD of Depok (2004-2009), in Depok, 
31 October 2010. 
913 Interview with Interview with Abdul Muhaimin Iskandar, General Secretary of PKB (2000-2002), 
Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz (2002-2005), General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz (2005-2013) and 
Minister of Man Power and Transmigartion, in Jakarta, 13 October 2010, in Jakarta, 13 October 2010; 
with Khatibul Umam Wiranu, Vice General Secretary of PKB (1999-2005) and Member of Parliament 
form PKB (1998-2004), in Depok, 17 October 2010; with H.Z Arifin Junaidi, General Secretary of 
Dewan Syuro of PKB (2002-2005) and Chairperson of Dewan Syuor of PKB (2005-2010), in Jakarta, 
28 October 2010; with Marinah Hardy, Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz of Western Nusa Tenggara 
DPW of PKB (2002-2005), in Jakarta, 28 October 2010; with Damanhuri, Chairperson of Dewan Syuro 
of Depok DPD of PKB (2002-2004), the Member of Parliament of DPRD of Depok (2004-2009), in 
Depok, 31 October 2010. 
914 Interview with Marinah Hardy, Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz of Western Nusa Tenggara DPW of 
PKB (2002-2005), in Jakarta, 28 October 2010; with Damanhuri, Chairperson of Dewan Syura of 
Depok DPD of PKB (2002-2004), the Member of Parliament of DPRD of Depok (2004-2009), in 
Depok, 31 October 2010. 
915 J. Kristiadi, ”Pergulatan dan Tantangan PKB Memenuhi Harapan Bangsa”, in Yenny Zanuba 
Wahid, A. Effendy Choirie, and M. Kholid Syeirazi, (eds.), 9 Tahun PKB, Kritik dan Harapan, 
(Jakarta: Panitia Nasional Harlah ke-9 PKB, 2007), p. 130. 
916 Interview with Zannuba Ariffah “Yenny” Wahid, General Secretary of Dewan Tanfidz PKB-Gus 
Dur (2008-2010), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010; with Marinah Hardy, Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz of 
Western Nusa Tenggara DPW of PKB (2002-2005), in Jakarta, 28 October 2010; with Damanhuri, 
Chairperson of Dewan Syura of Depok DPD of PKB (2002-2004), Member of Parliament of DPRD of 
Depok (2004-2009), in Depok, 31 October 2010; with Khofifah Indar Parawansa, State Minister for 
Women Empowerment (1999-2001), Chairperson of the Institute for Election Winning of PKB (2002-
2005), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010. 
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This assumption overlooked the fact that there were significant differences 
between NU as the socio-religious organisation and PKB as the political 
machinery917. In NU, the main motivation for people to join was to serve the people 
through a non-power approach. On the contrary, in PKB, members were motivated to 
be someone in power and use it to reach the goal. In these two different worlds, each 
organisation should develop its own tradition in order to meet its own objective.  
 
Over time, this situation created another problem. Many actors were involved 
in this process and in particular the ulama in their capacity as the leaders of the NU 
and the owners of pesantren. They played a salient role as a prime mover in 
conveying and socialising the ideology of the party to their santri (students) and the 
people918. Soon described, for instance, that in 1999 there were approximately 3,917 
kiai and 30,983 ustadz who actively introduced the party to santris and the people 
and influenced their political preference919. In this case, they also acted as a 
mediator in giving understanding on shared values of the party. In this situation, the 
party was not the only institution that was in charge and maintained value infusion. In 
its development, such situation became the main cause for the failure of the loyalty 
establishment. 
 
On the other hand, the capability of ulama in understanding the shared 
values and conducting their implementation, however, was not homogenous, as they 
were determined mainly through their unique experience and environment. This 
situation also opened the opportunity to table various understandings and 
interpretations on the party’s shared values. According to Khatibul U. Wiranu, the 
numbers of members or party apparatus that had the best skills in performing value 
infusion decreased continuously, particularly after the 2005 internal conflict920, when 
many of the best ulama in PKB, including Ma’ruf Amin, the first General Chairperson 
of Dewan Syariah (1999-2000), left the party and established a new party. 
                                                 
917 Interview with Zannuba Ariffah “Yenny” Wahid, General Secretary of Dewan Tanfidz PKB-Gus 
Dur (2008-2010), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010; interview with Khofifah Indar Parawansa, State 
Minister for Women Empowerment (1999-2001), Chairperson of the Institute for Election Winning of 
PKB (2002-2005), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010.   
918 Interview with Yahya Cholil Staquf, Vice of General Secretary of PKB (1998-2005) and President 
Abdurrahman Wahid Spokesperson (2001), in Rembang, 11 November 2010. 
919 Kang Young Soon, Antara Tradisi dan Konflik: Kepolitikan Nahdlatul Ulama, Ph.D Thesis, 
(Jakarta: Post Graduate Program, Department of Political Science, University of Indonesia, 2008), pp. 
317-318.  
920 Interview with Khatibul Umam Wiranu, Vice General Secretary of PKB (1999-2005) and Member 
of Parliament form PKB (1998-2004), in Depok, 17 October 2010. 
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 In addition, the process of value infusion gradually became inconsistent, as 
there was neither a clear concept and proportional training, nor the comprehensive 
control that could push the ulama to be consistent in conducting it. In these 
situations, the process of implementation and assessment of the value infusion, 
including the development of the understanding of shared of values, became less 
systematic. Thus, in general, the cadres did not have sufficient tools to understand 
and have a similar vision on the ideology. Moreover, the prolonged conflict that 
occurred in the party fundamentally contradicting the moderate spirit of Aswaja and 
the nationalist spirit of brotherhood destroyed the trust in the importance of the 
shared value development. It made the development and institutionalisation of these 
values become less appealing for not only the NU people but also to the cadres. 
According to Damanhuri, since the party became unattractive due to internal conflict 
and having a lesser contribution to their lives, NU members then had a greater 
interest to develop the shared values in the context of socio-religious matters (in NU) 
rather than in politics (in PKB)921.  
 
From the above situations, it can be seen that the problem of PKB related to 
value infusion was not only that this party still had a problem with the development of 
values, but also the fact that the value infusion itself was not something that had 
been comprehensively developed by this party.  
 
3. The Failure of “Value Infusion” and the Absence of Commitment.  
 
The above conditions, namely the general level of shared values and the relatively 
poor condition of shared value development instigated the limitation of the ability of 
the party in developing and conveying the shared values of the party. This situation 
generated some adverse conditions for the development of the role of shared values 
and the unity of the party. In the institutionalised party, as has been discussed in the 
theoretical framework, the attitude of the members was mainly determined by the 
shared values or ideology in which the relationship between the cadres tended to be 
less instrumental and more ideological. The cadres also had a deep commitment to 
make the party more adaptable and to preserve the continuity of the party. In 
addition, the cadres would evaluate the party as the medium to enact the party’s 
                                                 
921 Interview with Damanhuri, Chairperson of Dewan Syura of Depok DPD of PKB (2002-2004), the 
Member of Parliament of DPRD of Depok (2004-2009), in Depok, 31 October 2010.  
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idealism and not their individual interests. In the first decade of its existence, 
however, the PKB tended to undergo an opposite situation.  
 
3.1. Prominent Figures as a Driving Force 
 
In this atmosphere, where the party could not properly develop and maintain its 
shared values, the cadres became motivated more easily by other things. In the 
PKB’s case, to defend exclusive interests of figures was more appealing than 
implementing the ideology of the party.  
 
This situation grew in this party since the party’s ideology was not something 
practical. The patrons with their unique rules had been important figures in the daily 
lives of most of the cadres. In fact, ulama continued to remain the main driving factor 
that determined the behaviour of the cadres and undervalued the existence of the 
party and its values accordingly. Choirul Anam, the General Chairperson of PKB East 
Java, for instance stated, “If somebody said that PKB in the future does not need 
ulama, it was unhistorical and a non-sense opinion”922.     
 
The role of ulama figures eventually overshadowed the cadres’ dependency 
on their party. In this regard, sometimes the cadres preferred to follow their closest 
patrons rather than the party, let alone its shared values. “Dual-loyalty” found its 
place and influenced the internal party situation. The presence of several strong and 
charismatic figures that held exceptional positions among cadres was a common 
phenomenon in the PKB. At the national level, Wahid and ulama in the Kyai of 
Langitan Forum could mobilise the cadres and encourage them to defend and 
implement their political interests. Those figures, with their own interest, played a 
momentous role during the conflict between Wahid and Shihab episode, which 
determined the direction and the “quality” of the conflict923. In that conflict, their 
different opinion had rented the cadres’ tendencies and opinions. 
 
At the local level, some charismatic figures of PKB could determine the 
political behaviour of the cadres and even influence the result of the election. For 
instance, in the Situbondo District, one of the strongest political pockets of PKB in the 
                                                 
922 Choirul Anam, “PKB tanpa Kiyai, A-Historis”, in Membangun Demokrasi Berbasis Tradisi: 
Ketetapan-Ketetapan Muktamar II Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa  Tanggal 1-2 October 2005 di 
Surabaya, (Jakarta, DPP PKB, 2005), p.6. 
923 Kamarudin, Konflik Internal PKB, (Depok: Akses Publishing, 2008), p.245. 
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Eastern Java Province, the existence of a charismatic figure, namely Fawaid 
Syamsul Arifin, confirmed this situation. The charisma of Arifin could bring thousands 
of votes for the PKB in the 1999 election. This made PPP, the closest rival party in 
that area that used to be NU people’s party, lost all its seats and suffered heavy 
losses for the first time in that area since 1977. However, in the 2004 Election, Arifin, 
this time as the member of PPP, after PKB dismissed him in 2003924, could provide 
significant votes for PPP and increased its number of seats considerably in the local 
parliament from zero to 12 seats925.  
 
This situation proved that the party was not valued for itself by the members. 
The ease with which they changed political preferences and leave the party was a 
very indication of the lack of value infusion in a party, according to Selznick, where 
the members should feel loss when something negative happened to the party926. 
This situation also indicated the phenomenon of patron-client relationship where the 
cadres tended to follow the ulama rather than the party ideology, which according to 
Surbakti, also confirmed the under-institutionalised condition in this party927. 
 
Moreover, the loyalty towards a group or a prominent figure also reduced the 
spirit of togetherness in the party, which made the obedience and loyalty on a group 
or faction, became a kind of “code of conduct” that determined the future of cadres. 
This situation encouraged the cadres to defend their interest more rigorously from 
other cadres. It then motivated the cadres in each conflicting group to abolish the 
other group and regarded its supporters as eliminated. The phenomenon of 
disbanding each other occurred during the first decade of PKB’s existence, which 
sometimes was effected through evading democratic ways and party procedure928. 
Generally, the rationale for these policies were personal or subjective reasons, in 
                                                 
924 “Episode Pisah Ranjang PKB”, www.majalah.tempointeraktif.com, 24 November 2003. 
925 “Adu Kuat Dua Poros Kyai”, Gatra, No. 36, 16 July 2009. “Pemilu Presiden 2009”, Gatra, No. 36, 
16 July 2009. Interview with Yahya Cholil Staquf, the Vice of General Secretary of PKB (1998-2005) 
and President Abdurrahman Wahid Spokesperson (2001), in Rembang, 11 November 2010. 
926 Selznick, Leadership in Administration. A Sociological Interpretation, p.19. 
927 Ramlan Surbakti, “Tingkat Pelembagaan Partai Politik”, Kompas, 6 January 2003. 
928 According to Anam, during 2005, Iskandar with Wahid’s back up had suspended or established 37 
DPCs and 2 DPWs; and fired number of members of committee. Prior to the dismissal of Iskandar in 
2008 the party disbanded 14 DPWs and 67 DPCs, mostly were related to the disloyalty issues. Kompas, 
7 April 2008, “Muhaimin Didukung, Muspim Kukuhkan Muktamar Semarang”. Tri Ratnawati, 
“Beberapa Masalah Pelembagaan Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) dan Alternatif Solusi”, in Lili 
Romli, ed., Pelembagaan Partai Politik Pasca Orde Baru Studi Kasus Partai Golkar, PKB, PBB, PBR 
dan PD, (Jakarta: Pusat Penelitian Politik, Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, 2008). 
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which power maintenance particularly to guarantee cadres’ loyalty and the 
preservation of the patron’s position became one of the main reasons929. Some 
people then called PKB as Partai Kulkas Besar (the Big Freezer Party/PKB) for the 
fact that many of its local committees had been “frozen” or halted by the party930.   
 
In PKB, the commitment to figures’ interest and not the shared values also 
made santris, as the disciples of ulama, willing to oppose other ulama who were 
regarded as the “common enemy” by their ulama or group. For some, it showed the 
very gradation of the santri culture, particularly the culture of NU931. The dismissal of 
several influential ulama at the national and local levels by Wahid’s followers also 
indicated this phenomenon. The Wahid-Iskandar group, for instance, had no 
hesitation in removing ulama that had different points of view without a fair and 
comprehensive trial. It happened, for instance, to Warson Munawir, an important 
ulama figure in Yogyakarta who was also the General Chairperson of the Dewan 
Syura of the Yogyakarta DPW of the PKB, who was removed by the supporter of the 
Wahid-Iskandar without a fair trial932.  
 
Slander and condemnation of some of the very senior ulama also occurred. 
Choirie, for instance criticised ulama gathered in the Langitan Forum, several of 
whom were his former teachers by saying that those ulama were political tools of the 
anti-Wahid people. Choirie underestimated the sincere enthusiasm of the ulama that 
showed their commitment to help the party and considered them merely as the 
victims of a political manipulation by several irresponsible figures that were a part of 
the Shihab group933. On the other hand, the enthusiasm of the Wahid rivals to 
remove Wahid from the party, including those who regarded themselves as the 
disciples of Wahid, indicated a similar situation.   
 
                                                 
929 DPW PKB Jawa Timur, Data dan Fakta Pelanggaran AD/ART di Muktamar II Semarang, (DPW 
PKB Jawa Timur, 2005), p.1. 
930 “Sering Bekukan Pengurus, PKB Dijuluki “Partai Kulkas Besar”, www.detik.com, 29 April 2008. 
Forum Kiai Kebangkitan (FK2), “PKB Bertanya Kader Menjawab Disertai Hujjah Siyasiyyah Wa 
Syar’iyyah”, (Semarang: 2008), p. 13 in Ratnawati, “Beberapa Masalah Pelembagaan Partai 
Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) dan Alternatif Solusi”, p. 92. 
931 However, this situation actually was not something new for NU. The study on the NU political 
behaviour conducted by Irsyam in 1980s indicates similar situation. In this regard, although generally 
the ulama still gained respect from the santri or politicians, they were challengeable. Mahrus Irsyam, 
Ulama dan Partai Politik. Upaya Mengatasi Krisis, (Jakarta: Yayasan Perkhidmatan, 1984) 
932 DPW PKB Jawa Timur, Data dan Fakta Pelanggaran AD/ART di Muktamar II Semarang, p.3 
933 Ibid, p.5-6 
 292
This situation also indicates that the cadres or groups tended to abandon 
each other when they could not reach an agreement. The opponent was seen as an 
enemy that had an absolute different agenda and interest. A zero sum game tended 
to happen where the eagerness to discard other cadres existed, when a conflict of 
interest occurred among them. Parawansa said, “Above all, the thing that makes me 
feel not at home was the attitude to regard friends as enemies. For me, we should 
keep supporting each other and go hand in hand, even though we have conflict of 
interest. We should not neglect each other. But the fact was we neglected each 
other934.  
 
3.2 Value Free and Expendable Tools Phenomenon 
 
Another problem was the attitude of the cadres who tended to consider political 
struggles as “value free” matters. Musa said, “In the end, ideology plays a very 
limited role and even is absent entirely in the power sharing context”935. This 
appealed to the cadres to conduct a free interpretation of the ideology to in turn 
legalise their actions. For some cadres, the shared values or ideology in fact had 
been irrelevant936. In this regard, shared values eventually could not act as 
determining variables that could influence, unify and manage the perception and 
behaviour of the cadres when dealing with the real political situation. Parawansa 
said, “When cadres face the real political life, they put ideology in their pocket” 937. 
 
This situation influenced the relations between the cadres, where mutual 
symbiosis based on self-seeking interests became apparent. In this case, the party 
became merely an expendable tool where the relationships were mainly determined 
by the ability of each group or person to preserve the shared benefit. This is seen, for 
instance, from the political movement of Dimyati Rais, General Chairperson of 
Dewan Syura of PKB-Matori (2002-2005). In 2005, he changed his political position 
                                                 
934 Interview with Khofifah Indar Parawansa, State Minister for Women Empowerment (1999-2001), 
Chairperson of the Institute for Election Winning of PKB (2002-2005), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010. 
935 Interview with Dr. Ali Masykur Musa, Vice Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz PKB (2005-2010) and 
General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz PKB-Gus Dur (2008-2009), in Jakarta, 19 October 2010. 
936 Interview with Yahya Cholil Staquf, Vice of General Secretary of PKB (1998-2005) and President 
Abdurrahman Wahid Spokesperson (2001), in Rembang, 11 November 2010; with Damanhuri, 
Chairperson of Dewan Syuro of Depok DPD of PKB (2002-2004), Member of Parliament of DPRD of 
Depok (2004-2009), in Depok, 31 October 2010. 
937 Interview with Khofifah Indar Parawansa, State Minister for Women Empowerment (1999-2001), 
Chairperson of the Institute for Election Winning of the PKB (2002-2005), in Jakarta, 20 October 
2010. 
 293
from being Matori’s protector to be a Shihab supporter, Matori’s rival, and became a 
member of Dewan Syura of the PKB-Alwi938. However, in 2008, after Iskandar left 
Wahid and established his alternative party, Rais, charismatic ulama from Kaliwungu, 
joined Iskandar who was actually one of the main figures in the PKB that opposed 
Alwi and Matori. In the Iskandar camp, he became one of the candidates for the 
General Chairperson of Dewan Syura939. The attitude to join three different camps in 
one decade reflected an opportunist tendency, since such a movement would 
practically promote Rais to be part of the more promising group rather than the 
previous ones.  
 
Ali M. Musa, General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz of the PKB-Gus Dur 
(2008-2009) showed also a similar attitude, when in 2009 he accepted the condition 
to be loyal to Iskandar, who was the “main enemy” of the party that he led. This 
meant acknowledging the existence of PKB-Muhaimin as it held an important position 
in one of the national prestigious institutions Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan (State 
Audit Bureau/BPK) as compensation940. In the meantime, A. Effendy Choirie, one of 
Wahid’s main supporters and a member of central managing board of PKB-Gus Dur, 
indicated a similar gesture. In 2009, he agreed to cooperate with Iskandar and 
worked under the PKB-Muhaimin prior to the 2009 Election. PKB-Muhaimin then 
provided him the opportunity to join the election and became a member of parliament 
(2009-2014) representing the Iskandar camp941.  
 
On the other hand, after the 2009 Election, the relationship between Iskandar 
and his former main ally and Secretary General of PKB, Lukman Edy, became 
worse. Some people believed that the relationship between the two had reached the 
situation where they did not want to talk each other anymore. It happened after 
Iskandar, as the leader of the party, recommended one of his very close friends, 
                                                 
938 On this new position of Rais see “Laporan Pertanggungjawaban Dewan Pengurus Pusat Partai 
Kebangkitan Bangsa Masa Bakti 2002-2005”, in Membangun Demokrasi Berbasis Tradisi: Ketetapan-
Ketetapan Muktamar II Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa  Tanggal 1-2 Oktober 2005 di Surabaya, (Jakarta, 
DPP PKB, 2005), p. 74.  
939 “Berita Acara Muktamar Luar Biasa Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa”, in Laporan Lengkap Muktamar 
Luar Biasa Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa. Hotel Mercure Ancol, Jakarta, 2-4 Mei 2008, (Jakarta: Dewan 
Pengurus Pusat Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, 2008). 
940 Interview with Andi M. Ramly, Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz (2002-2010), Secretary of Dewan 
Syura PKB-Muhaimin (2008-2010) and writer of “Mabda’ Syiyasi PKB”, in Jakarta, 15 October 2010. 
941 “Daftar Lewat Muhaimin, Gus Dur Pecat Effendy Choirie dan Ikhsan Abdullah”, 
www.antaranews.com, 17 August 2008.  Interview with Andi M. Ramly, Chairperson of Dewan 
Tanfidz (2002-2010), Secretary of Dewan Syura PKB-Muhaimin (2008-2010) and writer of “Mabda’ 
Syiyasi PKB”, in Jakarta, 15 October 2010. 
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Hilmy Faisal, to President Yudhoyono to hold the position as State Minister for the 
Accelerated Development of Disadvantaged Regions, rather than Edy, who had 
previously held this position. According to Yenny Wahid, such phenomenon 
demonstrated that as long as the leader of the camp could sustain the needs of the 
followers, the solidity of that group would persist. However, the situation would be 
different if the leader could not continually satisfy the interests of the followers942. 
 
In relation to this, Parawansa believed that shared values were not the main 
basis that motivated cadres in conducting their behaviour. Parawansa said that: “I do 
not see that ideology is something that guides the political behaviour of my 
colleagues in the PKB”943. This situation implied that the party could not develop and 
persuade the cadres to regard the shared values as a main parameter to conduct 
their behaviour and to see the party as the tools of the shared values. In this sense, 
shared values tended to lose their relevance in the daily life, which increased the 
spirit of self-seeking behaviour, and regarded the party as merely what Selznick calls 
as “expandable tools”, and decreased the spirit of togetherness. Above all, these 
situations reflected the failure to develop commitment to the shared values in this 
party. 
 
4.  The Impact: From Defending Leader’s Interests towards Fragmentation 
 
The above problems – the inclination to hold the figures’ interest and treat the party 
as an expandable tool – eventually encouraged the leaders and their followers to act 
freely based on their exclusive and self-seeking interest, which over time cemented 
differences and even contradiction. These situations became pillars in each internal 
conflict episode in PKB that in the end paved the way for the emergence of internal 
fragmentation. 
 
4.1.  Leaders’ Interests as “Legitimate Sources” to Act   
 
In the situation where the party could not properly maintain its ideology, the 
awareness to hold the party leaders’ interests became more crucial than the 
                                                 
942 Interview with Zannuba Ariffah “Yenny” Wahid, General Secretary of Dewan Tanfidz PKB-Gus 
Dur (2008-2010), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010. 
943 Interview with Khofifah Indar Parawansa, State Minister for Women Empowerment (1999-2001), 
Chairperson of the Institute for Election Winning of the PKB (2002-2005), in Jakarta, 20 October 
2010. 
 295
ideological calculations. This situation can be seen in the main dismissal cases that 
then triggered party fragmentation three times, where the leaders’ interest, which to 
some extent was nuanced by their exclusive political interest and calculation rather 
than ideological consideration, became the crucial point. The dismissal often 
overlooked the importance of maintaining consistency in holding the shared values to 
avoid a personal and subjective decision.  
 
The abrupt dismissal of Matori, for instance, was under Wahid’s influence and 
own interest to have Matori removed from the party due to Matori’s willingness to 
attend the 2001 MPR Special Meeting. The problem of disloyalty became the main 
issue behind Jalil’s dismissal and not for his lack of commitment to the shared 
values. In fact, Jalil actually had made his own calculation, which was ideological, 
behind his decision to join the SI that and not given a hearing by Wahid and his 
supporters’. For Jalil, the decision to come to the 2001 SI MPR motivated by his 
commitment to PKB’s ideology, namely nationalism and the spirit of Aswaja. He 
stated, for instance, that his presence in the 2001 Special Meeting of the MPR was 
also mainly to block or fight the influence of the so-called “fundamentalist groups” in 
the parliament that tried to push “Islamic agendas”, which could jeopardise the 
existence of the nation-state through the dismissal of President Wahid944. This 
paradoxical situation, in which the party in fact dismissed to some extent an 
“ideological loyalist”, indicates the lesser commitment among the cadres who were 
mainly Wahid’s supporters wanting to put forward ideology in the shared values when 
making an important decision. 
 
The case of the dismissal of Alwi Shihab and Saifullah Yusuf also reflected 
on the one hand the very fragile relation among the cadres due to the absence of 
“shared values” and on the other hand proved the strong position of Wahid’s interest 
by many cadres. Although the interest to maintain the rules of the game was the 
formal reason for this policy, the eagerness to remove them as the figures accused of 
being disloyal to Wahid and being too close to the external power, namely President 
Yudhoyono, could not be neglected. In this case, again the problem of disloyalty 
towards Wahid became the main issue.    
 
                                                 
944 “Laporan Pertanggungjawaban Ketua Umum Dewan Pengurus Pusat Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa”, 
presented in Muktamar Luar Biasa Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, Jakarta, Hotel Borobudur, 14-16 
January 2002, (DPW PKB Popinsi Bengkulu, 2002), p. 18. 
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In the case of Iskandar, the rumours of his disloyalty to Wahid also became 
the foundation for his dismissal. The limited forum eventually decided unilaterally to 
dismiss Iskandar based on the accusation of being arrogant and disloyal to Wahid. In 
this case, again the policy to decide the future of the cadres was not determined by 
their commitment to struggle for and to preserve the shared values but his loyalty to 
the leader. Over time, those cases had also cemented the image of Wahid as a 
figure that deeply influenced the situation in the party rather than the party’s shared 
values.  
 
Moreover, the absence of standardised shared values enabled Wahid and 
any dismissed figures to be free when making an interpretation of a problem. The 
above situation infers that Wahid, as the leader, had a large opportunity to decide 
what the party should do. On the other hand, the attitude of Jalil to attend the 2001 SI 
MPR rather than joining the party and to reject such an occasion indicated the 
freedom of action within PKB. There was no uniting value that could stop him making 
such a “controversial decision”. Jalil, in this case, followed at most his political instinct 
and personal calculation rather than a certain code of conduct that could suggest him 
effecting appropriate actions according to the majority of the cadres945.  
 
As for Shihab and Yusuf, as the leaders of Dewan Tanfidz, their decision to 
join President Yudhoyono’s cabinet without having permission from Dewan Syura 
indicated the lack of communication between these two bodies, indicating a different 
political calculation and commitment between the leaders. The fact that both Shihab 
and Yusuf and their followers had a different understanding with the Wahid camp on 
the concept of rangkap jabatan (dual position) as the main basis for their dismissal 
where the Shihab camp tended to be less strict, also signified the unfinished process 
as having a solid understanding of the rules of the game. However, this situation to 
some extent was unavoidable, as a strict code of conduct did not exist for all the 
members to abide to. 
 
The absence of shared values also encouraged each conflicting group to 
preserve their position as part of the commitment to defend their leader’s interests, 
which eventually made the differences among them tended to persist and even 
escalate. As a reflection of this situation, they did not feel hesitate to make unfriendly 
                                                 
945 Sri Indarini, “Dia, Elang yang Terbang Sendirian“, in Mahrus Ali and M.F Nurhuda Y, Pergulatan 
Membela yang Benar. Biografi Politik Matori Abdul Jalil, (Jakarta, Penerbit Buku Kompas, 2008), 
p.361. 
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statements in the public media about the opponent. The non-Wahid groups usually 
raised the issues of mismanagement, unfairness and the authoritarian tendency 
committed by Wahid and his supporters. Equal access to the power and justice also 
became prime issues to convey. They heavily criticized Wahid’s party as a “big family 
party” or “the party based on genetics”946. 
 
On the other hand, the Wahid group stressed the “pragmatic” tendency of 
their opponents. In this regard, Wahid and his supporters occasionally conveyed the 
message on the role of external powers behind the resistance of the opponents947. 
For this reason, they sometimes labelled their opponents as “the tools of external 
power”. They also pointed out that the background of the opponents: Jalil, Shihab, 
Yusuf and Iskandar, to show the great role of Wahid in their political careers. The 
importance of such an issue was to underline the real meaning of being a traitor and 
disloyal to the party. Particularly for Iskandar, this supporter of Wahid sometimes 
attacked his attitude as “the real traitor” for the fact that he was Wahid’s nephew who 
had been protected and even lived with Wahid’s family for several years. This 
situation became the background of Shinta Nuriah, Wahid’s wife, who instructed her 
daughter Yenny Wahid to avoid any possibilities of having a meeting to discuss 
reconciliation with Iskandar948. This kind of quarrel eventually pushed the party to 
encounter more difficult moments where the spirit of togetherness tended to 
decrease sharply. In fact, each conflicting group preferred to hold a MLB as a 
medium to solve the problem. 
 
4.2.  Instrumentalist Group Formation in the Absence of Shared Values  
 
Besides giving an opportunity to the leaders to implement their interests, the lack of 
commitment to the shared values allowed the political deals based on something that 
eliminated the existence of shared values to be easily established. The absence of 
the role of ideology at the more practical level prevented the cadres from making a 
                                                 
946 Ratnawati, “Beberapa Masalah Pelembagaan Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) dan Alternatif 
Solusi”, p. 95. Interview with Khofifah Indar Parawansa, State Minister for Women Empowerment 
(1999-2001), Chairperson of the Institute for Election Winning of PKB (2002-2005), in Jakarta, 20 
October 2010. 
947 Interview with Zannuba Ariffah “Yenny” Wahid, General Secretary of Dewan Tanfidz PKB-Gus 
Dur (2008-2010), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010; with Muamir M. Syam, Chairperson of PKB (2005-
2010), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010. 
948 Interview with Ahmad Shodiq Noor, General Secretary of DKI Jakarta DPW of PKB, in Jakarta, 3 
November 2010. 
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comprehensive assessment on whether the elites’ offers and their acceptance were 
in-line with the party’s ideology or its values. In the end, the cadres preferred merely 
to follow their direct patron, mainly the ulama, as an influential element in the party 
for securing their daily life and political career. All conflicting groups used this 
situation as a chance to spread their influence and to foster their camp.  
 
This atmosphere provided the opportunity for Jalil to gain support from the 
cadres and santri. The presence of Dimyati Rois, one of the senior and influential NU 
ulamas from Salatiga, Central Java and Maksum Jauhari949, in the Jakarta MLB, was 
a vital source to the political encouragement of Matori’s group, legalising the sense of 
NU on the board led by Matori. Matori told the public that the presence of the party 
cadres coming from many areas and that most of them were actually also santri, 
indicated the direct or indirect support of the ulama for him, since a santri could not 
attend without the permission of his kyai.950   
 
A similar situation also occurred in the PKB-Alwi. The support from the 
charismatic ulama that gathered in the Langitan Forum, for instance, encouraged the 
fast grouping and establishment of the PKB-Alwi. The gathering of thousands of 
santri, particularly the disciples of Kyai Langitan in the MLB held by Shihab’s 
supporters to oppose the existence of the PKB-Gus Dur/Muhaimin indicates such a 
unique relation between ulama and their disciples. Anam said after Abdullah Faqih -- 
one of the most respectable ulama in Langitan Forum – gave his permission to hold a 
MLB, all the supporters and santri showed their courage to attend the MLB, including 
the committee members of 350 DPCs and 31 DPWs951. 
 
As for the Iskandar Camp, Yusuf Chudlori and Abdul Azis Mansyur--two 
charismatic ulama from Central Java and East Java--had played a similar role. Their 
presence legitimised the leadership of Iskandar in the eyes of their santri and PKB 
cadres. The presence of Yusuf Chudlori in this group was also culturally important 
                                                 
949 “Laporan Pertanggungjawaban Ketua Umum Dewan Pengurus Pusat Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa”, 
presented in Muktamar Luar Biasa Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, Jakarta, Hotel Borobudur, 14-16 
January 2002. 
950 “Megawati Tidak Hadiri MLB Matori”, Kompas, 15 January 2002. 
951 “Laporan Pertanggungjawaban Dewan Pengurus Pusat Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa Masa Bakti 
2002-2005”, in Membangun Demokrasi Berbasis Tradisi: Ketetapan-Ketetapan Muktamar II Partai 
Kebangkitan Bangsa  Tanggal 1-2 Oktober 2005 di Surabaya, p. 6. 
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since his father Chudlori was Wahid’s teacher952. With the support of those influential 
ulama, Iskandar succeed in holding the MLB in Jakarta to secure his position in the 
party.   
 
On the other hand, the existence of Wahid’s camp also depended on Wahid 
as a figure. In the Semarang MLB, that legitimised the existence of PKB Gus 
Dur/Muhaimin, for instance, the protection of Wahid’s interest was clearly expressed 
by his loyalists. On that occasion, they strictly protected crucial agendas, namely to 
elect Iskandar as the new leader of the Dewan Tanfidz and to preserve the position 
of Wahid in the Dewan Syura. Any attempts to challenge Wahid were stopped from 
the beginning by not allowing the MLB to hold a fair election. Even Wahid was 
elected by acclamation in the section that should only be a forum for delegates to 
respond to the DPP’s five-term report953. Also in the Semarang MLB forum, Shihab, 
as the member of the party and according to many, was still the real leader of the 
party but not allowed by the committee to enter the forum. These situations outraged 
and disappointed several Chairpersons of Dewan Tanfidz who were also senior 
figures of the party, including Prof. M. Mahfud MD and Parawansa who eventually 
preferred to leave the party954.  
 
From above situation, it can be understood, if in the conflict situation, where 
each conflicting group needed to have support, the elites in each group focused their 
activities on establishing close relations with the patrons, rather than to put forward 
party idealism based on the shared values. It indicates the low position of shared 
values before the party member.  
 
Furthermore, this situation also showed that each ulama or group of ulama 
had their own political calculations and interests, which were not only diverse but also 
not easily united. The independence of ulama in making their own policies was intact 
even when they joined the party. Their privilege continued and even determined the 
situation in the party. It showed the inability of the party to equalise the rights of each 
                                                 
952 Wahid acknowledged that Chudlori, together with Ali Maksum and Abdul Fattah Hasyim, was the 
most importance teacher in his life. See this statement in Abdurrahman Wahid, “Sambutan Pembukaan 
Muktamar Luar Biasa PKB di Yogyakarta 17-19 January 2002”, in Dewan Pengurus Pusat Partai 
Kebangkitan Bangsa, AD/ART Anggaran Dasar dan Anggaran Rumah Tangga Partai Kebangkitan 
Bangsa, (Jakarta: Sekretariat DPP PKB, 2002), p. XII).   
953 DPW PKB Jawa Timur, Data dan Fakta Pelanggaran AD/ART di Muktamar II Semarang, p. 9. 
954 Interview with Khofifah Indar Parawansa, State Minister for Women Empowerment (1999-2001), 
Chairperson of the Institute for Election Winning of PKB (2002-2005), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010. 
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member in following the rules or the code of conduct and to harmonise them into one 
direction. This situation raised critics on ulama who had joined political activities and 
had greatly dedicated their life to power relationships. They were accused of 
sharpening internal conflicts in PKB’s and NU’s communities955. However, the main 
problem actually was not necessarily their political activities, but the absence of the 
role of the shared values and the code of conduct that could control their behaviour 
and treatment towards the santri and their ulama fellows. 
 
In addition, the presence of Muktamar or MLB, supported by the ulama and 
their santri, became an indication of the existence of internal fragmentation. This 
forum accommodated the agenda to develop and protect the interest of each group, 
crystallised their existence and was a medium to attack other groups. In such a 
forum, each conflicting group claimed to be a legitimate party that represented the 
real PKB. In short, the establishment of MLB that was supported by the 
instrumentalist grouping was a medium that decreased the cohesion of the party 
 
4.3. The Conflict Continuation and the Trial of Commitment 
 
PKB’s cadres’ attitude after the MLB also showed the absence of commitment to the 
shared values. They preferred to use the third party, namely the court, as an external 
element to be an arbiter to decide the future of the party, rather than using their own 
tradition or method to solve the problems. This indicated the absence of the spirit of 
self-maintenance as, according to Selznick, is one of the important pieces of 
evidence of the existence of “value infusion”956.  
 
Both the non-Wahid groups and the Wahid camp wanted their opponent 
dissolved formally by the court, as the main prerequisite to there being any possibility 
of holding the next steps to peace. It showed that the main spirit of this action was 
not to restore the unity of the party through a win-win solution approach, but to 
discredit the other groups and strengthen each group’s position. After the court had 
reached its decision, no significant actions proved that there was a spirit of 
reconciliation. Each conflicting group remained a separate group with its own beliefs 
                                                 
955 Ibnu Hajar, Kiai di Tengah Pusaran Politik. Antara Petaka dan Kuasa, (Jogjakarta: IRCISoD, 
2009). On the NU Ulama Conflict in Politics see, Ichwan Arifin, Kiai dan Politik: Studi Kasus Perilaku 
Politik Kiyai dalam KonflikPasca Muktamar II Semarang, MA Thesis, (Semarang: Political Science 
Program, Post Graduate Program, University of Diponegoro, 2008).  
956 Selznick, Leadership in Administration. A Sociological Interpretation, pp. 20-22. 
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and agendas. Each non-Wahid group and most of its followers, for instance, never 
acknowledged their “mistake” or the legalisation of Wahid group. They preferred to 
establish their own parties. On the other hand, the Wahid group never had any 
sincere intention to invite the “disloyal” cadres to return to the party, let alone 
acknowledge their existence. In addition, to strengthen its position, each conflicting 
group was willing to dismiss the cadres who had different points of view and being 
supporters of the other groups.  
 
After the third party decided which group should be in charge in the party, the 
other camp eventually committed to creating new parties. Matori, for instance, 
eventually preferred to build a new party, namely the PKD, prior to the 2004 Election. 
This party was mainly set up to accommodate and establish more democratic values 
and nationalism. Shihab and the Kyai Langitan Forum also took similar action. They 
established the PKNU in 2006, which one of the aims was to establish the true party 
of the Aswajan people.  
 
Some important cadres, on the other hand, took a different direction. They 
preferred to join other parties to establish their interest, most of them after the 
conflict. These included M.A.S Hikam (former Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz, who 
joined the Hanura Party in 2008), Wiranu (former Vice General Secretary of Dewan 
Tanfidz, who joined the PD in 2008) and Rieke Dyah Pitaloka (former Chairperson of 
Dewan Tanfidz, who joined the PDIP in 2007), to name just a few.  
 
According to Steven Levitsky, an institutionalised party was a party that could 
maintain and preserve its existence during difficult situations. “Value infusion” had 
encouraged the cadres to commit and dedicate their life to the continuity of the life of 
the party. Using Partido Justicialista (Justice Party/PJ), founded in 1947 by Juan 
Peron, as the case study, he observed that even when Peron has passed away, the 
party still existed and became an important party in Argentina although several 
internal adjustments could not be avoided. The commitment of the cadres was still 
high as so was the spirit to save the life of the party. In this case, the party was 
“valued for itself by its members”957.  
 
                                                 
957 Steven Levitsky, “Institutionalisation and Peronism. The Case, The Concept and Cas for Unpacking 
the Concept”, Party Politics, Vol.4, No.1, p.82. 
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The case of PKB, however, showed a different situation. Its own cadres had 
fragmented the party three times during its first decade of existence and created four 
parties, where two of them used a different name and represented quite different 
values. The establishment of new parties in the short period and exit actions that 
were conducted by some important cadres, had indicated the failure of value infusion 
since the commitment to preserve party continuity was very low.   
 
5.  Overview 
 
PKB most likely could have avoided fragmentation if the party had properly 
developed and simplified its shared values. These situations almost would certainly 
have provided a facilitative environment for the development of the cadres’ respect 
towards their own shared values, ideology and ideals that had been developed by the 
party, rather than to the interests of factions led by charismatic figures with their 
exclusive objectives. The case of PKB showed that the absence of those conditions 
eventually decreased the sense of togetherness and provoked factionalism. It then 
pushed the party into a delicate situation where the cadres felt that there were almost 
no barriers to their political behaviour, including a factor that would endanger the 
unity of the party. The evidence surveyed above illustrates the correlation between 
the failure to develop commitment to shared values, which in this case was the 
ideology, as one indicator of institutionalisation, and party fragmentation. 
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Chapter XII 
The Commitment to Shared Values: 




 “The Islamic values that become ideology are guidance or code of 
conduct in building relationships and interactions…the way of PKS cadre 
talks and thinks about Islam in Depok (West Java), in Aceh, in Irian 
(Papua) is more or less the same”. (Amri Yusra)958. 
 
  
1.  Introduction 
 
This chapter explores the commitment towards shared values and the maintenance 
of value infusion in PKS, whose case will be shown to be qualitatively different from 
that of PKB. In the case of PKS, “the commitment to hold and spread dakwah” 
became a fundamental shared value, which not only became an identity for the 
members, but also a focal characteristic that created sentiment, commitment, a guide 
to behaviour and the thinking of the cadres. The party transformed this shared value 
through a standardized mechanism, which eventually was able to protect and 
maintain the unity of understanding of dakwah among the cadres.  
 
This chapter thus covers three topics of discussion, paralleling that in the 
previous chapter. The first, I examined the essence of dakwah as the party’s main 
shared value and the situation of shared value maintenance in PKS. The second 
discusses the situation of shared value commitment in this party and the level of 
“value infusion”. The third discusses the ability to hinder fragmentation as the result 
of the above conditions.   
           
2. The Existence of Shared Values 
 
2.1.  The Dakwah Struggle as a Central Value 
 
                                                 
958 Interview with Amri Yusra, M.Si, Chairperson of Depok DPD of PKS (2002-2004), Member of 
Parliament of Depok District, West Java, (2004-2009), and Lecturer at Political Sciences Department, 
Faculty of Social and Political Science, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 7 October 2010 
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Since the beginning of its existence, PKS has consistently declared itself as a Partai 
Dakwah (the Dakwah Party) 959 that believed in and implemented the struggle for the 
dakwah as a central value in the movement and life of the party and its cadres. It 
believed that the existence of the party was part of dakwah efforts960. The preamble 
of the party’s constitution stated that the party was created to carry out dakwah 
messages961. 
 
The main aim of dakwah is to create a civilization built on the sprit of 
respecting morality, rules of law and people sovereignty, in which the people plays a 
salient role in establishing and controlling the government. According to Anis Matta, 
Islamic civilization is a part of dakwah’s mission that in essence is “…to reconstruct 
the thinking and personality of Muslims, to be able to think, feel and act in line with 
the wishes of God and based on Islamic references. Then to bring these new 
Muslims, with their new awareness, back to reality in order to make the 
transformation in every aspect of life – including culture, social system, laws and 
institutions – to be based on the will of God”.962  
 
To meet such conditions, PKS developed several fundamental values that 
were projected and to be held by the party and the cadres. The first main value was 
the belief that the main aim of their existence was to be a tool of dakwah, seeking for 
God’s will (ridha Allah) or desire. In the spirit of being “a tool of dakwah” private or 
individual interests became something that must be avoided. Conversely, all activities 
undertaken by the party and the cadres should be a medium to maintain dakwah and 
the development of Islamic values. The logical implication in this situation was that 
the cadres should be willing to leave private ambition aside for the establishment of 
more important matters, namely God’s will963. The inclination to seek merely God’s 
                                                 
959 The AD of PK Article 6; The 2002 AD of PKS Article 2 (2). See also Sekilas Partai Keadilan, 
(Jakarta: Sekretariat DPP Partai Keadilan, 1998), pp. 21-22. 
960 Aay Muhammad Furkon, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Ideologi dan Praktis Politik Kaum Muda 
Kontemporer, (Bandung: Teraju, 2004), p.185. 
961 The Muqadimmah of The 2005 AD of PKS. 
962 Anis Matta, Menikmati Demokrasi Strategi Dakwah Meraih Kemenangan, (Jakarta: Pustaka Saksi, 
2002), p. 8. 
963 Interview with Amri Yusra, M.Si, Chairperson of the Depok DPD of PKS (2002-2004), Member of 
Parliament of the Depok District, West Java, (2004-2009), and Lecturer at Political Sciences 
Department, Faculty of Social and Political Science, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 7 October 
2010; with Aus Hidayat Nur, Head of the II Dakwah Region (2002-2005) and Chairperson of the 
BPDO (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 15 October 2010; with Hidayat, MM, Member of Parliament of the 
Tangerang District (2005-2010), in Tangerang, 21 October 2010; with Dr. Yon Mahmudi, PKS and 
Tarbiyah Movement observer, Lecturer at Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political 
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will became a foremost objective of the party, which eventually developed the sense 
of militancy among the cadres and some of the cadres even named themselves as 
“jundi” (the soldier).  
 
Most cadres regarded themselves as part of an institution that had a strong 
commitment to hold such religious aims. “To make the objectives of dakwah come 
into being as the main interest” was a “common language” collectively understood by 
the cadres. Although in its development a small number of cadres had failed to follow 
this obligation, for instance by leading a worldly life style, in general, such failures did 
not erase the spirit to hold such commitment. It created solidity in a sense that the 
cadres were willing to stick together as a group holding a similar spirit. According to 
Kemal Stamboel, this tendency had made the party relatively clean from exclusive 
motives, including external interventions that could potentially destroy the very 
characteristics of the party964.     
 
Moreover, as a dakwah group that believed in politics to meet its objective, 
PKS endorses teachings that stressed the importance of holding the spirit of 
togetherness or berjamaah (to gather together), as part of preserving ukhuwah 
(brotherhood), to reach their ideals. For PKS cadres, it was a major prerequisite or a 
foundation for the success of the struggle to maintain Islamic values. The party’s 
official documents stated that the jamaah had a special position in PKS for its role as 
a uniting element of the ummat, where the absence of this value would be the main 
cause of any setback to the establishment of Islamic interests965. For PKS, dakwah 
was something to be conducted in the spirit of berjamaah966. 
 
The party’s document also mentioned that some of the Islamic teachings 
reminding the Muslims of the correlation between the weak condition of jamaah 
(group) and the emergence of internal friction that could led to a drawback 
situation967. Mahfudz Siddiq stated that PKS underlined the value that: “It is 
                                                                                                                                            
Sciences, University of Indonesia, and one of the cadres who signed the PKS establishment declaration, 
in Depok, 6 October 2010. 
964 Interview with Kemal A. Stamboel, Head of Expert Advisory Body of PKS, Member of Parliament 
(2009-2014), in Jakarta, 8 October 2010. 
965 Syamsul Balda, Abu Ridho, Untung Wahono, Politik Da’wah Partai Keadilan, (Jakarta: DPP Partai 
Keadilan, 2000), p. 22. 
966 Tim Departemen Kaderisasi PKS, Profil Kader Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, (Bandung: Syaamil 
Cipta Media, 2004), p. 107. 
967 Balda, Ridho, Wahono, Politik Da’wah Partai Keadilan, p. 29. 
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impossible to enact Islam and truth in society if it is conducted outside the jamaah 
without having any organisation”968. Furthermore, the cadres also believed that only 
through a solid group that the benefit or “God’s blessing” for being part of the struggle 
for the establishment of Islamic values would exist969. In this regard, the spirit of 
togetherness and brotherhood became other derivative values that were developed 
by the party and infused into the cadres.  
 
Under the ideal of being a “tool of dakwah”, the spirit of ta’at (obedience) 
towards qiyadah (the leaders) also appeared. PKS regarded obedience as always 
existing in dakwah970. PKS also believed that only the existence of perfect 
obedience, any dakwah goals could be reached. In this regard, the decisions made 
by the elites became a kind of fatwa (religious command) that must be implemented 
by all of the cadres. Such obedience became an important pillar that nuanced the 
very relation between leaders or elites and the cadres or ordinary members. The 
cadres at a higher level, the level of obedience to the leader was more demanding as 
part of a more total commitment that they should undertake for the party971. It created 
a type of obedience, which at the practical level helped the party to mobilize its 
cadres easily when fulfilling any duties and obligations. It was also the main reason 
behind PKS’ ability to make several important adjustments as a response to the 
current political situations.    
                                                
 
The obedience attitude took its foundation literally from the Al-Qur’an (4:59), 
stating that: “Obey the God, and obey the Messenger of God, and those of you who 
are in authority…”.972 The last term was translated by PKS together with other 
leaders of the party. To strengthen cadres’ understanding of the importance of 
obeying the leader the party also propagated readings and training materials for 
cadres under the topic “Qiyadah wal Jundiyah” (the leader and the soldier/the 
follower).  
 
968 Interview with Mahfudz Siddiq, Head of Cadrerization Department of DPP of PKS (2002-2005) and 
Member of Parliament (2004-2014), in Jakarta, 27 October 2010. 
969 Interview with Nooryanto, Chair of Cadrerization Department of Bekasi DPD of PKS, in Bekasi, 7 
November 2010. 
970Ali Said Damanik, Fenomen Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di 
Indonesia, (Bandung: Teraju, 2002), p. 117. 
971 Ibid, p. 117. 
972 Interview with Dr. Yon Mahmudi, PKS and the Tarbiyah Movement observer, Lecturer at Political 
Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, and one of the 
cadres who signed the PKS establishment declaration, in Depok, 6 October 2010. 
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 However, the obedience tradition developed in the party was not a sort of 
“blind obedience”; it was only relevant to the extent that it followed the rules of the 
game973. A leader of this concept could effectively dictate and be obeyed by the 
cadres if he had a strong commitment to maintain the constitution of the party. In this 
regard, the order to follow and obey the leader should be complied with as far as the 
leaders’ policies did not relate to negative deeds. As mentioned by Mushthafa 
Masyhur, “the obedience towards Amir (the leader) and his leadership for subjects 
that were not of maksiyat (unfaithfulness) could be regarded as being a similar 
obedience to God”974. Thus, obedience could not be used as a foundation for 
establishing blind obedience to a figure. Hence, obedience in PKS was essentially 
not a one-way and blind commitment but two-way and with conditions975. 
 
On the other hand, PKS believed that the core of dakwah required a gradual 
process and moderate approach, which dakwah activists and institutions could not 
neglect or underestimate the context where dakwah was developed976. Moderatism 
became an important concept in PKS’ dakwah. This attitude to some extent also 
differentiated this party from other new Islamic movements in Indonesia, which 
tended to be excessive in conducting dakwah by suggesting for instance, the 
immediate implementation of Islamic Syariah and ignored if the people were 
ready977.  
                                                 
973 Interview with Untung Wahono, Head of PK, Department of Research and Development of the DPP 
of the PK (2000-2003), Head of Department of Politics and Defence of DPP of PKS (2002-2005), and 
Chairperson of MPP of PKS (2010-2015), in Jakarta 27 October 2010; with Sitaresmi S, M.Psy, 
Member of Dakwah Department of the PK DPP (2000-2003), in Jakarta, 8 October 2010; with Aus 
Hidayat Nur and Head of the II Dakwah Region (2002-2005) and Chairperson of BPDO (2010-2015), 
in Jakarta, 15 October 2010; with Sigit Sosiantomo, PKS Regional Coordinator for East Java and Bali 
(2005-2009), in Jakarta, 25 October 2010; with Ahmad Feri Firman Yusuf, Head of the III Dakwah 
Region (2002-2005), member of Majelis Syuro PKS (2002-2010), in Jakarta, 2 November 2010; with 
Dr. Yon Mahmudi, PKS and Tarbiyah Movement observer, Lecturer at Political Science Department, 
Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, and one of the cadres who signed the 
PKS establishment declaration, in Depok, 6 October 2010; with Mustofa, PKS cadre and former 
i S, M.Psy, Member of Dakwah Department of the PK DPP (2000-2003), in 
dilan). Hilmi Aminuddin, 
reporter of Profetik Magazine, established by PKS cadres in Depok, 7 October 2010. 
974 Mushthafa Masyhur, Al Qiyadah Wal Jundiah (Jakarta: Al Ishlahy Press, Without Year), p. 90. 
975 Interview with Sitaresm
Jakarta, 8 October 2010. 
976 Buku AD/RT PK Masa Bhakti 2000-2005, (Depok, DPD Partai Kea
Strategi Dakwah Gerakan Islam, (Jakarta: Pustaka Tarbiatuna, 2003), p.62. 
977 M. Imdadun Rahmat, Arus Baru Islam Radikal: Transmisi Revivalisme Islam Timur Tengah ke 
Indonesia, (Jakarta: Erlangga, 2005). Anthony Bubalo and Greg Fealy, Joining the Caravan? The 
Middle East, Islamism and Indonesia, (Alexandria: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2005). 
Muhammad Iqbal Ahnaf, “MMI dan HTI; The Image of The Others”, in A. Maftuh Abegebriel, A Yani 
Abeveiro, SR-Ins Team, Negara Tuhan. The Thematic Encyclopaedia, (Jakarta: SR-Ins Publishing). 
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 One of the reflections of these values was the tendency to avoid direct 
discussions on delicate issues such as the state ideology or matters related to the 
relation between religion and the state. PKS preferred to be more active in discussing 
and being involved in “practical” matters, such as fighting corruption and increasing 
the people’s prosperity through social and humanitarian programmes or helping civil 
society flourish978. For PKS, the Muslims would demand that Islam be implemented 
more comprehensively including at state’ ideological level, if they had already seen 
the greatness of Islam at the practical level. Many scholars had portrayed this 
commitment as one of the important characteristics or identities of this party in 
Indonesian contemporary political life, which became one of the main characteristics 
of PKS in conducting its political attitude, actions and policies979.    
 
From the discussion above, it can be seen that dakwah as the main shared 
value had many important derivative values, such as being a tool of God, living in a 
group or collectivism, obedience and moderateness. Many of these values, as can be 
seen in the following section, were relevant to some aspects in the life of the party, in 
terms of both external affairs and for the most part at the internal level.  
 
2. 2.  Shared Values Maintenance 
 
In order to preserve its shared values, halaqah became one of the important media 
for shared value infusion in PKS. On this occasion, the shared values were 
introduced and developed on a continuous basis for the cadres under the supervision 
of murabbi playing the role of an ideology apparatus. Attended only by between 5-12 
cadres, the ideology transformation process tended to be effective in which the 
cadres had more time to discuss many issues related to ideology. This process, as 
being part of halaqah, was normatively implemented for it to be continuously 
                                                                                                                                            
Firman Noor, Moderate Islamic Fundamentalism in Indonesia: A Study of Political Thinking and 
Behaviour of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), 1998-2005, MA Thesis, (Canberra: Faculty of Asian 
Studies, ANU, 2006).  
978 Yon Machmudi, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Wajah baru Islam Politik Indonesia, (Bandung: 
Harakatuna Publishing, 2005). “PKS Pledges to help civil society flourish”, The Jakarta Post, 6 June 
2005. 
979 Damanik, Fenomen Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia. 
Furkon, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Ideologi dan Praktis Politik Kaum Muda Kontemporer. Bubalo and 
Fealy, Joining the Caravan? The Middle East, Islamism and Indonesia. Elizabeth Fuller Collins, 
“Islam is the Solution, Dakwah and Democracy in Indonesia”, in 
http://www.classics.ohio.edu/faculty/collins/islamsolution.pdf. 
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conducted by the cadres. Although cadres had held important public positions, such 
as members of parliament, governors, ministers, or the highest positions in the party, 
including the General Chairperson of MS980. 
cs, including materials that should be discussed in 
this process by all the cadres981.  
                                                
 
To support the quality of this value infusion activity, the party standardized 
and systemised the materials used in the halaqah. Materials that discussed topics on 
obedience, mainly under the theme of Qiyadah wal Jundiyah; the importance of 
togetherness and the politics of the dakwah, for instance, were subjects that must be 
understood by all cadres as well as other topics such as ahlaq (manner), aqidah 
(belief). For this reason, PKS had published several books that discussed the 
halaqah, both to inform ordinary people on the essence of this process and to give 
guidance on the process and topi
 
The party also held some additional activities in this process, mainly religious 
propagation, conducted monthly, six monthly and yearly, where the topics were to 
recall and strengthen the shared values and maintain the spirit of unity982. The party 
also conducted an evaluation of the cadres983. The results of evaluation were then 
reported regularly by murabbi to the Cadre Development Body (BPK) as a formal 
 
980 Interview with Selamat Nurdin, MM, former tarbiyah activist leader in University of Indonesia, 
Member of Parliament of DKI Jakarta Province (2004-20014), in Jakarta, 22 October 2010. 
981 Tim Departemen Kaderisasi DPP PK Sejahtera, Manajemen Tarbiyah Anggota Pemula, (Jakarta: 
DPP PK Sejahtera and PT Syaamil Cipta Media, 2004). Tim Departemen Kaderisasi PKS, Profil Kader 
Partai Keadilan Sejahtera. H. Hilmi Aminuddin, Strategi Dkawah Gerakan Islam, Serial Fiqud 
Da’wah, (Jakarta: Pustaka Tarbiatuna, 2003). Departemen Kaderisasi Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, 
Manhaj Kaderisasi Anggota Partai Keadilan, unpublished, (Jakarta: Departemen Kaderisasi Partai 
Keadilan Sejaktera). Departemen Kaderisasi Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Sekilas tentang Sistem 
Kaderisasi Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, unpublished, (Jakarta: Departemen Kaderisasi Partai Keadilan 
Sejaktera, 2004). DPP Partai Keadilan, Risalah Am Jamahiri 1423, Seri Dokumentasi Partai, (Jakarta: 
DPP Partai Keadilan). Ahmad Satori, (et.al). Taujihat Ri'ayah Ma'nawiyah Kader PK Sejahtera, 
(Jakarta: Departemen Kaderisasi DPP Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, 2003). Tim Bidang PSDM PK 
Sejahtera, Mobilitas Kader Da’wah: Arah Kebijakan Da’wah dalam Pemberdayaan Sumber Daya 
Manusia, unpublished, (Jakarta: DPP Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Jakarta, 2003). Tim Kerja Penyusunan 
Kurikulum, Satuan Acara Pembelajaran Tarbiyah Islamiyah: Buku 1, unpublished. Tim Kerja 
Penyusunan Kurikulum, Satuan Acara Pembelajaran Tarbiyah Islamiyah: Buku 2, unpublished. Tim 
Kerja Penyusunan Kurikulum, Satuan Acara Pembelajaran Tarbiyah Islamiyah: Buku 3, unpublished. 
982 Interview with Nooryanto, Chair of Cadrerization Department of Bekasi DPD of PKS, in Bekasi, 7 
November 2010. 
983 Interview with Selamat Nurdin, MM, former tarbiyah activist leader in University of Indonesia, 
Member of Parliament of DKI Jakarta Province (2004-20014), in Jakarta, 22 October 2010. In some 
areas this process became very hard, like in Bekasi one of important pouches for PKS. In that area, the 
local committee tightly controlled the quality of the cadres in religious activities, including memorizing 
Al-Quran and the commitment to join the party’s political activities, triggered the cadres to be more 
focussed on their moral obligations and duties as a party member. Interview with Nooryanto, the Chair 
of Cadrerization Department of Bekasi DPD of PKS, in Bekasi, 7 November 2010. 
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institution in the party that handled and supervised halaqah. The party used the 
report as one of the references in evaluating and determining the future of the 
cadres.
ugh halaqah in 
preserving consistency and developing the behaviour of the cadres. 
oh) inherited from the tarbiyah method, which relies heavily on collective 
action”985.  
was one of the parties in Indonesia that had successfully developed its value 
                                                
  
 
Furthermore, in order to enhance the commitment of the cadres to the shared 
values, the party also set up BPDO. As the body in charge of disciplinary matters, 
BPDO also had a role as the main instrument to control the commitment of the 
cadres to implement the party’s mission including the shared value. This body would 
play a role in evaluating a cadre who had been accused by other cadres or by the 
party to be less committed to consistently performing the shared values when 
performing his duty. BPDO maintained usually that the problems related to this 
inconsistency following halaqah’s activities were generally the main reason behind 
being committed to contradict the party’s values984. It inferred BPDO”s 
acknowledgement of the significant role of value infusion thro
 
The above situation indicates that the process for maintaining shared values 
was not something that out of direction. PKS had centralised this process quite 
systematically through halaqah’s networking to guarantee the unity of the process. 
For the critical elements, halaqah had strictly brought about uniformity of all the 
cadres and eventually had effectively suppressed their freedom to act and think thus 
decreasing the sprit of democracy in this party.  As mentioned by Masdar Hilmy “the 
lack of autonomy among PKS activists is to a large degree inspired also by the cell 
system (usr
 
This situation to some extent, however, indicated the effectiveness of value 
maintenance in PKS where the party could considerably ensure the transformation of 
the shared values in the party to all cadres. In his research on the behaviour of seven 
large political parties in contemporary Indonesia, Ignas Kleden concluded that PKS 
 
984 Interview with Aus Hidayat Nur, Head of the II Dakwah Region (2002-2005) and Chairperson of 
BPDO (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 15 October 2010. 
985 Masdar Hilmy, Islamism and Democracy in Indonesia Piety and Pragmatism, (Singapore: Institute 
of South East Asia Studies, 2010), p.254.  
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system986. This situation, according to Randall, indicated the presence of 
institutionalisation where the party could create “its own value system or culture”.  
 
3.  Internal Situation: The Existence of Collective Commitment  
 
In PKS, the commitment towards shared values was reflected in two main areas. The 
first, shared values were used as the main guidance for the party’s daily activities. 
The important point in this situation was the development to promote party idealism 
in many aspects of the party’s life and its relation to the members. The second was 
the spirit to maintain the spirit of berjamaah, which encouraged the members to value 
the unity of the party. The following section will discuss those important aspects, 
involving the ideal characteristics of the impact of the presence of shared value 
infusion in a party, as a reflection of the collective commitment.   
 
3.1.  The Party as ’Receptacle’ of Group Idealism 
 
According to Selznick, one of the indications of an institutionalised party was when 
the institution became “the receptacle of group idealism”987. PKS to some extent met 
this situation. The implementation of shared value infusion in the party had fairly 
maintained the commitment to its ideology. 
 
The realisation of the commitment to dakwah as a shared value in PKS 
existed in the party’s platform that, in general, indicated the commitment of the party 
to dakwah. PKS understood its platform “as a set of values, hope and conceptual 
objectives derived from the result of interaction and internalisation between dakwah 
institution and its long history and experience in the life of the nation. With the 
platform, each cadre as a da’i (Islamic preacher) could understand the movement, 
attitude and direction of dakwah institution”988.  
 
According to Hilmi Aminuddin, the platform was a document that united and 
guided all dakwah activities, in which dakwah itself should eventually nuance the life 
                                                 
986 Ignas Kleden, Partai Politik Indonesia. Dari Mesin Partai hingga Volunterisme Politik (Refleksi 
wakil Tujuh Partai Politik Indonesia 2008), (Jakarta: Komunitas Indonesia untuk Demokrasi, 2009), 
p.22. 
987 Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration. A Sociological Interpretation, (New York: Row, 
Peterson and Company, 1957), p. 22. 
988 Majelis Pertimbangan Pusat  PK Sejahtera, Memperjuangkan Masyarakat Madani, Falsafah 
Perjuangan Dasar, Platform Kebijakan Pembangunan PK Sejahtera, (Jakarta: MPP PKS, 2008), p. iv. 
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of the society and the state989. Suharna Surapranata, one of Jamaah Tarbiyah senior 
cadres, said for PKS the platform of the party, which played a role as guidance for 
the policy-making process and a code of conduct for cadres, reflected the very 
characteristic of Dakwah Party not only focusing on the power struggle and related 
matters but also on the development of community and civilization990. In this regard, 
the platform was a set of obligations that should be implemented by the cadres, 
where the interest was to develop Islamic values and the quality of dakwah became 
the focal point in it. 
 
The commitment to dakwah can also be seen in sumpah kader (the cadre’s 
oath), which obliged loyalty to dakwah’s values and willingness to establish Islamic 
values991. According to Ahmad Yusuf, there are at least three important points in the 
cadres’ oath; (1) to establish Islamic syariah, (2) to consistently fulfil the obligations 
as a member of the party, including obeying and being loyal to the leaders, and (3) to 
implement the objectives of dakwah992. In this regard, the level of understanding and 
commitment of the shared values became one of the indicators that determined the 
position of a cadre in the party. The “seniority” or the acknowledgement of the 
cadre’s ideology’ maturity was determined mostly by his commitment and 
understanding of the party’s ideology.993 For the cadres, this situation was something 
normal and acceptable. They acknowledged that as a party that was driven by 
ideological motivation, the quality of understanding of the ideology had to be a 
parameter for decisions and this including the future of the cadres.            
 
In such circumstance, cadres considered the members of MS, the highest 
institution in the party, as the best cadres in PKS. The internal election to fill the 
membership of MS then tended to be merely a “formal acknowledgement” of their 
commitment to the ideology and the party. In reality, since cadres, who were eligible 
to vote, were reasonably well informed and had an opportunity to asses the 
                                                 
989 Ibid, p. iii 
990 Ibid, p. xiii. 
991 The 2005 ART of PKS Article 6. 
992 Interview with Ahmad Feri Firman Yusuf, Head of the III Dakwah Region (2002-2005), member of 
Majelis Syuro PKS (2002-2010), in Jakarta, 2 November 2010. 
993 Interview with Dr. Yon Mahmudi, PKS and Tarbiyah Movement observer, Lecturer at Political 
Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, and one of the 
cadres who signed the PKS establishment declaration, in Depok, 6 October 2010; with Selamat Nurdin, 
MM, former tarbiyah activist leader in University of Indonesia, Member of Parliament of DKI Jakarta 
Province (2004-20014), in Jakarta, 22 October 2010. 
 313
candidates for the membership of MS, only the best cadres in each province across 
the country had the potential to be elected994. 
 
Moreover, the consciousness to seek God’s will, as part of the ideological 
commitment developed a spirit of avoiding self-interest. In this case, the political 
orientation and calculation of the cadres were dedicated to the glory of the party as a 
tool for dakwah995. In relation to this, the spirit of sincerity became a working ethos in 
the party. The importance of sincerity is exemplified in this extract of a speech made 
to the cadres by Sembiring: “The enjoyment of being a party cadre will not exist 
without loyalty, the enjoyment of loyalty will not exist without obedience, the 
enjoyment of obedience will not exist without sacrifice and the enjoyment of sacrifice 
will not exist without keikhlasan (sincerity)”.996 In this regard, the party also kept 
reminding the cadres to be sincere and patient in the struggle and to see it as part of 
the attempts to find God’s will997.  
 
For this reason, even discussing matters related to important positions 
outside the relevant forums tended to be a taboo in PKS998. When the party noticed 
that a cadre was very ambitious to hold a position, it would be contra-productive for 
his career development in PKS999. This situation also encouraged the cadres to avoid 
having any discussions on their position in the party. In fact, the attitude to support 
someone else rather than to promote himself to hold important positions in the party 
became a tradition in the party. For many cadres, holding a position as a supporting 
                                                 
994 Interview with Dr. Yon Mahmudi, PKS and Tarbiyah Movement observer, Lecturer at Political 
Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, and one of the 
cadres who signed the PKS establishment declaration, in Depok, 6 October 2010 
995 Interview with Aus Hidayat Nur, Head of the II Dakwah Region (2002-2005) and Chairperson of 
BPDO (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 15 October 2010; with Musa Abdillah, the Chairperson of 
Cadrerization Department of Kelapa Dua DPC of PKS, in Jakarta, 23 October 2010; with Dr. 
Kamarudin, Indonesian Islamic political party expert and Lecturer at Political Science Department, 
Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 7 October 2010. 
996 See in Nur Hasan Zaidi, “Resepsi PKS”, Republika, 30 Juli 2005. 
997 Interview with Aus Hidayat Nur, Head of the II Dakwah Region (2002-2005) and Chairperson of 
BPDO (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 15 October 2010. 
998 Interview with Sitaresmi S, M.Psy, Member of Dakwah Department of DPP of PK (2000-2003), in 
Jakarta, 8 October 2010. 
999 Interview with Sitaresmi S, M.Psy, Member of Dakwah Department of DPP of PK (2000-2003), in 
Jakarta, 8 October 2010. 
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element in the party was more enjoyable and preferable rather than to be someone 
who led or held a key position in the party1000.  
        
In some cases, the party also took a pragmatic approach, for instance, by 
providing some allowances to temporarily support the life of very needy cadres or by 
supporting the cadres’ business through financial aid so that the cadres could attain a 
minimum standard of living1001. However, it was conducted very strictly and was 
limited. In general, the party wanted to develop an ideological relationship between 
the elites and the cadres, where the ideology became a common language and 
interest.          
 
Sometimes the party gave the background of a case and its political strategy 
to explain the rationale behind the decision. However, the party’s answers would only 
satisfy cadres if they did not see a difference between the normative (ideological) 
aspects and the facts (the implementation of the ideology)1002. When the cadres 
viewed the party’s policies to be removed from the party’s ideal, they would eagerly 
ask the party mainly through murabbi to explain the reasons. In some cases, many 
cadres asked the party elites directly when they had a chance to meet them1003. In 
facing critics from the cadres, the party implemented an ideological approach in 
response. In this regard, the party would commonly convey the “message” “for the 
sake of dakwah interest and the continuity of the implementation of Islamic values” 
as a base to the answer or response to the cadres. 
 
Although it seemed naïve to entirely believe that an ideological commitment 
was the only factor that motivated the elites or party to act, in the case of PKS, the 
party could not deviate from its ideology when establishing political movement or 
making any policies. The party eventually had to be able to always provide 
“rationalisation” for its policies, which was basically a set of ideological 
                                                 
1000 Almost all interviewees indicated this attitude. The writer also sensed this attitude when attending 
and observing a local annual meeting to select a new leader at the occasion of “Musyawarah Daerah III 
DPD PKS Depok” (“the III Local Meeting of Depok DPD of PKS”), in Sawangan, Depok, West Java 
28 November 2010. 
1001 Interview with Hidayat, MM, Member of Parliament of Tangerang District (2005-2010), in 
Tangerang, 21 October 2010. 
1002 Interview with Dr. Prihandoko Chairperson of Depok DPP of PKS (2004-2007) in Depok, 5 
October 2010. 
1003 Personal experience when attending the PKS’ cadres meeting after the government reduced the oil 
subsidy in 2005.    
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considerations1004, to legalise or back up any decisions taken by the party. According 
to Prihandoko, by having such a background, the situation would be very contra-
productive for the development of trust in the party if the party failed to do so1005. As 
long as the rationalisation was logical and still in line with the party’s idealism in the 
cadres’ perspective, they would sincerely obey and implement it. The party members’ 
consciousness to be merely a tool of dakwah had relatively been able to obstruct the 
escalation of exclusive interests. It made their political opinions and movements or 
even objections not motivated by pragmatism, but were still in the corridor of dakwah. 
This situation made pragmatic or self-seeking behaviour become difficult to develop 
in this party. 
 
In addition, the above conditions indicated that the relation between the party 
and the cadres had transcended from material things where the ideology or shared 
values became the main motivation of the cadres to join and remain in the party, 
which according to Randall, Svasand and Surbakti indicated the dimension of the 
party’s institutionalisation. The above commitment, to some extent, also indicated the 
position of the party for the cadres as an institution that was more than a mere tool 
for filling a set of handed duties, but as a part of their personal life. Hence, the party 
became something more than an expandable tool. 
 
However, in line with the growth of the party, new phenomena appeared in 
the party. Some of the cadres tended to be more expressive in conveying their 
opinions and including criticising the leaders. A cadre even had the courage to 
criticize severely through newspapers on the way the leader dealt with national 
issues that sometimes confused and discouraged the cadres at grass roots level1006. 
In the past this attitude was something unusual. Some of the cadres tended also to 
be less committed to follow the instructions of the leaders. Making excuses, they 
tended to avoid some of their duties. In one of the areas in East Jakarta, it triggered 
the local party committee to renew the commitment by submitting a form of 
                                                 
1004 Interview with Sigit Sosiantomo, Regional Coordinator for East Java and Bali of PKS (2005-2009), 
in Jakarta, 25 October 2010. 
1005 Interview with Dr. Prihandoko, Chairperson of Depok DPP of PKS (2004-2007) in Depok, 5 
October 2010. 
1006 Sapto Waluyo was one of the cadres who criticized the political behaviour of the party leaders that 
sometimes confused the members by providing different opinions about some sensitive cases, including 
establishing a coalition with President Yudhoyono prior to 2009 Presidential Election. See his opinion 
in Sapto Waluyo, “Komunikasi Politik PKS”, in Republika 1 May 2009.    
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declaration that had be signed by the cadres to ensure that they were still willing to 
join and follow the instruction of the party1007.  
 
Some people believed that such a “disobedience phenomenon” was related 
mainly to the effects of boredom after years of belonging to political activities. Others 
believed that this phenomenon was a result of uninspiring murabbi who eventually 
discouraged the cadres from maintaining their commitment to the party1008. For 
some, it was the result of the lack of commitment to being consistently active in 
halaqah1009. Although this phenomenon did not shake the existence of the party and 
occurred in a very small proportion, during its development PKS did face several 
difficulties in controlling the cadres. However, besides these negative aspects, the 
party in general was capable of building the spirit of anti-pragmatism and the idealism 
to hold shared values that protected the party from self-seeking behaviour and 
exclusive orientations. This internal situation became an important capital for the 
development of the party’s cohesion. 
                                                
 
3.2.  The Emergence of the Spirit of Collectivism  
 
Another situation that occurred in PKS was the emergence of the consciousness to 
strengthen the corps and to believe that only through berjamaah could any ideals and 
some added values be reached. The consciousness of berjamaah demanded that 
the cadres sacrifice their self-interests and put forward the party’s interests. The spirit 
of scarification was reflected, for instance, by joining party activities in a difficult 
situation1010, giving financial assistance to the party’s activities1011 and even their life 
 
1007 Interview with Umar Salim Basalamah, Vice General Secretary of PKS (2002), and personal 
secretary of Hidayat Nur Wahid (former President of PKS and Chairperson of MPR of Republic of 
Indonesia), in Jakarta, 12 October 2010. 
1008 Interview with Akmal Burhanuddin, former tarbiyah activist and student in Egypt who joined the 
PKS after finishing his study, in Jakarta, 24 October 2010.    
1009 Interview with Aus Hidayat Nur, Head of the II Dakwah Region (2002-2005) and Chairperson of 
BPDO (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 15 October 2010. 
1010 Solikhin Abu Izzudin, Quantum Tarbiyah, (Solo: Bina Insani, 2006). Interview with Kemal A. 
Stamboel, Head of Expert Advisory Body of PKS and Member of Parliament (2009-2014), in Jakarta, 
8 October 2010. 
1011 Interview with Dr. Yon Mahmudi, PKS and Tarbiyah Movement observer, Lecturer at Political 
Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, and one of the 
cadres who signed the PKS establishment declaration, in Depok, 6 October 2010; with Kemal A. 
Stamboel, Head of Expert Advisory Body of PKS and Member of Parliament (2009-2014), in Jakarta, 
8 October 2010. 
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in helping the party to hold some important activities1012. In Aceh, for instance, a 
pregnant cadre was willing to join party’s activities in a neighbouring village around 
70 Km from her home by going there alone on her motorcycle1013. In such a situation, 
self-seeking behaviour tended to become something irrelevant in this party. In 
general, the cadres regarded themselves and their fellows as the tool of dakwah 
struggle, which then encouraged them to put forward the interest of the party above 
their personal interest.  
 
The spirit to put forward the interest and the existence of jamaah also 
encouraged the cadres to do their best to bring something that jamaah would be 
proud of, which means glorifying the name of the party. Sitaresmi explained that the 
cadres would feel good inside if they could contribute to the grandeur of the party 
through the achievements that they had gained1014. She described, for instance, the 
success in the academic world would also be dedicated to the party in the hope that 
such an achievement would increase the prestige of the party before the people. She 
emphasised that the thing that made the cadres feel at home was due to the spirit to 
preserve the sense of togetherness, where pride was felt by all and all the goodness 
was enjoyed collectively1015.  
 
On the contrary, the cadres would be disappointed and regret it if they 
troubled or destroyed the positive image of the party. In some cases a cadre 
preferred to leave the party after committing something inappropriate, such as 
attending a massage club1016that, according to that cadre, would potentially have 
provided a bad image for the party, although the party had not yet decided on his 
future1017. In the Jambi Province, Zulhalmi Al Hamidi, a cadre, preferred to leave the 
party after the press mentioned him as one of several people who attended panti pijat 
(massage clinic). Although it was not a crime, in fact the main reason for him to go to 
                                                 
1012  Interview with Hidayat, MM, Member of Parliament of Tangerang District (2005-2010), in 
Tangerang, 21 October 2010. 
1013 “Mereka yang Bergelimang Darah Demi Dakwah”, in http://pks-jakarta.or.id/opini/item/67-
mereka-yang-bergelimang-darah-demi-dakwah. 
1014 Interview with Sitaresmi S, M.Psy, Member of Dakwah Department of DPP of PK (2000-2003), in 
Jakarta, 8 October 2010. 
1015 Interview with Sitaresmi S, M.Psy, Member of Dakwah Department of DPP of PK (2000-2003), in 
Jakarta, 8 October 2010. 
1016 “Kader PKS Jambi Tertangkap di Panti Pijat”, www.antaranews.com 
1017 Interview with Sitaresmi S, M.Psy, Member of Dakwah Department of DPP of PK (2000-2003), in 
Jakarta, 8 October 2010 
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such a place was due to his illness, the existence of a negative sense towards the 
massage clinic, as a place sometimes used to cover illegal prostitution, pushed that 
cadre to leave the party to save the party’s face1018. The party accepted his decision, 
even though panti pijat visited by him was actually legal and nothing to do with 
prostitution1019. These kinds of attitude only became possible if the cadres had a 
deep sense of belonging to the party or what Huntington said as “valued for itself”, 
that also indicated the presence of party institutionalisation1020. For many of cadres, 
being part of the party provided a kind of religious satisfaction, mainly in the belief 
that they worked for the institution, which had a strong commitment to struggle for 
Islamic interests. 
 
Another point was the willingness to sacrifice or put aside personal opinion 
when facing the party or leaders’ rationalities or opinions. The party developed this 
attitude at the level where the cadres were deeply consciousness of considering that 
their opinions were not sufficiently comprehensive compared to the thoughts of the 
leaders. Hence, it was common in PKS if the cadres were eventually willing to follow 
the vision of the leaders since their vision was beyond comparison. If they still saw 
some worth in their opinion, they tended to keep it to themselves and kept it 
personal. Most of the party members were not interested in conveying this to the 
other cadres, mainly in order to maintain the party’s unity. Some cadres might 
ngedumel (grumble silently), but they were still willing to implement the decisions of 
the party. The statement from Sumiyanto, a party cadre, represented this situation: “I 
am disappointed, but as a cadre I have to obey the decision”1021.  
 
This value of colegialism also provided an impact on the decision-making 
process, in which any decisions made were the result of the consultation process and 
not a result of a personal or unilateral decision. Musyawarah or consultation was a 
main mechanism in the party that reflected the spirit of berjamaah. In musyawarah, 
every problem was discussed together or collegially, where members of the decision-
making forums had equal rights. In these forums, the cadres were motivated to be 
                                                 
1018 http://www.inilah.com/read/detail/81234/anggota-dprd-pks-pijat-mundur/ 
1019 Interview with Sitaresmi S, M.Psy, Member of Dakwah Department of DPP of PK (2000-2003), in 
Jakarta, 8 October 2010 
1020 Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Society, (New Haven: Yale Univerity Press, 
1968), pp.12-15.  
1021 Muhammad Syihabuddin, ”Majelis Syura, Alternatif ”Demokrasi-Islam”, dan Ketaatan Kader 
PKS”, www.syihabasfa.wordpress.com, 18 December 2007. 
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able to convince other members by having clear arguments and not putting forward 
other matters such as seniority, physical force or money, in order to have their 
argument accepted. In the light of such a spirit, the existence of respected figures 
that usually held the position as the chair of the forum, did not hamper the right of the 
other members including junior cadres, to speak on behalf of their ideas1022.  
 
Moreover, the spirit to hold jamaah created the sense of a permanent 
dependence to be always in the group and eventually enhanced the spirit of 
collectivism as one community, united as holding similar beliefs. This situation also 
became the foundation for the spirit of sharing and understanding each other. The 
relation between the cadres became more than merely as professionals holding the 
objectives of the institution but tended to be members of a family. It indicates the 
institutionalisation situation described by Selznick where the party became a tool of 
personal satisfaction1023. In this circumstance, the party could relatively maintain the 
culture of consultation as a consequence, which enhanced the process to hold a 
common identity. It also supported the conflict resolution process since every cadre 
had a chance to convey his arguments and be treated as a brother rather than as an 
enemy.  
 
However, this situation did not affect all cadres in the same way. Some 
cadres preferred to step aside from the jamaah and became merely a supporter of 
the party, since they regarded themselves as not being suitable in the political 
domain and activities1024. Some disappointed cadres even decided to entirely leave 
the party, where some of them even became very critical about the party1025. A part 
from this situation, since the party generally had became a medium for personal 
satisfaction and collective idealism for most part of cadres, internal factionalisation 
tended to have some difficulty in emerging. On the other hand, it preserved the spirit 
                                                 
1022 Interview with Sigit Sosiantomo, Regional Coordinator for East Java and Bali of PKS (2005-2009), 
in Jakarta, 25 October 2010; with Dr. Yon Mahmudi, PKS and Tarbiyah Movement observer, Lecturer 
at Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, and 
one of the cadres who signed the PKS establishment declaration, in Depok, 6 October 2010; with 
Ahmad Feri Firman Yusuf, Head of the III Dakwah Region (2002-2005), member of Majelis Syuro 
PKS (2002-2010), in Jakarta, 2 November 2010. 
1023 Selznick, Leadership in Administration. A sociological Interpretation, p. 17. 
1024 Interview with Noviyanti Utaminingsing, cadre of the PKS, in Jakarta, 9 October 2010. 
1025 Interview with Hurriyah MA, cadrerization of PKS observer and Lecturer at Political Science 
Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 29 October 
2010. 
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of togetherness, which supported the preservation of party cohesion. The following 
chapter discusses the effects of the above situation. 
 
4.  Preserving Internal Cohesion  
 
The presence of a collective commitment to the shared values provided two 
advantageous dimensions for the preservation of party cohesion. The first was that 
the party became the tool of idealism for the cadres. There were still some 
weaknesses but the cadres believed that they were in the right political vehicle to 
reach their main goal of dakwah, namely to carry out the spirit of dakwah. Moreover, 
since the ideology or shared values played a real parameter in guiding the thinking 
and behaviour of the cadres, the existence of people who offered alternative 
ideologies, let alone materials advantages, would not easily attract the cadres to 
develop faction or camps inside the party. It also protected the party from the 
presence of figures who could easily take over the process of understanding and 
interpreting the ideology or the leadership of the party in the name of improving the 
party’s situation. This condition eventually made the creation of alternative camps or 
parties within PKS not an easy one. 
 
The second was the commitment to the unity of the party that encouraged the 
cadres to promote party harmony rather than personal ambition. The commitment to 
the unity of the party created the belief of the importance of being part of one group. 
This commitment became the reason for many of PKS’ cadres to remain in the group 
or at least avoid doing something that could be harmful to the unity of the party as the 
medium to struggle for dakwah. The existence of such a commitment prevented the 
cadres from also taking careless abrupt decisions or forming sudden conclusions 
when responding to delicate situations inside the party. In most cases, as long as the 
cadres did not see any evidence showing the real violation of the shared values or 
ideology, they would see it as something acceptable.  
 
In some sensitive cases, where there was the potential for fragmentation 
inside the party, it could avoid prolonged conflict. Since the party had quite 
successfully built and preserved its shared values, potential conflict would hardly be 
relevant in the domain of the policy-making process and not as something that 
essentially related to the fundamental matters such as party ideology. PKS and its 
cadres then regarded the strategic matters as furu’ (a branch problem). Mardani Ali 
Sera associated this situation with “choosing the best vehicle after agreeing the place 
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to go”1026. In this situation, the cadres valued conflict as part of a consequence 
emanating from the efforts to find the best way to implement party ideology. The 
cadres also believed that the main motivation of the “conflicting cadres” was for the 
glory of the party. Under this circumstance, any differences existing mainly at the 
technical or strategic level were not crucial to party’s cohesion. The situation became 
easier since it was supported by the willingness to maintain the unity of the party by 
obeying the decisions of the leaders. 
 
In the 2004 election, there were differences in the perspectives used by each 
group in assessing the presidential candidates and the future of dakwah movement. 
To the Rais proponents in the PKS, the figure of Rais was strategic for his position as 
the leader of the Reformasi movement and as an Islamic modernist figure. Thus, a 
combination of a leader of reformers and Islamic communities was perfect in that it 
would attract many people who were committed to reform and many Muslim 
communities. As the religious leader, Rais would provide a significant opportunity 
and access for PKS to enhance its dakwah movement as a concession to its 
support1027.  
 
However, for the supporters of Wiranto, they considered that Rais was only 
popular with the modernists, intellectual groups and professionals in urban areas, 
which represented a very limited percentage of the total population. The Wiranto 
proponents, who mainly were the leaders of the party at local level, considered that 
the Wiranto’s popularity was better than Rais’ at the grass roots level or remote 
areas1028. Furthermore, with the support from Golkar Party, as the winner of the 2004 
Parliament Election, Wiranto seemed to have a more promising situation. Hence, for 
them it was worth for dakwah if PKS would support the candidate who would have a 
better potential to win the election. Moreover, they also saw Wiranto as the figure that 
was sympathetic to dakwah movement1029. Although he was a military figure, who 
                                                 
1026 Interview with Dr. Mardani Ali Sera, Vice Chairperson of MPP PKS (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 6 
October 2010. 
1027 R. Alex Sandi, Sikap Poitik Partai Keadilan Sejahtera terhadap Pilpres 2004 dan Pemerintahan 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Studi Kasus Psikologi Politik Partai Dakwah, Master Thesis, (Depok: 
Islamic Studies and Psychology, Middle East and Islamic Studies, Post Graduate Program, University 
of Indonesia, 2006), pp. 120-121. 
1028 Interview with Aus Hidayat Nur, Head of the II Dakwah Region (2002-2005) and Chairperson of 
BPDO (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 15 October 2010; with Ahmad Feri Firman Yusuf, Head of the III 
Dakwah Region (2002-2005), member of Majelis Syuro PKS (2002-2010), in Jakarta, 2 November 
2010. 
1029 Defy Ruspiyandi, ”Menebak Arah Dukungan PKS”, Pikiran Rakyat, 21 June 2004 
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stigmatised the proponent of the “nationalistic tendencies camp” that opposed the 
military officers with religious tendencies, he did not have such a bad track-record 
showing his resistance to the development of an Islamic dakwah. In fact, his two 
daughters were members of PKS’ tarbiyah1030.  
 
The above case indicates that the continuation of dakwah prospect was the 
main issue that held by each group. It means that behind their different actions and 
strategic reasons, they shared a similar interest showing that their commitment was 
not dedicated to other aspects but to the development of dakwah. This situation was 
sufficiently encouraging to maintain relations between cadres in the different camps 
running well and to find a resolution to the difference. Eventually, all the cadres who 
supported Wiranto could accept the party’s decision to recommend that all the people 
and PKS’ members should support Rais in the 2004 Election. Some important figures 
form both sides appeared together before the press to confirm and convey the 
decision of MS. This situation showed that the party was still able to maintain its 
solidity after facing one of the most and first serious debates among the cadres of the 
party.       
 
In the case of BBM, another delicate case, the commitment to preserve the 
unity of the party became an important element. In this case, the attitude to obey the 
leader and the readiness to put aside personal interest became the main reasons for 
most of the cadres to accept the decision of the leaders to continue to remain in the 
coalition of President Yudhoyono’s Cabinet, after a government controversial 
decision to cut the oil subsidy in 2005. Although many cadres expressed their 
disappointment with this governmental decision before the party had concluded its 
decision and where several others even proposed that the party should leave the 
government1031, most of the cadres eventually could accept the party’s policy to 
remain in the coalition. This was not only because the government had agreed to 
provide compensation to the people as demanded by their party, but also because 
the leader of the party had decided on that policy.  
 
                                                 
1030 Sandi, Sikap Poitik Partai Keadilan Sejahtera terhadap Pilpres 2004 dan Pemerintahan Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono. Studi Kasus Psikologi Politik Partai Dakwah, p.107. 
1031 This people including the General Secretary Anis Matta and Mashadi, Member of Parliament for 
the PKS, two Provincial Boards (in DKI Jakarta, DI Yogyakarta) and one Branch of the PKS (in Solo). 
”Tak Ada Koalisi Tanpa Perubahan”, in Saksi, No.6/VIII/30 November 2005, pp.7-9. “Ini Politik Bos”, 
Tempo, 16 October 2005. 
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In relation to this, for Trianto Prabowo, the capability to find and to preserve 
the ultimate goals as the basis of the spirit of togetherness and to some extent the 
attitude to believe in the leaders became main factors that influenced the cadres to 
accept the decision to remain in the coalition1032. Of the cadres who initially 
disagreed with this decision, many of them eventually changed their minds and 
agreed to support party policy. According to Prabowo, approximately 73% of the 
cadres who initially disagreed on that policy changed their preference. As for the rest, 
they were still consistent with their initial choice1033. However, although their opinion 
was not in line with party policies, they agreed to accept the party’s decision. They 
kept this decision as an individual preference. As for the cadres who had changed 
their opinion, they believed that trustworthy people in DPP had made the decision 
and had more understanding and a better comprehensive vision than they did. 
Hence, it was logical if they followed their leaders’ decision1034. This condition 
reflected the capability of the party to preserve its unity through its cadres’ 
commitment to their shared values.  
                                                
 
As for the case of being an “open party” in 2008, the consciousness of being 
a tool of idealism and the importance to hold unity took a role in securing the 
willingness of the cadres to follow the leaders’ instructions. In this regard, the party 
leaders tried to develop a more overt and inclusive approach mainly in order to have 
a better chance to win the election so increasing the possibility for the ideals of the 
party to be enacted in Indonesia as a plural country. For this understanding, the party 
then proposed a new policy to give a chance to the non-Muslims to join the party and 
become members. The leaders then conducted socialisation and revealed the 
considerations taken into account behind the policies. They tried to convince the 
cadres that their work was also attached to the interest to develop dakwah. In this 
case, the leader conveyed the need to gain further political votes to obtain a political 
position giving more access and power to support dakwah.   
 
Although the leaders had tried to rationalise their policy, the potential for 
disagreement was still high. It could happen, as many of the cadres did not yet have 
a similar understanding on this issue. For those against this, such a decision was a 
 
1032 Triatno Yudho Prabowo, Pengaruh Taklim Rutin Terhadap Prilaku Politik Kader Partai Keadilan 
Sejahtera dana Perspektif Teori Intergroup Relation, BA Thesis, (Jakarta: Syarif Hidayatullah State 
Islamic Univeristy, 2006). 
1033 Ibid, p. 49. 
1034Ibid, p. 54, 60, 69. 
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kind of “great leap or jump”, even an indication of the failure to maintain the very 
characteristic of the party1035. They also assumed that this decision was a symbol of 
pragmatism, in which party idealism was sacrificed merely to gain more support as 
compensation. Some of the cadres who constantly resisted the moderation of the 
party, however, even regarded such a policy as intolerable. Some of them then 
decided to set up a forum named FKP to criticise this policy. Later, they extended the 
issues by criticising the way of life of PKS’ elites.  
 
On the other hand, those in favour of this believed that the party needed such 
a policy in order both to be more acceptable to the plural Indonesian societies and to 
be more influent on the life of the people. The party could not be influential if it was 
not accepted. Also for those in favour, the policy to be more inclusive was not 
something that contradicted dakwah1036. According to them, the very characteristic of 
dakwah was the flexibility of the way to gain the attention of the people and 
afterwards convey the message.    
 
However, the differences of opinion among the cadres did not lead to 
fragmentation. The spirit of obedience prevented the party form serious 
precariousness. Although in that case the potential to have prolonged debates 
between supporters was quite open on the subject of the presence of the 
commitment to the unity of the party, PKS could eventually manage the cohesion of 
the party not long after this policy was implemented. After the party decided to be 
more overt in recruiting cadres, most of the cadres were willing to end the debate, 
which minimised the intensity of this quarrel.  
 
Most of them preferred to understand the leaders’ instructions and implement 
them. Although some ex-cadres had heavily criticised such policies, until today, many 
of PKS cadres did not complain about such a political adjustment, let alone use it to 
attack the party. The consciousness to maintain party unity kept emerging in difficult 
situations and made the solidity of the party become less problematic to maintain. 
                                                 
1035 Interview with K.H Yusuf Supendi Lc, Member of the PKS DSP (2000-2005) and Member of 
Parliament (2004-2009), in Jakarta, 3 November 2010. 
1036 Interview with Amri Yusra, M.Si, Chairperson of Depok DPD of PKS (2002-2004), Member of 
Parliament of Depok District, West Java, (2004-2009), and Lecturer at Political Sciences Department, 
Faculty of Social and Political Science, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 7 October 2010. Interview 
with Dr. Yon Mahmudi, PKS and Tarbiyah Movement observer, Lecturer at Political Science 
Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia and one of the cadres 
who signed the PKS establishment declaration, in Depok, 6 October 2010. Interview with Hidayat, 
MM, Member of Parliament of Tangerang District (2005-2010), in Tangerang, 21 October 2010. 
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Most of the cadres also refused to follow FKP, which then became a limited and 
“liquid” forum, attended mainly by the disappointed cadres and people who wanted to 
discuss the “negative sides” of the leaders of PKS, some wrongdoings of this party 
and how far this party had deviated from its initial idealism. Most importantly, there 
was not any group who used the same name, flag and constitution, which clearly 
claimed as an alternative for tarbiyah cadres after this decision. 
 
In recent development, some of the cadres who left the party decided to 
return to it1037. This proved, according to some interviewees, that their heart was still 
in jamaah1038. In this case, the party had become valuable to the cadres and 
provided personal satisfaction that was not easy to replace. Some political 
adjustments did not change the general situation in PKS where the commitment of 
many cadres was still high. This situation indicated that the continuity of the 
existence of the party was valuable to the cadres, and also indicated the ability of the 
party to adapt. 
ers for violating the rules of the game when 
dismissing him from the party1041.  
 
                                                
 
However, other ex-cadres preferred to be very critical of their former party1039. 
One of them was Yusuf Supendi, the former vice chairperson of DSP removed by the 
party in 2009 and who publicly accused the leaders of the party of committing 
corruption. Supendi expressed his resistance through the mass media and attacked 
the leaders of the party. directly. The interesting point was that he did not attack the 
party for deviating from its ideology; instead, he accused the two leaders of the party, 
Luthfi H. Ishaaq and Matta, for committing improper behaviour namely making 
personal attacks towards him and corruption1040, denied by Ishaaq and Matta. He 
then also accused ten PKS lead
 
1037 Interview with Sitaresmi S, M.Psy, Member of Dakwah Department of DPP of PK (2000-2003), in 
Jakarta, 8 October 2010; with Aus Hidayat Nur, Head of the II Dakwah Region (2002-2005) and 
Chairperson of BPDO (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 15 October 2010; with Musa Abdillah, Chairperson of 
Cadrerization Department of Kelapa Dua DPC of PKS, in Jakarta, 23 October 2010.  
1038 Interview with Musa Abdillah, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Kelapa Dua DPC of 
PKS, in Jakarta, 23 October 2010.  
1039 Interview with Hurriyah MA, cadrerization of PKS observer and Lecturer at Political Science 
Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 29 October 
2010.  
1040 “Presiden PKS Dilaporkan ke BK DPR”, Republika, 17 March 2011.  
1041 “Yusuf Supendi Gugat 10 Petinggi PKS ke PN”, http://us.politik.vivanews.com/news/read/217843-
yusuf-supendi-gugat-10-petinggi-pks-ke-pn. 
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However, this situation did still not provide a serious impact on the cadres 
and the solidity of the party. Supendi’s movement to use public media to attack his 
former fellows in the party also showed that he did not find sufficient support from 
inside it. According to Sembiring, all PKS’ cadres in all regions of the country were 
still solid and were not influenced by Supendi’s political manoeuvres1042. It showed 
that any attempt to influence the cadres to follow a person or a group of people was 
not easy to do, let alone to make faction in the party. Above all, it proved that the 
presence of shared values and their maintenance were indeed relevant to the 
preservation of party cohesion. 
 
The discussions above show that the commitment to preserve shared values 
and simplify them as the code of conduct had provided a positive impact on the 
cohesion of the party. It prevented the party from having an emergence of 
factionalisation from within. Even when some critical founding fathers and important 
figures who had then entirely left it or had been removed by the party for their 
disobedience or resistance attitude and were still in the party, they were not able to 
influence most of the cadres to follow their opinions.  
 
5.  Overview 
 
PKS has shown a relatively greater ability to find, preserve and develop dakwah as 
the main value to be used as the main reference in the party that also brought a 
unique identity to it. The party also did not find any difficulty in implementing value 
infusion through the halaqah. The identity as a jundi, which had a main duty to 
struggle for God’s will, had reached most of the cadres and become an identity that 
created commitment to preserve the ideals of the party and regarded such ideals as 
their priority. Such commitment also reduced the attitude to regard the party merely 
as a “disposable tool”, for material compensation, and exclusive advantages. Even 
though several weaknesses were still in evidence, the commitment to obey the 
leaders to maintain the spirit of togetherness and be part of dakwah membership still 
existed in this party. Some delicate moments that occurred in this party could 
potentially have shaken the unity of the members. However, thanks to the positive 
situation regarding shared values infusion, PKS was relatively able to avoid serious 
or prolonged conflicts and in general was capable to maintain its cohesion.  
                                                 
1042 “Tifatul: PKS Tetap Solid”, Republika, 26 March 2011. 
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Chapter XIII  







The main aim of this thesis is to show the role of party institutionalisation as the key, 
independent variable determining the likely emergence of whether a party exhibits 
fragmentation or cohesion.  There are four dimensions of party institutionalisation 
that are discussed comprehensively, indicating the important factors that should be 
considered when studying this issue in the context of the Indonesian Islamic political 
parties. These factors are (1) the decision making process based on legitimate the 
rules of the game, (2) systematic cadrerization as a medium for cadre development 
and career, (3) the presence of a conflict resolution mechanism (CRM) to handle and 
terminate the conflict and potential and (4) the development of commitment to shared 
values through value infusion. 
 
From previous discussions, it can be considered that PKB and PKS 
experienced quite different situations in the dimensions that eventually provided 
distinct consequences on their internal conditions, particularly on the appearance of 
fragmentation in PKB and cohesion in PKS. The following discussion will summarise 
the main points of comparison and difference between the records of the two parties 
with regard to the four dimensions and the impact that occurred during the first 
decade of their existence in the Indonesian Reform Era.     
 
1. 1.  Procedural Leadership 
 
An institutionalized party is the party that could consistently apply its mechanism or 
rules in the decision making process. In this case, the party procedure becomes the 
only guidance in such process, which proves that the leadership of the party is 
controlled and dictated by the legitimate rules when making policies.  On the 
contrary, an un-institutionalised party tends to neglect its constitution or procedures 
when making policies. This type of party sometimes relied on the will of the leading 
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figures to run this process and used the procedure merely as an accessory to be 
immediately modify or freely understood to legalise the leader’s wish.  
 
The discussion of legal-formal aspects concerning procedural leadership in 
PKB and PKS have indicated that each party developed decision-making processes, 
including some basic and important aspects about policy making mechanism and the 
level of authority of many forums in the decision-making process. PKB and PKS also 
had also underpinned the importance of musyawarah to be conducted in their party. 
Although some observers believed that the party’s constitution had permitted a large 
and wide authority to Dewan Syura relevant to many aspects and including the 
decision making process, there was actually no single chapter in the constitution that 
really permitted Dewan Syura to decide unilaterally on policies, let alone individually. 
The legal-formal normative situation in PKS also indicates to some extent a similar 
condition. In PKS, musyawarah became the main way and core of the spirit of this 
process. The party, for instance, did not put forward the leader of MS to be the sole 
element that could decide on a policy.  
 
   Although both parties, in their written regulations and constitutions, had put 
forward the spirit of consultation and had described the decision-making process in 
detail, each party followed different paths in terms of implementing the rules of the 
game, which differentiate their quality of party institutionalisation and eventually the 
internal cohesiveness. 
 
Based mainly on the case of the dismissal of the General Chairperson of 
Dewan Tanfidz and other relevant cases in PKB, this thesis shows PKB’s 
inconsistency in implementing its constitution when making a policy, which also 
indicates that in practice, the influence of the personal leadership played a role. The 
personal leadership discussed in this thesis is understood as the leadership that 
tended to avoid the existence of party’ procedures. 
 
The forms of procedure infringement include the medium that was used to 
decide the dismissal policy, the period that was taken to handle and stipulate the 
policy and the reasons or substance behind the dismissal. In terms of the medium, 
the procedural violation was related to the DPP’s attitude that refused to organise 
Muktamar or MLB as a legal forum to evaluate the performance of the General 
Chairpersons of Dewan Tanfidz before formally deciding on their future status. Matori 
Abdul Jalil was dismissed by a quick decision made by Dewan Syura on the same 
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day he attended the 2001 SI MPR. Alwi Shihab and Syaifullah Yusuf were also 
discharged by the PKB in a very limited forum called as a preliminary meeting, which 
was actually not attended by Shihab as the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz. 
In the Muhaimin Iskandar case, the party even dismissed him during the forum so 
called as a “joint meeting”, which was not initially addressed to discuss his position 
as the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz.  
 
In relation to time, the abruptly decided dismissal indicated the violation of 
procedure. The party did not implement a gradual process leading to finally 
stipulating the dismissal, although the ART had stressed such a process to be 
applied. In fact the process only took a few hours for Jalil and Iskandar’s case. As for 
the substance, some ostensible reasons became the foundation for dismissal without 
initially having undergone a proper inspection. Jalil was discharged for being disloyal 
to the party’s decision. However, although he was dismissed due to his appearance 
in the 2001 SI MPR, a forum considered illegal by PKB, this party eventually decided 
to re-join the MPR not long after Wahid’s impeachment, which was seen by the 
people as an indirect acknowledgment of the MPR’s existence and its entire policies 
including the SI MPR.  
 
Shihab case was questionable since the main reason for dismissing him was 
because he held a dual position. According to some, including Shihab, this policy 
potentially obstructed the opportunity for members to take on more roles in political 
life, which was not in line with the spirit of the party’s constitution and which in fact, 
encouraged each cadre to take as many roles as possible in society. As for the 
Iskandar and Yusuf cases, the party could not clearly prove the substantial reasons 
for their dismissal. Even though the party eventually continued their policy to dismiss 
Iskandar and Yusuf from their positions, the party actually could not convincingly 
demonstrate professional mistakes committed by these persons in these cases. 
Moreover, the local cases indicated a similar situation in which the dismissal decision 
or suspension was not based on the party procedure but on political interest. 
 
These cases to some extent also indicate the salient role of Wahid in the 
dismissal process, which in many ways had overshadowed the party’s procedure. 
The PKB case demonstrates basically that the failure of establishing commitment 
towards the party’s constitution had eventually paved the way leaving it open for the 
prominent figures to influence and even determine the party’s policies, or, at least put 
forward their considerations as something that should be run by the party. In facing 
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this situation, A. Mustafa Bisri, one of the prominent figures in the PKB establishment 
said that Wahid as the General Chairperson of Dewan Syura had acted as “a special 
institution” in PKB1043. 
 
PKS operated in a different way. Although some people criticised the 
implementation of the decision making process as seeming to give some of the elites 
or people surrounding Hilmi Aminuddin, the Chairperson of MS, the opportunity to 
unilaterally dictate the result, the above discussion indicated that during the first 
decade of its existence, in general, PKS was not trapped into abandoning or ignoring 
the procedure and the spirit of musyawarah in its decision-making process. The role 
of the Aminuddin, as one of the founding fathers of Jamaah Tarbiyah in Indonesia, in 
this institution was of little importance. However, it did not obstruct the party from 
implementing musyawarah and respect the rules of the game, which made both 
musyawarah and MS became institutionalized in this party. In some important cases, 
Aminuddin trusted the floor to decide and even found his opinion not to be taken into 
account. 
 
In general, MS could maintain the spirit of collectivism and avoid the nuance 
of authoritarianism. However not all of the MS’ decisions satisfied the majority of the 
cadres. Often people blamed the centralised and elitist mechanism in PKS that gave 
too large a concession to the untouchable figures in MS when deciding party policies. 
However, the above discussion showed that unpopular policies were still the result of 
the musyawarah process and not based on the wish of several people in MS. Most 
cadres believed that since all the policies had their rationale and were decided 
through a fair and legal mechanism applied by the trustworthy cadres, there was no 
reason for them to oppose the result.  
 
The inconsistency in implementing party procedures in the decision-making 
process raised resistance among the disappointed cadres. It then motivated them to 
continually criticise such inconsistency but also in the long term, to establish factions 
inside the party. The above discussion indicates that the factions’ establishment was 
not dedicated to facilitate reconciliation. Rather, they were mainly created to secure 
just each conflicting group’s interest. Hence, in its development, the presence of 
factions tended to impede any attempts to build reconciliation. Over time, the 
absence of a real reconciliation among factions became uncontrollable and ended 
                                                 
1043 “Sekali Lagi PKB”, in A. Mustofa Bisri, Gus Dur Garis Miring PKB, (Surabaya: MataAir 
Publishing Surabaya, 2008), p. 66. 
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with the realisation of Muktamar or MLB that cemented factions and in turn legalised 
fragmentation. 
 
 PKS’ consistency in implementing the rules of the game in the decision-
making process had enabled the party to maintain the system running proportionally. 
This condition motivated the cadres to believe that consistency in implementing the 
procedure was important and highly appreciated in this party, which, over time, 
encouraged the cadres to also value the system. Furthermore, by having the 
opportunity to be heard as one of several consequences emanating from the 
implementation of the party’s procedure in the decision-making process, the cadres 
felt that their presence was meaningful. It enhanced the sense of belonging with their 
fellow cadres to their party, which eventually helped the party to underpin its 
capability to avoid the presence of worthless factionalism that could endanger the 
unity of the party and preserve its internal cohesion.   
 
The above studies confirmed that a party’s incapability or capability to 
implement the rules of the game in the decision-making process, as one of the 
dimensions of the party institutionalisation, influenced the presence of fragmentation 
or cohesion in the party. 
 
Table 11 
Comparison of the of the Procedural Leadership Conditions 
to the Decision Making Process Applied by PKB and PKS 
 
Matters National Awakening Party  
(PKB) 
Prosperous Justice Party 
(PKS) 
Legal Formal Aspect  Decision Making Process: The 
Acknowledgment of 
Consultation 
 A commitment towards 
Consultation and the 
Consultative Assembly 
Implementation  The Emergence of 
Unconstitutional Phenomena 
 Overshadowing Party’s 
Constitution: The Role of Wahid 
 MS as the Pre Eminent 
Body 
 Musyawarah as the main 
way 
The Tendencies   Procedure Violation  
 Following the Patrons’ interests 
 Procedure maintenance 
 Respecting the System 
The Effects on the 
Party  
 The Emergence of Internal 
Resistance 
 The Emergence of Factions 
Formation and Fragmentation 
 The development of Trust  




1. 2.  Conflict Resolution Mechanism 
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Another dimension of party institutionalisation is the presence of a conflict resolution 
mechanism (CRM) which functioned. This dimension is actually related to the level of 
systemness where conflict, as something that commonly occurs in any institution 
including a political party and its related matters and their impact, can be solved 
through a standard mechanism or institutional approach and not based on any 
personal decision. An un-institutionalised party, hence, is a party that puts the conflict 
resolution to a non-standard or subjective mechanism, involving incapable persons 
and an illegal medium.        
 
In the case of PKB, the presence of this dimension is low. PKB did not have a 
comprehensive CRM and up until 2005, did not have any institutions that were 
competent in to these matters. The main reason for the absence of a comprehensive 
CRM was that PKB and its supporters quite believed that internal conflicts would not 
easily lead to fragmentation since members of this party were united by a similar 
affiliation of their religious background and of the same objectives, namely to struggle 
for NU people’s interests. They also believed that their islah tradition was quite 
effective in solving internal conflicts in NU and could therefore effectively work in 
PKB.     
     
This situation created a lack of legitimate bodies in the party who legally held 
the authority to act and required acknowledgement from all the elements for handling 
conflict resolutions. Several institutions were projected by many to be the medium to 
solve the conflict and relevant matters, namely Muktamar and Dewan Syura, in 
reality, could not play their role, which was mainly due to the difficulty to maintain the 
objective and an impartial attitude. Instead, these institutions were used to some 
extent by the conflicting groups to serve their own interest. 
 
In the situation where the mechanism for conflict management was absent, 
several important decisions on this matter were practically dependent on the will of 
personal opinion and consideration. Most of the cadres presumed that Dewan Syura 
was the institution handling this matter and managing the problem fairly and 
objectively, but its inability to do so just made the situation worse. The absence of a 
competent body to take care of this problem caused repeated imprecision in 
managing the conflict and also rendered the decision prone to result from exclusively 
from political concerns, which were sometimes nuanced by the prominent figure’s 
will, rather than it being based on a legal opinion. Gradually over time, PKB was 
subject to disadvantageous situations and it often fell short in detecting and localising 
 333
the conflict and in general, it could not respond to this situation correctly, which 
eventually paved the way for conflict escalation.   
 
The dismissals of the elites and the cadres indicated clearly the fact that 
there was no CRM in place thus creating a void and allowed the disappointed cadres 
to use it for their complaints and voice their opinions and interests so increasing 
conflict potential and degrading any inter-groups’ relationships who held different 
opinions. The disappointed cadres or “dissident cadres” were fiercely pushed by the 
authority to follow the will of the party. The lack of a medium in order that the cadres 
would receive fair treatment made any attempt to terminate the conflict become 
difficult to attain, as the party’s decisions would be most likely to continue to 
disappoint for those cadres in question.  
     
Constructive dialogues that could be a proper catalyst were replaced by an 
eagerness to resolve the differences. The absence of a CRM encouraged each 
conflicting group to hold their position firmly, either as the victim or the ones that 
believed that they were already on the right track and consistently struggled for their 
interest. Factionalism could not the be neglected and was expressed mainly through 
the presence of Muktamar or MLB that legalised the position of each conflicting 
group in front of their supporters, although in essence, the legalisation was unitarily 
conducted.   
 
In its development, the absence of the CRM had eventually provided an 
opportunity for the court, to act the third party, to take role in this problem. However, 
the above study showed that the presence of the third party could did not ensure a 
comprehensive reconciliation and termination of the conflict. Rather, by providing a 
confusing decision that appealed many interpretations, the third party in PKB case 
had preserved the enthusiasm of each conflicting group to struggle for their case. In 
the end, the presence of the third party also became worthless. 
 
Regarding PKS, the party constitution mentioned that certain institutions were 
competent to be elements of CRM. These bodies, namely DS, BPDO and halaqah 
had the authority for example to be a reconciliation body, to conduct internal tribunals 
and investigations, or as the medium, to find a resolution for any different points of 
view. The party also in reality had a standard pattern in dealing with conflict 
prevention and resolution. Although PKS could not entirely escape from certain 
limitations, the presence of these bodies and a standard mechanism enabled the 
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party to have an authoritative guidance and proper reference in dealing with conflict, 
which in the end helped the party to enact with trust and avoid conflict escalation. 
 
Contrary to PKB’s condition, PKS was able to detect the conflict potential and 
respond at a very early stage. This was because halaqah, as one of CRM institutions 
in PKS, could undertake to act as an effective medium for the supervision of the 
quality of the cadres’ development and occasionally their personal life, which also 
gave the opportunity for the party’s apparatus to supervise and note the cadres’ 
feelings, desiderata, aspirations and anxieties. On the other hand, the presence of 
DS exemplified the existence of an authoritative body, composed of competent 
persons, who, when taking a decision, were respected by the cadres. Moreover, 
BPDO, another element in CRM, had also enabled the party to handle several 
delicate cases related mainly to discipline and loyalty issues which, if the party could 
not immediately correctly solve them, this situation could potentially generate 
prolonged disputes and conflict among the cadres, or between the party and the 
cadres. Through these several instruments, PKS, hence, had the capacity to contain 
the conflict practically immediately and prevent the party from prolonged disputes 
that potentially led to factionalisation.  
 
Some crucial and delicate moments with an internal conflict potential did not 
prolong disputes and enhance conflict. PKS could convince the cadres that the rules 
of the game were a significant foundation on which to base their attempt to resolve a 
conflict, which, over time, satisfied most of the cadres where the work of the party 
system was concerned and decreased any disappointment that may have ensued 
from it. During the first decade of the Reform Era, PKS could avoid any unilateral 
movements, terminating conflicts by constantly providing an opportunity for the 
cadres to communicate their opinions and defend their case before facing internal 
judgment. This situation maintained trust and weakened factionalism tendencies, 
which eventually enabled PKS to secure its cohesion.  
 
Although the party could undertake these positive tendencies however, not all 
cases, of course, could be handled properly by the party. In some very rare and 
delicate cases, the party tended to be sluggish in deciding its verdict. The historical 
situation of the cadre sometimes made the entire process difficult, which for some 
showed inconsistency. Whereas this type of situation might occur in PKS, in general 
the party could constitutionally process the case. The above discussion indicates a 
very fundamental role of the CRM as one of the indicators of party institutionalisation, 
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which is relates mainly to the work of judicial institutions, in creating an ability to 
preserve party cohesion.  
 
Table 12 
Comparison of the CRM Conditions Applied by PKB and PKS 
 
Matters National Awakening Party  
(PKB) 
Prosperous Justice Party 
(PKS) 
Legal Formal Aspect  The non-existence of a relevant 
rules of the game and 
institutions on CRM 
 The presence of the rules 
of the game and relevant 
institutions on CRM 
Implementation   Mainly based on personal 
opinion and interest rather than 
institutional perspective 
 Conducted through 
authoritative institutions 
and mechanism 
The tendencies   Difficulty in preventing and 
terminating the conflict 
 Having trouble in localising the 
conflict 
 Capability to detect conflict 
potential at very early stage 
 Capability to localise the  
conflict 
The Effects   Conflict escalation and 
factionalisation enhancement 
 The Disappearance of 
constructive dialogue 
 The third party’s “resolution”. 
 The preservation of trust 
towards internal system  




1. 3.  Systematic Cadrerization 
 
The systemic cadrerization is another dimension of an institutionalized party. The 
institutionalized party is the party that develops its cadres using a standardized and 
transparent mechanism. The objective of this process is not only to have cadres with 
certain commitments that are in line with the mission of the party, but also to 
determine the future of the cadres, using the cadre status as the basic pre-request 
for holding a position inside the party or as a public officer.   
 
In the legal-formal context, PKB asserted a set of rules for maintaining 
cadrerization and the recruitment process. In general, however, the party’s 
constitution did not clearly contain a complete and comprehensive regulation on 
cadrerization and the recruitment process and the institutions to deal with their 
procedures neither the steps to be taken pertaining to the cadres’ career 
development. The party constitution only implicitly claimed that cadrerization would 
be Executive Board’s domain. Even though the party possessed the cadres training 
models and a guide to recruitment, in general, these areas were stagnant and in fact 
depended on other institutions, such as NU and pesantren. Gradually this situation 
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cemented PKB’s dependency on NU and its supporting elements. PKB failed to 
implement cadre discipline within the party and for the leaders.  
 
In terms of the recruitment process, the influence of prominent figures in the 
party and NU was more powerful than the standard mechanism and objective 
assessment in determining the future of the potential cadres or members. The above 
studies indicated several recruitment models that substantially weakened the role of 
the rules of the game and its objectivity, which eventually also diminished the cadres’ 
respect towards the party apparatus.  
 
Inconsistency in implementing cadrerization and the presence of many 
elements, which had taken part in this process, paved the way for the “phenomenon 
of federalism”, in which the party was not the only authoritative body that should 
provide an official interpretation and teaching of the ideology and the rules of the 
game. Eventually many cadres tended to put forward their direct patron’s 
understanding and interest as something worthy to follow, which again indicated the 
cadres’ independency from those figures rather than the party apparatus. 
 
The absence of a solid and final interpretation of the rules of the game and to 
certain extent ideology provided the opportunity for anybody to develop and make his 
own interpretation. Each conflicting group had its own understanding of the 
implementation of the rules of the game and which sometimes contradicted each 
other. In the dismissal cases, the difference in understanding the constitution had 
become something that also increased the tension and made it difficult to solve. The 
difference in implementing spirit of pluralism as one of the main aspects in party 
ideology was also one of the reflection of the failure of establishing common 
understanding on the party’s ideology to all party members. 
 
At the practical level, these differences provided each conflicting group with 
reasons to legitimize their existence and confront the opponent’s opinion at the same 
time. It increased the fragmentation potentiality, as it was the differences among the 
conflicting cadres rather than their similarities, which were more apparent rather than 
they disappearing. In addition, the above discussion also indicated a rapid formation 
of groups as another effect of the failure of a systematic cadrerization. It was an 
internal phenomenon that exacerbated the fragmentation potential in PKB. Having 
the capacity to set up a complete party committee in a short time, each conflicting 
group claimed to have significant supporters who demanded the realisation of their 
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rights and this encouraged the sense of fighting each other. The establishment of 
Muktamar or MLB then followed in order to provide a legitimate right to their 
existence that diminished the unity of the party. 
 
On the other hand, cadrerization had been an important matter, sometimes 
called “the real spirit” in PKS. The party had managed this tool systematically. Since 
2005, PKS had clearly mentioned in its constitution that one of the main functions of 
DPP was to conduct cadrerization. Modules taken from the constitution and other 
official cadrerization modules that were published as a complement, the cadres or 
cadre candidates could see the entire picture of this process, including the 
cadrerization levels and the materials. 
 
Besides having clear rules of the game, the party’s solidity was also 
supported by the consistency of at implementation level. Halaqah, as the main 
institution for cadrerization in PKS, was functioning as an effective medium for 
socializing and seeding the party’s ideology and all related organisational matters to 
the cadres. Under the supervision of the party’s cadre institutions, murabbi, the 
people in charge in each halaqah, had an obligation to conduct a set of rules to 
handle the cadres’ development. Halaqah at the practical level was moving hand in 
hand with other forums of cadrerization, such as TOP, TD, TL, TMKS and the AKIP, 
created by the party to cement the sense of solidarity and establish militant cadres. It 
also provided significant aid to bring qualified cadres into the party to fill any needed 
positions inside or outside the party. Regarding recruitment, PKS was consistent in 
making this process a collective process that involved several elements and stages 
to reach its conclusion. The party allowed eligible cadres to determine the process, 
which avoided the possibility that a limited group or a single person could unilaterally 
conclude the result of the process.            
 
The presence of systematic cadrerization run by a committed apparatus had 
supported the party to not only preserve the unity in understanding the party’s values 
and objective, but also loyalty towards the party. The systematic indoctrination was 
also supported by a consistency in implementing the rules of the game, had 
developed a consciousness by the cadres to respect the existence of the party and to 
put forward the party’s interests before their individual interests. These tendencies 
eventually enabled the party to avoid a prolonged conflict and worthless factionalisms 
that could jeopardize the unity of the party.  
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Whereas some people believed that factionalism happened in PKS, it did not 
threaten the unity of the party. Moreover, what happened in PKS was actually close 
to the situation where different opinions could not be avoided. Tendencies of having 
different opinions emerged time after time since the party, to some extent, allowed 
the cadres to form their own opinions before the part released an official policy. 
However, it did not necessarily become a source of the establishment of a faction, 
similar to what occurred when a certain and distinct group was formed inside the 
party. In fact, during the first decade of PKS’s existence, there was no group that 
considered itself as a faction in this party with its own distinct characteristics, 
leadership and supporters. So far, if it was related to the real and active cadres, the 
factionalism happened to be a very limited case in this party.      
 
Moreover, the systematic cadrerization also motivated the cadres to put 
forward similarities rather than differences and discouraged worthless factionalisms 
let alone resistance. A few former cadres had indeed taken some unusual moves to 
show their resistance to the policies or the general current conditions of the party. 
However they were never able to convince the vast majority of the cadres to follow. 
Hence, in general, the party could relatively maintain the unity of the party. This 
situation was in line with the spirit of cohesion, namely to avoid any possibilities for 
the emergence of fractures among the members of an institution. However, it is also 
fair to say that the existence of those “dissident cadres” reflects some weaknesses in 
PKS’ cadrerization, particularly in terms of providing more comprehensive thinking 
that could be implemented, as a foundation to build strategies in facing new political 
dynamics which could be understood and followed by all the cadres, including those 
with “radical” tendencies. 
 
The cases of PKB and PKS show how party institutionalisation, reflected by 
the presence of systematic cadrerization, had influenced the internal situation and 
solidity of the party. The absence of systemic cadrerization had pushed PKB to 
fragmentation. On the other hand, PKS’ capability to maintain its cohesion during its 





Comparison of the Conditions of Systematic Cadrerization 
Applied by PKB and PKS 
 
Matters National Awakening Party  Prosperous Justice Party 
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(PKB) (PKS) 
Legal Formal Aspect  The partial rules of the game 
and undeclared institutions  
 The presence of the rules 
of the game and relevant 
institutions  
Implementation  Inconsistency in Conducting 
Cadrerization 
 Party Recruitment and 
Subjectivism 
 Cadrerization: Halaqah and 
Cadres Maintenance 
 Recruitment: Finding Best 
Cadres 
The Tendencies   The Development on 
Different Interpretation 
 The Weakening of Esprit de 
Corps 
 The Loose Attitude towards 
Rules of the Game 
 Preserving a Common 
Approach an 
Understanding  
 Preserving Loyalty 
 The Development of Trust 
The Effects   Prolongation of the 
differences 
 The Emergence of 
Resistance  
 Quick Grouping to Maintain 
Faction’s Interest 
 Saving the party from the 
conflict prolongation 
 Reducing factionalisation 
tendencies 




1. 4.  Shared Values Infusion  
 
The above discussion indicates several significant differences in both of the Islamic 
parties in dealing with their commitment to the subject of shared values. PKB   
already shared values, namely nationalism and Aswaja, which normatively could be 
implemented as a uniting element. However, the generality of these values provided 
some basic problems. This situation not only had put PKB in a position where it could 
not develop its distinct identity among the Islamic parties established by NU 
communities, but where at the practical level where it made the presence of shared 
values become less effective in playing the role as an internal code of conduct 
including the cadres’ orientation and behaviour. The party eventually became a party 
lacking values, orientation and guidance 
 
Besides having a problem with the essence of the shared values, PKB also 
had one with value infusion. The orientation of the party which was still mainly 
focused on the external problems, made value infusion and its related matters 
including giving standard schedules, materials and evaluation, become largely futile. 
The fact that the party did not effectively control the implementation of value infusion 
worsened the situation. Eventually, PKB could not effectively avoid the role of several 
informal leaders who took over this process. Thus, the phenomenon of “federation” 
as was mentioned by Yahya Staquf happened. In addition, the party could not 
escape from multi-loyalties and the attitude to step aside from internal shared values, 
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since the future of the cadres, in most cases, actually depended on their good 
relationship with the prominent figures rather than on their commitment to the shared 
values.        
 
On the other hand, PKS had shown a relatively greater ability to find, 
preserve and develop the dakwah as the principal value used as the main reference 
in the party. The values of collectivism being the tools of dakwah’s struggle appeared 
to be the shared values, which, over time, became invaluable to cadres. Such shared 
values also became the foundation for the party’s code of conduct, namely putting 
forward consultation, understanding and protecting each other, loyalty to the leaders 
and to the community, trust and discipline, which dictated the behaviour of the 
cadres. Although grades were accredited on the way the cadres understood and 
implemented these values, the presence of these values enabled PKS to preserve its 
identity. In addition, PKS did not find any difficulty in implementing value infusion. 
The identity as a jundi, for which the main duty was to struggle for God’s will, had 
been conveyed mainly through halaqah to the cadres and became an identity that 
created commitment to preserve the ideals of the party and they regarded such 
ideals as their priority. Such commitment also reduced the attitude to regard the party 
merely as a “disposable tool. In general, although some weaknesses were still in 
evidence, the commitment to follow the leaders, to maintain the spirit of togetherness 
and belonging to dakwah still existed in this party. 
 
In all the above tendencies, PKB tended to be vulnerable, as any conflict 
tended to be difficult to terminate and it troubled internal cohesion. The discussions in 
the previous chapters indicate how the conflict could easily increase and attract many 
cadres to develop factions, which then legalised the presence of parallel committees 
of PKB. Accordingly, the absence of the shared values commitment, which in its 
development deteriorated the spirit of togetherness, made the fragmentation 
tendency became obvious in PKB.  
 
On the other hand, PKS experienced a different situation. By having a 
commitment to the shared values and its infusion, PKS was relatively able to avoid 
serious or prolonged conflicts and was capable to maintain its cohesion. This does 
not mean that the party did not have any serious problems. Some delicate moments, 
including during the 2004 presidential election, the BBM case and the issue of an 
open party that occurred in this party could indeed potentially jeopardize the party’s 
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unity. However, the presence of the shared values had underpinned the party’s 
aptitude to maintain solidarity and the sense of togetherness among its cadres. 
 
This comparison confirms the hypothesis that the capability to develop a 
commitment to the shared values makes a party capable of maintaining cohesion. On 
the other hand, the failure to implement and preserve the shared values, which also 
means preserving the commitment to the party’s ideals and shared identity, brings 
disadvantages to party cohesion. 
 
Table 14 
Comparison of the Shared Values Infusion Conditions  
Applied by PKB and PKS 
 
Matters National Awakening Party  
(PKB) 
Prosperous Justice Party 
(PKS) 
Legal Formal Aspect  Nationalism and Aswaja as a 
potential values  
 The Limited Efforts towards 
Shared Values Development 
 Dakwah Struggle as a 
Central Value 
 Shared Values 
Maintenance  
Implementation  Mainly based on personal 
opinion and interest rather than 
institutionalised perspective 
 Conducted through 
authoritative institutions 
and mechanism. 
The Tendencies   Prominent Figures as a Driving 
Force  
 Value Free and Expendable 
Tools Phenomenon  
 Party as ’receptacle’ of 
group idealism  
 The Emergence of the 
Spirit of Collectivism 
The Effects  Leaders’ Interests as 
“Legitimate Sources” to Act  
 Instrumentalist group formation 
in the absence of shared values 
 The Conflict Continuation and 
the Trial of Commitment. 
 Party as the tools of 
idealism  




2.  Conclusion 
 
2.1.  The Relation between Variables  
 
The case of PKB demonstrated that the violation of the rules of the game in the 
decision-making process had generated resistance from the disadvantaged and 
critical cadres. It indicated the crucial effect of the absence of procedural leadership 
in this process towards party internal fragmentation. This situation could actually 
have been avoided if the party, since the very early stage, could properly manage 
this type of process constitutionally, by following all the processes and stages 
carefully. The absence of the medium for conflict reconciliation had worsened the 
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situation by paving the way for the creation of prolonged disputes. In the main, it 
occurred as the party did not have an authoritative and fair medium to terminate the 
conflict comprehensively, which was respected by all cadres. It then persuaded the 
conflicting groups to uphold their beliefs, which gradually over time deteriorated the 
trust and solidarity among the cadres. 
 
This situation was exacerbated by the vagueness to build unity based on the 
shared values, which in its development deteriorated the quality or relationship 
between the cadres, particularly between those whose opinion was different. They 
saw the other cadres in different groups simply as an enemy who had to be finished 
off rather than as a partner of dialogue in seeking the truth. The weakness of value 
infusion and the absence of the code of conduct had also limited the cadres in their 
development of a full awareness to regard their party more than as an exponible tool. 
On the other hand, the absence of systematic cadrerization, which in essence 
lessened loyalty towards the party and a respect of the party procedures, had made 
the rapid formation of groups become possible. These groups which were legalised 
through MLB, made any attempts, for reconciliation to be in vain.  
 
The absence of proper cadre development underpinned the potential 
fragmentation in this party, since the cadres could not maintain their loyalty to the 
party and preserve a similar understanding of the party’s rules of the game. In these 
circumstances, the cadres tended to follow the perceptions of their direct patrons, 
which were influenced by subjectivity or the interests of their patrons. In short, to 
uphold a different understanding on the implementation of the constitution was quite 
possible in PKB. Moreover, the above situation also created a larger opportunity for 
the cadres and elites to establish factions to support and legalise their will, which was 
reflected by the rapid formation of groups after the conflicting groups failed to reach 
formal agreement. This trend happened continuously in PKB giving negative effects 
due to the absence of a systematic cadrerization. In its development, the failure to 
maintain the coherence, the presence of prominent elite figures who could act above 
the law and the increase of disappointment, which indicated the un-institutionalized 
party, provided a significant impact for the emergence of party fragmentation. Hence, 
the absence of procedural leadership, systematic cadrerization, CRM and shared 
values that should have united all of the cadres, in the long term caused party 
fragmentation.     
 
 343
On the other hand, PKS’ competence to establish the four dimensions of 
party institutionalisation brought the party to establish its cohesion. The party could 
avoid fragmentation, as PKS, at its very early stages, could properly manage the 
decision-making process by leaving aside any actions that could deteriorate the 
cadre’s trust in the system. In fact, PKS, during the first decade of its existence, was 
consistently able to put forward MS as a collective institution for the decision-making 
process, particularly where major issues were concerned and implemented 
musyawarah as the main medium to take decisions at all levels.   
 
This situation became a main asset for PKS, as it was able to continue to 
protect the honour of the leaders before the cadres. Consistency in implementing 
musyawarah as the main principle of the decision-making process had eventually 
increased the cadres’ sense of belonging towards their party due to their involvement 
in several important events. At the end of the day, this tradition made the cadres tend 
to be more dependent on the system rather than on the prominent figures. In fact 
such a situation made it possible, even for the prominent figures including the vice-
president of the party or the members of DS to be surpassed by the system. The 
unity of PKS resulted from of the strong solidarity that was established through the 
systematic cadrerization and fair recruitment, consisting of a spirit of mono-
understanding, mono-loyalty and trust in the system, which was a kind of synthesis 
between systematic indoctrination and fair practices.  
 
This solidarity had prevented the cadres from being easily provoked by 
dissident figures to follow their beliefs including established factions. PKS was also 
capable of developing a CRM with some internal institutions to surmount any conflict 
potential in this party, even though it was not entirely successful. Having this 
mechanism, PKS was able to solve delicate cases, bring the conflicting groups or 
cadres before the authoritative institution and maintain its supervision of the conflict 
potentialities. On the other hand, the work of value infusion that infused the party by 
the shared values derived from the party’s ideology played a salient role in forcing 
unity among the cadres. It cemented the purpose of the cadres in the party together 
with their sense of solidarity and identity among themselves.        
 
The party avoided several cases having the potential to bring about internal 
conflicts due to a proper and constitutional response, the presence of a medium to 
accommodate opinion, a strong ideological networking and cadre solidarity and 
loyalty. The case of PKS indicated that the fourth discussed dimension, hence, 
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provided a significant contribution to the establishment of its very foundation for 
cohesion. 
 
Concerning the reason behind the failure of PKB to hold party 
institutionalisation, the above discussion indicates that in general, it was caused by 
its deep commitment to traditions. Over time, it is fair to say that PKB had been 
trapped by its own traditions. First of all, it gave a large role to the charismatic figures 
for determining the direction of the organisation and it very much relied on personal 
and the members’ loyalty. Secondly, the flexibility with which the members regarded 
the system and the rules of game reflected their choice to settle any problems 
informally. The third, members embraced the identity of communal values in their 
political lives without first having a detailed study and rationality. 
 
PKB’s failure to uphold procedural leadership was due to the party’s tradition 
to give a larger role to the party’s leaders in the decision making process. Wahid was 
one of these, who could work without an effective control and sometimes 
overshadowed the rules of the game. The elite’s unique and special position in the 
party’s tradition made PKB more dependent on personal figures for making decisions 
than on the system. In the context of a CRM, the absence of CRM’s tools and rules 
of the game were the root cause of the party’s failure to build conflict management. 
The above study shows that there was a belief among the party members and elites 
that PKB would never experience deep and prolonged conflicts because they share 
the same traditions and interests. There was also a belief that the strength of NU 
tradition in dealing with conflicts generates confidence among PKB’s members and 
elites that they could contain any emerging conflicts. In addition, it was believed that 
the existence of the old and respectable ulama would effectively restrain conflicts. 
These beliefs are the real trap behind the absence of an operational CRM in this 
party, since the party tended to rely on informal approaches or traditions in dealing 
with conflict than trying to develop a comprehensive CRM.  
 
In terms of cadrerization, this party dependency on the tools of the 
cadrerization of NU, pesantren, and ulama was the main reason behind PKB’s failure 
to centralize cadrerization and above all create systematic cadrerization. The 
tradition to highly regard ulama and “royal bloods” slowly undermined the effort to 
carry out objectively an organised and regular cadrerization. As for PKB’s failure to 
institutionalize value infusion, it was because the party regarded no urgency in 
developing, internalizing and preserving these values to cadres and other members 
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at practical levels. The party believed that through NU’s cadrerization that had been 
received by the party cadres they had naturally understood the party’s traditions and 
values. In general, the tradition to do things informally had put aside any attempts to 
systemise and channel PKB values. The above study, hence, signifies that various 
traditions among the Muslim traditionalists, which became the foundation of PKB’s 
political culture, could not any longer be relied upon to support PKB’s 
institutionalisation.  
 
With regard to PKS, the capability of the party to preserve institutionalisation 
was mainly related to its commitment to uphold Islamic teachings in every aspect of 
people’s daily lives, including in political activities. Specifically, this ideological belief 
itself covers several values. The first is that Islam manages every aspect of the 
human life, the second is the need to build a comprehensive system, gradually 
starting with individuals (cadres) in order to reach the Islamic ideals, and the third is 
the importance of committed leadership and the cadres’ loyalty based on shared 
values. These are values developed in this party, which are supported by a 
systematic method. In the long term, ideology and its implementation become 
inseparable. 
 
In terms of procedural leadership, PKS’ success in upholding this dimension 
was due to the commitment of this party to put forward a system rather than a 
person. Members of the party, whether leaders or cadres, were perceived as parts of 
the system and elements to ensure that the system would work well. While the 
commitment to uphold CRM emerged as a part of the effort to uphold internal rules 
for all cadres, which was based on Islamic principles. CRM, also created as an effort 
to ensure the obedience of all members to the rules of game and the existing party’s 
system and as a media to empower and protect the party’s cadres. PKS’s 
commitment to cadre institutionalisation was deeply related to the party’s ideology 
that perceived the cadres as the main core of this party permitting it to reach its 
goals. The commitment to build civilization, which starts with individuals, motivated 
this party to develop and empower the cadres’ comprehension so that they can be 
committed to bring the party’s idealism to fruition. For this reason, a comprehensive 
curriculum was put into place and the institution that implements this curriculum, 
obliging every cadre to follow and implement it.     
 
Related to value infusion, PKS’ success in upholding this dimension was 
related to the establishment of existing values. This establishment emerged due to 
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the commitment to develop ideology and Islamic methods seriously and 
comprehensively. These two elements were meant to be the daily guidance of 
cadres. The success to uphold this particular dimension was also related to their 
commitment to build a system that can transmit ideology continuously and 
systematically. This commitment was preserved through the halaqah. In general, the 
above study infers that PKS’ success in developing an institutionalisation dimension 
was linked to this party’s commitment to uphold its ideology. In other words, the case 
of PKS shows how a party having a huge commitment to uphold ideology is 
compatible with its effort to uphold its institutionalisation. 
 
The above explanation indicates that the Islamic parties are not monolithic in 
terms of handling their organisational life or the institutionalisation of their party. The 
case of PKB and PKS, the two most important Islamic parties in Indonesia during the 
first decade of the Reform Era, indicates that the fragmentation or cohesion of the 
party was not determined by merely Islamic factors, but by the capability of the 
Islamic parties to institutionalise themselves, providing four important dimensions of 
institutionalisation in the party’s life to protect their solidity. One should not neglect 
the background of the party in discussing this topic. However, in general, the 
presence of the four dimensions of the party’s institutionalisation played a salient role 
in contributing to, or, even to some extent, determining the situation of cohesion or 
fragmentation. 
 
The case of PKB reveals similar dimensions that used to be reasons behind 
the fragmentation of the Islamic parties before the Reform Era. These factors 
including the existence of strong and charismatic persons who could act above the 
law, caused damage to the procedural implementation, very similar to what had 
happened in the case of the split between PSII and Partii. The inability to set up and 
preserve shared values was also the reason for the split between the pro-communist 
cadres and the anti-communist cadres in PSII; and to some extent, between the 
cadres with a NU background and with a non-NU background in Masyumi and the 
split between Barisan Penyadar-PSII and PSII. These phenomena showed the 
continuation of aspects which, from time to time, appeared to be the rationales for the 
failure of the Islamic parties to maintain their cohesion. In the light of this situation, it 
can be said that there was a kind of stagnation in the life of the Islamic party. 
 
On the other hand, the case of PKS indicated another situation in the Islamic 
party. The capability of this party to maintain its cohesion for more than a decade in 
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the Indonesian reformasi was an example of a success story of the party based on 
Islam to bring institutionalisation dimensions into its life. The party, in some other 
perspectives, had indeed held some qualities to be a cohesion party. This, included 
as a cadre (non-catch all) party and an ideological (non-pragmatic) party; but the fact 
that this party could preserve its consistency to build a system, value it and be 
consistent in implementing it, played a more salient role in the way that this party 
uphold its cohesion. The case of PKS was exceptional in Indonesia’s Islamic political 
history. 
 
This thesis focuses on the discussion on the relation of party 
institutionalisation and its effect on its fragmentation and cohesion. Although 
emphasis is placed on the role of the institution or party as an organisation, the thesis 
also covers some of the party’s non-institutional aspects such as the role of 
individuals in shaping the real situation in the party. However, the thesis regards the 
role of the individual as an impact on the situation of party institutionalisation, rather 
than as the real determinate variable on its fragmentation or cohesion. In this regard, 
this thesis tends to see the role of the individual as complementary.  
 
However, some people would most likely argue and highlight the role of the 
individual as the main factor that influenced the real situation in both parties. They 
argue, for instance, that Wahid and his opponents would secure power as the main 
factor behind the PKB’s fragmentation and the Aminuddin’s commitment to maintain 
the system that paved the way for cohesion in the PKS. Although it is naïve to 
neglect individual or group interest, the above cases indicate that the resistance in 
PKB was triggered mainly by the violation of party’ procedure, rather than merely due 
to the presence of individual interest in seeking power. The opponents of Wahid state 
that the commitment to maintain the party’s constitution consistently and its internal 
democracy was the main objective of their resistance. Hence, it was not the tendency 
to seek power to actually trigger resistance to Wahid, which over time became the 
commencing point of the party’s split.  
 
On the other hand, Wahid had generated several controversial policies, 
endangering the unity of the party and which made him popularly known as a 
“controversial figure”. However, if we scrutinise the case of PKB carefully, it would 
become clear that this situation occurred because the party was not sufficiently ready 
to treat Wahid’s ideas, agendas or hopes through a systematic and standardised 
procedure. The lack of institutionalisation, hence, had opened an opportunity for 
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Wahid to easily uphold his opinion and interests. In other words, fragmentation would 
be likely to occur, with or without the presence of “controversial but a charismatic 
figure” like Wahid as long as the party continued to be weak in establishing a fair 
procedure, to not be supported by an effective CRM, could not convince its cadres to 
see the party more than as a dispensable tool, and failed to establish fair and 
objective cadrerization and recruitment.  
 
Moreover, this thesis did not see the relevance of “reification” towards the 
emergence of party fragmentation or cohesion. “Reification” as an external dimension 
of party institutionalisation, may relate mostly to the impact of the relationship 
between the party and society to the party, but it is less relevant to the discussion of 
party fragmentation or cohesion. The case of PKB clearly indicates that the main 
problem of internal fragmentation was inside the party. The case of PKS also shows 
that internal factors played a salient role in preserving party cohesion. 
 
This thesis also excludes the study of the role of the political system as an 
external factor for fragmentation and cohesion. The case of PKS indicates that the 
open political system was not automatically a medium for internal fragmentation. In 
fact, after more than one decade the fragmentation had never occurred in this party. 
Of course, one may say that one decade could not portray the real situation of the 
party. Some important European socialist parties, such as SPD and PSI, enjoyed 
more than one decade of cohesion before eventually experiencing fragmentation. 
However, the studies of these socialist parties actually indicate that fragmentation 
resulted from ideological disputes and personal conflicts at the elite level rather than 
as the direct impact of the political system. The above discussion also indicates that 
the relation between the presidential system and the tendency to fragment, which 
was believed by several scholars, does not really have any relevance in the case of 
the Indonesian Islamic parties. However, the fact that factionalism tended to grow in 
PKS after the Indonesian political system had implemented a direct presidential 
election, is an interesting phenomenon to study. 
 
This thesis contends the role of institutionalisation dimensions plays a more 
significant role in establishing cohesion rather than the role of several aspects that 
were supposed to be supporting elements for party cohesion, such as the political 
system or social and cultural conditions. In other words, in the end, cohesion was 
determined more by the internal situation rather than by external factors such as the 
political system or cultural background in which the party lived. In addition, one could 
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not totally neglect the existence of the party’s internal culture that to some extent 
explains the behaviour of the members of the party, which gave nuance to the 
presence or the absence of the party’s institutionalisation dimensions.     
 
On the other hand, this thesis shows that the role of the organisation model 
and the development of cohesion are related, where the capability to establish 
certain managerial functions, including a functioning discipline and the rules of the 
game, became apparent for such development. In terms of fragmentation, there is a 
tendency to confirm the opinion on the crucial role of ideology in the solidity of the 
party. In several cases factionalisms based on ideological tendencies or orientations 
tend to be potentially crucial factors in the creation of internal fragmentation. In the 
case of PKB, however, fragmentation occurred, which was not really due to 
ideological conflict but to the consequences of a situation where ideology had lost its 
relevance and had been freely understood by the cadres becoming less significant to 
the cadres’ unification of values. 
 
2.2.  Suggestion for Further Research 
 
I realize, however, that there are some other important aspects that should be 
explored, but due to my limitations, they could not be covered in this thesis. One of 
them is the exploration of other Islamic parties. In their development, some of them 
have survived until today whereas many of them had failed. Of those that could 
continue their presence in Indonesian politics until today, are PPP and PAN, which 
during the first decade of the reform era, also experienced internal fragmentation. 
The studies of these parties must be challenging. I hope that the ground covered in 
this thesis contributes to a useful perspective and a preliminary assumption to 
discuss the phenomenon of fragmentation in these parties and perhaps other Islamic 
parties in Indonesia. 
  
In addition, the period after 2008 of the party’s development is also an 
interesting period to study. Both parties experienced some internal dynamics. After 
obtaining a permit from the Election Commission, PKB-Muhaimin joined the 2009 
Election and faced a bitter reality due to PKB number of votes plunging to around 
four million compared to 13 million in the 1999 Election. This situation indicates the 
real damage that fragmentation may create. After the death of Wahid in December 
2010, each of the conflicting groups, PKB-Muhaimin, PKB-Gus Dur and PKNU, 
remain separate groups. In the 2011, the PKB-Gus Dur led by Yenny Wahid changed 
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its name to PKBN, leaving PKB-Muhaimin as the only group including the name of 
PKB.  
 
Fragmentation occurred three times, which seemed to provide good lessons 
for PKB, particularly PKB-Muhaimin and push this party to be more aware of 
institutionalisation. Some prominent figures of this party had stated the importance of 
establishing institutionalisation. This awareness was shown by the emergence of new 
internal arrangements and regulations, for instance, by creating a more serious 
cadrerization mechanism and creating a body to handle CRM. This new condition, to 
certain extent over time, had helped PKB-Muhaimin to preserve a party cohesion. 
Such developments are interesting subjects to study. However, a more detailed study 
is required to explain the current situation in PKB. 
 
After the 2009 Election, PKS became the largest Islamic party in Indonesia, 
though it remains a mediocre party in terms of the number of votes. Although it was 
still capable of holding its cohesion, the party faced some new and crucial 
experiences. Some critics and ex-cadres had more courage to express their opinion 
and resistance to the leaders of the party. The legal action to cancel the dismissal 
taken by Yusuf Supendi through the court was one of the important examples. This 
situation was important and seemed to have seriously damaged tradition in PKS. 
Moreover, some people believed that this party had suffered a more serious internal 
factionalism, which influenced the internal dynamics in this party. The critical 
elements tended to grow, but found difficulty to establish themselves in this party. 
Furthermore, some people have also questioned the quality of cadrerization, since 
the quantity of these party activities at the grass roots level are tending to decrease. 
These PKS’ current developments are interesting subjects to discuss through the 
institutionalisation approach. The study in this thesis of institutionalisation in PKS 
may provide a perspective to discuss the latest situation of PKS. However, a 
comprehensive and detailed research to discuss the latest development in this party 








Mabda’ Siyasi PKB 
(The Political Principles of PKB) 
1. Cita-cita proklamasi kemerdekaan bangsa Indonesia adalah terwujudnya 
suatu bangsa yang merdeka, bersatu, adil dan makmur sejahtera lahir dan 
batin, bermartabat dan sederajat dengan bangsa-bangsa lain di dunia, serta 
mampu mewujudkan suatu pemerintahan Negara Kesatuan Republik 
Indonesia menuju tercapainya kesejahteraan umum, mencerdaskan 
kehidupan bangsa, keadilan sosial dan menjamin terpenuhinya hak asasi 
manusia serta ikut melaksanakan ketertiban dunia. 
2. Bagi Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, wujud dari bangsa yang dicitakan itu adalah 
masyarakat yang terjamin hak asasi kemanusiaannya, yang 
mengejawantahkan nilai-nilai kejujuran, kebenaran, kesungguhan dan 
keterbukaan bersumber pada hati nurani (as-shidqu), dapat dipercaya, setia 
dan tepat janji serta mampu memecahkan masalah-masalah sosial yang 
dihadapi (al-amanah wa al-wafa-u bi al-ahdli), bersikap dan bertindak adil 
dalam segala situasi (al-’adalah), tolong menolong dalam kebajikan (al-
ta’awun) dan konsisten menjalankan ketentuan yang telah disepakati 
bersama (al-istiqomah) musyawarah dalam menyelesaikan persoalan sosial 
(al-syuro) yang menempatkan demokrasi sebagai pilar utamanya dan 
persamaan kedudukan setiap warga negara di depan hukum (al-musawa) 
adalah prinsip dasar yang harus selalu ditegakkan. Dalam mewujudkan apa 
yang selalu dicita-citakan tersebut, misi utama yang dijalankan Partai 
Kebangkitan Bangsa adalah tatanan masyarakat beradab yang sejahtera 
lahir dan batin, yang setiap warganya mampu mengejawantahkan nilai-nilai 
kemanusiaannya. Yang meliputi, terpeliharanya jiwa raga, terpenuhinya 
kemerdekaan, terpenuhinya hak-hak dasar manusia seperti pangan, sandang 
dan pangan, hak atas penghidupan/perlindungan pekerjaan, hak 
mendapatkan keselamatan dan bebas dari penganiayaan (hifdzu al-Nafs), 
terpeliharanya agama dan larangan adanya larangan adanya pemaksaan 
agama (hifdzu al-din), terpeliharanya akal dan jaminan atas kebebasan 
berekspresi serta berpendapat (hifdzu al-aql), terpeliharanya keturunan, 
jaminan atas perlindungan masa depan generasi penerus (hifdzu al-nasl) dan 
terpeliharanya harta benda (hifdzu al-mal). Misi ini ditempuh dengan 
pendekatan amar ma’ruf nahi munkar yakni menyerukan kebajikan serta 
mencegah segala kemungkinan dan kenyataan yang mengandung 
kemunkaran. 
3. Penjabaran dari misi yang diemban guna mencapai terwujudnya masyarakat 
yang dicitakan tersebut tidak bisa tidak harus dicapai melalui keterlibatan 
penetapan kebijakan publik. Jalur kekuasaan menjadi amat penting ditempuh 
dalam proses mempengaruhi pembuatan kebijakan publik melalui perjuangan 
pemberdayaan kepada masyarakat lemah, terpinggirkan dan tertindas, 
memberikan rasa aman, tentram dan terlindungi terhadap kelompok 
masyarakat minoritas dan membongkar sitem politik, ekonomi, hukum dan 
sosial budaya yang memasung kedaulatan rakyat. Bagi Partai Kebangkitan 
Bangsa, upaya mengartikulasikan garis perjuangan politiknya dalam jalur 
kekuasaan menjadi hal yang niscaya dan dapat dipertanggungjawabkan. 
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4. Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa sadar dan yakin bahwa kekuasaan itu sejatinya 
milik Tuhan Yang Maha Esa. Kekuasaan yang ada pada diri manusia 
merupakan titipan dan amanat Tuhan yang dititipan kepada manusia yang 
oleh manusia hanya boleh diberikann pada pihak lain yang memiliki keahlian 
dan kemampuan untuk mengemban dan memikulnya. Keahlian memegang 
amanat kekuasaan itu mensaratkan kemampuan menerapkan kejujuran, 
keadilan dan kejuangan yang senantiasa memihak kepada pemberi amanat. 
5. Dalam kaitan dengan kehidupan bermasyarakat, berbangsa dan bernegara, 
kekuasaan yang bersifat demikian itu harus dapat dikelola dengan sebaik-
baiknya dalam rangka menegakkan nilai-nilai agama yang mampu 
menebarkan rahmat, kedamaian dan kemaslahatan bagi semesta. Mafestasi 
kekuasaan itu harus dipergunakan untuk memperjuangkan pemberdayaan 
rakyat agar mampu menyelesaikan persoalan hidupnya dengan lebih 
maslahat. Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa berketetapan bahwa kekuasaan yang 
hakekatnya adalah amanat itu haruslah dapat dipertanggungjawabkan di 
hadapan Tuhan dan dapat dikontrol pengelolaannya oleh rakyat. Kontrol 
terhadap kekuasaan itu hanya mungkin dilakukan manakala kekuasaan itu 
tidak tak terbatas dan tidak memusat disatu tangan, serta berada pada 
mekanisme sistem yang institusionalistik, bukan bertumpu pada kekuasaan 
induvidualistik, harus selalu dibuka ruang untuk melakukan kompetisi 
kekuasaan dengan perimbangan kekuasaan sebagai arena mengasah ide-
ide perbaikan kualitas bangsa dalam arti yang sesungguhnya. Pemahaman 
atas hal ini tidak hanya berlaku saat memandang kekuasaan dalam tatanan 
kenegaraan, melainkan juga harus terefleksikan dalam tubuh internal partai. 
6. Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa menyadari bahwa sebagai suatu bangsa 
pluralistik yang terdiri dari berbagai suku, agama dam ras, tatanan kehidupan 
bangsa Indonesia harus senantiasa berpijak pada nilai-nilai Ketuhanan Yang 
Maha Esa, kemanusiaan yang adil dan beradab, persatuan Indonesia, 
kerakyatan yang dipimpin oleh hikmat kebijaksanaan dal 
permusyawaratan/perwakilan dan keadilan bagi seluruh rakyat Indonesia. 
Penerapan nilai-nilai Pancasila tersebut haruslah dijiwai dengan sikap 
mengembangkan hubungan tali persaudaraan antar sesama yang terikat 
dengan ikatan keagamaan (ukhuwah diniyah), kebangsaan (ukhuwah 
wathoniyah), dan kemanusiaan (ukhuwah insaniyah), dengan selalu 
menjunjung tinggi semangat akomodatif, koperatif dan integratif, tanpa harus 
saling dipertentangkan antara sesuatu dengan yang lainnya. 
7. Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa bercirikan humanisme religius (insaniyah 
diniyah), amat peduli dengan nilai-nilai kemanusiaan yang agamis, yang 
berwawasan kebangsaan. Menjaga dan melestarikan tradisi yang baik serta 
mengambil hal-hal yang baru yang lebih baik untuk ditradisikan menjadi corak 
perjuangan yang ditempuh dengan cara-cara yang santun dan akhlak 
karimah. Partai adalah ladang persemaian untul mewujudkan masyarakat 
beradab yang dicitakan, serta menjadi sarana dan wahana sekaligus sebagai 
wadah kaderisasi kepemimpinan bangsa. Partai dalam posisi ini berkehendak 
untuk menyerap, menampung, merumuskan, menyampaikan dan 
memperjuangkan aspirasi rakyat guna menegakkan hak-hak rakyat dan 
menjamin pelaksanaan ketatanegaraan yang jujur, adil dan demokratis. 
8. Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa adalah partai terbuka dalam pengertian lintas 
agama, suku, ras, dan lintas golongan yang dimanifestasikan dalam bentuk 
visi, misi, program perjuangan, keanggotaan dan kepemimpinan. Partai 
Kebangkitan Bangsa bersifat independen dalam pengertian menolak segala 




Naskah Deklarasi PKB 




Bahwa cita-cita proklamasi kemerdekaan bangsa Indonesia adalah 
terwujudnya suatu bangsa yang merdeka, bersatu, adil dan makmur, serta 
untuk mewujudkan pemerintahan Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia yang 
melindungi segenap bangsa Indonesia dan untuk memajukan kesejahteraan 
umum, mencerdasan kehidupan bangsa, serta ikut melaksanakan ketertiban 
dunia yang berdasarkan kemerdekaan, perdamaian abadi dan keadilan 
sosial. 
 
Bahwa wujud dari bangsa yang dicita-citakan itu adalah masyarakat beradab 
dan sejahtera, yang mengejawantahkan nilai-nilai kejujuran, kebenaran, 
kesungguhan dan keterbukaan yang bersumber dari hati nurani; bisa 
dipercaya, setia dan tepat janji serta mampu memecahkan masalah sosial 
yang bertumpu pada kekuatan sendiri; bersikap dan bertindak adil dalam 
segala situasi; tolong menolong dalam kebajikan; serta konsisten 
menjalankan garis/ketentuan yang telah disepakati bersama. Bahwa dalam 
kurun tiga dasawarsa terakhir ini, perjuangan bangsa mencapai cita-cita 
tersebut terasa semakin jauh dari yang diharapkan. Pembangunan politik, 
ekonomi, sosial dan budaya telah mengabaikan faktor rakyat sebagai 
pemegang kedaulatan, pengingkaran terhadap nilai-nilai dan prinsip-prinsip 
tersebut telah melahirkan praktik kekuasaan tidak terbatas dan tidak 
terkendali, yang mengakibatkan kesengsaraan rakyat. 
 
Bahwa untuk mewujudkan nilai-nilai dan prinsip tersebut serta mencegah 
terulangnya kesalahan serupa di masa mendatang, diperlukan tatanan 
kehidupan bermasyarakat, berbangsa dan bernegara yang demokratis. Di 
dalam tatanan kehidupan yang demokratis itu warga Jam’iyah Nahdlatul 
Ulama sebagai bagian dari bangsa Indonesia bertekad untuk bersama 
komponen bangsa lain mewujudkan masyarakat Indonesia yang adil, 
makmur, berakhlak mulia dan bermartabat melalui suatu wadah partai politik. 
 
Maka dengan memohon rahmat, taufiq, hidayah, dan inayah Allah Swt, serta 
didorong oleh semangat keagamaan, kebangsaan dan demokrasi, kami 
warga Jam’iyah Nahdlatul Ulama dengan ini menyatakan berdirinya partai 
politik yang bersifat kejuangan, kebangsaan, terbuka dan demokratis yang 
diberi nama Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa. 
 
Jakarta, 29 R. Awwal 1419 H/23 July 1998 M 
 
Para Deklarator 
MUNASIR ALI    A. MUSTOFA BISRI 











Bahwa sesungguhnya Bangsa Indonesia telah melintasi gelombang pasang naik dan 
pasang surut, menghela beban berat penjajahan, penindasan dan pengkhianatan. 
Tahap demi tahap perjuangan panjang mengantarkan bangsa ini ke gerbang 
kemerdekaan dan kedaulatan, yang pada mulanya dicitakan untuk mewujudkan 
Negara yang melindungi segenap bangsa Indonesia dan seluruh tumpah darah 
Indonesia untuk memajukan kesejahteraan umum, mencerdaskan kehidupan 
bangsa, dan ikut melaksanakan ketertiban dunia yang berdasarkan kemerdekaan, 
perdamaian abadi dan keadilan sosial, sesuai dengan semangat Proklamasi 1945. 
Namun selama lima dekade berikutnya, garis sejarah itu mengalami berbagai 
penyimpangan, sehingga cita-cita besar bangsa menjadi kabur. 
 
Kejatuhan rejim Orde Lama, diikuti dengan keruntuhan rejim Orde Baru, merupakan 
tragedi yang seharusnya menyadarkan kembali bangsa ini akan cita-cita luhurnya 
semula. Seluruh kekuatan bangsa wajib bergandeng tangan dengan landasan 
persaudaraan, keadilan, dan berpacu dalam kebaikan, seraya meninggalkan 
permusuhan, kedhaliman, dan pertikaian antar kelompok. 
 
Gerakan mahasiswa, yang disokong penuh rakyat Indonesia, telah mengobarkan 
"Reformasi Mei 1998" sebagai peretas jalan bagi terbentuknya "Orde 
Reformasi";orde yang diikat dengan nilai-nilai fitri kemanusiaan berupa keimanan, 
moralitas, kemerdekaan, persamaan, kedamaian, dan keadilan. Berkat rahmat Allah 
SWT, kemudian dipicu semangat reformasi, tercetuslah momentum untuk 
membangun kembali negeri yang besar ini, dengan cara pandang yang benar dan 
meninggalkan segala bentuk kesalahan generasi terdahulu. Mari bersatu dalam 
kebenaran untuk mengisi lembaran sejarah baru agar bangsa Indonesia senantiasa 
berdiri tegak dan berperan serta dalam mewujudkan masyarakat international yang 
berperadaban. 
 
Kejayaan atau kehancuran suatu negeri merupakan buah dari kepatuhan atau 
keingkaran penduduknya terhadap nilai-nilai religius dan universal, terutama nilai 
keadilan. Pada titik ini fitrah insani bertemu dengan tuntutan reformasi dan peluang 
demokratisasi. Maka perjuangan menegakkan keadilan pun menjadi keharusan, 
sebagai manifestasi misi utama Islam untuk menjadi rahmat bagi seluruh alam.  
 
Demi mewujudkan cita-cita sejati Proklamasi, mengisi kemerdekaan, 
mempertahankan kedaulatan dan pe rsatuan, serta berbekal semangat reformasi 
dan dukungan umat dari berbagai daerah, kami selaku anak bangsa dengan ini 
mendeklarasikan berdirinya PARTAI KEADIL AN. 
 
Semoga Allah Yang Maha Kuasa membimbing dan memberi kekuatan untuk 
menegakkan keadilan, mewujudkan kesejahteraan dan kemakmuran bagi seluruh 
bangsa Indonesia. 
 




Dinyatakan di Jakarta 






Dr. M. Hidayat Nurwahid, M.A. 
Ketua 
 






Dr. Salim Segaf Aljufri, M.A. 
Dr. Mulyanto, M.Eng. 
Dr. Ir. H. Nur Mahmudi Isma'il, M.Sc. 
Drs. Abu Ridho, A.S. 
Mutammimul Ula, S.H. 
K.H. Abdul Hasib, Lc. 
Fahri Hamzah, S.E. 
Dr. Daud Rasyid Sitorus, M.A. 
Dr. Agus Nurhadi 
Igo Ilham, Ak. 
Chin Kun Min (al-Hafizh) 
Drs. Arifinto 
Nursanita Nasution, S.E., M.E. 
H. Rahmat Abdullah 
Dr. Ahmad Satori Ismail 
Ir. Untung Wahono 
Ir. Suswono 
Mashadi 
Dra. Sri Utami 
Nurmansyah Lubis, S.E., Ak., M.M. 
dr. Naharus Surur    
Drs. Muhroni 
Drs. H. Suharna S., M.S. 
H.M. Ihsan Arlansyah Tanjung 
H. Aus Hidayat 
Ir. H. Tifatul Sembiring 
Drs. Al Muzammil Yusuf 
Drs. Mukhlis Abdi 
Maddu Mallu, S.E., M.B.A. 
H.M. Nasir Zein, M.A. 
K.H. Acep Abdus Syakur 
Dr. Ahzami Samiun Jazuli, M.A. 
K.H. Yusuf Supendi, Lc. 
Hj. Yoyoh Yusroh 
M. Anis Matta, Lc. 
Ahmad Zainuddin, Lc. 
Dra. Zirlirosa Jamil 
Syamsul Balda, S.E., M.M. 
Habib Aboe Bakar Al-Habsyi 
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Sunmanjaya Rukmandis, S.H. 
Ahmad Heriawan, Lc. 
Drs. Erlangga Masdiana, M.Si. 
Didik Akhmadi, Ak. Mcom. 
K.H. Abdur Roqib, Lc. 
H. Abdullah Said Baharmus, Lc. 
Ahmad Hatta, M.A., Ph.D. 
Makmur Hasanuddin, M.A. 






PARTAI KEADILAN SEJAHTERA 






Bangsa Indonesia telah menjalani sebuah sejarah panjang yang sangat menentukan 
dalam waktu lebih dari lima dekade ini dengan sebuah perjuangan yang berat dan 
kritis. Setelah lepas dari penjajahan Belanda dan Jepang selama tiga setengah 
abad, Indonesia memproklamirkan kemerdekaannya pada tanggal 17 Agustus 1945.  
Kebangkitan ini berjalan hingga tahun 1959 ketika upaya untuk membangun bangsa 
yang demokratis dan sejahtera mengalami kebuntuan dengan dikeluarkannya Dekrit 
Presiden 5 Juli 1959 yang menandai awal diktaktorisme di Indonesia. Orde Baru 
muncul pada tahun 1966 tetapi ternyata hanya merupakan sebuah perpanjangan 
tangan kekuasaan militer yang benih-benihnya sudah mulai bersemi pada masa 
Orde Lama.  
 
Pada tanggal 21 Mei 1998 bangsa Indonesia mengukir kembali harapannya untuk 
hidup dalam suasana yang mampu memberi harapan ke depan dengan 
digulirkannya Reformasi Nasional yang didorong oleh perjuangan mahasiswa dan 
rakyat. Reformasi Nasional pada hakekatnya adalah sebuah kelanjutan dari upaya 
mencapai kemerdekaan, keadilan dan kesejahteraan bagi bangsa Indonesia dari 
perjuangan panjang yang telah ditempuh selama berabad-abad.  
 
Demokratisasi menjadi tulang punggung perjuangan tersebut yang mewadahi 
partisipasi masyarakat dalam keseluruhan aspeknya. Bertolak dari kesadaran 
tersebut, dibentuklah sebuah partai politik yang akan menjadi wahana dakwah untuk 
mewujudkan cita-cita universal dan menyalurkan aspirasi politik kaum muslimin 
khususnya beserta seluruh lapisan masyarakat Indonesia umumnya. Partai tersebut 
bernama Partai Keadilan Sejahtera. 
 
Semoga Allah SWT memberikan hidayah dan inayah-Nya kepada kita, mengikatkan 
hati diantara para pengikut agama-Nya dan menolong perjuangan mereka dimana 
pun mereka berada. Amin. 
Jakarta, 20 April 2002 
 
 










(Drs. Haryo Setyoko) 






DAFTAR NAMA PENDIRI  
PARTAI KEADILAN SEJAHTERA 
Abdullah  
Achyar Eldine, SE 
Ahmad Yani, Drs. 
Ahmadi Sukarno, Lc., MAg 
Ahzami Samiun Jazuli, MA, DR 
Ali Akhmadi, MA  
Arlin Salim, Ir 
Bali Pranowo, Drs 
Budi Setiadi, SKH 
Bukhori Yusuf , MA 
Eddy Zanur, Ir, MSAE 
Eman Sukirman, SE 
Ferry Noor, SSi 
H. Abdul Jabbar Madjid MA 
H.M Ridwan 
H.M. Nasir Zein, MA 
Harjani Hefni, Lc  
Haryo Setyoko, Drs 
Herawati Noor, Dra 
Herlini Amran, MA 
Imron Zabidi, Mphil 
Kaliman Iman Sasmitha 
M. Iskan Qolba Lubis, MA 




Mohammad Idris Abdus Somad, MA, DR 
Muhammad Aniq S, Lc. 
Muhammad Budi Setiawan, Drs 
Muslim Abdullah, MA 
Musoli, MSc, Drs 
Musyafa Ahmad Rahim, Lc 
Nizamuddin Hasan, Lc 
P. Edy Kuncoro, SE. Ak 
Ruly Tisnayuliansyah, Ir 
Rusdi Muchtar 
Sarah Handayani, SKM 
Susanti 
Suswono, Ir 
Syamsu Hilal, Ir 
Umar Salim Basalamah, SIP 
Usman Effendi, Drs 
Wahidah R Bulan, Dra 
Wirianingsih, Dra 
Yon Mahmudi, MA 
Yusuf Dardiri, Ir 
Zaenal Arifin  





The Central Managing Board of  
National Awakening Party (PKB) 






Ketua   :  K.H. Ma’ruf Amin 
Wakil Ketua  :  K.H. M. Cholil Bisri  
 
Sekretaris  :  K.H. M. Dawam Anwar 
Anggota  :  K.H. Dimyati Rais 
          K.H. Hasyim Latief 
          Dr K.H. Nahrawi A. Salam 
         K.H. M. Mukeri Gawith, MA 
         K.H. Yusuf Muhammad, MA 
         Brigjen TNI (Ret) Sullam Syamsun 
         Hj. Sariana Thaha Ma’ruf 




Ketua Umum  :  H. Matori Abdul Djalil 
Ketua   :  Dr. H. Alwi Shihab 
         Dra. Hj Umrah M Tolchah Mansoer 
         H. Agus Suflihat Mahmud 
          H. Amru Mu’tashim, SH 
         KH. Imam Buchari 
         Drs. Yafi Thahir 
         Dra. Khififah Indar Parawansa 
 
Sekertaris Jenderal  :  Drs. A. Muhaimin Iskandar 
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Wakil Sekjen  :  Drs. Amin Said Husni 
         H. Aris Azhari Siagian 
                 H. Yahya Cholil Staquf 
 
Bendahara  :  H. Imam Churmein 
Wakil Bendahara   :  H. Ali Mubarak 




The Central Managing Board of  
National Awakening Party (PKB)  




Dewan Syura   
 
Ketua   :  K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid 
Wakil Ketua  :  K.H. M. Cholil Bisri  
 
Sekretaris  :  H. Z. Arifin Junaidi 
Anggota  :  K.H. Dawam Anwar 
          K.H. Dimayati Rais 
         K.H. Yusuf Muhammad, MA 
         Najib Abdurrahman 
         Azidin 
   dr. Sugiat 
      TGH Turmudzi Badruddin 
      Habib Chirzin 
      Imam Mansyur Burhan 
      Prof. Jon Wumu 
      Kamaludin Lubis 
      Cholilul Rahman 
      K.H. Fuad Amin Imron 





Ketua Umum  :  H. Matori Abdul Djalil 
Ketua   :  Dr. H. Alwi Shihab 
         Dra. Hj Umrah M Tolchah Mansoer 
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         Taufikurrahman Saleh 
          Shofwan Chudori 
         Imam Mawardi Sanjaya 
         Lalu Misbah 
         Zainal Mahmud 
 
Sekertaris Jenderal  :  Drs. A. Muhaimin Iskandar 
Wakil Sekjen  :  H. Yahya Cholil Staquf 
               Drs. Amin Said Husni 
         Lilis Nurul Husna 
                 Chotibul Umam Wiranu 
 
Bendahara  :  Munif Basuni 
Wakil Bendahara   :  Nurdin Hasibuan 
              Nico Krisnanto 
      Erman Suparno   
 
 
Dewan Pertimbangan: K.H. Ilyas Ruchiyat 
      K.H. Munasir Ali 
      K.H. Muchit Muzadi 
      K.H. A. Mustofa Bisri 
      K.H. Ma’ruf Amin 
      Khofifah Indar Parawansa 
      Imam Churmein 
      Muhtar Muda Nasution 




The Central Managing Board  
National Awakening Party –Matori or Batu Tulis  




Dewan Syura   
 
Ketua   :  K.H. Dimyati Rais 
Wakil Ketua  :  K.H. Maksum Jauhari  
 
Sekretaris  :  Drs. K.H. Masyhuri Malik 
Wakil Sekretaris :  K.H. An’im Falahuddin Machrus 
Anggota  :  K.H. Mahfud Ridwan 
          Dr. K.H. Haib Wahab Hasbullah 
       Prof. Dr. K.H. Ahmadi Isa, MA 
         Drs. K.H.M Sholeh Harun 
         H. Mahyuddin Nawawi 
   K.H. Umar Anshori Khusnan 
      Drs. H. Imam Sofwan 
      H. Jacob Siga 
      H. Habib A.Gudban 
      H. Anshori Anwar 




Ketua Umum  :  H. Matori Abdul Djalil 
Ketua   :  K.H. Musthofa Qudbi Badri, MA 
         Drs. M. Anshori Ishak 
         Drs. H. Agus Suflihat Machmud 
          Dr. Nadiroh Suherland, M.Pd 
         Dr. H. Marwoto Mintohardjo, SE, MM 
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         H.M. Basuni BN 
         Daud Ali Lukman 
   Drs. Arvin Hakim Thoha 
   H. Irham Abdurrahim 
   H. Ibrahim Laconi, SH 
K.H. Syarif Utsman Yahya 
H. Tan Gatot Mahawisnu 
H. Daud Nadjuri, MBA 
Dra. Marhamah Mudjib 
Drs. Isa Muchsin 
H. Amru Almu’tashim, SH, MM 
Moh. Asyikin Kaharuddien, SmHK 
Drs. H. Ahmad Syatibi 
Ir. Yusuf Dali 
 
Sekertaris Jenderal  :  Drs. Abdul Khaliq Ahmad 
Wakil Sekjen  :  Francis Wanandi 
Suwanto DVM 
T. Aminova 
Drs. Roisuddin Ilyas 
Drs. Ridwan Balia 
Dra. Desriana Elfah 
N. Syamsuddin Ch. Haesy 
Sukarman Dj. Soemarno 
Jimmy Walewangko 
Drs. Wiwid Wizyanto 
                
Bendahara  :  Nico Cristanto 
Wakil Bendahara   :  Ade Kardiman 
              Baningsih Tedjo Kartono 
      Ir. M. Yazid Bustomi 




The Central Managing Board of  
National Awakening Party (PKB) – Gus Dur/Alwi or Kuningan  
Period of 2000-2005 
 
 
Dewan Syura   
 
Ketua   :  K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid 
Wakil Ketua  :  K.H. Moh. Cholil Bisri 
K.H. Idris Marzuki 
K.H. Irfan Zidni  
 
Sekretaris  :  H. Z. Arifin Junaidi 
Wakil Sekretaris :  K.H. Nurhadi Iskandar Albarsani 
      Drs. H. Habib Chirzin   
Anggota  :  K.H. Yusuf Muhammad, Lc 
K.H. Drs. M. Dawan Anwar 
Hj. Asmah Syahroni 
Dra. Hj Umrah M Tolchah Mansoer 
K.H. Ma’shum Jauhari 
TGH Turmudzi Badruddin 
K.H. R. Imang Mansur Burhan 
Saggaf Aljufri 
K.H. Mutawakil Alallah 
dr. Sugiat AS, SKM 
K.H. Ahmad Rawi 
K.H. Humaidi Dahlan 
K.H. Ahmad Shoddiq 
Prof. John Wumu, SE 
H.M. Rusli 
Pedande Puni Atmaja 






Ketua Umum  :  Dr. H. Alwi Shihab 
Wakil Ketua Umum :  Dr. H. Moh. Mahfid MD 
Ketua   :  Dr. H. Muhammad AS. Hikam, MA. APU 
Dr. H. Lalu Misbah Hidayat, SE, M.Si 
Drs. H. Ali Masykur Musa 
H. Taufikurrahman Saleh, SH. M.Si 
Arizna Agustina, SE 
H. Andy Muawiyah Ramly, M.Pd 
H. A. Muhaimin Iskandar, M.Si          
          
Sekertaris Jenderal  :  H. Saifullah Yusuf, S.Sos* 
Wakil Sekjen  :  H. Yahya Cholil Staquf 
Drs. Amin Said Husni  
Zunnatul Mafruhah, SH 
Hermawi Fransiskus Taslim, SH 
Dra. Hj. Gefarina Johan, MA 
Ahmad Anas Yahya 
Abdullah Azwar Anas, S.Pd 
 
Bendahara Umum :  H.A. Munif Basuni 
Bendahara    :  H. Ir. Erman Soeparno 
              H. Ali Mubarak 
Saleh Abdul Malik 
Bambang Sungkono 
Ir. Arya Witoelar 
Tony Wardoyo 
 
* Replaced by H. A. Muhaimin Iskandar, M.Si in 2004 
 
Dewan Pertimbangan: K.H. Ma’ruf Amin 
   K.H. Abdullah Faqih 
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K.H. Ilyas Ruchiyat 
      K.H. Muchit Muzadi 
K.H. A. Mustofa Bisri 
K.H. Abdullah Abbas 
K.H. Abdullah Schaal 
K.H. Zainuddin Jazuli 
K.H. Sullam Samsun 
Syekh Muchtar Muda Nasution 
Hj. Nur Zaenab 
K.H. Ahmad Sofyan 
K.H. Chotib Umar 




The Central Managing Board of  
National Awakening Party (PKB)-Semarang  




Dewan Syura   
 
Ketua Umum  :  K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid 
Ketua   :  H.Z. Arifin Junaidi 
  Drs. K.H. Hamdun Ahmad, M.Ag 
  dr. H. Sugiat Ahmad Sumadi, SKM 
  Prof. Drs. K.H. Cecep Syarifuddin, M.Pd 
  
Sekretaris  :  H. Muhyidin Arubusman 
Wakil Sekretaris         :  Dra. Hj. Badriyah Fayumi 
   Dra. Hj. Anisah Mahfudz 
Anggota                       :  TGH. Turmudzi Badruddin 
  Dr. K.H. Manarul Hidayat      
  Prof. H. John Wumu, S.E.     
  Ratu Krisna Bagus Oka 
  Dr. Nur Rofi’ah 
  Drs. H. Ali Hanafiyah 
  Drs. H. Ahmad Rawi 
  Drs. H. Amiruddin Nahrowi 
  Dra. Hj. Umi Chusnul Chotimah, MA 
  Buntoro 
  K.H. Muzakki 
  K.H. A. Razaq Safawi 
  H. M. Hasyim Karim 
  Drs. K.H. Dadang Za’im Affandi, M.Si 
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  K.H. Hanif Ismail, Lc 
  Hj. Salis Mahrus 
  Dr. K.H. A. Akrom Malibary, LAS, MA 
  Drs. K.H. Q. Ahmad Syahid 
  Hj. Ma’mullah Harun, M.Si 
  Drs. H. Mochamad Zein, M.B.A 
  H. Ishomuddin M. 
  K.H. Maman Imanulhaq Faqieh, MA 
  Sigid Haryo Wibisono, S.E 
  K.H. Nurbasyah Junaidi 
  Dr. Muslim Abdurrahman 





Ketua Umum  :  H. A. Muhaimin Iskandar, M.Si 
Wakil Ketua Umum    :  H. Ali Maskyur Musa, M.Si. 
  Dr. H. Lalu Misbah Hidayat, SE. M.Si. 
  Drs. H. Andi Muawiyah Ramly, M.Pd, Dipl.M 
  H. A. Effendy Choirie, M.Ag. M.H. 
  Hermawi Fransiskus Taslim, SH. 
  Dra. Hj. Maria Ulfah Anshor, M.A. 
  Muamir Mu’in Syam 
  Maria Pakpahan, M.A., M.Sc. 
  Dr. Moh. Mahfud MD 
  Drs. Hendi Kariawan, M.Sc. 
  Nursyahbani Katjasungkana, S.H 
  Drs. H. Ahmad Ni’am Salim 
  H. Abdul Kadir Karding, S.Pi 
   
Sekertaris Jenderal  :   Zannuba A.C. Wahid 
Wasekjen                    :   Ir. H. A. Helmy Faishal Zaini 
Dra. Hj. Ida Fauziyah 
Anak Agung Ngurah Agung, S.E. 
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Drs. Alexius Gregorius Plate 
Drs. H. Abdul Khobir 
Moch. Munib Huda 
Munyati Sullam, S.H. M.A 
H. Ikhsan Abdullah, S.H, M.H 
Abdul Muis, M.Si 
 
Bendahara Umum :  H. Aris Junadi, S.E 
Wakil Bendahara   :  H. Bachrudin Nashori, S.Si, MM 
              Drs. H. A. Nashihin, MBA, AAAIJ 





The Central Managing Board of  
National Awakening Party (PKB)-Ulama or Surabaya 





Ketua   : K.H. Abdurrahman Chudlori 
Wakil Ketua  : K.H. Ahmad Warson Munawwir 
K.H. Anwar Iskandar 
K.H. Chumaidi Dahlan, Lc. 
K.H. Ubaidillah Faqih 
K.H. M. Thohir Syarkawi 
 
Sekretaris  : Prof. Dr. H. Alwi Shihab 
Wakil Sekretaris : Drs. K.H. Ali As’ad 
K.H. Nur Muhammad Iskandar S.Q 
Hj. Mufidah Rozi Munir 
Anggota  : K.H. R. Muhammad Cholil As’ad 
K.H. Sholeh Qosim 
K.H. Hasan Amiruddin 
K.H. Muchtar Amin 
K.H. Machrus 
K.H. Abdul Haq 
K.H. Sulthon Daeng Rowa 
K.H. Amir Asyikin 
K.H. Abdul Latif Faqih 
K.H. Aniq Muhammadun 
K.H. Amin Siradj 
K.H. Habib Anis Al-Hinduwan 





Ketua Umum  : Drs. H. Choirul Anam 
Wakil Ketua Umum : Drs. H. Yahya Cholil Staquf 
Ketua   : Drs. H. Habib Syarif Muhammad 
H. Aris Azhari Siagian, SH 
R. Saleh Abdul Malik 
Drs. H. Fathurrosyid, M.Si 
Imam Anshori Saleh, Msi 
Dr. H. Heflin Frinces 
H. Rodjil Ghufron, SH 
Hj. Ariza Agustina, SE 
H. Mohamad Said 
M. Murhadi, M.Si 
Drs. H. Ahmad Taqiyuddin Mansur 
H. Ibrahim Tambaru, SH. MH 
 
Sekretaris Jenderal : H. Idham Cholied 
Wakil Sekjend  : Mohammad Tohadi, SH, M.Si 
Ir. Aria Witular 
Andi Najmi Fuadi, SH 
Drs. H. Nur Hasan, M.Si 
H. Syaifullah Adnawi, SH, MBA 
Drs. Muhammad AL Khadziq 
Ir. Galih Fachrudin Qurbany 
Dra. Hj. Ulha Soraya 
Imam Marsudi, M.Si 
Zainal Abidin Amir, SIP, S.Ag 
Drs. Syamsu Alam 
Ir. Riswan Muflihudin 
M. Ghozi Al-Fatih 
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 Bendahara  : Harry Danardoyo 
Wakil Bendahara : Dipo Nusantara Pua Upa, SH 
H.A. Faried Gafar, MBA 
Dra. Farichatul Aini, M.Si 
H. Saidul Khudri 
Drs. Erwan Cik Murod 
Bambang Sungkono 
H. Abdul Halim 






Ketua   : K.H. Abudllah Faqih 
Wakil Ketua  : K.H. Ma’ruf Amin 
Anggota  : K.H. A. Mustofa Bisri 
K.H. Idris Marzuki 
K.H. Muhaimin Gunardo 
K.H. Muhammad Mas Subadar 
K.H. Ahmad Basyir AS 
K.H. Manshur Sholeh 
K.H. Idris Abdul Hamid 
K.H. Ahmad Sufyan Miftahul Arifin 
K.H. Zainuddin Djazuli 
K.H. Abdul Djalil Ma’ruf 
K.H. Zainal Abidin Munawwir 
Habib Syaqaf Al-Jufri, MA 
K.H. Nurul Huda Djazuli 
K.H. Hasan Syarif 
K.H. Hasbullah Badawi 
K.H. Afif Astari 
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K.H. Khoiruddin Rais 
K.H. Abdurrahman 
K.H. A. Damiri 
K.H. Ahmad Basyir 
K.H. Abdul Azis Affandi 
K.H. Ahya Al-Anshori 
Hj. Nihayah Ahmad Siddiq 
Hj. Umroh Tolhah Mansur 







The Central Managing Board of  
National Awakening Party (PKB) -Parung  
Period of 2008-2010 
 
Dewan Syura   
 
Ketua Umum  :  K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid 
Ketua   :  H.Z. Arifin Junaidi 
  Drs. K.H. Hamdun Ahmad, M.Ag 
  dr. H. Sugiat Ahmad Sumadi, SKM 
  Prof. Drs. K.H. Cecep Syarifuddin, M.Pd  
Sekretaris  :  Drs. H. Muhyidin Arubusman 
Wakil Sekretaris         :  Dra. Hj. Badriyah Fayumi 
   Dra. Hj. Anisah Mahfudz 
Anggota                       :  TGH. Turmudzi Badruddin 
  Dr. K.H. Manarul Hidayat      
  Prof. H. John Wumu, S.E.     
  Ratu Krisna Bagus Oka 
  Dr. Nur Rofi’ah 
  Drs. H. Ali Hanafiyah 
  Drs. H. Ahmad Rawi 
  Drs. H. Amiruddin Nahrowi 
  Dra. Hj. Umi Chusnul Chotimah, MA 
  Buntoro 
  K.H. Muzakki 
  K.H. A. Razaq Safawi 
  H. M. Hasyim Karim 
  K.H. Dadang Za’im Affandi, Lc., M.Si 
  K.H. Hanif Ismail, Lc 
  Hj. Salis Mahrus 
  Dr. K.H. A. Akrom Malibari, LAS, MA 
  Drs. K.H. Q. Ahmad Syahid 
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  Hj. Ma’mullah Harun, M.Si 
  Drs. H. Mochamad Zein, M.B.A 
  H. Ishomuddin Muchtar 
  K.H. Maman Imanul Haq, MA 
  K.H. Nur Basar Juned 
  Dr. Moeslim Abdurrahman 
  K.H. Ubaidillah Syathori 
  K.H. Nadlir Muhammad 




Ketua Umum  :  DR. H. Ali Masykur Musa, M.Si 
Wakil Ketua Umum    :  DR. H. A. Effendy Choirie, M.Ag. M.H. 
  Dr. H. Lalu Misbah Hidayat, SE. M.Si. 
  Hermawi Fransiskus Taslim, SH. 
  Dra. Hj. Maria Ulfah Anshor, M.A. 
  Ir. Muamir Mu’in Syam 
  Dr. Maria Pakpahan, M.A., M.Sc. 
  Abdullah Azwar Anas, M.Si 
Sekertaris Jenderal  :   Zannuba Arifah Chafsoh, MPA 
Wasekjen                    :   H. Ikhsan Abdullah, SH, MH 
Munyati Sullam, S.H. M.A 
Anak Agung Ngurah Agung, S.E. 
Drs. Alexius Gregorius Plate 
Drs. H. Abdul Khobir 
Moch. Munib Huda 
Haryanto Ogie 
Abdul Muis, M.Si 
Bendahara Umum :  Choirul Sholeh Rosyid, SE 
Wakil Bendahara   :  Ali Mubarak, Amd. Par 
              Drs. H. A. Nashihin, MBA 
  Hj. Nur Hasanah AJ 
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Ketua : KH. Abd. Aziz Manshur 
Wakil Ketua   : KH. Mafudh Ridwan 
 : H. Muhyidin Arubusman 
 : KH. Ali Maschan Moesa 
 : KH. Munif Zuhri 
 : KH. Abd. Hayyi Na’im 
 : KH. Saifuddin Amsir 
 : KH. Abd. Aziz Afandi 
 
Sekretaris : H. Andi M Ramly 
Wakil Sekretaris : KH. Abd. Ghafur 
 : KH. Mufid Busyairi 
 : KH. Mujib Chudlori 
 
Anggota  : KH. Dimyati Rois 
 : KH. Subhan Ma’mun 
 : Hj. Nurhayati Said Aqil Siraj 
 : KH. Mukhlas Dimyati 
 : KH. Najib Abd. Qodir 
  : KH. Usfuri 
 : KH. Maman Imanul Haq 
 : Hj. Lily Rozi Munir 
 : Hj. Fatimah Toyyib 
  : Hj. Ida Kholidah Ilyas Rukhiyat 
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 : Hj. Peggy Patricia Pattipi 




Ketua  Umum : H. A. Muhaimin Iskandar 
Wakil Ketua Umum : Hj. Nursyahbani Katjasungkana 
Ketua  : H. Moh Lukman Edy 
 : H. A Helmi Faisal Zaini 
 : H. Abd. Kadir Karding 
 : H. Marwan Ja’far 
 : Muh. Hanif Dhakiri 
 : Hj. Ida Fauziyah 
 : Muamir Muin Syam 
 : H. Syaiful Bahri Anshori 
  : H. Ni’am Salim 
 : H. Saifullah Maksum  
 : Eko Putro S 
 : Hj. Anna Muawanah 
 : H. Abd. Wahid Maktub 
 : H. Agus Sulistiono 
 : Antonius Doni Dihen 
 : H. Yanuar Prihatin 
 : H. Amir Mahmud 
 : Marwan Dasopang 
 
Sekretaris Jenderal  : H. Imam Nahrawi 
Wakil Sekertaris  : Jazilul Fawaid 
 : H. Fathan Subchi 
 : H. M. Yusuf Mujenih 
 : H. Samsudin Pay 
 : Faisol Reza 
 : Luluk Nur Hamidah 
 : Anggia Ermarini 
 379
 : H. Zainal Arifin Na’im 
 : Chusnunnia 
 : Zainul Munasichin  
 : Margareth Aliyah 
 : H. Mohammad Munib Huda 
 
 
Bendahara Umum  : H. Bachrudin Nasori 
Wakil Bendahara : H. Arvin Hakim Thoha 
 : Daniel Johan 
 : Siti Mukarromah 
 : H. Arif Rahman 
 : Miranti Dewaningsih 
 : Bambang Susanto 
 : Dini Suhardiany 
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Majelis Pertimbangan Partai  
Ketua    : Dr. H.M Hidayat Nurwahid, MA 
Wakil Ketua  : Drs. H. Abu Ridho Abdi Sumaiti 
Sekretaris   : H. Luthfi Hasan Ishaaq, MA 
Anggota  : Drs. Arifinto 
     K.H Abdul Hasib 
     H. Abdul said Baharamus, Lc 
     Dr. Agus Nurhadi 
     Dr. H. Ahmad Satori Ismail, MA 
     Mashadi 
     H.M. Ihsan Arlansyah Tanjung 
     Drs. H. Suharna, MT  
 
Dewan Syari’ah  
Ketua    : Dr. H. Salim Segaf Aljufri, MA 
Wakil Ketua  : Dr. H. Daud Rasyid Sitorus, MA 
Ketua Pelaksana : H. Setiawan Budi Utomo, Lc, MM, MBA 
Sekretaris  : Imam Santoso, Lc 
Anggota  : H. Aunur Rafiq Saleh Tamhid, Lc 
     Dr. H. Muslih Abdul Karim, MA 
     K.H Yusuf Supendi, Lc 
     H. Buchari Yusuf, MA 
  H. Asnin Syafi’uddin, Lc 
  H. Ridwan Yahya 
  H. Thalhah Nuhin, Lc 
 
Dewan Pimpinan Pusat 
Presiden   : Dr. Ir. H. Nur Mahmudi Isma’il, MSc 
Wakil Presiden : H. Syamsul Balda, SE, MM, MBA, MSc 
Sekretaris Jenderal  : H.M. Anis Matta Lc. 
Wakil Sekjen   : Ir. H. Suswono, MMA. 
Bendahara Umum  : Nurmasyah Lubis, AK, MM  
Wakil Bendahara  : Edy Kuncoro 
 
Departemen Kaderisasi   
Ketua   : K.H Rahmat Abdullah 
Anggota  : Dr. H.Ahzami Samiun Jazuli, MA 
     Navis Murbianto 
     H. Abdul Muiz, Lc 
     H. Raihan A. Iskandar, Lc 
     Ir. Fajar Rahmat Saleh 
     Drs. D.H. Al Yusni 
     H. A. Madani, Lc 
     Drs. Mahfudz Sidik 
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     H. Muslim Abdullah, MA 
     Dra. Wiryaningsih 
     Hj. Herlini Amran, MA 
 
Departemen Riset dan Pengembangan   
Ketua   : Ir. H. Untung Wahono 
Anggota  : H Budi Darmawan 
     Hermanto, SE 
 
Departemen Pendidikan  
Ketua   : R.B. Suryama MS, Psy 
Anggota  : H. Fahmy Abdul Kadir Alaydrus, PSy 
     H. Abdul Jabbar, MA 
     Drs. H. M. Idris Abdussomad, MA 
 
Departemen Ekonomi   
Ketua   : Dr. H. Ahmad Hatta, MA 
Anggota  : Didik Ahmadi, Ak, MCom 
     Agus Puji Raharjo, SE, Ak 
       H. Maddu Mallu, MBA 
     Saymsul Falah, MSc 
     Ir. Eddy Zanur, MSAE 
     Ir. Ruly Tisna Yuliansa 
     Drs. Matri Agung 
 
Departemen Politik dan Hukum  
Ketua   : H. Mutamimul Ula, SH 
Anggota  : H. Amang Syafrudin, Lc 
     Fauzul A. Abror, SH 
  Drs. Al Muzzamil Yusuf 
     Iman Nugraha, SH 
 
Departemen Ilmu Pengetahuan, Teknologi dan Lingkungan Hidup   
Ketua   : Ir. M. Sohibul Iman, MEng 
Anggota  : Dr. Warsito, MEng 
     Ir. Budiarto, MEng 
     Ir. Purwadi, Meng 
 
Departemen Sosial dan Kesehatan   
Ketua   : dr. H. Naharus Surur 
Anggota  : drg. H. Hardiono, Sp.B.M 
     dr. Helda 
     Drs. Bali Pranowo 
     Ahmad Firman Yusuf 
     H. Burhanuddin, Lc 
    
Departemen Dakwah   
Ketua   : Drs. H. Mukhlis Abdi 
Anggota  : H.M. Nasir Zein, MA 
     Drs. H. Ahmad Yani 
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     H. A. Jazuli Juaini, Lc 
     Drs. Agus Wahid Rahman 
     Habibullah, Lc 
     Dra. Sitaresmi 
     Hj. Emma Ruchaema 
 
Departemen Pembinaan dan Pengembangan Wilayah   
Ketua   : H. Abdul Raqib, Lc 
Anggota  : H. Ahmad Chudori 
     H. Aus Hidayat Nur 
     Drs. Muhroni 
     Drs. Muhammad Syahfan 
     Drs. Chairul Anwar, Apt 
     H. Ahmad Zainuddin, Lc 
     Muhammad Ferous 
 
Departemen Seni dan Budaya   
Ketua   : Igo Ilham, Ak 
Anggota  : H. Muhammad Ridwan 
     Tri Aru Wiranto 
     Sidik Cahyo Kusumo 
     Zack Sorga 
     Halimi 
     Ahmad Mabruri 
     Barata, S.Si 
     Yose Rizal 
 
Departemen Kepeloporan Pemuda   
Ketua   : Mustafa Kamal 
Anggota  : Abdul Azis Muhtadi 
     Agus Priatna, SPd 
     Selamat Nurdin, SSos 
  Dwi Septiawati, SPd 
     Dra. Kingkin Anida 
 
Departemen Penerangan dan Humas 
Ketua   : Ir. H. Tifatul Sembiring 
Anggota  : H. Aboe Bakar Al Habsy 
     M. Lili Nur Aulia 
     Komaruddin 
     Reza Syarif, Dipl.Pn 
     H. Taufiq Kiemas 
     Hj. Pujiastitu, SH 
 
Departemen Kewanitaan   
Ketua   : Hj. Yoyoh Yusroh 
Anggota  : Dra. Zirly Rosa Jamil 
     Dra. Hj. Siti Zainab 
     Dra. Sri Utami 
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Ketua   : K.H. Hilmi Aminuddin 
 
Majelis Pertimbangan Partai  
Ketua    : K.H. Rahmat Abdullah  
Anggota  : Drs. H. Abu Ridho Abdi Sumaiti 
  Drs. H. Arifinto 
  Mashadi 
  Drs. Mukhroni 
     H. Abdul Said Baharamus, Lc 
     Drs. HM Muhammad Yusuf 
     Hj. Yoyoh Yusroh 
     H. Tb. Soenmandjaja 
     H. Maddu Mallu, SE, MM 
     Dra. Hj. Aan Rohana  
 
Dewan Syari’ah  
Ketua    : Dr. H. Salim Segaf Aljufri, MA 
Anggota  : K.H Syauqi, Lc 
  H. Aunur Rafiq Saleh Tamhid, Lc 
     Dr. H. Muslih Abdul Karim, MA 
     K.H Yusuf Supendi, Lc 
     H. Buchari Yusuf, MA 
  Imam Santoso, Lc  
  H. Bakrun Syafi’i,MA 
  K.H. Tadjuddin Noor 
  H. Raqib Abdul Kadir, Lc 
 
Dewan Pimpinan Pusat 
Presiden   : Dr. H.M Hidayat Nur Wahid  
Wakil Ketua Umum : Dr. H. Surahman Hidyat  
                                      Drs. H. Almuzammil Yusuf 
 
Sekertaris Jenderal : H.M. Anis Matta, Lc 
Wakil Sekjen   : Ir. H. Suswono, MMA. 
     Riko Desendra, S.Si 
     H. Fahri Hamzah, SE 
     H. Abu Bakar Al Habsyi 
     Drs. Haryo Setyoko 
 
Bendahara Umum  : H. Luthfi Hassan Ishaaq, MA  
Wakil Bendum  : Edy Kuncoro,AK 
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     Irsyal Ismail, AK 
     H.Mahfudz Abdurrahman, SE 
 
Ketua Wilayah Dakwah I  : Ir. H. Tifatul sembiring 
Ketua Wilayah Dakwah II  : H. Aus Hidayat  
Ketua Wilayah Dakwah III  : Ahmad Firman Yusuf 
Ketua Wilayah Dakwah IV  : Ahmad Zainuddin, Lc 
 
Ketua Lajnah Pemenangan Pemilu : M. Razikun, Msi, Ak 
Ketua Biro Luar Negeri  : Dipl. Eng. H. Priyatna Suryawijaya 
Ketua Bidang Pembinaan Kader : H. Abdul Hasib Jassan, Lc 
Ketua Departemen Kaderisasi : Drs. H. Mahfudz Siddiq, M.Si 
Ketua Departemen Dakwah  : Drs. H. Ahmad Yani 
Ketua Dep. Kepeloporan Pemuda : Mustafa Kamal, SS 
Ketua Dep. Olahraga dan Kepanduan : Ir. Ahmad Faradis 
Ketua Bid. Pembinaan SDM  : Drs. H. Suharna Surapranata, MT 
Ketua Dep. Pembinaan Organisasi : H. Budi Dharmawan 
Ketua Departemen Pendidikan : Drs. H. Musholli 
Ketua Dep. Kesehatan dan Sosial : Drs. H. Agus Kushartoro 
Ketua Dep. Iptek dan LH  : Dipl. Eng. Agung Hardianto 
Ketua Bidang Kebijakan Publik : Dr. H. Iwan Prayitno 
Ketua Dep. Politik dan Hankam : Ir. H. Untung Wahono, M.Si 
Ketua Departemen Hukum dan HAM: H. Mutamimul Ula, SH 
Ketua Dep. Komunikasi dan Jaringan: RB Suryama Psi 
Ketua Departemen Seni dan Budaya : H. Muhammad Ridwan 
Ketua Bidang Kewanitaan  : Hj. Nursanita Nasution 
Ketua Dep. Pemberdayaan Wanita : Hj. Herlini Amran, MA 
Ketua Dep. Jaringan Lembaga Wanita: Dra. Sri Utami, MM 
Ketua Dep. Pembinaan Keluarga : Dra. Hj. Wirianingsih 
Ketua Bidang Ekonomi  : Didik Ahmadi, AK, M.Com 
Ketua Dep. Pemberdayaan Ekonomi : Ir. H. Rulli Tisna Yuliansa 
Ketua Dep. Kebijakan Ekonomi : Dr. Zulkiflimansyah 
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Majelis Syuro  
Ketua    :K.H. Hilmi Aminuddin.  
 
Badan Pertimbangan Tugas dan Jabatan : ex officio 
Ketua    : Drs. H. Suharna Supranata, MT.  
 
Badan Penegak Disiplin Organisasi : ex officio 
Ketua    : H. Luthfi Hasan Ishaq, MA 
 
Dewan Pimpinan Pusat 
Presiden Partai  : Ir. H. Tifatul Sembiring 
Sekretaris Jenderal  : H.M. Anis Matta Lc. 
Wakil Sekjen I  : Ir. H. Suswono, MMA. 
Wakil Sekjen II  : Ir. Ade Barkah 
Wakil Sekjen III  : Ir. Aboe Bakar Alhabsy 
Wakil Sekjen IV  : Dr. Mardani 
Wakil Sekjen V  : H. Fahri Hamzah, SE. 
Wakil Sekjen VI  : Nurhasan Zaidi, S.Sos.I 
Wakil Sekjen VII  : Riko Desendra : SSI. 
Bendahara Umum  : H. Mahfud Abdurrahman 
Bendahara I   : P. Edy Kuncoro 
Bendahara II   : Masfuri, Ak. 
Bendahara III   : Taruna Wiyasa 
Bendahara IV   : H. Kiemas Taufik 
Bendahara V   : H. Didin Amaruddin, Ak.  
 
Bidang Pembinaan Kader   : Ahmad Zainuddin, Lc 
Departemen Kaderisasi   : Abdul Muiz, MA 
Departemen Dakwah    : Thahhah Nuhin, Lc. 
Departemen MDI    : Samin Barkah, Lc 
Bidang Pembinaan Wilayah   : H. Aus Hidayat Nur 
Departemen Wilda Sumbagut  : Drs. Chairul Anwar, Apt. 
Departemen Wilda Sumbagsel  : Drs. M. Syahfan Badri  
Dep. Wilda Banten, Jakarta, Jabar  : Ir. Syamsu Hilal 
Dep. Wilda Jateng dan Jogjakarta  : Zubeir Syafawi, SH.I 
Departemen Wilda Jatim dan Bali  : Ir. Sigit Sosiantomo 
Departemen Wilda Kalimantan  : Abdurrohman Amin 
Dep. Wilda Maluku, Malut, Irian  : Ahmad Zaki, Ak. 
Departemen Wilda Sulawesi   : Drs. Cahyadi Takariawan, Apt. 
Departemen Wilda NTB, NTT  : Triono, SH. 
 
Bidang Kewanitaan    : Ledia Hanifa, MS 
 386
Departemen Kajian Wanita   : dra. Sri Utami, MM 
Dep. Jaringan Lembaga Wanita  : Netti Prasetyani 
Departemen Pemberdayaan Wanita  : Dwi Septiawati 
Bidang Kesejahteraan Rakyat  : drs. H. Musholi 
Departemen Pendidikan dan SDM  : drs. Fahmi Alaydroes, Psi, MM, Med. 
Departemen Kesehatan dan Sosial  : dr. H. Agoes Koos Hartoro 
Departemen Kemahasiswaan   : Ahmad Ariyandra, Ak. 
Departemen Seni dan Budaya  : H. M. Ridwan 
Bidang Polhukam    : Ir. H. Untung Wahono, Msi. 
Departemen Politik dan Hankam  : drs. H. Almuzammil Yusuf 
Departemen Hukum dan HAM  : Fitra Arsil, SH, MH. 
Departemen Pemerintahan dan Otda  : Achyar Eldine, SE,MM 
Bidang Euintek   : DR. Mohammad Sohibul Iman 
Dep.Ekonomi, Keuangan, Perbankan : Sigit Pramono, SE,MSE. 
Departemen Pembinaan UKM  : Ir. H. Ruly Tisna Yuliansyah  
Departemen Teknologi, Industri, LH : DR. Edi Syukur 
Departemen Buruh Tani, Nelayan  : Edy Zannur, MSAE. 
Bidang Pembinaan Pemuda   : Ir. Ahmad Faradis 
Departemen Kepeloporan Pemuda : Slamet Nurdin 
Departemen Kepanduan   : Cahya Zailani 
Departemen Olahraga   : Unggul Wibawa 
Badan-Badan di Bawah DPP  
Badan Pemenangan Pemilu    : H.M. Razikun, Ak, MS. 
Badan Legislatif     : Hermanto, SE, MM. 
Badan Litbang     : drs. H. Mahfudz Siddiq, MSE. 
Badan Hubungan Luar Negeri  : H. Lutfi Hasan Ishaq, MA 
 
Dewan Syariah Pusat  
Ketua    : Dr. H. Surahman Hidayat 
Amin Maktab   : H. Bukhari Yusuf, MA. 
Amin Mali   : H. Kastiri 
Laznah Qadha :  
Amin Lajnah    : drs. Muhroni 
Anggota   : DR.H. Muslih A. Karim  
      Dr. H. Mu’inuddin 
  H. Abdul Hasyib Hasan, Lc  
  H. Amang Syarifuddin, Lc, Msi 
Lajnah Tahqiq : 
Koordinator   : H. Iskan Qolban Lubis, MA 
Anggota   : DR. H. Idris Abdu Shamad   
  H. Aunurafiq Saleh Tamhid, Lc  
  Hj. Herlini Amran, MA  
  Dra. Suzy Mardiani 
Lajnah Ifta  
Amin Lajnah   : Harjani Hefni, MA 
Anggota   : Dr. H. Muslih Abdul Karim  
  Dr. H. Muiduddin  
  H. Abdul Hasib Hasan  
  Lc, H. Abdul Aziz Arbi, MA  




Amin Lajnah   : H. Abdul Raqib, Lc 
Anggota   : A. Zairofi, Lc,  
                                      drs. H. Amad Yani 
Staf Sekretariat/Teknologi Informasi : Ridho Kurniawan 
 
Majelis Pertimbangan Pusat  
Ketua    : Drs. H. Suharna Surya Pranata, MT. 
Sekretaris   : Drs H. Arifinto 
Komisi Organisasi dan Kewilayahan 
Ketua    : Ir. Memed Sosiawan 
Anggota   : Najib Subroto, SE, H. Refrizal 
Komisi Pembinaan Kader dan Kewanitaan  
Ketua    : Drs. H. Abdi Sumaithi 
Anggota   : Mustafa Kamal 
     Hj. Aan Rohana, Mag  
     H. Yoyoh Yusroh, Sag. 
Komisi Kebijakan Publik  
Ketua      : H. TB. Sunmandjaja 
Anggota   : Hj.Nursanita Nasution, SE, ME  
     Didik Akhmadi, Ak.,M.Com.  
     Mutammimul Ula, SH. 
Komisi Kajian Strategis  
Ketua    : H. Ahmad Firman Yusuf 
Anggota   : H. Suripto, SH,  
  H. Ahmad Relyadi. 
Dewan Pakar 




The Table of Score of the Candidate of Major for Depok  
 
No Name Marketable Acceptable Leadership Experience Understanding 
Depok 
Scoring Total
 Significance 0.3 0.25 0.2 0.15 0.1      
 Scoring 4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1  
1 Dr. Nur Mahmudi Ismail 14 5 0 1 12 6 1 1 9 7 2 0 15 3 2 1 1 4 12 3      
  17 4.5 0 0.3 12 4.5 0.5 0.3 7.2 4.2 0.8 0 9 1.4 0.6 0.2 0.4 1.2 2.4 0.3 45.4 15.8 4.3 1 66.45
2 Amang Syafrudin 7 8 5 0 7 8 5 1 1 6 9 5 3 8 6 3 8 10 2 1      
  8.4 7.2 3 0 7 6 2.5 0.3 0.8 3.6 3.6 1 1.8 3.6 1.8 0.5 3.2 3 0.4 0.1 21.2 23.4 11.3 1.8 57.7 
3 Saleh Martapermana 2 8 8 2 2 2 10 6 1 2 9 8 3 7 7 4 10 5 3 3      
  2.4 7.2 4.8 0.6 2 1.5 5 1.5 0.8 1.2 3.6 1.6 1.8 3.2 2.1 0.6 4 1.5 0.6 0.3 11 14.6 16.1 4.6 46.25
4 Yunus Daud 0 2 8 10 0 3 8 9 2 4 9 5 0 6 8 6 1 4 8 7      
  0 1.8 4.8 3 0 2.3 4 2.3 1.6 2.4 3.6 1 0 2.7 2.4 0.9 0.4 1.2 1.6 0.7 2 10.4 16.4 7.85 36.6 
5 Muslih Abd. Karim 8 6 6 1 7 5 8 1 2 3 11 5 0 5 14 2 1 8 10 2      
  9.6 5.4 3.6 0.3 7 3.8 4 0.3 1.6 1.8 4.4 1 0 2.3 4.2 0.3 0.4 2.4 2 0.2 18.6 15.6 18.2 2.05 54.45
6 Musholli 3 5 8 3 3 6 9 2 5 5 7 3 3 8 6 2 3 3 12 2      
  3.6 4.5 4.8 0.9 3 4.5 4.5 0.5 4 3 2.8 0.6 1.8 3.6 1.8 0.3 1.2 0.9 2.4 0.2 13.6 16.5 16.3 2.5 48.9 
7 Bahrun Syah 0 4 14 2 1 4 14 1 2 5 11 3 1 8 10 1 1 6 13 1      
  0 3.6 8.4 0.6 1 3 7 0.3 1.6 3 4.4 0.6 0.6 3.6 3 0.2 0.4 1.8 2.6 1 3.6 15 25.4 1.7 45.7 
8 Abd. Muaz 1 7 10 3 0 7 10 3 0 3 12 6 0 7 10 4 3 9 9 1      
  1.2 6.3 6 0.9 0 5.3 5 0.8 0 1.8 4.8 1.2 0 3.2 3 0.6 1.2 27 1.8 0.1 2.4 19.2 20.6 3.55 45.75
9 Ihsan Tanjung 6 9 4 2 5 5 9 2 2 5 8 5 1 4 10 5 0 2 14 6      
  7.2 8.1 2.4 0.6 5 3.8 4.5 0.5 1.6 3 3.2 1 0.6 1.8 3 0.8 0 0.6 2.8 0.6 14.4 17.3 15.9 3.45 51 
10 Dr. Prihandoko 0 4 12 5 2 3 12 3 4 10 6 1 2 7 9 3 0 4 9 8      
  0 3.6 7.2 1.5 2 2.3 6 0.8 3.2 6 2.4 0.2 1.2 3.2 2.7 0.5 0 1.2 1.8 0.8 6.4 16.2 20.1 3.7 46.4 
     
 
Sources:  Data Pilkada Center, in Amri Yusra, Mekanisme Partai Politik dalam Pencalonan Kepala Daerah: Studi Kasus Partai Keadilan Sejahtera dalam Pilkada Depok 2005, Master 






Ahlu al-halli wa al-'aqdi: A group of Islamic scholars or experts that has a power to 
decide the grand design of party’s political agendas and policies. 
Ahlu sunnah wal jamaah: group of Muslims that understands and practices Islam 
and the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad by following the path, rule, method or 
tradition which had been established by the jamaah, namely first the generation of 
the Prophet Muhammad’s close-friends (sahabah and tabiin) to the next generations 
of the followers, represented by the ulama.(Aswaja) 
Al-Qur’an: Muslim Holy book. 
Anggaran Dasar and Anggaran Rumah Tangga: The Statutes and Rules of 
Association of a Party (AD/ART) or party’s constitution.  
Aqidah: Faith. 
Badan Kehormatan: Council of Honour.  
Badan Pekerja: Executive Committee. 
Badan Penegak Disiplin Organisation: Board for Organisational Discipline 
Enforcement. A body that was established to be in charge of disciplinary matters and 
to control the commitment of the cadres in implementing the party’s mission including 
the shared values. 
Barisan Penyadar PSII: Self-Realisation Front of PSII.  
Berjamaah: to gather together.  
Dakwah: Islamic Predication or propagation.  
Daurah:  Training. 
Demokrasi Terpimpin: Guided Democracy. An era of authoritarian government 
(1959-1965), led by the President Soekarno, who believes in the unique type of 
Indonesian democracy. 
Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia: Indonesian Council for Islamic Predication 
(DDII). An Islamic missionary organisation founded in 1967 by Mohammad Natsir, a 
former leader of Masyumi. 
Dewan Muhtasyar: Advisory Council 
Dewan Syura: Consultative Board  
Dewan Syuriah: Consultative Board  
Dewan Tanfidz: Executive Board 
Dewan Tanfidziyah: Executive Board  
Fikrah: Idea, thought. 
Fiqh: System of Jurisprudence  
Forum Kader Peduli: The Care Cadre Forum (FKP). A group that was set up by ex-
PKS’ cadres as a informal medium to criticize the existence of the party and mainly 
its leader. 
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Forum Langitan: A forum of very special and senior NU’s Islamic scholars led 
Abdullah Faqih by that usually takes place in the Pesantern Langitan, Tuban City, 
East Java Province.  
Garda Bangsa: Nation Guard. A semi military organization and subpart of PKB.  
Gerakan Pemuda Anshor: Youth Movement of Anshor (GP Anshor).  
Gerakan Tarbiyah: Education Movement, a movement which flourishes in 1980s 
mainly in campus mosques and becomes an embryo of PKS. 
Golkar: Golongan Karya. (Functional Group). A political party founded by the regime 
of Soeharto. 
Hadith:  the saying of the Prophet Muhammad. 
Halaqah: Circle or Development Unit. An obligation activity for PKS’ cadres, 
conducted in a small group with around 5-12 members. 
Hizbut Tahrir: A trans-national movement, founded by Taqiyyuddin al-Nabhani in 
Jordan which has promoted the establishment of an international caliph. 
Ijtihad: interpretation through reasoning. 
Ikhwan Muslimin: The Muslim Brothers founded by Hasan al-Banna in Egypt in 
1928.  
Imam: Leader. 
Islah: Reconciliation or peaceful settlement of conflict. 
Jamiyah: Organization or association. 
Jaring Capres Emas: Golden President Candidate Selection (Jaring Emas). A 
selection method for president candidate set up by PKS prior to the 2004 President 
Election. 
Jemaah/Jamaah: Group or Congregation. 
Jundiyah: Soldier or Follower.  
Kader inti: Main Cadres.  
Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia: Indonesian Muslim Student Action 
Union. An extra campus organization founded by activist of Jemaah Tarbiyah in 
secular campuses in 1998. 
Komite Pembela Kebenaran PSII: The Defence Committee of Truth for PSII 
Korwil: Area Coordinator. A party’s apparatus which its main function is to 
coordinate several managing boards at the village level. 
Kyai: Muslim Cleric 
Mabda Siyasi: Political Principles  
Mabit: Night activity to improve spiritual capacity 
Mahkamah Agung: Supreme Court (MA) 
Majelis Syura: Consultative Assembly or Consultative Council 
Masura: Majelis Silaturahmi Ulama Rakyat (the Assembly of Peoples’ Islamic 
Scholar Meeting). A forum established by Wahid and his followers to challenge the 
existence of several very-seniors Ulama who are mainly the members of the Langitan 
Forum.  
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Masyumi, Partai Politik Islam: Majlis Syura Muslimin Indonesia (Consultative 
Assembly of Indonesian Muslim), Islamic Political Party. The largest Indonesia 
Islamic political party (1945-960), established by several important Islamic 
organizations, including NU and Muhammadiyah, in Yogyakarta in 1945.  
Mazhab: School of Islamic jurisprudential thought. 
Mihwar: Stage. 
Moderen: Modern. It refers to a modernist Muslim group. 
Modernist Islam: A reformed wing of Islam that has attempted to remove local and 
historical beliefs from the Islamic orthodoxy unique to Indonesia; and concerned with 
the purification of Islamic teachings.  
Muffaraqah: definitely ending the relationship with the opponent. 
Muhammadiyah: A modernist group association influenced by the ideas of 
Muhammad Abduh in Egypt founded in 1912.  
Mukernas: Musyawarah Kerja Nasional (National Working Conference). 
Muktamar: Conference. 
Munas: Musyawarah Nasional (National Conference). 
Murabbi: Teacher, mentor. 
Muspim: Musyawarah Pimpinan (the Conference of the Heads).  
Musyarakah: Political participation or Cooperation.  
Musyawarah: Consultation. 
Mutarabbi: Pupil or student. 
Nahdlatul Ulama: Awakening of Islamic Scholars. An Islamic organisation 
associated to traditionalist group founded in 1926 in Surabaya to counter increasing 
modernist influence and to defend the interest of traditional/orthodox Muslims. 
Pancasila: The Five state-endorsed principles. The principles are: belief in one God, 
nationalism, humanitarianism, democracy and social justice. 
Parmusi: Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Muslims Party), formed in 1968 by 
government approval to represent modernist Islamic interest. 
Partai Dakwah: Dakwah Party. A party that is fulfilled mainly by the spirit to 
propagate Islamic teachings to every single Muslim, entire society and the state.  
Partai Islam Indonesia: Indonesian Islamic Party. A party founded by Sukiman, one 
of ex SI leaders. 
Partai Kader: Cadre Party. A party that believe in the quality of the cadres rather 
than their quantity. 
Partai Keadilan: Justice Party. A party established by members of Jemaah Tarbiyah 
in 1998 and changed its name into Partai Keadilan Sejahtera or (Prosperous Justice 
Party/PKS) in 2002. 
Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Parmusi): Indonesia Muslims’ Party. The party aimed 
to continue the struggle of Masyumi after it failed to be revived. 
Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia: Party of Indonesia Islamic Association. A Muslim 
trader based association became the first political medium for indigenous Muslims 
and Indonesian in general. 
Pengkaderan Formal Dasar: Basic Formal Cadrerization. 
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Pengkaderan Formal Kejuruan: Vocational Formal Cadrerization. 
Perti: Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah (Islamic Education Association). Traditionalist 
organisation based in West Sumatra.  
Pesantren: Ulama led Islamic boarding school.   
Pragmatisme: the Indonesian term for ‘self-seeking behaviour’ – quite different from 
the common English usage for ‘pragmatism’.  
Qiyadah: The Leaders.  
Rapat Gabungan: Join session. 
Rapat Pleno: Plenary Meeting.  
Rihlah: Physical activity or Recreation. 
Santri: Devout Muslim or (Kyai’s) disciples.  
Sarekat Dagang Islam: (Islamic Commerce Association). An organization of 
Javanese batik traders founded by Samanhudi in 1905. 
Sya’bi: Society, community or socialisation. 
Syariah: Islamic Law. 
Syura: Consultation. 
SI-Merah: the Red SI. A faction inside Sarekat Islam (Islamic Association) with the 
Marxist orientation  
SI-Putih: the White SI. A non-Communist camp inside Sarekat Islam (Islamic 
Association) led by Agus Salim, Abdoel Moeis and Soerjopranoto.  
Ta’aruf: Introduction or knowing each other. 
Ta’at: Obedience. 
Tafahum: Mutual understanding. 
Tafakul: Assistance, insurance or helping each other. 
Taklim Rutin Mingguan: Weekly Routine Meeting. 
Tanzim: Organisation. 
Tarbiyah: Education or training model of Jemaah Tarbiyah in disseminating its ideas 
developed by Egyptian Ikhwan Muslimin and adopted by Jemaah Tarbiyah activist as 
cadrerization system in PKS.  
Tawhid: Theology of the oneness of God. 
Tim Sebelas an independent committee (that consisted of 11 members) that held a 
series of verification, for mainly examining and stipulating the eligibility of the parties 
to join the 1999 election. This effort was important since not all parties were actually 
ready to join the election. 
Tim Tiga: Team of Three. A team that was established by DPP of PKB to confirm 
negative rumours, involving Party’s General Secretary Syaifulah Yusuf. The 
members of this team are Prof. M Mahfud MD, Dr. A.S Hikam and Nur Iskandar Al-
Barsany.  
Tsiqoh: Trust. 
Ulama Khos: Very senior or special Islamic Scholars.  
Ulama: Islamic scholars, jurists.  
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Ummah: Society, community and nation. 
Usrah: Family, Group or Cell System. 







A. Primary Sources 
 
1. Interview with National Awakening Party Leaders and Cadres. 
 
Interview with Abdul Khalik Ahmad, Secretary of PKB Faction in DPR RI (1999-2001) 
and General Secretary of PKB- Jalil (2000-2005), in Jakarta, 11 October 2010.  
 
Interview with Agus Suflihat, Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz PKB (1998-2001) and 
the Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz PKB (1998-2001), via telephone, Jakarta-
Bandung, 11 October 2010.  
 
Interview with Ahmad Shodiq Noor, General Secretary of DKI Jakarta DPW of PKB, 
in Jakarta, 3 November 2010. 
 
Interview with Dr. Ali Masykur Musa, Vice Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz PKB (2005-
2010) and The General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz PKB-Versi Parung (2008-
2009), in Jakarta, 19 October 2010. 
 
Interview with Anas Nashikin, General Secretary of Garda Bangsa, one of PKB’s 
onderbows, in Jakarta, 26 October 2010.  
 
Interview with Andi M. Ramly, Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz (2002-2010), Secretary 
of Dewan Syuro “PKB- Muhaimin” (2008-2010) and the writer of “Mabda Syiyasi 
PKB”, in Jakarta, 15 October 2010. 
 
Interview with Choirul Anam, Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz of Eastern Java DPW of 
PKB (1998-2005) and the General Chairperson of DT of “PKB-Alwi” (2005-2007), in 
Jakarta, 13 October 2010. 
 
Interview with Dr. Kamarudin, Islamic Political Party Observer, Lecture at Department 
of Political Sciences, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, 
in Depok, 7 October 2010. 
 
Interview with H.Z Arifin Junaidi, General Secretary of Dewan Syuro of PKB (2002-
2005) and Chairperson of Dewan Syuor of PKB (2005-2010), in Jakarta, 28 October 
2010. 
 
Interview with Ida Fauziyah, Member of Parliament of PKB (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 
14 October 2010. 
 
Interview with K.H A. Damanhuri, Chairperson of Dewan Syuro of Depok DPD of 
PKB (2002-2004), Member of Parliament of DPRD of Depok (2004-2009), in Depok, 
31 October 2010. 
 
Interview with Khofifah Indar Parawansa, State Minister for Women Empowerment 
(1999-2001), Chairperson of the Institute for Election Winning of PKB (2002-2005), in 
Jakarta, 20 October 2010. 
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Interview with Marinah Hardy, Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz of Western Nusa 
Tenggara DPW of PKB (2002-2005), in Jakarta, 28 October 2010. 
 
Interview with Muamir M. Syam, Chairperson of PKB (2005-2010), in Jakarta, 20 
October 2010. 
 
Interview with Prof. Dr. Kacung Marijan, NU policies’ observer and former member of 
Assistance Team of the proposal for the establishment of PKB (Rembang version), in 
Jakarta, 26 November 2010. 
 
Interview with Zannuba Ariffah “Yenny” Wahid, General Secretary of Dewan Tanfidz 
PKB-Wahid (2008-2010), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010.  
 
Interview with Tohadi, Member of PKB (1998-2005) and Vice Chairperson of PKNU 
DPP, in Jakarta, 6 October 2010. 
 
Interview with Yahya Cholil Staquf, Vice of General Secretary of PKB (1998-2005) 
and President Abdurrahman Wahid Spokesperson (2001), in Rembang, 11 
November 2010. 
 
Interview with Imam Nahrowi, General Chairperson of East Java DPW of PKB and 
Member of Parliament (2009-2014), in Jakarta, 25 October 2010. 
 
Interview with Khatibul Umam Wiranu, Vice General Secretary of PKB (1999-2005), 
and Member of Parliament (1998-2004), in Depok, 17 October 2010. 
 
Interview with Dr. A. Effendy Choirie, Member of Parliament from PKB (1998-2011) 
and The Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz PKB-Versi Parung (2008-2009), in Jakarta, 
19 October 2010. 
 
Interview with Abdul Muhaimin Iskandar, General Secretary of PKB (2000-2002), 
Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz (2002-2005), General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz 
(2005-2013) and Minister of Man Power and Transmigartion, in Jakarta, 13 October 
2010.  
 
Interview with Munib Huda Abdullah, Vice General Secretary of PKB (2008-2010) 
Abdurrahman Wahid personal’s Secretary, in Jakarta, 26 October 2010. 
 
Interview with A. Mustafa Bisri, One of PKB’s Founding Fathers, in Rembang, 11 
November 2010.  
 
  
2. Interview with Prosperous Justice Party Leaders and Cadres. 
 
Interview with Ahmad Feri Firman Yusuf, the Head of the III Dakwah Region (2002-
2005), member of Majelis Syuro PKS (2002-2010), in Jakarta, 2 November 2010. 
 
Interview with Akmal Burhanuddin, former tarbiyah activist and student in Egypt who 
joined PKS after finishing his study, in Jakarta, 24 October 2010. 
 
Interview with Amri Yusra, M.Si, Chairperson of Depok DPD of PKS (2002-2004), 
Member of Parliament of Depok District, West Java, (2004-2009), and Lecturer at 
Political Sciences Department, Faculty of Social and Political Science, University of 
Indonesia, in Depok, 7 October 2010. 
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Interview with Aus Hidayat Nur, Head of the II Dakwah Region (2002-2005) and the 
Chairperson of BPDO (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 15 October 2010. 
 
Interview with Dr. Kamarudin, Indonesian Islamic political party expert and Lecturer 
at Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University 
of Indonesia, in Depok, 7 October 2010. 
 
Interview with Dr. Prihandoko, Chairperson of Depok DPP of PKS (2004-2007) in 
Depok, 5 October 2010. 
 
Interview with Dr. Yon Mahmudi, PKS and Tarbiyah Movement observer, Lecturer at 
Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of 
Indonesia, and one of the cadres who signed PKS establishment declaration, in 
Depok, 6 October 2010. 
 
Interview with Hidayat, MM, Member of Parliament of Tangerang District (2005-
2010), in Tangerang, 21 October 2010.  
 
Interview with K.H Yusuf Supendi Lc, Member of DSP of PKS (2000-2005) and 
Member of Parliament (2004-2009), in Jakarta, 3 November 2010. 
 
Interview with Kemal A. Stamboel, Head of Expert Advisory Body of PKS and 
Member of Parliament (2009-2014), in Jakarta, 8 October 2010. 
 
Interview with Mahfudz Siddiq, Head of Cadrerization Department of DPP of PKS 
(2002-2005) and Member of Parliament (2004-2014), in Jakarta, 27 October 2010. 
 
Interview with Musa Abdillah, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Kelapa 
Dua DPC of PKS, in Jakarta, 23 October 2010. 
 
Interview with Mustofa, cadre of PKS and former reporter of Profetik Magazine, 
established by cadres of PKS, in Depok, 7 October 2010. 
 
Interview with Nooryanto, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Bekasi DPD of 
PKS, in Bekasi, 7 November 2010. 
 
Interview with Selamat Nurdin, MM, former tarbiyah activist leader in University of 
Indonesia, Member of Parliament of DKI Jakarta Province (2004-20014), in Jakarta, 
22 October 2010. 
 
Interview with Sigit Sosiantomo, Regional Coordinator for East Java and Bali of PKS 
(2005-2009), in Jakarta, 25 October 2010.  
 
Interview with Sitaresmi S, M.Psy, Member of Dakwah Department of DPP of PK 
(2000-2003), in Jakarta, 8 October 2010.  
 
Interview with Umar Salim Basalamah, Vice General Secretary of PKS (2002), and 
personal secretary of Hidayat Nur Wahid (former President of PKS and Chairperson 
of MPR of Republic of Indonesia), in Jakarta, 12 October 2010. 
 
Interview with Untung Wahono, Head of Department of Research and Development 
of DPP of PK (2000-2003), Head of Department of Politics and Defence of DPP of 




Interview with Dr. Mardani Ali Sera, Vice Chairperson of MPP PKS (2010-2015), in 
Jakarta, 6 October 2010. 
 
Interview with Hurriyah MA, cadrerization of PKS observer and Lecturer at Political 
Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of 
Indonesia, in Depok, 29 October 2010. 
 
Interview with Noviyanti Utaminingsing, cadre of PKS, in Jakarta, 9 October 2010. 
 
 
I also conducted several interviews with other members of the National Awakening 
Party and the Prosperous Justice Party but for some reason they did not want their 
name to be cited in this thesis. 
 
 
2.  Official Documentations 
 
2.1. The National Awakening Party (PKB) 
 
“Berita Acara Muktamar Luar Biasa Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa”, in Laporan Lengkap 
Muktamar Luar Biasa Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa. Hotel Mercure Ancol, 
Jakarta, 2-4 Mei 2008, (Jakarta: Dewan Pengurus Pusat Partai Kebangkitan 
Bangsa, 2008). 
 
“Berita Acara tentang Upaya Penyelesaian Perselisihan Politik Partai Kebangkitan 
Bangsa oleh Tim Utusan Muktamar Luar Biasa untuk Upaya Penyelesaian 
Perselisihan Politik PKB melalui Mekanisme Musyawarah”, in Dewan 
Pengurus Pusat Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, Laporan Lengkap Muktamar 
Luar Biasa Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, Hotel Mercure Ancol, Jakarta 2-4 
May 2008. 
 
 “Laporan Pelaksanaan Kebijakan-Kebijakan DPP PKB Masa Bakti 1998-2000” in  
Dokumen Muktamar I PKB. Membangun Persaudaraan Sejati Antar Manusia 
Sebagai Esensi Rekonsiliasi Nasional, (Jakarta: DPP PKB, 2000). 
 
“Laporan Pertanggungawaban Dewan Pengurus Pusat Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa 
2005-2008. Menyelamatkan Partai dan Konsolidasi Politik Menjelang 2009 
dalam Dewan Pengurus Pusat Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, Laporan Lengkap 
Muktamar Luar Biasa Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, Hotel Mercure Ancol, 
Jakarta 2-4 May 2008.  
 
“Laporan Pertanggungjawaban Dewan Pengurus Pusat Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa 
Masa Bakti 2002-2005”, in Membangun Demokrasi Berbasis Tradisi: 
Ketetapan-Ketetapan Muktamar II Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa  Tanggal 1-2 
Oktober 2005 di Surabaya, (Jakarta, DPP PKB, 2005). 
  
 “Laporan Pertanggungjawaban Ketua Umum Dewan Pengurus Pusat Partai 
Kebangkitan Bangsa”, presented in Muktamar Luar Biasa Partai Kebangkitan 
Bangsa, Jakarta, Hotel Borobudur, 14-16 January 2002, (DPW PKB Popinsi 
Bengkulu, 2002). 
 
“Perjalanan Muktamar Luar Biasa Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa. Jakarta, 2-4 ei 2008”. 
Dewan Pengurus Pusat Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, Laporan Lengkap 
Muktamar Luar Biasa Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, Hotel Mercure Ancol, 
Jakarta 2-4 May 2008. 
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“Pidato Pertanggungjawaban Dewan Pengurus Pusat Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, 
Masa Bakti 1998-2000” in Dokumen Muktamar I PKB. Membangun 
Persaudaraan Sejati Antar Manusia Sebagai Esensi Rekonsiliasi Nasional, 
(Jakarta: DPP PKB, 2000). 
 
“Rekrutmen Caleg”, in PKB dalam Pemilu 2004, (Jakarta: DPP PKB). 
 
“Sistem Kaderisasi PKB”, in Dokumen Muktamar I PKB. “Membangun Persaudaraan 
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Dewan Pengurus Pusat PKB, 2000).  
 
Anam, Choirul, “PKB tanpa Kiyai, A-Historis”, in Membangun Demokrasi Berbasis 
Tradisi: Ketetapan-Ketetapan Muktamar II Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa  
Tanggal 1-2 October 2005 di Surabaya, (Jakarta, DPP PKB, 2005). 
 
Decree No: 3/MLB/PKB/V/2008 on Tim Utusan Muktamar Luar Biasa untuk 
Penyelesaian Perselisihan Politik PKB melalui Musyawarah (the Envoy Team 
of Special Conference for the Political Conflict Resolution through 
Consultation). 
 
Decree No: 5/MLB/PKB/V/2008 on Penolakan Laporan Pertangungjawaban Ketua 
Umum Dewan Syuro PKB Periode 2005-2010 (The Rejection of The Report 
of General Chairperson of Syuro Board. 2005-2010 Period). 
 
Dokumentasi Hasil Mukatamar II Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, Semarang , 16-19 April 
(Jakarta: DPP PKB, 2005). 
 
DPP PKB, “Membangun Politik Rahmatan Lil’Alamin: Hasil-Hasil Musyawarah Kerja 
Nasional I PKB dan Silaturahmi Alim Ulama” (Jakarta: DPP PKB, 1999). 
 
DPW PKB Jawa Timur, Data dan Fakta Pelanggaran AD/ART di Muktamar II 
Semarang, (DPW PKB Jawa Timur, 2005). 
 
Laporan Pertanggungjawaban Ketua Umum Dewan Pengurus Pusat Partai 
Kebangkitan Bangsa, presented in Muktamar Luar Biasa Partai Kebangkitan 
Bangsa, Jakarta, Hotel Borobudur, 14-16 January 2002.  
 
Menggerakan Roda Partai da Perubahan Sosial di Tingkat Basis. Modul Pendidikan 
Dasar Politik Tingkat Anak Cabang Sistem Kaderisasi Partai Kebangkitan 
Bangsa, (Jakarta: DPP PKB, 2000).  
 
Menjadi Politisi Negarawan. Modul Pelatihan dan Orientasi Politik DPC-DPW PKB 
Modul Orientasi Ideologi DPP PKB, (Jakarta: DPP PKB, 2000).  
 
Menjadi Politisi Organiser Masyarakat. Panduan Pendidikan Kader Basis Partai 
Kebangkitan Bangsa, (Jakarta: Lembaga Kaderisasi dan Pendidikan Politik, 
2003).  
 
Menumbuhkan Kader Bangsa. Investasi Politik Bersama Rakyat. Kosepsi Dasar dan 
Metodologi Sistem Kaderisasi Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, (Jakarta: DPP 
PKB, 2000). 
 
The 1998 Anggaran Dasar (AD) of PKB.  
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The 1998 Anggaran Rumah Tangga (ART) of PKB.  
 
The 2000 Anggaran Dasar (AD) of PKB.  
 
The 2000 Anggaran Rumah Tangga (ART) of PKB.  
 
The 2002 Anggaran Dasar (AD) of PKB.  
 
The 2002 Anggaran Rumah Tangga (ART) of PKB.  
 
The 2005 Anggaran Dasar (AD) of PKB.  
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The Anggaran Dasar (AD) of Partai Kebangkitan Nahdlatul Ulama (PKNU). 
 
The Anggaran Rumah Tangga (ART) of Partai Kebangkitan Nahdlatul Ulama 
(PKNU). 
 
Wahid, Abdurrahman, “Sambutan Pembukaan Muktamar Luar Biasa PKB di 
Yogyakarta 17-19 January 2002”, in Dewan Pengurus Pusat Partai 
Kebangkitan Bangsa, AD/ART Anggaran Dasar dan Anggaran Rumah 
Tangga Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, (Jakarta: Sekretariat DPP PKB, 2002). 
 
 
2.2. The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) 
 
“Kebijakan Dasar PK“, in Buku Anggaran Dasar Partai Keadilan, (Depok: Dewan 
Pimpinan Daerah Partai Keadilan Kota Depok). 
 
Bayan DPP Partai Keadilan Sejahtera No. 02/BYN/DPP-PKS/VII/1425 tentang Sikap 
Politik Mendukung Pasangan SBY-JK pada Pemilihan Umum Presiden dan 
Wakil Presiden Putaran Kedua. 
 
Bayan of PKS, 6 Februari 2008. 
 
Bidang Kewanitaan Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Rakornas 
Bidang Kewanitaan Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, (Jakarta: 2001). 
 
Buku AD/RT PK Masa Bhakti 2000-2005, (Depok, DPD Partai Keadilan).  
 
Departemen Kaderisasi Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Manajemen Tarbiyah Anggota 
Pemula, (Bandung: Penerbit Asy-Syaamil, 2004). 
 
Departemen Kaderisasi Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Manhaj Kaderisasi Anggota Partai 
Keadilan, unpublished, (Jakarta: Departemen Kaderisasi Partai Keadilan 
Sejaktera).  
 
Departemen Kaderisasi Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Sekilas tentang Sistem Kaderisasi 
Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, unpublished, (Jakarta: Departemen Kaderisasi 
Partai Keadilan Sejaktera, 2004).  
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2005). 
 
Tim DPP Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Seri Manhaj Tarbiyah. Manajemen Tarbiyah 
Anggota Pemula (Jakarta: DPP PK Sejahtera dan PT Syaamil Cipta Media, 
2004).  
 
Tim Kerja Penyusunan Kurikulum, Satuan Acara Pembelajaran Tarbiyah Islamiyah: 
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